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RELIGION

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AŚVAMEDHA AND PURUȘAMEDHA IN ANCIENT INDIA

Nicolas Wyatt

The Aśvamedha is examined, and its double nature noted—a combination of sacrificial and hierogamic rites of cosmogony. Its relationship with the Puruṣamedha is examined, and it is proposed that the latter was no mere 'theoretical rite' as widely supposed, but predated the former, and was transformed into it following the Āryan settlement in India, as a second function adaptation of a first function rite appropriate to military expansion.

The horse-sacrifice (aśvamedha) was the most elaborate of the rites of the ancient Āryan Indians: in its fully developed form, attested as late as the 10th century CE, it took years of preparation and exhausted the resources of entire kingdoms. It was in essence a cosmogonic rite, corresponding in purpose to the human sacrifice (puruṣamedha) which may have been performed before the settlement of the Āryans, and which probably inspired the hymn of Primal Man in RV 10. 90. As we shall see, the very historical existence of this rite has been doubted, and we shall deal with this matter below. By extension, since military conquest itself was a type of cosmogony—delivering new territory to the victors¹—it was seen as an appropriate rite to mark a military triumph. To perform the aśvamedha became a spectacular demonstration of a king's power.²

The procedure for the performance of the rite ran as follows: a horse was chosen from the royal herd. It was bathed in a pool, and a dog, called rather mysteriously 'four-eyed', 3 was killed and pushed underneath it as it stood in the water. The reason for this was apotropaic: the dog functioned as a scapegoat, carrying away in its own body the evil powers which might otherwise affect the horse, thus guaranteeing its ritual purity. The purified horse was then set free and allowed to wander at will for a year, attended and guarded by one hundred princes, one hundred nobles with swords, one hundred sons of heralds and charioteers bearing quivers and arrows, and one hundred sons of attendants and charioteers bearing staves. Apart from the participation of large numbers for ceremonial reasons, this elaborate guard served a practical purpose: meticulous performance of the rite was essential to its efficacy, and SB 5. 4. 21f. mentions two instances in which the whole

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rite had to be abandoned after the horse had been stolen by a rival tribe. The purpose of the wandering of the horse was the definition of territory: an epic passage speaks of 'the [sacrificial] steed, having wandered over the whole earth bounded by the ocean'. This is the language of cosmic kingship we meet for example in the Psalms:6 just as a king circumambulates his territory and thus defines it, either by a royal progress or in mimetic fashion in rites, so here the horse, a transfunctional symbol of royal, military and economic power, the sacred animal of the sun which bestrides the cosmos,7 acts as an extension of his power. This definition of territory not only established legal rights of tenure, but actualised the territory in the cosmogonic sense, causing it to be. After a year, the horse was prepared for sacrifice. Before it was killed-a matter of timing which is disputed—it was used in a mimed hieros gamos. The wife of the clan chief was made to lie down with the horse, and the officiating priests recited various obscene remarks, intended to promote the fertility of the simulated intercourse. There is no evidence that an act of bestiality actually took place. 8 SB 13. 1. 9. 99 observes that 'a hero was born to him who sacrificed with the aśvamedha', which suggests that the rite as a whole may have had further connections with royal succession. The killing of the horse then took place, accompanied by the immolation of enormous numbers of other victims, including quite possibly a number of human ones.

The fixing of the performance at the time of the Spring equinox indicates its connection with the New Year. ¹⁰ This itself provides circumstantial evidence for the cosmogonic nature of the rite. This is further borne out by such passages as KYV/TS 7. 5. 25, \$B 10. 6. 4. 1 and Brh U 1. 1, which treat the horse as microcosmic, along the same lines as the Man is treated in RV 10. 90 and AV 10. 2. In the sacrificial context this means that the ritual treatment of the victim is a transformation of it into the correspondences: that is, the world is made in the rite. There is considerable support for the view that sacrifice was an important figure for cosmogony in early Indian thought. At the same time, it is curious to find the aśvamedha combining two quite distinct images of cosmogony (that is, sacrifice and the hieros gamos), and the question arises as to whether one or the other is secondary. There are reasons for supposing this to be the case, the sacrifice having been grafted on to an older hierogamic rite.

J. Puhvel refers to a hieros gamos as the 'mythical underpinnings' of the aśvamedha.¹¹ He notes that in Celtic tradition there is clear evidence for a rite involving a man of the second function with a transfunctional goddess, whom he associates with Sarasvatī in the Indian tradition. The following narrative is of particular interest in view of his further discussion of possible near eastern influence in the Vedic context:

There are some things which, if the exigencies of my account did not demand it, shame would discountenance their being described. But the austere discipline of history spares neither truth nor modesty.

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There is in the northern and further part of Ulster, namely in Kenelcunill, a certain people which is accustomed to appoint its king with a rite altogether outlandish and abominable. When the whole people of that land has been gathered together in one place, a white mare is brought forward into the middle of the assembly. He who is to be inaugurated, not as a chief, but as a beast, not as a king, but as an outlaw, has bestial intercourse with her before all, professing himself to be a beast also. The mare is then killed immediately, cut up in pieces, and boiled in water. A bath is prepared for the man afterwards in the same water. He sits in the bath surrounded by all his people, and all, he and they, eat of the meat of the mare which is brought to them. He quaffs and drinks of the broth in which he is bathed, not in any cup, or using his hand, but just dipping his mouth into it round about him. When this unrighteous rite has been carried out, his kingship and dominion have been conferred. 12

The relationship here—of king and mare—is the mirror of that attested in the aśvamedha context-of queen and stallion-and Puhvel suggests that this transformation was the result of contact with near eastern and Aegean tradition, where the latter pattern was prevalent.¹³ This is open to doubt, since the most obvious near eastern examples, albeit all susceptible of an originally Semitic provenance,14 are all Greek in form: Europa and the bull/eagle, Pasiphae and the bull, Leda and the swan. The male partner in each instance is Zeus, although here too near eastern gods undoubtedly underlie his forms. In the case of Europa, for instance, if we accept Astour's identification of her as a goddess of the setting sun, then her marriage partner might be construed variously as the Semitic moon-god or as Venus (the Semitic god cAttar, who as the apotheosis of kingship would indeed perform the ritual hieros gamos with her, though she was his own mother¹⁵). Nor should the human status of the female be stressed, since not only were her antecedents in any case divine, but the very distinction of divine and human in such prototypical and ideological materials is a concern more of modern analysis than of the ancient tradition. On the other hand, we have clearly non-Indo-European forms of the counter, where it is the female who is animal: such are the encounter of Bacal and the heifer in Ugaritic mythology, 16 and of Sin and the heifer in Babylonian (originally Sumerian?) mythology. 17 The neat cultural divide cannot therefore be pressed, and Puhvel's assessment of the aśvamedha as 'a halfway house of transformation' is unnecessary. If there is a rationale to the shift from one form (male human/anthropomorphic god and female animal) to the other or vice versa, I suggest that it is the result of local theological and other factors rather than broader trends which we have seen to be reversible. In the Indian case, the probability that the aśvamedha is ultimately derived from an earlier puruṣamedha (see below) must have been a contributory element, and another was undoubtedly the motif of men as the 'solar race', that is, as children of a solar deity who in India was male (Sūrya, Savitr, and others), but in the Semitic world was

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originally female. ¹⁸ The animal partner seems to have been of the same sex as the local solar deity.

The ancient motif of fertility is preserved in the aśvamedha not only in the survival of the hierogamic dimension, but also in the list of recipients of the blessing accruing, which are classified by function in ŚB 13. 1. 9. 1–10. ¹⁹ The list is as follows:

- (1) Brahman
- (2) Rājanya
- (3) Milch cow
- (4) Ox
- (5) Horse
- (6) Woman
- (7) Warrior(8) Youth
- (9) Male offspring
 - (10) Rain
 - (11) Plentiful ripe fruit
 - (12) Peaceful enjoyment (Eggeling: security of possession).
- G. Dumézil has devoted an important study to this passage, ²⁰ but in my view misconstrues the role of the second figure as second function. This leads him to need his mention here and again as the seventh figure. Since the latter is agreed to raise a problem, we may solve it most simply by transferring the seventh figure to third place, recognising in the second the second element of the first function of sovereignty. We thus have the blessings classified as follows:

First function: 1 and 2 (priest and king)

Second function: 7 (> '3') (warrior) Third function: 3, 4, 5 (stock)


6, 8, 9 (people)

10, 11 (ecology, agriculture)

General summary: 12

The final element is not just a summary of the benefits to the third function, but represents in nuce the overall benefits to the cosmos of the successful performance of the rite. A plausible reason for the disruption to the tradition that has taken place is twofold: first, that the third function order was perhaps originally people, stock and agriculture in the context of the puruṣamedha, subsequently modified in the incorporation into the later aśvamedha rite, with the original third item being inadvertently moved to seventh place; second, that as its usage in RV 10. 90. 5 testifies, there was indeed a shift in the meaning of the term rājanya, so that it became a synonym of kṣatriya. In our further discussion, we shall see that the milieu of the aśvamedha is perhaps the context in which the shift takes place, for the rite seems to lie in its final form midway between the interests of the first two functions.

Arguing that an older mythical structure has been lost in the evolution of the aśvamedha, Puhvel suggests that the older mythology (sc. of king and mare) may be discerned in the Saranyū mythology.²² This is concerned with the first generations of mankind. We may represent its relationships in genealogical form:



Vivasvat, at once a solar god, an Aditya, and a mortal, is a first man who is the father of other 'first man' figures, Yama (with his twin Yamī) and Manu, and is in every respect a royal figure: he himself is both god and man; his offspring are royal (Yama becomes king and god of the dead. Manu king and god of the living); he marries within the first function (Saranyū is of this rank as sister to the Brahman Triśiras) connected with sovereignty; his role as Aditya confirms this, as does his traditional authorship of the Dharmaśāstra (while Manu is credited with the Mānavaśāstra) for the giving and maintenance of law is a royal function. While as archetypal figures all these 'first men' are royal, the triplication of the origin of man within one tradition can only seriously be understood as an allusion to the three functions, all having an equally illustrious origin (the complex myth thus serving among other things to legitimate the three functions in their own eyes).23

The point of immediate interest to us is Saranyū's transformation into a mare. It is in his hieros gamos with her that Vivasvat becomes a stallion (i.e. subsequently to her transformation, so that when the act is on the point of consummation we have exactly the situation as preserved in the Irish version cited above). Interestingly, this does not square with our principle stated above that the animal partner's sex is determined by the sex of the solar deity: it is Vivasvat who is specifically solar. However, the equine form of his wife itself has solar overtones, as do the Aśvins born of this third marriage of the same couple. There is even reason to think that the Vedic sun-goddess Sūryā was originally of greater importance than later, perhaps to the point of being the solar deity, accompanied in her chariot by the Aśvins as attendants. If this is so, then we can see preserved in the marriage

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of Vivasvat and Saraṇyū the event giving rise to the apotheosis of the former by virtue of his union with the latter, which perhaps contributed to the change of sex of the deity, the aśvamedha rite reflecting the now completed process. That is, the transformation can be explained without necessary recourse to outside influence.²⁴

If the hieros gamos was originally the main significance of the rite, as has been suggested.²⁵ then the question arises as to how and why the sacrificial element became attached to it, to the point of becoming the climax to the whole affair, N. N. Bhattacharya draws attention to such passages as Brh U 6. 1. 13, 6. 4. 3, 6, 7, Chand U 2. 1. 3 and 5. 8. 1, 2, which equate sexual intercourse with sacrifice. 26 But even here there is no obvious connection between fecundation and killing, and it is reasonable to suppose that the link is already established before such passages draw on it. In consideration of an answer to this problem, we need to treat the problem of the relation of the burusamedha to the aśvamedha. As we have noted, a similar symbolic application of both the equine and human victims in cosmological terms appears in Vedic texts, suggesting an intimate connection between them.²⁷ But Eggeling considered the *burusamedha* to be a comparatively late development from aspects of the aśvamedha.²⁸ He pointed to the lateness in terms of the growth of the RgVeda of allusions to it, there being none outside Mandala 10, with only RV 10. 90 dealing with it in extenso. This seems to have been the consensus until quite recently, as noted by Puhvel, who himself remarks that it was 'a somewhat unreal appendage to the horse sacrifice, almost a theoretical afterthought . . . The historical puruşamedha was thus at best obsolete, at worst unreal.'29 The final remark is interesting, as providing a chink in the armour. W. Kirfel considers there to have been a purușamedha as a special form of the hieros gamos when a king was unable to perform it himself.30 He argues that the hierogamic scene in the aśvamedha took place after the horse had been killed, and notes that after death by strangulation there is often tumescence and emission of semen, so that in a human counterpart a child could indeed be fathered. 31 At the same time, the purușamedha was not, in Kirfel's view, an original Indo-European rite, but one grafted onto the old Indo-European horse-rite within India. But since the human sacrificial motif is itself widespread in Indo-European culture, 32 this seems implausible. In fact, the Vedic evidence for the aśvamedha is itself comparatively late, being alluded to only twice in the RgVeda in the late Mandala 1 (hymns 162, 163).33 Bhattacharya argues for the historical incidence and priority of the purusamedha, and reconstructs the following development: 'the union of the principle queen with the dead horse (sic), the earliest elaborate description of which is found in the Brāhmaņa literature, is a relic, or rather a transformation, of an older ritual in which a man, evidently a

a priest, had to play the part of the horse and after his ceremonial intercourse with the queen, he was put to death.'³⁴ If this reconstruction is plausible, then we have an explanation of the connection between the *hieros gamos* and the death of the queen's partner, which would readily be interpreted in sacrificial terms. The horse was a later substitute for the man.

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Bhattacharya gives examples of the ritual killing of kings in the mediaeval period after reigns of five or twelve years, 35 which is not entirely convincing, since not only do they post-date the supposed replacement of the human by the equine victim, but also have no necessary connection with the hieros gamos. But his allusion to RV 10. 95 is another matter. This hymn is the earliest of several versions of the myth of Purūravas and Urvasī. The later versions, from as early as SB, depart from the meaning of the original, which has been most successfully treated by D. D. Kosambi. 36 The Revedic hymn is in the form of a dialogue between Purūravas, who is a man, and the goddess Urvaśī. In the final verse (18) he is referred to as mrtyubandhuh (lit. 'deathbound'), which means more than 'mortal', but alludes to his forthcoming sacrificial death (perhaps by strangulation: the means of death of first function victims;³⁷ at the least it is an allusion to his binding to the sacrificial stake $[y\bar{u}pa]^{38}$). His forthcoming death is anticipated by Purūravas in his plaintive request in v. 12 concerning his unborn son, and by Urvaśī in her assurance in v. 15 that he will not die, reminiscent of the language addressed to the horse in RV 1. 162. 21.39 The ritual background to the dialogue is apparently a hieros gamos to be followed immediately by the immolation of the male partner. This seems to be so close a parallel to the asvamedha and to the circumstantial evidence linking an original purusamedha to it that in my view it is the direct evidence for which we have been looking. There are further interesting possibilities too. The meaning of the name Purūravas has not been adequately explained. I propose that it is a combination of pur, 'great', 'honourable', 'prominent', with ūrava < ūru, 'loin', 'thigh', giving the epithetal 'great loins'. This seems an entirely appropriate title for the male partner in a hieros gamos, and may be compared with the titles (not personal names) David—'lover'—and Cain (qayin)—'begetter'—used of two biblical examples of the genre. 41 Kosambi has looked in more detail at Urvaśī, and found that she is a form of the goddess Uşas, who was wife, sister and even mother to the sun-god. 42 Perhaps she was originally the sun deity herself, 43 an early form of Sūryā.

It may be objected that the text of RV 10. 95 is scarcely of sufficient clarity to bear this interpretation. But this is precisely the quality of many Rgvedic hymns, which obviously did not need to explain rites familiar to their celebrants, but could simply allude to the mythical dimension in this allusive fashion. What is striking about RV 10. 95 is its very explicitness, suggesting that it is a myth now divorced from actual ritual performance.⁴⁴

Besides, the presence of a 'commentary' (Bhattacharya's expression) 45 on the hymn in $\hat{S}B$ is sufficient evidence of its ritual significance.

We are now perhaps in a position to suggest an answer to the question of the amalgamation of hierogamic and sacrificial elements in the aśvamedha. We have all the necessary ideological framework to make a case. There is no reason to think of an increasing humanitarianism in the change from the earlier purusamedha, since human sacrifice is attested much later, 46 and the list of offerings in the mass-sacrifices envisaged by ŚB47 selects various classes of criminals for the provision of victims, which is in keeping with what is known of human sacrifices, for instance, in ancient Rome or among the Vikings. A better explanation for the transformation of the human into the equine rite, in so far as the latter appears to have displaced the former as the centre of ideological attention, lies in the functional symbolism of the victims. A man replaced by a horse suggests a first function rite being gradually appropriated within the second function, as perhaps an original hieros gamos, relating to questions of sovereignty, is slowly transformed into the alternative image of cosmogony effected by sacrifice, still in general a first function concern, but one increasingly of interest to a military caste that is, the second function—charged with the task of expanding boundaries and maintaining Aryan supremacy in a land increasingly populated by alien forces. The double change, from hierogamy to sacrifice (fossilised half way, so that the two are preserved) and from human to equine victim, is probably a reflection of the environmental changes which took place upon the Āryan migrations into and settlement in India.

NOTES

See J. Gonda, Loka: world and heaven in the Veda (Amsterdam, 1966). This military dimension is one reason for Indra's cosmogonic role and its characteristic treatment in the mythology of conflict. Cf. N. Wyatt, Devas and Asuras in early Indian religious thought, SJRS 7 (1986) 61–77.

2 ŚB 13. 1. 6. 3 (SBE 44, 288): 'Verily, the aśvamedha means royal sway: it is

after royal sway that these strive who guard the horse'. \$B 3. 1. 2. 9 (SBE 44, 278f.).

On the four-eyed dog, see M. Bloomfield, The two dogs of Yama, JAOS 15 (1893) 163-172. He identifies the dog in the aśvamedha with Yama's dogs and quotes TB: 'He slays the four-eyed dog. The dog is evil, as it were, and his rival; his evil indeed and his rival he slays. . . The horse descended from Prajāpati has a thunderbolt; with the thunderbolt indeed does he overcome evil and his rival.' The reason for its evil nature is duplicated in the two dogs of Yama, which Bloomfield argued to represent the sun and moon as images of day and night, aspects of time which Yama as god of death uses to destroy men's hopes. So the killing of the dog is an annihilation of time. Cf. RV 10. 14. 10-12 where two dogs, called four-eyed in v. 11, are the guardians of the entrance to the underworld.

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- 4 ŚB 13. 4. 2. 16 (SBE 44, 359). One is tempted to see here the adaptation of the tripartite organisation to the developing four caste system of later times (already attested in RV 10. 90. 12).
 - 5 MB 14. 82. 1 (Roy, xii 157).
- 6 Cf. Gen. 1. 26 (9. 7), Pss. 2. 8, 72. 8ff., 80. 11, 89. 25.
- 7 Cf. the mythological motif of Vișnu's three strides.
- 8 ŚB 13. 2. 8. 5, 13. 5. 2. 2 (SBE 44, 323f., 386).
- 9 SBE 44, 295.

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- 10 8, 9 Phalguni: V. M. Apte, Vedic rituals, in S. Radhakrishnan (ed.) The cultural heritage of India (Calcutta, 1958²) i 253.
- 11 J. Puhvel, Aspects of equine functionality, in J. Puhvel (ed.) Myth and law among the Indo-Europeans (Berkeley, 1970) 164.
- Giraldus Cambrensis (Gerald of Wales), *The history and topography of Ireland* (ET J. O'Meara, Harmondsworth, 1982²) 3. 102, pp. 109f. In the rite described here we have a first function rather than second function figure in the king, while the mare is probably transfunctional. There seems to be a totemic nature to the mare here, with which the king is mystically identified in the *hieros gamos*. The king's 'profession' suggests that the sequence 'not as a chief . . .' is not simply irony, but rather part of the theoretical transformation of the man. This being a rite of royal initiation is entirely in keeping with a general cosmogonic theme: each new reign begins a new cosmos. On this rite see also F. R. Schroeder, Ein altirischer Königsritus, *ZCP* 16 (1927) 310–312, Puhvel, 163ff.
- 13 Puhvel, 168f.
- 14 Cf. M. C. Astour, Hellenosemitica (Leiden, 19672) 128ff.
- 15 Cf. N. Wyatt, 'Araunah the Jebusite' and the throne of David, StTh 39 (1985) 43f.
- 16 KTU 1. 5 v 18ff. ETs in J. C. L. Gibson, Canaanite myths and legends (Edinburgh, 1978²) 72, C. H. Gordon, Poetic legends and myths from Ugarit, Berytus 25 (1977) 108.
- 17 F. M. T. de Liagre Böhl, Oud-Babylonischen Mythen, *JEOL* 4 (1936) 194–204. Both Ba^cal and Sin could be represented as bulls, as well as anthropoid in shape; but in neither immediate context is the bovine form to be assumed. In Ba^cal's case in particular, the god has just celebrated the completion of his temple-palace, and all the imagery is derived from human affairs.
- The Canaanite and South Arabian solar deities were female; Babylonian Šamaš, originally female, became male by assimilation to Sumerian Utu. For the reverse process, cf. the male deity ^cAttar (Canaan, South Arabia) who becomes the female Ištar (retaining the masculine form) in Mesopotamia by syncrasia with Sumerian Inanna.
- 19 SBE 44, 294f.
- 20 G. Dumézil, Quaestiunculae Indo-Italicae 9, Latomus 20 (1961) 257–262; See also Puhvel, 169.
- 21 Dumézil gives the distinct impression of arguing himself into a corner here: if the original first function meaning of the term *rājanya* is not maintained, his whole tripartite edifice is seriously threatened.
- Puhvel, 169f. The earliest versions of the myth are RV 10. 17. 1-2, Nirukta 12. 10 and BD 6. 162f., conveniently translated as myths §§ 17, 15 and 16 in W. D. O'Flaherty, Hindu myths (Harmondsworth, 1975) 60f. An allusion to the myth of the transformation of Saranyū probably lies behind the account of the cosmogony in Brh U 1. 4. 3ff. (R. E. Hume, The thirteen principal Upanishads [Oxford, 1921²] 81).

Cf. the Iranian counterpart to this, in which Yima, Azi Dahāka and Thraetaona represent the three functions. Azi Dahāka is however a form of Vrtra, who as a son of Tvastr begotten to avenge Triśiras is himself of Brahman caste. See G. Dumézil. Deux traits du monstre tricéphale indo-iranien, RHR 120 (1939) 5-20.

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- Cf. RV 4, 44.1 and 4, 43, 6, discussed by J. Przyluski, Les Aśvin et la grande 24 déesse, HIAS 1 (1936) 134. This is not to say that parallels in other cultures would have no catalytic effect in changing patterns of thought in a given environment. The means of transmission of such influence would be important to determine, and the most likely direct influence on Vedic thought would be that of Indus Valley cosmology. Przyluski rightly notes the thematic link between the Asvins and the asvattha, and the aurochs heads protruding from a pipal (= aśvattha) in a seal from Mohenjo-Daro: J. Marshall, Mohenjo-Daro and the Indus civilisation (London, 1931) iii pl. CXII § 387. The solar associations of this seal were established by J. Volcok, Towards an interpretation of the proto-Indian pictures, JTamS 2 (1970) 34.
- Puhvel, cited above. See also A. B. Keith, Religion and philosophy of the Vedas (HOS 31, 32, Cambridge, Mass., 1925) ii 345, cited with approval by N. N. Bhattacharya, Ancient Indian rituals (Delhi, 1975) 3.
- Bhattacharya, 9f. Cf. RV 10. 129. 5, discussed by J. Prasad, The philosophical 26 significance of Rgveda X, 129, 5 and verses of an allied nature, JRAS 1929, 586-599.
- Associations of this kind cannot of course be pressed. Nor can another quaint 27 speculation: in \$B 13. 3. 1. 1 (SBE 44, 328) the horse (aśva) is identified with Prajāpati's left eye which swelled (aśvayat < \sévi), fell out and became the horse.
- 28 J. Eggeling, SBE 44, xxxiif.
- Puhvel, 161. 29
- 30 W. Kirfel, Beiträge zur indischen Philologie und Altertumskunde (W. Schubring FS, Hamburg, 1951) 39-50. Discussed by Puhvel, 161f.
- Cf. the post-mortem conception of Horus on Isis by Osiris, though he had been 31 drowned.
- Cf. J. L. Sauvé, The divine victim: aspects of human sacrifice in Viking Scandi-32 navia and Vedic India, in Puhvel (ed.) MLIE (n. 11) 173-191.
- 33 Bhattacharya questions the connection: 5.
- Bhattacharya, 6. 34 35 Bhattacharya, 18f.
- Discussions: H. Oldenburg, Akhyana-Hymnen im Rgveda, ZDMG 29 (1885) 72-76; R. Pischel and R. F. Geldner, Vedische Studien (Stuttgart, 1889) i 243-295; A. Ludwig, Purūravas und Urvašī, SBB 20 (1897); J. Hertel, Die Geburt des Purūravas, WZKM 25 (1911) 153-186; A. B. Keith, The birth of Purūravas, JRAS 1913, 412-417; H. J. de Zwaart, RV X. 95, ON (Leiden, 1948) 363-371; K. R. S. Iyengar, Urvasi, 46-84 in Sri Aurobindo Mandir Annual Jayanti 9 (15. 8. 1949); I. Nalin, The legend of Purūravas and Urvasi, JUB 19 (1950) 85-93; D. D. Kosambi, Urvasī and Purūravas, JBRAS 27 (1951) 1-30; D. D. Kosambi, Urvaśi and Purūravas, IS 1 (1959) 141-175; D. D. Kosambi, Myth and reality (Bombay, 1962) 42-81; M. A. Mehendale, On cakran na in Rgveda X. 95. 12-13, BDCRI 14 (1955) 109-118; A. T. Hatto, The swan maiden: a folktale of North Eurasian origin?, BSOAS 24 (1961) 326-352; J. C. Wright, Purūravas and Urvaśī, BSOAS 30 (1967) 526-547; N. N. Bhattacharya (n. 25) 18-24; W. D. O'Flaherty, The Rig Veda (Harmondsworth, 1981) 252-256.

- 37 On the different means of killing different function victims see Sauvé (n. 33). On mṛtabandhuḥ see Kosambi, JBRAS 27, 14.
- 38 The stake is a surrogate of the tree, which is itself a phytomorph of the goddess who is here present in Urvaśī. Cf. also the curious myth of Saptavadhri in RV. 5. 78.
- 39 Kosambi, JBRAS 27, 14.

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- 40 Cf. the rather over-sophisticated attempt by Wright, BSOAS 30, 528.
- On their involvement in the hieros gamos and in the latter case the etymology of the name as well (I had not at the time come to this view regarding David), see my articles 'Araunah the Jebusite' and the throne of David, StTh 39 (1985) 43–47, and Cain's wife, Folklore 97 (1986) 88–95, 232. Both are qatil active participial forms (from dwd [cf. ydd] to love and qyn [cf. qny] to beget).
- 42 Kosambi, JBRAS 27, 19.
- 43 Cf. Kosambi, JBRAS 27, 21.
- 44 This is not on the assumption that all myths are related to rites: but RV 10. 95 seems a clear case of one that originally was.
- 45 Bhattacharya, Indian rituals, 20.
- 46 Though cf. the moral qualms that were felt: G. U. Thite, Animal sacrifice in the Brāhmaṇatexts, Numen 17 (1970) 152f.
- 47 ŚB 13. 6. 2 appendix (SBE 44, 413–417).

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WOMEN AS ASPECTS OF THE MOTHER GODDESS IN INDIA: A CASE STUDY OF RAMAKRISHNA*

M. D. McLean

In India the worship of the Goddess as Mother is often linked with the recognition of all women as in some ways embodiments of the Mother. This is in turn taken as ascribing a high view of women themselves. In this paper I wish to question this latter assumption, taking as a case study Ramakrishna Paramahamsa, a famous nineteenth century Benali 'saint and mystic', well known for his devotion to the Goddess and his teaching that devotees should regard all women as Mother. This questioning is based on the record of his teaching in the śrī śrī rāmakrisna kathāmrita, and on published material on India sexual psychology, and concludes that Ramakrishna did not, in fact, demonstrate a high view on women.

INTRODUCTION

It is a common belief among Hindus in India that all women are to be regarded as in some sense aspects or embodiments of the Mother, the Goddess however imagined.1 One of the most famous advocates of this belief in modern times was Ramakrishna Paramahamsa, the nineteenth century charismatic and mystic who lived at Dakshineswar near Calcutta. But when one examines the record we have of his life and teachings² we find that his attitude to women was very ambivalent, his actions and words showing sometimes a very positive attitude and sometimes extreme negativity. As I believe attitudes to women in general and the belief that they are embodiments of the Mother to be related aspects of a single complex of beliefs, I want, in this paper, to examine Ramakrishna's attitudes to women, because Ramakrishna is an important figure in the history of religion and also because I believe this will throw more light on the implications of regarding all women as aspects of the Mother. Another reason is that I believe that the accepted view of Ramakrishna's attitude to women is overdue for some correction.3

In an article on Ramakrishna's attitude to women⁴ Arvind Sharma has noted that his attitude was 'not . . . entirely consistent. One might even say

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that he seems to have been ambivalent in his attitude towards women'.⁵ But then, after listing some of the evidence which reflects the ambivalence, he concludes with a reconciliation which is largely positive. He argues that if Ramakrishna seems to be against women it is only when they are considered as obstacles to God-realisation. He then concludes that

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... on the other hand, whenever women stand in a positive relation to Godrealisation, whether as an aspect of the Godhead itself, as Kali, or as assisting in God-realisation as a Teacher or Guru, or as a devotional mode or as herself striving for God-realisation, Ramakrishna has nothing against her.⁶

Sharma is not alone in adopting this kind of view which amounts virtually to the standard received position. I believe, however, that this is an incorrect view, and I intend to argue against it in this paper. But before I turn to examine the evidence relating to Ramakrishna's attitude to women it will be helpful to outline as background to the discussion a picture of male attitudes to women in general among high-caste Hindus in India. This will enable us to see some of Ramakrishna's attitudes as typical and enable us also to see the significance of some of his comments and actions as reflecting attitudes of a certain kind.

For this background sketch I will draw on the researches of a number of scholars from different disciplines whose work presents a comprehensive and consistent picture of the subject among high-caste Hindus, one of whose work relates directly to Bengal, of which Ramakrishna was a native.⁸

In India, the most important relationship for the formation of sexual attitudes in the male child is that with his mother. This relationship is particularly significant because in India peculiar circumstances exist which place more pressure than we would expect on the sexual component in the relationship. This is because a young woman comes to an (arranged) marriage with certain heightened expectations, of a romantic–sexual kind, which the husband is usually unable to satisfy, for reasons largely to do with his response to his own early sexual experiences. The woman's feelings are then transferred to her infant son. This results in the formation of a close bond between mother and son, a bond which has from the mother's side a high sexual content, no doubt in a sublimated form.

Aggravating the situation is the fact that during these early years of the son's life the father is a distant figure, both physically and emotionally. His role in the child's early nurture is a minor one as the care of the infant is left to the mother and the other women of the joint household. And in that household little open affection is able to be shown between the man and his wife. 10

These relationships are very important for the formation of the male child's attitude to the mother and to women in general, especially with

respect to the prevalent belief in the overtly erotic nature of women, and the split image of the 'good' and 'bad' mother which develops later, based partly also on the anxiety which follows from the sudden withdrawal of the affection, previously so freely lavished on the child, with the advent of subsequent siblings.

This pattern of closeness, a highly sexually charged closeness, followed by relative separation from the mother, certainly contributes to the development of the split image of the mother. The 'good mother' inherits the benefit of the long years of close nurturing which in India is accompanied by considerable physical closeness, including breast feeding which may continue sporadically until the child is six or seven years old. The 'bad mother' image arises from the often sudden disruption of this idyllic state, and because from the mother's side the earlier closeness was so highly charged with sexual longings unfulfilled by her husband. This leads to the creation in the male child of an image of the mother as one who may arbitrarily withdraw affection/punish, and an anxiety state of fear of maternal incest.¹¹

A byproduct of this split mother-image is the attitude to women in general which develops from early childhood experiences. An attitude prevails among males of fear of the sexually mature woman, including the wife, which, coupled with the natural tendency to seek gratification with a woman (and the need to produce a male heir) creates an anxiety state resolved by regarding the woman/wife as a 'mother'. The birth of a son thus serves the dual purpose of continuing the male line and converting the sexually eager and thus threatening wife into a safe mother who, frustrated in her sexual dealings with her husband, transfers such feelings to the newborn son, thus perpetuating the syndrome.

Associated with these feelings and contributing to them is the prevailing cultural attitude that the male's virility lies in his semen, which must therefore be preserved, and that the woman with her insatiable sexual desire is out to rob the male of his semen/virility. Thus sexually mature women come to be seen as lustful, insatiable, treacherous, contaminating, dangerous and destructive of the spiritual life. On the other hand, they are objects of sexual desire and provide the means for the experience of the greatest pleasure, and are essential for providing a son to continue the line. Some of the anxiety is defused by regarding the dangerous wife as a safe mother, but only at the expense of the new anxiety generated by the maternal incest danger, which may in turn create negative feelings towards women. 12

RELIGIOUS ATTITUDES

When we turn to the religious situation we find that these attitudes are sanctioned and reinforced by the mythology¹³ and have generated a set of

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compensatory mechanisms which have been incorporated in the goals and practices of Hinduism. Most importantly, these attitudes are seen as responsible for the high place given to moksha as a religious goal in Hinduism. especially as ascetic practice dominates the pursuit of moksha. Because the irrational impulses associated with the sexual drives are seen as dangerous (or leading to dangerous contact with women in general and the wife in particular) the goal of self-control and detachment from the world becomes dominant. The complete detachment of the ascetic from the world, and thus from dangerous women, is the ideal, and even in the householder selfcontrol is sought in the cultivation of partial non-attachment. 14 In its extremes asceticism takes the form of self-punishment and complete denial of the self in the quest for samadhi. This involves, among other things, a denial of sexuality—in fact sexual denial is the most important and obvious denial of the life of the ascetic who is thus able to conserve his semen and enhance his spiritual powers. And through the avoidance of women, even as mother, as the ascetic abandons all his family ties, there is avoidance of the guilt engendered by incest fears arising from the relationship with the sexually aggressive mother:

The ascetic, fleeing from the incestuous aggression of his mother, retreats into a state of chastity enforced by the perception of all women as his mother. 15

Another way in which the Hindu male copes with these feelings aroused by his early sexual socialisation is through devotion to the Mother goddess. The most notable and relevant aspect of the Mother as goddess is her dual nature which may be seen as a projection of the good mother/bad mother image onto the Goddess. Thus ambivalence towards women is mirrored in the goddess Kali who is seen as a powerful loving mother who protects and grants moksha to the devotee, and a terrifying blood-devouring figure displaying sexual/martial aggression, even over her husband whose prostrate body she so often tramples underfoot. The ambivalence in the devotee is heightened when the two aspects of her nature are separated off into separate deities, concentrating the 'bad mother' elements in the figure of Kali while the 'good mother' elements inhere in her alter ego, Durga. The two, of course, continue to be regarded as but two aspects of the one Goddess, but the division betrays the anxiety of the devotee. The most of the service of the one Goddess, but the division betrays the anxiety of the devotee.

Devotion to the Mother, in either of her aspects, involves a regression to infancy, based on the inability to cope in an adult fashion with the dual nature of the natural mother, and its subsequent transference to other women. Once again, all women become embodiments of the Mother, and are thus rendered safe. Not all anxiety is eliminated, however, as even the grace of the Mother has a terrifying aspect; the dark Kali is the one 'who allows neither individualisation nor blissful union, but only permits an anxiety-laden

abject surrender'. 18 This response involves a surrender of manhood and regression to the state of helpless infancy, an attitude encouraged in the literature of devotion to the Mother. 19

THE CASE OF RAMAKRISHNA

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I have already indicated that the attitude of Ramakrishna to women was ambivalent. I think that this ambivalence is more apparent than real, as I will demonstrate below, but let us first survey the evidence as found in the śrī-śrī-rāmakrisna-kathāmrita, a record of the teachings of Ramakrishna over the last few years of his life, made by one of his lay disciples, Mahendranath Gupta (here referred to as 'Mani', one of the pseudonyms he used to refer to himself).²⁰

Ramakrishna saw women as distractions which would seduce a man from the way to the realisation of God. He believed that women were $m\bar{a}y\bar{a}$, a screen of illusion hiding God from the devotee as a cloud hides the sun (3.3.3.1f, 3.17.4.6, 4.13.2.1f), a delusion so powerful as to delude even Brahma and Visnu (2.2.2.2)! They make the devotee forget God, and are the embodiment of ignorance (3.14.2.1). They are obstacles on the way to God (3.14.4.12), they prevent one from attaining $Brahmaj\tilde{n}ana$ (3.13.1.3, 4.7.2.3). Women can even draw a man away from God (1.10.8.2). So Ramakrishna constantly warned his followers against them, and commended those who followed him before women had corrupted them (4.23.8.2). They are so dangerous that men should even keep away from women who are themselves devotees (2.19.2.1). He could not even bear to be touched by them (2.6.4.4, 2.27.1.2). He even admitted to the presence in his own life of an extreme anxiety state where contact with women was concerned.

I'm very frightened of women. I look on them as tigers coming to eat me up. Their limbs and pores and things all seem very large. They all seem like demonesses.

I used to be even more afraid! I wouldn't let them near me. But now I've convinced myself that they're parts of Bhagavati [the Goddess]. But men, holy men and devotees, must cast them aside. 4.22.3.1. (See also 2.17.4.1, 2.27.2.1, 5.17.1.3.)

Ramakrishna seemed to see women predominantly in sexual terms. He expressed to Mani his anger at those who enjoy sexual intercourse while seeking God:

You've no shame, you have children, but you still enjoy sex! You love a body which is veins, blood, urine and so on! One who meditates on God should think of even the most beautiful women as no more than ash from the cremation ground. You enjoy an impermanent body which has worms filth, mucus and so many impure things in it! You've no shame at all. 4.7.1.1.

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You won't realise God while your mind is on women and gold. Sex with women—what pleasure is there in that! Realising God gives ten times more joy than sexual pleasure. Gauri used to say that when you attain mahabhava all the bodily orifices, even the pores of the skin, became like a great vagina [mahāyoni]. You attain the pleasure of intercourse with the atman in each one of them, 4.7.4.2.

Even normal social contact with women he saw in sexual terms:

Even sitting with women and talking with them is a kind of sexual intercourse. There are eight kinds of sexual intercourse. To listen to a woman and enjoy what she says is one kind, talking about women is another, whispering to a woman in private is another kind, keeping something belonging to a woman, and enjoying that, is another. Touching is another, so a sannyasi shouldn't even touch the feet of the young [sic] wife of his guru. 5.17.1.4.

He wanted householders to live with their wives as brother and sister (4.27.4.3) but he who forsakes them altogether is a holy man (1.9.2.1), and he preferred his disciples to have nothing to do with them (4.20.2.4f).

On the other hand, theologically speaking, he had some very positive things to say about women, and he regarded them very highly. 'All women are manifestations of Sakti. This Primal Power has taken the form of woman'. (2.12.1.2.) So one should see all women, even one's wife, as manifestations of the Mother:

After you've acquired knowledge you should see your wife as a manifestation of the Mother. It says in the Chandi, 'The goddess is present in all things in the form of the Mother'. She even becomes your own mother. She is present in all women, 2.13.4.3.

He said he himself preferred to look on a woman as his mother and himself as her son (2.17.4.1). He also worshipped young virgins $(kum\bar{a}r\bar{\iota}\ p\bar{u}j\bar{a})$ because they were incarnations of the Mother:

I even worshipped a sixteen year old girl as Mother. I looked on her breasts and vagina as the Mother's breasts and vagina. This attitude is the last word in sadhana, you regard God as Mother and yourself as her son. 5.17.1.3. (See also 2.13.1.5, 4.11.2.2, 4.22.1.4.)

Ramakrishna also manifested some rather unusual behaviour which had sexual overtones. He was constantly fondling the youths who had become frequenters of the temple, especially Narendra (later to become known as Vivekananda) and Rakhal (see 1.14.9.2, 3.17.4.9, 3.12.1.2, 3.26.2.2, 4.23.1.1ff, 4.23.3.1, 4.23.4.2, 4.32.1.1). He himself realised that his behaviour was unusual and explained it as due to what he called his 'feminine' nature (2.15.1.2) and said:

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Women as Mother Goddess in India

I tell you—ordinary people can't understand these things—the devotee who thinks of himself as a woman wants to embrace God, who he conceives of as masculine, 4.29.1.1.

Thus he saw his attitude, especially to Rakhal, in terms of Yasoda's love for the infant Krishna:

At the time the Thakur [Ramakrishna] was often overwhelmed with a feeling of motherly love, like Yasoda's, that's why Rakhal was always with him. The Thakur looked on him as Gopal, and sat with him in his lap like a mother breast-feeding her young child. 5.4.2.2. (See also 1.5.1.1, 2.6.1.1, 4.1.3.1.)

Early Ramakrishna had indulged his feminine nature in transvestitism, something to which he still returned at times, even if only in play:²¹

I [took the attitude of a woman] for a long time. I wore women's clothes and a scarf. I used to worship with a scarf on! Otherwise how could I have kept my wife with me for eight months? . . . I can't call myself a man. 2.19.1.3.

Ramakrishna was sitting on his bed basking in the joy of the company of the pure-souled young devotees who were laughing at his imitations of a kirtani. A kirtani puts on lots of ornaments and fancy clothes when she sings. She stands with a coloured handkerchief in her hand, and every now and then coughs, and lifting her nosering, blows her nose. If some very important person arrives during her performance she welcomes them and says, 'Please come in!' From time to time she lifts the border of her sari and shows off her amulets and jewelery.

The devotees were laughing uproariously at this performance. Paltu was rolling about on the floor with laughter. Looking at him the Thakur said to Mani, 'He's only a boy, that's why he rolls about like that'.

Ramakrishna (to Paltu, smiling): Don't tell your father about all this or he'll lose the little respect he still has for me. They're like the English. 3.12.2.1. (See also 2.6.212, 3.11.3.5, 5.6.2.2.)

EVALUATION

We are now in a position to undertake an evaluation of this material. Interpreted against the background outlined in the first two sections a consistent picture emerges, one in which his attitude can be seen as compensating for a negative attitude to, including a fear of, women.

The first notable feature of this attitude is his strong desire for moksha, a way of escape from the world and avoidance of sexual contact with women. This explains his retirement to the temple complex at Dakshineswar. However, it will be objected that he was married. Yes, but against his will, and because he was manifesting such strange behaviour that it was thought he was going mad and that marriage might settle him down.²² But this is still insufficient as an explanation because those who enter sannyasa are expected to renounce their wives. In fact, Ramakrishna virtually did so. He brought

his wife to the temple and established her in separate quarters, to live the rest of his life as a kind of special servant on the one hand, and a venerated embodiment of the Mother on the other. She was known as the Holy Mother. One fact about their relationship that is consistently vouched for is that the couple never had sexual relations.²³

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Here is a classical case of the wife as Mother. The transformation is complete—the otherwise dangerous wife becomes the safe 'mother', without even the sexual relationship needed for the conception of a son, by being made Mother, thus eliminating any incest anxiety which might have resulted from relations with the 'mother'. This is particularly interesting in the light of his constant exhortation to his disciples to avoid sex by living with their wives as brother and sister (4.27.4.3) or as mother/Mother:

... you should see your wife as a manifestation of the Mother. It says in the Chandi, 'The goddess is present in all things in the form of the Mother'. She even becomes your own mother. She is present in all women. 2.13.4.3. (See also 2.12.1.3.)

Ramakrishna could not bear physical contact with women and few were allowed even to touch his feet. I have cited above passages showing this physical aversion (especially 4.7.1.1 and 4.22.3.1, pp. 11f) even to his open avowal of fear of them. In an even more striking passage the fear is linked explicitly to regarding them as mother:

If I touch a woman my hand goes numb, and aches. If I approach a woman to speak to her in a friendly way, it's as if there was a screen between us, through which I can't go. If a woman comes when I'm sitting alone in my room then I immediately become like a child and I see the woman as my mother. 2.27.2.1.

His earlier dressing as a woman and acting out their role by moving among them in their secluded quarters can be seen not as contradicting his aversion to women but as displaying another mechanism for avoiding contact with sexual overtones. As a 'woman' himself no such contact was permissible.

This passage (2.27.2.1) also displays the element of psychological regression to infancy noted by Kakar and others as often associated with this syndrome. The idea is theologically underlined in the devotion to the Mother which under the influence of particularly the songs of Ramprasad Sen, characterised so much of Ramakrishna's religious practice. The dominant mode of devotion in both Ramprasad and Ramakrishna is that of a son to his mother. This relationship is also loaded with the anxiety that the Mother will manifest as the 'bad mother' who rejects rather than the 'good mother' who accepts her child. This anxiety was almost responsible for the ending of Ramakrishna's life before his public life had even begun, when he threatened to do away with himself with the sacrificial sword hanging beside the image of

Kali in the Dakshineswar temple if she did not reveal herself to him as she had done to Ramprasad. 25

Ramakrishna also stresses that the Mother is wilful, she may respond to the devotee, or she may not (1.2.5.1). As a result, like an infant, the devotee must importune her, force her to do his bidding like an infant his mother (1.12.5.3, 1.3.3.1, 2.19.5.3). Here the regression to infancy is sublimated in a legitimate attitude of devotion; but the regression is evident, none-the-less.

Another aspect of Ramakrishna's teaching on women is that they are to be avoided because they are temptations which will lead a young (male) devotee away from the true path of religion (see page 17 above). This is an acknowledgement of the existence of the other pole operating in the creation of the anxiety state experienced by Indian males in marriage, the strong sexual attraction which is legitimated by the need to provide a son. It is interesting that while Ramakrishna saw women as obstacles to the (male's) pursuit of salvation, he still advocated the life of the householder over that of the sannyasi for his disciples.²⁶ Of course, after his death his disciples, who had learned the real lesson well, took the logical step of adopting sannyasa and founded the Ramakrishna Math.

CONCLUSION

Ramakrishna was neither the first nor the last to advocate the treating of women as embodiments in some way or other of the Mother Goddess. This has usually been taken as conveying great status on women, but I have argued here that in the case of Ramakrishna this is not so, and that it masks a number of anxiety states which made normal relations with women difficult, if not impossible, and in fact amounts to an anti-woman stance. I would argue that this is true not only for Ramakrishna but applies in many cases, something which has wide implications for the way women are regarded in both religious and secular India. Holding them to be embodiments of the Mother may be a cheap way of covering up the fear of or denigration of women so that it is not recognised for what it is.

Let me in conclusion illustrate this point from the experience of a tourist who recently visited Madras. He had been taken to a strip show where he had seen twelve Indian women displayed only in bras and panties. He reports:²⁷

Public nudity is forbidden in India so that this revelation in thigh and armpit was considered very bold stuff indeed by local standards.

'Of course', the manager apologised, 'we have not topless like you.'

'Or bottomless', [his host] added giggling.

'Certainly not bottomless', agreed the manager in reverential tone. 'In India things are much more restricted. Very strong rules on what we can show . . .' He paused, and then added: 'Unfortunately.'. . .

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I made to leave . . . 'As you wish.' He was looking hangdog now, the manager, with a slight hint of vindictiveness about these beteled lips. 'But I tell you this, sir,' he said. 'I am pleased I do not live outside India. Very pleased. Here we respect our girls not exploit them . . . All girls are our mothers here.'

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I am grateful to the University of Otago for the generous Study Leave provision which enabled me on a recent visit to India funded by the University, to undertake some of the research on which this paper is based.

NOTES

1 The belief is as old as the *Chandi*, or *Devi Mahatmya*, a section of the *Markandeya Purana* devoted to the mythology and worship of the Goddess, see M.P. 91.5.

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- 2 The śrī-śrī-rāmakrisna-līlāprasanga (E.T., Sri Ramakrishna The Great Master, tr. Swami Saradananda, (Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Math, 6th edn 1983), and śrī-śrī-rāmakrisna-kathāmrita (E.T., The Gospel of Sri Ramakrishna, by 'M' (Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Math, 6th edn 1974).
- 3 As this investigation proceeds it may incidentally prove to be relevant to the debate as to whether Mother goddess worship is a more realistic option for women who reject the patriarchal tradition of Father god worship, but this is not the concern of the paper. For a discussion of this issue see L. D. Shinn, 'The Goddess: Theological Sign or Religious Symbol?' *Numen*, vol. XXX, 1/2 (1984), pp. 175–198.
- 4 'Ramakrishna Paramahamsa: A Study in Mystic's Attitude Towards Women', in Beyond Androcentrism: New Essays on Women & Religion, ed. by Rita M. Gross (Missoula, Scholars Press, 1977), pp. 115–124.
- 5 Ibid., p. 116.
- 6 Ibid., p. 119f.
- 7 See, for example, many of the views expressed in Sri Ramakrishna In the Eyes of Brahmo & Christian Admirers, ed. by N. Mookerjee (Calcutta, Firma KLM, 1796). Sharma, in another article, gives what amounts to the received view:
 - ... 'Ramakrishna held women in high spiritual esteem. His first ecstatic experiences were the result of meditations on the goddess Kali. The last words he uttered when he died were also "Kali, Kali, Kali".'
 - 'This divinization of the feminine he achieved to an extent by identifying himself with womankind—to the point that he is believed to have menstruated himself for a while, so complete was the identification. Menstruation, with which so many tabus are associated in orthodox Hinduism, was thus converted by him virtually from a stigma into the stigmata of spiritual success.' 'Hindu Religious Reformers as Feminists: Paradox or Hypocrisy?' Asian Profile, 11/2 (April 1983), p. 197.
- 8 G. M. Carstairs, The Twice-Born: A Study of a Community of High-Caste Hindus (London, Hogarth Press, 1970); S. Kakar, The Inner World: A Psychoanalytic Study of Childhood and Society in India (Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1978); W. D. O'Flaherty, Women, Androgynes, And Other Mythical Beasts (Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1980), The Origins of Evil in Hindu Mythology (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1976) chapter XI, and Asceticism & Eroticism in the Mythology of Siva (London, Oxford University Press, 1973),

themes 27a, 'regard woman as mother' and 29ea, 'erotic/horrible'; M. Roy, Bengali Women (Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1972), 'The Oedipus Complex and the Bengali Family in India (A Study of Father-Daughter Relations in Bengal)' Psychological Anthropology, ed. by T. R. Williams (The Hague, Mouton, 1975), pp. 125–134; D. Jacobson & S. S. Wadley, Women in India: Two Perspectives (N. Delhi, Manohar, 1968). Some interesting comparative material on South Indian attitudes may be found in D. Shulman, 'The Murderous Bride: Tamil Version of the Myth of the Devi of the Buffalo-Demon', History of Religions 16/2 (November 1976), pp. 120–146, and G. Obeyesekere, The Cult of the Goddess Pattini (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984).

See Kakar, op. cit., pp. 56-79; Roy, Bengali Women, chapters 2 & 3; and

O'Flaherty, Women, Adrogynes, pp. 111-115.

10 Carstairs, op. cit., pp. 68, 159f; Roy, Bengali Women, pp. 17, 93-100, 117ff, 160-162; Jacobson & Wadley, op. cit., p. 82. In the mythology of the Devi Siva is also very much the absent husband, and the image of Durga used in Bengal at Durga Puja reflects this by portraying Siva as a small distant figure above and behind the head of Durga.

1 Roy, Bengali Women, pp. 118f; Carstairs, op. cit., chapter 10; Kakar, op. cit.,

chapter 3; O'Flaherty, Women, Androgynes, chapter 4.

2 As for note 11. See also K. Horney, 'The Dread of Women: Observations on a specific difference felt by men and by women respectively for the opposite sex',

International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 13 (1932), pp. 348-360.

For example, the Skanda myth. Skanda is said to have persisted in committing adultery with all the wives of the gods until they complained to his mother, Parvati, who then took the form of whichever woman Skanda was about to seduce. Then Skanda thought, 'The universe is filled with my mother', and he became passionless and resolved to treat all women as he would his mother, though when he found out how his mother had tricked him, he was ashamed (Brahma Purana 81.1-6). O'Flaherty, Women, Androgynes, p. 106, and passim; Kakar, op. cit., chapter 2.

14 Carstairs, op. cit., p. 156; Kakar, op. cit., pp. 23f; J. M. Masson, 'The Psychology of the Ascetic', Journal of Asian Studies, XXXV/4 (August 1976) pp. 611-625, and 'Sex & Yoga: Psychoanalysis and the Indian Religious Experience', Journal

of Indian Philosophy, 2 (1974), pp. 307-320.

5 O'Flaherty, Women, Androgynes, p. 106. See also pp. 77, 115f, and Carstairs,

op. cit., p. 167.

The iconography is full of images of Kali militant standing on or over the prostrate body of Siva, for example see W. G. Archer, *Indian Paintings from the Punjab Hills* (London, Sotheby Parke Bernet, 1973), vol. 2, p. 331 (plate 12). That the couple is often shown in sexual intercourse, with Siva's erect penis penetrating, or about to penetrate, the militant Kali, heightens the tension in the image, see P. Rawson, *Tantra: The Indian Cult of Ecstacy* (London, Thames & Hudson, 1973), plate 18, and his *Erotic Art of the East* (London, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1968), plates III & IX. This is also the theme of many of Ramprasad Sen's songs, for example:

Oh, I'm dying with the shame of it, Here's a wife standing over her husband!

What a strange yogi Siva is lying there under her feet.

What a shameless woman

Standing with her feet on her husband's chest,

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You don't even spare him a glance,

Solitary destroyer that you are,

You have renounced shame and modesty. ā mori ki lājer kathā, see S. N. Bhattacharya, Rāmprasād: jībanī o racanāsamaora 27

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(Calcutta, Granthamela, 1975), p. 113.

17 I believe that what we have here is a projection of the image of the actual mother in both her good and bad aspects, and an attempt at coping with the ambivalence by splitting these two aspects into separate images, see Ashis Nandy, 'Sati: A Nineteenth Century Tale of Woman, Violence & Protest', in Rammohan Roy & The Process of Modernisation in India, ed. by V. C. Joshi (Delhi, Vikas, 1975), pp. 168-194, especially p. 176. See also O'Flaherty, Women. Androgynes, pp. 91, 97, 117; Kakar, op. cit., p. 173. On the historical development of the composite Devi in history, see J. N. Tiwari, Goddess Cults in Ancient India: with special reference to the first seven centuries A.D. (Delhi, Sundeep Prakashan, 1985), and T. B. Coburn, Devi-Mahatmya: the crystallization of the goddess tradition (Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1984).

Kakar, op. cit., p. 180. See also O'Flaherty, Women, Androgynes, pp. 279f.

19 See the Ramprasad song kebal āsār āśā, bhabe āsā, S. N. Bhattacharya, op. cit., p. 149:

The hopes I brought into this world are unrealised,

I have been deluded like a bee with a painted lotus. You deceived me Mother with bitter nim, calling it sugar,

O Mother, tempted by the sweetness, I now sit with bitterness in my mouth. You said you'd play a game with me, but that hope too remains unfulfilled.

Ramprasad says, what happens in the world's game has come to pass, Now that evening has come take your infant son home in your arms.

20 Quotations in this paper are from my own translation of the Bengali kathāmrita, and the references are to the volume, chapter, section and subsection of the work, as, e.g. 3.17.4.6.

For accounts of his transvestitism see also the līlāprasanga 1.8.7-10 (= Great Master, pp. 73-76), 2.14.6-19 (= GM pp. 270-277), and 3.7.2-8 (= GM pp.

509-513).

22 See, for example, kathāmrita 2.6.2.1.

kathāmrita 4.24.3.2.

- See the songs referred to above: also my 'Ramakrishna: the Greatest of the Saktas of Bengal'? Memorial Festschrift for Ian Kesarcodi-Watson, ed. by P. Bilamoria and P. Fenner (Indian Books Centre, 1988) and my 'Tradition and History in Isvaracandra Gupta's Biography of Ramprasad Sen' South Asia, IX/ 2 (1986).
- 25 līlāprasanga 2.6.9f (= GM pp. 160-163) and kathāmrita 4.10.2.1, 5.3.2.1, 5.4.2.7, The kathāmrita references all indicate he intended to 'cut his throat' with the sword used for despatching sacrificial goats. On the significance of beheading as symbolising castration, and the Goddess as an aggressive, castrating woman, see O'Flaherty, Women, Androgynes, pp. 81-87, and D. M. Wulff, 'Prolegomenon to a Psychology of the Goddess', The Divine Consort (Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1984), especially pp. 289-292.

See my unpublished Ph.D., dissertation, 'A translation of the śrī-śrī-rāmakrisnakathāmrita with explanatory notes and critical introduction' (Otago University,

1983), pp. l-lxiii.

27 B. McNeill, 'Oh, India!' MORE 36 (June 1986), pp. 76-80 (emphasis added).

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Religion (1989) 19, 27-40

RACHEL'S TOMB: SOCIETAL LIMINALITY AND THE REVITALIZATION OF A SHRINE

Susan Starr Sered

An examination of records left by pilgrims visiting Rachel's Tomb in Bethlehem reveals flourishing themes and rituals during the 1940s. These years were also a time of major cultural upheaval for the Jewish community of Palestine. The author suggests that an increase in pilgrimage to shrines of saints can be seen as an attempt to make sense out of current reality by linking it to sacred history. An important impetus for the development of a pilgrimage site may be the perceived convergence of aspects of the saint's biography with current political and social conditions.

"... I ask Rachel Our Mother to grant mercy and salvation to the Jewish nation as a whole. To our soldiers who are heroically and valorously fighting in the Occupied Countries [of Europe]—all the best and they should return speedily, healthy and unharmed, to their homes. And to all the daughters of Israel who, for the good of our people, sit in [British] detention camps and prisons—speedy release and all the best' (Rachel's Tomb Day Book, 28/12/44).

During the 1930s and 1940s a process of ritual revitalization took place at Rachel's Tomb in Bethlehem. This paper traces that process in an effort to understand why particular shrines become popular at particular times. I argue that during the 1940s, the Jewish community in Palestine was, collectively, in a state of 'societal liminality'. I suggest that it is during such periods of cultural upheaval—when the old symbols and cultural metaphors become insufficient but new ones have not yet crystallized—that new religious rituals are likely to develop and flourish. Specifically, an increase in pilgrimage to shrines of saints can be seen as an attempt to make sense out of current reality by linking it to sacred history. An important impetus for the development of a pilgrimage site may be the perceived convergence of aspects of the saint's biography with current political and social conditions.

Literate cultures can sustain large repertoires of rituals and symbols, not all of which are 'active' at any given time. Various factors may cause a dormant ritual or symbol to regain popularity; for example, new and publicized miracles or visions are frequently responsible for resurgences of interest in traditional shrines. The case described in this paper concerns a different sort of process. Here, a group of people recognized a theme from their distant past as newly relevant to their current situation. Significantly, it was during a period

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of rapid social and political transformations that the relevance of that theme could be thrust forward and re-explored through the use of new rituals.

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Through the mid-1930s Rachel's Tomb was a minor Jewish, Christian, and Muslim shrine, not associated with any special concerns or sought out by any particular population. During the 1940s Rachel's Tomb became an important spiritual centre for Allied soldiers, for members of the Jewish Underground seeking victory in their struggle for Jewish sovereignty, for Jews seeking comfort from the horrors of the Holocaust, and for the expanding local female Jewish population seeking fertility. Two points here seem of the utmost importance. First, all of these themes strongly resonate with episodes in the Biblical and Midrashic accounts of Rachel (see below). And second, a quarter of a century later, when after a 20-year period of dormancy the Tomb reemerged as a Jewish shrine (from 1948 through 1967 Jews did not have access to the Tomb because it was in Jordanian hands), its appeal had significantly narrowed—in the post Six Day War era, Rachel's Tomb is once more a minor shrine.⁴

The evidence for the revitalization of Rachel's Tomb comes from a series of Day Books that were kept at the Tomb during the 1930s and 1940s. In the Day Books, thousands of pilgrims to the Tomb signed their names, often including a brief petition or statement of the purpose of their visit. In addition, the guard who worked at the Tomb during that time seems to have been an unusually good observer and he recorded (in Hebrew) many outstanding, interesting, and important events that occurred at the Tomb. Since anthropologists can rarely study a shrine for more than a few months or several years at most, and generally only begin to study shrines once they have already become popular, the Day Books provide rare insights into the process of the creation and spread of religious ritual.

SOCIETAL LIMINALITY

During the decades covered in the Day Books tens of thousands of Jews from Europe and Asia came to Palestine (legally and illegally), World War II began and ended, rumours and then news of the Holocaust in Europe reached Palestine, survivors of the death camps began to arrive, the British Mandatory Government of Palestine turned away thousands of Holocaust survivors, sending them to detention camps in Cyprus, and Jews living in Palestine were engaged in struggles both with local Arabs and with the British Mandate. These decades were in fact a time of **societal liminality**: the Jews of Palestine knew that they would eventually have an independent State, they no longer perceived themselves as a British colony, yet that State had not yet come into being. For the Jews of Palestine, during these few years, the entire world had been turned upside down. It was not possible for them to return to their homes in Europe, which had been destroyed by the Nazis. It was also not yet possible

for them to go forward, because the British still controlled access to Palestine. Indeed, this was an era of 'betwixt-and-between' for the majority of the Jewish

population of Palestine.

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As a society, the Jews living in Palestine were experiencing the following 'symptoms' that anthropologists have come to expect for liminal individuals: (1) the feeling of communitas and equality among comrades (for example, use of terms like 'comrade' [haver]); (2) seclusion or exclusion from others; in this case, both from all neighbouring Arab countries and from the Jewish communities abroad (because of the British 'White Paper' severely curtailing Jewish immigration); (3) lack of structure or, more precisely, a situation of interstructure (being between two structures: Diaspora/British Mandate vs. independent statehood); (4) secrecy (for example, hiding information and arms from the British); (5) change in consciousness and self-image (in this case, transition from 'Diaspora' mentality to 'independent' mentality); (6) the use of metaphors of birth (the Jewish settlement was referred to as the Moledet, literally 'Birthland'), in addition to metaphors (or in this case, the reality) of death—the Holocaust; (7) a prevailing condition of ambiguity and a confusion of customary categories (the entire region was experiencing economic, political, cultural, and social upheavals); (8) blurring of gender distinctions among neophytes (women also participated in the Underground and functioned as soldiers); (9) blurring of status, property, and rank distinctions; (10) the receipt of new instructions and knowledge (military, linguistic, etc.); (11) the experience of being 'ground down . . . to be fashioned anew'7 and the experience of 'ordeals and humiliations, often of a grossly physiological character'8-the Holocaust, and harassment and imprisonment by the British; (12) the sense of being in 'transition' (as opposed to being in a 'state'); and (13) the reputation of being sacred or holy (many Jews in the Diaspora pictured the Jewish community in Israel as heroic fighters for a sacred cause).9 It is against this background that we will now examine the story of Rachel as it appears in Jewish tradition.

BACKGROUND-RACHEL AND HER TOMB

Rachel appears in six places in the Bible: Genesis 29ff., Genesis 46:19 & 22, Genesis 48:7, Ruth 4:11, Jeremiah 31:14ff., and I Samuel 10:2. In Genesis 29ff. Jacob arrived in Haran, fell in love with Lavan's beautiful daughter Rachel, served Lavan for seven years in exchange for the right to marry her, but was tricked by Lavan into marrying his elder daughter Leah instead. Confronted by Jacob, Lavan then consented to Jacob's marrying Rachel in addition to Leah, in exchange for another seven years' labour. Because Jacob 'loved Rachel more than Leah' (29:30), God 'opened her [Leah's] womb; but Rachel was barren' (29:31). After many attempts to overcome her infertility, 'God remembered Rachel, and God hearkened to her and opened her womb'

(30:22–24). After a short reference in Genesis 33, the next time that Rachel appears is in Genesis 35:16–22 where following a difficult labour '. . . Rachel died and was buried on the road to Efrat, which is Bethlehem. And Jacob set a pillar upon her grave; that is the pillar of Rachel's grave to this day'. Rachel's death takes on cosmological significance in Jeremiah 31:14ff., where in the context of the Babylonian Exile the roadside imagery of Genesis 35 is used as a metaphor for God's promise to return the people of Israel to the land of Zion. In this evocative passage, when the weeping Rachel refuses to be comforted because her children have been forced into exile, God promises her that she will indeed be rewarded for her work and 'they shall come back again from the land of the enemy. And there is hope for thy future, says the Lord, and thy children shall come back again to their own domain' (31:16–17).

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The Biblical material is further developed in the Midrashic literature. In particular, Jacob's wedding with Leah is reinterpreted—in the Midrashic version Rachel kindly and generously agreed to defer to her older sister. This generous act is understood as the 'work' for which she will be rewarded (in Jeremiah 31:16). Other elements of Rachel's story stressed in the Midrash are Rachel's piety (e.g. Genesis Rabba 7:6), her merit and ability to intercede (e.g. Genesis Rabba 73:6 and 72:10; Pesikta Rabbati 3; Divrei Me Ha Ri Parshat VaYishlach; Opening to Lamentation Rabba 24), her death and tomb (e.g. Midrash Lekach Tov on Genesis 48:7), and her association with exile (e.g. Zohar 1:175a).

Although the references in Jeremiah and in Genesis 35:22 perhaps hint at the existence of an early cult of some sort at her Tomb, the first concrete evidence of pilgrimage to Rachel's Tomb appears in reports of Christian pilgrims from the first centuries of the Christian Era and Jewish pilgrims from approximately the 10th century. However, in almost all of the pilgrims' records the references to Rachel's Tomb are incidental—it is one more shrine on the road from Bethlehem to Jerusalem. Rachel's Tomb continued to appear as a minor shrine in the itineraries of Jewish and Christian pilgrims through the early 20th century. No well-publicized or flamboyant new miracles took place at Rachel's Tomb in the early 20th century, nor were any old miracles rediscovered.

THE DAY BOOKS11

Healing and Guardianship

'In the merit of Our Mother Rachel we will all be healthy and whole' (19/7/44).

Only two of the Rachel's Tomb Day Books are available for study today; the first volume begins in 1932 and ends in mid-1936, and the second volume begins in July 1942 and ends in March 1947. The first volume, then, can be seen as reflecting religious concerns and rituals from the years before the great

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cultural upheavals of the late 1930s and 1940s, while the second volume covers the climactically liminal years of the Jewish settlement in Palestine. The pilgrims' entries in the Day Books clearly indicate important developments of cultural and religious themes, concerns, rituals, and symbols during the 1940s. In this paper I have chosen to present the material from the Day Books thematically, but the thematic organization used here is quite close to the original chronological organization.

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The majority of entries in both volumes of the Day Books consist of signatures or lists of names, sometimes with a home address. On the first page of the second volume the guard wrote a blessing for 'all those whose names are in this book'. The entries in the second volume indicate that more pilgrims came in the 1940s than in the 1930s, and that 1940s pilgrims more often included messages next to their names. These messages served as reminders to Rachel to intercede on behalf of the pilgrim.

Requests for good health, healing, ensuring that dead relatives are protected in Heaven, etc.—the kinds of requests that are made at all Jewish shrines were made frequently by pilgrims in the 1930s and did not significantly change or increase in the 1940s. In both volumes prayers for health are numerous and most are short (e.g. vol. 1, pp. 38 and 144), many are in Yiddish (e.g. vol. 1, pp. 173 and 181), and common expressions include Muter Rachel (Mother Rachel) and zechut Rachel (that in Rachel's merit God should grant the request). A typical entry (19/3/47) consists of a list of names accompanied by personal requests for perfect healing, joy from children, a good marriage, a fair match, a good livelihood, success in the new apartment, and bodily health. The supplicant him/herself was not required to come to the Tomb, and there are many entries describing pilgrims or the guard praying on behalf of an absent believer. For important or urgent requests, some pilgrims would visit the Tomb daily for a week or a month, or ask or pay the guard to mention their name in his prayers and/or record their name in the Day Book for a period of time. Praying for dead kin on the anniversaries of their deaths, a widespread Jewish custom performed at but not uniquely connected to Rachel's Tomb, was common in both the 1930s and 1940s. In the first volume (p. 81) there is reference to a book of yahrzeits (anniversaries of deaths) that seems to have been kept at the Tomb. It is likely that the book was kept either to remind the guard to pray for the dead on the appropriate days, or as a more general zechut or merit-to have one's name somehow connected to Rachel and her Tomb. At the end of the second volume of the Day Book there is a list of people for the guard to mention on the anniversaries of their deaths.

A small number of passages address Rachel in the second person. For example, on 27/8/43 an entry reads, 'Hello to you Mamma Rachel. [Please] request mercy for all of Israel, and me among them!' And on 29/9/46 a five-year-old girl from Buchara who visited the Tomb with her family asked,

'When, Our Mother Rachel, will you come to us and we will not cry any more?' (quoted by the guard). Although the number of entries that address Rachel as 'You' are few, I suspect that this form of petition closely resembles the unrecorded oral petitions of the many illiterate pilgrims who did not know how to sign their names in the Day Books. (Some men and perhaps even most of the women who visited the Tomb during those years were illiterate.)

ZIONISM, ISRAEL, WAR, SOLDIERS, AND PRISONERS

'Rachel, Rachel! For how long shall we continue being scorned by the nations? For how long shall we be without a homeland?' (7/2/46).

In the 1930s there were very few references to political or broad societal themes. In the volume covering those years there are a handful of prayers in which Rachel is asked to help the exiles return to Israel, but these supplications are either non-specific or messianic, not blatantly political like the supplications in the second volume. The Day Books show that in the 1940s Rachel's Tomb became explicitly identified with the return to Zion, Jewish statehood, and Allied victory. During the 1940s Rachel's identity as defender of the exiles and guardian of the gates of Zion thrived. Almost every week there is at least one reference to soldiers coming and crying at the grave (23/2/44, 19/7/42 and many others), praying before going off to war (7/8/42 and others), or lighting oil candles (27/10/42, 6/6/44, 18/10/44 and others), for example, 'for the Allies to win' (31/5/43, 8/10/43). The guard marked V.E. Day in large letters in the Day Book, writing in block print: BLESSINGS OF THANKS ON THIS DAY OF VICTORY. On V.E. Day and the days following many pilgrims wrote messages thanking God for 'defeating the forces of darkness'.

Members of the Jewish Underground (in the struggle for independence from the British rule) also saw in Rachel and her Tomb a meaningful symbol. For example, on 25/4/43 there is a reference to Eliahu Beit Zuri and Eliahu Hakkim 'martyrs of the nation' who assassinated Lord Moin (a British official in Egypt), and were executed by the British. Throughout 1944 and 1945 there are references to and entries made by a woman named Rachel Habashush, who was active in the Jewish Underground. On 13/2/44 the entry reads that Rachel Habashush is in prison in Bethlehem and 'May Our Mother Rachel guard her from all sorrow, and bring about her speedy release'. More than a year later on 10/5/45 there is an entry reading: 'Rachel Habashush, Ohevel Ami¹² was released on . . . [this day]'. Approximately four months later (no exact date given) we again read: '[I] Rachel Ohevet Ami visited [Rachel's Tomb] three months after my release from the dungeons. I vowed [to give] oil for lighting [a candle], on behalf of the souls of our brothers and sisters who fell [fighting] for our Motherland [Moledet, literally, Birthland] and for the wellbeing of my Uncle . . . and his family'.

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A prayer for the Jewish Underground recorded on 15/10/44 clearly connects Rachel's merit to the current political struggle: 'In the merit of Rachel Our Mother we should succeed in vanquishing our enemies and freeing our holy land, Amen, Let it be [God's] will'. This entry is signed in code names by two members of the Underground. On 26/3/47 the mother of Geula Cohen, who at the time was a prisoner of the British for her Underground activities, came to the Tomb and lit an oil candle.

HOLOCAUST

'Rachel, Rachel, Mother of the Israeli Nation, for how much longer will the tears of Israel be shed in vain? Arise, arise from your sleep' (early 1945).

Much of the impetus for the revitalization of the Tomb came from news of the Holocaust and then the survivors themselves reaching Palestine. Whereas in the 1930s there were a few scattered prayers to Rachel to intercede for her children in the Diaspora (vol. 1, p. 46), in the 1940s there are hundreds of references to and prayers for the Jews of Europe. 13 The pilgrims making these prayers were not only Jews of European background, but Oriental Jews as well. There is an entry from July 1943 describing a group of Iraqi Jews who came at night to perform a mystical ritual (leil tikkun karet). According to the guard they 'cried for our brothers who suffer in all countries conquered by the Kingdom of Evil'. In August 1944 there is a passage that reads: 'Rachel Rachel Mother of the Nation. We received the news about the Holocaust and everyone's sufferings. They should all be able to come here [to Palestine]'. The title 'Mother of the Nation' (Em haUma) became more popular at about this time, as did petitioners referring to themselves as 'your child' and to the Jews in Europe as 'your children in the Diaspora'. On 1/11/44 three brothers prayed with tears and shouts about the evil that was being done to the Jewish people in all of the Occupied lands. In several other entries Rachel is called upon to witness the bloodshed (e.g. 18/10/44).

Holocaust survivors were among those who came to pray at the Tomb of Rachel, Mother of the Exiles. On 16/3/43 thirty-six immigrant Polish children who had escaped Nazi Europe via Teheran came to the Tomb and lit candles. On 2/4/44 the Tomb was visited by children who had recently escaped from Hungary. 'They cried out loud and so did everyone else at the Tomb'. According to the record left by the guard, the children prayed and would not stop praying even to answer questions. One child was five years old. On 7/8/45, approximately thirty children who had survived Buchenwald came to Rachel's Tomb. On 8/8/45 two thousand pilgrims came to the Tomb, and among them were new immigrants who fainted (probably from grief and excitement). Again on 31/10/45 many new immigrants came and the women cried. And on 6/12/45 a Holocaust survivor whose entire family was murdered

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On 26/4/45 mention is made of a curtain which had been brought to Rachel's Tomb from Poland. This curtain, which had originally covered an ark in which Torah scrolls were kept, was donated to cover Rachel's tombstone. Stained with the blood of Jews martyred in pogroms, the curtain was embroidered with the Biblical verse 'For God will bring every deed into judgement' (Ecclesiastes 12:14). At a later date, a large, ceremonial memorial service was performed at the Tomb for the victims of the Holocaust and the soldiers who had died in the war.

In the 1930s there are no references to organized groups of pious Jewish men or yeshiva (seminary) students coming to the Tomb. During the 1940s groups from yeshivot came to the Tomb weekly. The earliest such reference is to the Admor of Gur, a major Hassidic leader, who visited the Tomb with his entourage on 14/9/42. Throughout the 1940s there are references to the men of Yeshivat Etz Haim, Yeshivat Porat Yosef, Bretslav Hassidim, groups of Iraqi men, etc. (e.g. 30/9/42; 31/12/42; and many more). A number of new ceremonies were performed by the men from the yeshivot: circling the Tomb seven times, blowing the shofar (ram's horn), and praying as a minyan (quorum of ten men). The yeshivot would sometimes organize all-night praying sessions at the Tomb (e.g. 18/2/43, 17/6/43, 2/7/43, 12/7/43). The reason most commonly recorded for these sessions was the welfare of 'the community of Israel in the Diaspora'. We may assume that the proliferation of yeshivot visiting the Tomb, and the introduction of new rituals there, were connected to news of the Holocaust reaching Israel. Many of the yeshivot had deep connections with European Jewry, and during these months they heard rumors and then received news of the destruction by the Nazis of entire communities, families, and schools. While most of the organized groups coming to the Tomb seemed to have been men from the various yeshivot, there are several references to groups of school girls praying at the Tomb (e.g. 9/4/ 47).

FERTILITY AND THE FEMALE LIFE-CYCLE

'Rachel Our Mother, I beg Your Highness to pray for me, that I will have a male child this year, God willing, and grant my husband . . . complete health, and also to me . . . , and that all of Israel will be healthy and unharmed and joyous, and that salvation will come, Amen. And all the people of Israel will come to their land when the Messiah will come, speedily, Amen. And I thank you in advance and ask you to make it happen quickly, Amen' (3/4/44).

While health was sought at Rachel's Tomb during both decades, fertility became a popular theme only in the 1940s. ¹⁴ Beginning in the early 1940s there are numerous references to the apparently new custom of using the key ¹⁰ the shrine as a charm for women in labour in order to facilitate childbirth. ¹⁵

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There are no references to the key as a charm for fertility and only a few isolated references to fertility at all during the 1930s (5/1/35; 10/6/35). In the first volume there are a very small number of entries dealing with other aspects of the life-cycle: on 18/12/34 a bar-mitzvah was held at Rachel's Tomb; on 9/1/35 a circumcision ceremony was held; on 8/9/35 a pilgrim prayed in 'Rachel's merit for a good match'; on 19/1/36 a prayer for a bride is recorded.

In contrast, in the 1940s there are hundreds of entries dealing with fertility. The key is specifically noted on dozens of occasions (2/8/42; 29/9/42; 28/10/41; 22/11/42; 26/11/42; 14/7/43; 27/7/43; 16/10/44—to two women in child-birth; 4/2/45; 4/9/45—to someone as far away as Haifa; 10/3/47; 23/3/47; and many more.) In the 1940s it became common for Jewish women who had recently given birth (or sometimes their husbands) to pray at Rachel's Tomb (e.g. 29/1/43). Infertile women or couples sometimes repeatedly visited the Tomb, signing their names hundreds of times in the Day Book.

Rachel's identity as a guardian mother who had overcome love and marital problems flourished in the 1940s. In the second volume there are numerous entries dealing with life-cycle events and troubles. For example, on 1/11/42 a Jewish woman soldier came and cried because she had become engaged to a Christian man. ¹⁶ Several entries were made by brides and grooms immediately before or after their weddings. According to a former guard at Rachel's Tomb, 'The visitors see her [Rachel] with their spiritual eyes as the beloved mother, that in her lap every Jew will find his rest and healing. It seems that she is still alive, and any minute will rise from her grave and hug her children. And when one cuddles on her tomb that has absorbed the tears of generations, one feels the spirit of Mother Rachel hovering over her house'. ¹⁷

THE PROLIFERATION OF RITUAL OBJECTS AND ACTS

In the 1930s the only rituals specifically mentioned in the Day Book were lighting oil or candles, donating many candles to be lit over a period of time, making vows to give gifts to the Tomb (such as money for oil and money for an eternal candle), and one elusive reference (30/10/34) to someone bringing pigeons to sacrifice at the Tomb as a charm. In the 1940s there was a striking increase in new ritual objects and acts. Undoubtedly, the arrival of Jewish immigrants from diverse countries of Europe, Asia, and North Africa contributed to the introduction of new rituals. In the second volume we find that pilgrims asked to be closed into the Tomb for various amounts of time (5/3/46, 23/3/47 and many others); mezuzot (ritual object that is hung on doorposts of Jewish homes), books of Psalms, and sacks of dust (from around the Tomb) were sold at the Tomb; the guard blessed visitors; groups prayed all night; pilgrims donated new cloth coverings for the Tomb; festive meals (seudot mitzvah) were held; pilgrims distributed cakes to everyone at the Tomb; pilgrims fasted and prayed at the Tomb; large numbers of candles were lit (e.g.

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on 12/12/46 one woman lit twenty-five candles); organized prayer services were held for special purposes; a sukkah (outdoor hut that Jews are required to eat and sleep in during the autumn holiday of Sukkot) was built at the Tomb for the first time in 1946; and one pilgrim even brought a sheep to sacrifice (16/9/46).

In the second volume of the Day Books there are frequent references to large groups visiting the Tomb on Jewish festivals, the day before each New Moon and the anniversary of Rachel's death (the 11th day of the autumn month of Heshvan). For example, the entry on the anniversary of Rachel's death in 1949 describes Jewish visitors from many countries of origin, all-night study, shofar blowing, and a festive meal. During the day several hundred men and women came to the Tomb and the praying continued for twenty-four hours. According to the guard, many more people came than in previous years. Similarly, on the day preceding the New Moon of the month of Adar in 1943 thousands of pilgrims, including groups of soldiers, schools, yeshivot, and new immigrant came to the Tomb from morning until night. 'The crying and the shouting these were supernatural (sic); some fainted from grief at hearing details of the suffering of our brethren in the Occupied countries.' On the anniversary of Rachel's death in 1943 pilgrims who stayed all night included groups of 1940s Bratslav Hassidim, Jews from Haleb (Syria), Iraqi Jews, Yemenite Jews, and of the a group from the Sephardi Yeshivat Porat Yosef. They danced and sang and a midnight performed the kabbalistic ritual tikkun hatsot. There was 'crying and not yo shouting over the condition of our brethren in the Diaspora'. A large meal was that r provided for the poor.

Not surprisingly, as the Tomb became more popular, the process of under institutionalization set in. 18 On 24/8/44 the Hassidic Belz Rebbe decreed that cultur men and women stand on separate sides of the tombstone (the tombstone itself that h stands in the middle of the building which houses it). On 27/8/46 when a duals group came to the Tomb to pray, 'righteous women brought them [the men] entire lemonade and food and pastries. Most of the women sat in the entryway truly (rather than next to the tomb with the men, as had been described in earlier and n entries). 19 In September of 1945 Rabbi Herzog (the Chief Rabbi of Palestine) limins suggested that 'an eternal light in memory of the victims of the Holocaust be than installed at Rachel's Tomb, and that Sabbath candles be lit each week at the Power Tomb by a respectable woman' (in contrast to the spontaneous candle for the lighting of individual pious pilgrims). By 8/2/45 there seems to have been 3 fixed price to light oil candles at the Tomb. And, as time went on either the shows requests for the key became too numerous, or the guard became reluctant to hand out the key to strangers. So, we read that on 4/5/43 he gave the key for leader deposit of fifty pounds (a very large sum of money at the time) as a charm to symb woman in childbirth. 'She had a son.'

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ed to The themes that 'took-off' at Rachel's Tomb in the 1940s—fertility, nationom hood, the return of the exiles, the Holocaust-are intrinsically and dramatically rifice linked to Rachel's biography as it is described in the Bible and the Midrashic literature. Rachel, in Jewish tradition, is the mater dolorosa, crying for her children as they are led into Exile in Babylonia. In the 1940s, with rumours, news, and then survivors of the Holocaust reaching Palestine, this image must have been fantastically potent. Equally important, Rachel's weeping was effective; she received a divine promise that she will see her children return to hofai their Land. In the 1940s, with independent statehood so close, that promise must have seemed tantalizingly real. In addition, Rachel overcame infertility conquered death. With the increase in the number of Jewish women living in y, of Israel, and the deep need to bear children both to settle the Land and to make ds of up for those destroyed by the Nazis, Rachel's expertise in fertility and rant motherhood must have been a powerful drawing card. The combination of uting these themes made Rachel and her Tomb into a crucial metaphor for the f the times.

As shown earlier, the Jewish society in Palestine during the late 1930s and ps of 1940s was, in Turner's terms, 'betwixt-and-between'. While both the atrocity , and of the Holocaust and the beginnings of mass immigration to Palestine had nd at changed Jewish life forever, the form that this new Jewish State would take was and not yet clear. Anthropologists from van Gennep to Turner have pointed out l was that ritual activity, reflection upon society and the cosmos, and closer contact with the infinite are usually part of the liminal process. 20 Individuals who are ss of undergoing transformations from one known state or status within their that culture to another known state or status, can be taught the traditional rituals itself that have been performed by previous generations of similarly liminal indivinen a duals (e.g. through initiation rites). I would suggest, however, that when an men entire society is liminal, when the transformation is from the known into the way truly and collectively unknown, new symbols, new metaphors, new myths, arlie and new rituals can be expected to emerge. Indeed, during a time of societal tine liminality, a time of cultural upheaval, new rituals can emerge more easily st be than during more stable periods. When the old institutions have lost their t the power but the new ones have not yet solidified, there may be more opportunities ndle for the creation of rituals that reflect current realities.

In this context, we must stress the relevance of Rachel's identity as a female r the saint within a male-oriented religious tradition.21 Historians of religion have nt to shown that when new religions or new religious sects begin, women often hold leadership positions that they will be denied later on. 22 While it may not be fair to generalize from real women in leadership roles to mythological women in symbolic roles, in both types of situations we can identify conditions that seem to allow for the emergence of powerful female figures. Historical studies have

indicated that women may be more likely to function as charismatic leader before the new cult has become totally institutionalized. Similarly, the drasticultural upheavals in Palestine in the 1940s may be seen as particularly conducive to the expansion of the cult of a female saint. It does seem that it is frequently in the interstices of history that we find powerful female figures. The cult of the popular Argentine saint La Difunta Correa provides a fascinating parallel to the process described in this paper. La Difunta Correa, like Rachel suffered and then died, leaving her baby alive. Figgen, analysing the Argentinian cult, has written 'I do not think it coincidental that the cult (which originated during turbulent political times [between 1815 and 1860]) spread significantly during the 1970s, another era of intense socio-economic and political stress in Argentina'. Figgen notes that the cult originated in the early 19th century when independence from Spain had been declared but the new State had not yet solidified.

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In the 1970s and 1980s only one of the several themes that re-emerged a Rachel's Tomb in the 1940s has continued to flourish; nowadays, Rachel Tomb is the most popular fertility shrine in Israel. Israeli women turn to Rachel and her Tomb as powerful symbols of the ability to overcome problem of love, conception, pregnancy, and childbirth. It is seems then, that in the pass decades Rachel's story has come to be perceived as converging with the personal stories of individuals rather than with the historical situation of group. Rachel's story has not changed; rather, the way in which it is ritually renacted has shifted (or, in fact contracted). At the same time, with the involvement of the Israeli Ministry of Religion and Chief Rabbinate, expressions of spontaneous and folk piety at Rachel's Tomb are actively suppressed. For example, by order of the Ministry of Religion, it is now forbidden to light candles at Rachel's Tomb, and the basin in which women had traditionally candles has been filled with water to prevent infringement of the rule.

The new Jewish society in Palestine was not created ex nihilo; continuit with the past was important both ideologically (in the form of Zionism) and personally (because of the Nazi genocide). Against this background, we can see the attraction of a traditional symbol—Rachel, who could be rediscovered and reinterpreted in terms of the struggle for independence, the Holocaus and the immigration of Jews to Palestine. Rituals at her Tomb dramatized the new-old symbols that helped people make sense out of current realitie Religious feelings flourish or die out in particular social and mythologic contexts. In the 1940s the Jewish people stood in between extinction (the Holocaust) and redemption (the State of Israel). Rachel, the woman who have conquered barrenness to stand at Israel's border and demand that God return the children to their Land, suddenly became important to a great man people.

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- On liminality, see Victor Turner, 'Betwixt and Between: The Liminal Period in Rites de Passage', The Proceedings of the American Ethnological Society, Symposium on New Approaches to the Study of Religion (1964), pp. 4-20. In the anthropological literature, the term liminality generally refers to personal status; for example, the condition of an initiate who has not yet ritually become an adult, or of a pilgrim who has temporarily abandoned his or her job, home, clothes, name, and social niche. It seems to me that the notion of liminality can also apply to a society-to people who, for political or other reasons, are in between two states or statuses.
- See Mary Douglas, Natural Symbols: Explorations in Cosmology, New York, Vintage Books 1971.
- For an insightful overview and critique of current anthropological writings on pilgrimage see E. Alan Morinis, Pilgrimage in the Hindu Tradition: A Case Study of West Bengal, Delhi, Oxford University Press 1984, pp. 233-275. An excellent source on Christian saints is Stephen Wilson (Ed.), Saints and Their Cults, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1985.
- On current women's rituals at Rachel's Tomb see, Susan Sered, 'Rachel's Tomb and the Milk Grotto of the Virgin Mary: Two Women's Shrines in Bethlehem', Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion 2:2 (1986), pp. 7-22.

For a more detailed history of this era see, Binyamin Eliav, Jewish National Home from the Balfour Declaration to Independence, Jerusalem, Keter Publishing 1976.

See especially Turner 1964, and Victor Turner, The Ritual Process, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul 1969.

Turner 1969, p. 95.

Ibid., p. 103.

I have reconstructed this description of the 'liminal years' through interviews with Jews who lived in Palestine during the 1930s and 1940s. Also see Yechiam Weitz, 'The Yishuv's Response to the Destruction of European Jewry, 1942-1943', Studies in Zionism 8:2 (1987), pp. 211-222, esp. p. 215.

The best English source for early references to Rachel's Tomb are the publications of the Palestine Pilgrim's Text Society. Relevant volumes were published in London in the late 19th century. There is almost no information in the pilgrimage literature about customs at Rachel's Tombs. One of the very few pilgrims to write more than a few words about the Tomb was the 17th-century Rabbi Moshe Surait of Prague, quoted in Avraham Yaari, Trips in the Land of Israel

of Jewish Pilgrims, Ramat Gan, Masada 1976 (in Hebrew), p. 301.

I was given access to the Day Books by the son of the last Jewish guard (before 1948) at Rachel's Tomb. Day Books were used at the Tomb for approximately twenty years, but only two volumes have been preserved. The guard's family told me that the Day Books were kept in the 'Ruin of Rabbi Yehuda HaHassid' (a beautiful synagogue in the Old City of Jerusalem.) When the Old City was taken by the Jordanians in 1948 the Synagogue was destroyed. In 1967 two of the volumes of the Day Books were found in the possession of an Arab leader, and these volumes were returned to the family of the Jewish guard.

All of the Day Book entries quoted in this paper were originally in Hebrew (the Day Books include entries in other languages as well). The English translations are my own. On some of the pages of the Day Books the guard delineated small boxes in which pilgrims could fit their names and an address or a brief message. On other pages, signatures, anecdotes, poems, and petitions are scrawled

everywhere. The pages of the first volume are generally numbered and sometimes dated. The pages of the second volume are not numbered, but are, for the most part, dated. Those entries that lack dates can often be assigned dates through references to Jewish holidays or political events.

She most probably changed her last name from Habashush (an Arabic name) to Ohevet Ami (Lover of My People-a Hebrew name).

Especially in July 1943. 13

Rachel's Tomb had been a fertility shrine in the past. One of the few intriguing references to the Tomb that I have found in the pilgrimage literature is from the 15th century, concerning women collecting stones from around Rachel's Tomb to use as charms for easier deliveries. See Eli Shiller, Kever Rachel, Jerusalem, Ministry of Tourism 1973 (in Hebrew), p. 17 (quoting Bernard von Breedenberg, a Christian pilgrim to the Holy Land in 1483). In the 1970s and 1980s the most spectacular ritual at Rachel's Tomb involves winding a red thread around the Tomb seven times and then wearing the thread as a charm for fertility. One male informant who had lived in Jerusalem in the 1930s and 1940s recalls accompanying his father to the Tomb in 1939 in order to perform the string ritual on behalf of his sister who had a difficult pregnancy. Thus, I would not argue that fertility rituals at the Tomb were limited to the 1940s. However, they do seem to have 'taken off' during those years.

It is of course possible that the custom of the key began in the years between the two extant Day Books. Note that keys are frequently used as childbirth charms to

'unlock the womb'.

The guard convinced her that God will not mind if she breaks this promise. In this and in many other passages we see that the guard must be given a great deal of credit for the success of the Tomb.

17 Shiller, p. 11.

Cf. Victor Turner and Edith Turner, Image and Pilgrimage in Christian Culture, New York, Columbia University Press 1978; Nissan Rubin, 'Death Customs in a Non-Religious Kibbutz: The Use of Sacred Symbols in a Secular Society', Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 25:3 (1986), pp. 292-303.

Today, in the 1980's, men and women stand on opposite sides of the tomb but the

women's side is larger and better furnished.

Arnold L. Van Gennep, The Rites of Passage, Chicago, Routledge and Kegan Paul 20

1960 [French edition, Les Rites de Passage. Paris, E. Nourry, 1909].

21 Rachel is the only potent female saint within Jewish tradition. God is always addressed in masculine grammar and described with masculine imagery, and no other female Biblical figures or holy women serve as the foci of cults. Thus, the emergence of the cult of Rachel must be seen as connected to very particular historical, social, and mythological circumstances.

See especially Rosemary Ruether and Eleanor McLaughlin (eds.), Women of Spirit, Female Leadership in the Jewish and Christian Traditions, New York, Simon

and Schuster 1979.

See Kathleen Figgen, 'Bottles of Water on the Road: Material Symbols of an Argentine Popular Saint's Cult', Women's Studies International Forum 9:3 (1986). pp. 281-285, esp. p. 283.

I conducted fieldwork at Rachel's Tomb in 1982.

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WILLIAM ROBERTSON SMITH AND THE STUDY OF RELIGION¹

Margit Warburg

This article discusses William Robertson Smith's significance to the study of religion in the light of some important themes in his Lectures on the Religion of the Semites. Although rooted in an evolutionist frame of understanding which in Robertson Smith's case represented a particular theological variation, this work pointed forward to the functionalist theory of religion as a social phenomenon. Robertson Smith's theory of sacrifice as a communion has been abandoned for more than half a century, but it is interesting in the way it draws upon the major, yet controversial source to early Semitic sacrifice, the Narratio ascribed to Nilus. The reasons for the contemporary view of the Narratio as an unreliable source are reviewed, and it is shown that Robertson Smith's use of the Narratio reflects his own preassumed model of religion. Robertson Smith does not stand alone with this model. On the contrary, the conformation of the Narratio of both past and present prejudices explains its popularity as a 'source' in the history of religions. A review of Robertson Smith's work and influence concludes that his significance is not so much due to specific achievements in the study of religion, but rather to his intuitive ability to grasp essential elements of religion.

It cannot be denied that William Robertson Smith is a major figure in the study of the history of religions. He laid the foundation of the work of so many successors that it is difficult to name any later scholar in comparative religion who has not been directly or indirectly influenced by Robertson Smith. Furthermore, his fundamental ideas on religion as a social phenomenon profoundly influenced several other fields within the humanities and social sciences.²

Robertson Smith's ideas, however, are not only interesting from a historical angle, but also because they raise important general questions in the study of religion. It is the purpose of this article to focus upon certain of Robertson Smith's theories and methods in the light of later criticism. Indeed, Robertson Smith has been criticised by a number of great scholars, but this criticism carries with it implications which have not been pointed out previously. Since these implications concern different themes rather than one single issue in Lectures on the Religion of the Semites,³ I shall begin with a brief, general introduction to Robertson Smith's background for writing this opus major in comparative religion.

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THE LIFE AND CAREER OF ROBERTSON SMITH⁴

Robertson Smith was born in 1846 in Aberdeenshire, Scotland, as the son of a minister in the conservative branch of the Scottish church, The Free Church. He was barely fifteen when he entered the University of Aberdeen, and in 1866 he was given a grant which allowed him to continue his studies at New College in Edinburgh. Here he combined the study of mathematics and physics with theology and the classics. He laid the foundation of his later career by studying classical Hebrew under professor A. B. Davidson (1831–1902) who had come to hold a controversial position in Scottish theology by taking the view that the Bible, like any other text, should be treated with critical philological methods.⁵

As a student Robertson Smith went to Germany and Holland several times where he came into contact with leading Biblical scholars belonging to the so-called higher criticism. Thus, during a stay in Göttingen in 1869 he came under the influence of the significant German theologian Albrecht Ritschl⁶ (1822–1889). His views on the nature of religion had a profound influence on Robertson Smith who gradually acquired a more historical-critical and less dogmatic view of the scriptures of the Old Testament. In essence, this view was that the Bible was less a source of dogmatic propositions about God than a historical record of that state of mind which was inspired by the divine revelation. When Robertson Smith later forwarded this standpoint in the article 'Bible',⁷ on which the notorious series of libels against him were to be based, there was no doubt that Ritschl's ideas were also on trial.⁸

After Robertson Smith took over the chair of Hebrew and Old Testament studies at the The Free Church College in Aberdeen in 1870 he maintained close relations with the scholars of the higher criticism in continental Europe and soon became its most outstanding representative in Great Britain. However, he detached himself from the more radical, naturalistic views advanced by some of the continental theologians, such as the Dutchman Abraham Kuenen (1828–1891).

Besides Ritschl the theologian Julius Wellhausen (1844–1918) became of the utmost importance to Robertson Smith's later work. In particular, Wellhausen's studies of Arabic traditional religion inspired Robertson Smith to emphasise the significance of the sacrificial meal in his theory of sacrifice. But Robertson Smith was also influenced by non-theologians, such as Ignaz Goldziher (1850–1921), a specialist in early Arabic traditions, and the Semitic linguist and Islamic historian Theodor Nöldeke (1836–1930) which is evident, for example, from Robertson Smith's general view of the cultural homogeneity of the ancient Semites. Finally, it should be mentioned that during a second visit to Göttingen in 1872 he studied Arabic under the famous professor of Oriental languages, Paul de Lagarde (1827–1891).

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In consideration of Robertson Smith's rising international position it was obvious for the new progressive editor of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Professor T. S. Baynes, to ask Robertson Smith to write a couple of articles to the forthcoming ninth edition. In 1875 the second volume was issued containing among other things Robertson Smith's articles 'Angel' and 'Bible'. These two articles, in which he expressed his well-known views on the historical-critical interpretation of the Bible, ¹² aroused a great stir, however, among leading fundamentalist theologians in The Free Church. This controversy resulted in the long series of libels, in which Robertson Smith was accused of defaming the holy scriptures because he had stated, among other things, ¹³

- (1) that the laws of Leviticus had not been fixed once and for all during the time of Moses,
- (2) that Deuteronomy was not a simple account of historical facts, nor was it written during the time of Moses,
- (3) that religious writers took their liberties and made errors in transcription like any other author or scholar.

Today, only few would consider these points of view controversial, but during the 1870's the Scottish church experienced a long series of internal struggles, and many—even among the more liberal theologians—regarded the work of Robertson Smith as a potential cause of further schisms.

The case against Robertson Smith reached a turning point in 1877 when his opponents succeeded in having him suspended from the university. In the following years Robertson Smith gave lectures all over the country, defending his points of view against 'the dogmatics'. Of more importance to his later work, however, was his two great travels to the Middle East in 1878–1880, each for a period of half a year. Since he mastered Arabic, he could talk with the local population and make his own observations. Thus, unlike many other scholars of his time, he *personally* visited the countries and the cultures which were his objects of study.

Back in Scotland the campaign against Robertson Smith continued, and it was formally closed only in May 1881 with his ultimate dismissal as professor. He was then offered the position as editor-in-chief of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, and in the following seven to eight years he wrote more than two hundred articles to the encyclopaedia, mainly on Old Testament and Arabic topics. ¹⁵ In the same period he also completed four books, *The Old Testament in the Jewish Church. Twelve Lectures on Biblical Criticism* from 1881, *The Prophets of Israel and Their Place in History to the Close of the Eighth Century B.C.* from 1882, *Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia* from 1885, and *Lectures on the Religion of the Semites, First Series: The Fundamental Institutions* from 1889. ¹⁶

In 1883 Robertson Smith accepted the Arabic chair at the University of Cambridge, and in 1886 he also became chief librarian there. At the same

time he kept his position as editor-in-chief of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. His enormous working capacity met these challenges brilliantly, but his health, which had always been poor, was further weakened. He died in 1894, only 48 years old.

LECTURES ON THE RELIGION OF THE SEMITES

Among Robertson Smith's many works Lectures on the Religion of the Semites from 1889 has remained a classic. In this work Robertson Smith described his theories on the origin and development of what he called the early Semitic religion which he perceived as the roots of Judaism. Some of his thoughts, in particular on the Semitic sacrifices, had been forwarded earlier in his book, The Old Testament in the Jewish Church; however, in Lectures on the Religion of the Semites presented in his elegant and easily readable prose his epoch-making discussion of the relation between cult and myth appeared fully elaborated for the first time.

Characteristic of its time Lectures on the Religion of the Semites stands as one long epic, where most of the sources are interpreted again and again from new angles. His theoretical considerations are brief and mainly given in the introductory chapter. The rest of the book is a detailed discussion of those elements of Semitic religion which according to Robertson Smith represented significant aspects of the religion in pre-Biblical, Semitic pastoral

society.

It was Robertson Smith's aim with this work to illuminate the origin of Judaism and hence Christianity. Robertson Smith regarded Judaism, Christianity and Islam as *positive* religions. They had been founded by great religious innovators who preached a divine revelation. The positive religions did not, however, appear *in vacuo*, but evolved on a background of more ancient, *unconscious* religious traditions which had been passed on from generation to generation (LRS, pp. 1–2).

ROBERTSON SMITH'S COMPARATIVE METHOD

At Robertson Smith's time science and the humanities were influenced by evolutionist theories, in particular in biology, history and social anthropology. Robertson Smith also had an evolutionist approach in his treatment of 'the great problem of the origins of the spiritual religion of the Bible'. (LRS, p. 2). The prime thesis of historical-anthropological evolutionism was that all human cultures had followed a parallel development towards a still higher cultural and moral stage. This conception implied the methodological assumption that it was possible to reconstruct older cultures by comparative studies of younger ones and thereby to reconstruct the common cultural foundation of all cultures. This reconstruction was to a great extent based on the identification of the so-called survivals in the younger cultures—a

concept introduced by the social anthropologist, Edward Burnett Tylor (1832-1917).

As the term implies survivals were defined as cultural phenomena which continued to exist even though their original meaning and function had disappeared with the society in which they originated. However, the weakness in using the identification of survivals as a scientific method is, among other things, that deciding whether something is a survival or not must be based on a priori suppositions of the direction and character of historical development. As a consequence the method easily leads to tautologies and/ or becomes supported by prejudices.

Evolutionism as such has been heavily criticised for many years, and T. O. Beidelman, for example, has criticised Robertson Smith for his use of evolutionist ideas. However, Beidelman does this in general terms only, and it appears that the specific problems in Robertson Smith's use of the comparative method had not yet been pointed out. Perhaps this is due to a lack of apprehension of Robertson Smith's rationale among his critics, since this can be understood only from his standpoint as a theologian. That he was first and foremost a Christian theologian is often underplayed in discussions of his influence on the history of religions, sociology of religion, and social anthropology. I shall therefore demonstrate how his reasoning rested on theological premises, taking as an example a passage in *Lectures on the Religion of the Semites*. The passage chosen concerns, to quote Robertson Smith, 'one of the most important things in ancient religion' (LRS, p. 140), which is the distinction between the *sacred* and the *secular*.

The sacred is first presented by empirical examples (LRS, pp. 142–152). Robertson Smith then introduces the Polynesian term taboo to describe the restrictions which were prescribed in the handling of sacred things and places. According to Robertson Smith all Semites had rules stating what was clean and what was unclean as well as rules stating what was sacred and what was secular. The distinction between these two sets of rules was mostly blurred, however, which Robertson Smith took as evidence of their common root in ancient concepts of taboo (LRS, p. 153). In order to explain how these rules of taboo could give rise to a true concept of holiness, Robertson Smith therefore had to distinguish between rules of taboo which point forward to 'religion proper' (LRS, p. 152), and rules of taboo which may be regarded as 'magical superstition' (LRS, p. 154),

'Thus alongside of taboos that exactly correspond to rules of holiness, protecting the inviolability of idols and sanctuaries, priests and chiefs, and generally of all persons and things pertaining to the gods and their worship, we find another kind of taboo which in the Semitic field has its parallel in rules of uncleanness.'

(LRS, pp. 152-153)

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Following the reasoning of Robertson Smith the rules concerning clean and unclean animals in Leviticus should be related to that category of rules of taboo which was denoted 'magical superstition'. However, these rules were not considered superstitious by Robertson Smith for the very reason that they appeared in the Bible. The rules have been brought 'within the sphere of divine ordinances, on the view that uncleanness is hateful to God and must be avoided by all that have to do with Him', as Robertson Smith put it (LRS, p. 153). Robertson Smith here clearly expressed his general view that an analysis of the Old Testament does not make sense unless it is based on an acceptance of the hand of a revealing God in history. Thus, only when realising this theological premise can we understand the above statement as part of the argumentation for considering the Jewish dietary rules as survivals from the taboo-ridden past. 21

Robertson Smith's distinction between the kind of taboos which pointed forward towards the sacred and the kind of taboos which did not, is expounded in a reasoning typical of the Victorian evolutionists,

'On the other hand, the fact that the Semites—or at least the northern Semites—distinguish between the holy and the unclean, marks a real advance above savagery. All taboos are inspired by awe of the supernatural, but there is a great moral difference between precautions against the invasion of mysterious hostile powers and precautions founded on respect for the prerogative of a friendly god. The former belong to magical superstition—the barrenest of all aberrations of the savage imagination—which, being founded only on fear, acts merely as a bar to progress and an impediment to the free use of nature by human energy and industry.'

(LRS, p. 154, my italics)

In these sentences Robertson Smith presented—more explicitly than elsewhere—his general criterion for distinguishing between those religious phenomena, in casu the taboos, which held the seeds of the positive religions from that kind of phenomena which belonged to the superstitions of the savage past. The criterion was whether the phenomenon was derived from respect of the divinity, or whether it was based on fear of the supernatural. The nature of this distinction was purely moral.

RELIGION AS A SOCIAL PHENOMENON

A prevailing theme in Lectures on the Religion of the Semites was that religion in antiquity was not a matter of privacy but first of all a collective affair whose function was to sustain society,

'Religious nonconformity was an offence against the state; for if sacred tradition was tampered with the bases of society was undermined, and the favour of the gods was forfeited.'

(LRS, p. 21)

Robertson Smith proceeded by emphasising that in Semitic pastoral society religion was part of an *organic* entity, namely a community consisting of men and gods together. The intrinsic solidarity and unity of society was the *raison d'être* of religion,

'There was no separation between the spheres of religion and of ordinary life. Every social act had a reference to the gods as well as to men, for the social body was not made up of men only, but of gods and men.'

(LRS, p. 30)

'The principle that the fundamental conception of ancient religion is the solidarity of the gods and their worshippers as part of one organic society, carries with it important consequences, which I propose to examine in some detail, . . . a great part of what I shall have to say in the present lecture might be applied, with very trifling modifications, to the early religion of any other part of mankind.'

(LRS, p. 32)

These two quotations expressed a concept of religion which clearly anticipated the functionalism of twentieth century anthropologists. At the same time Robertson Smith generalised his view of ancient Semitic pastoral religion to include all 'unconscious' religions. Robertson Smith's influence on Durkheim and the functionalists shall be treated later, and the following is concentrated on his theory of sacrifice, which he himself considered his most important achievement.

ROBERTSON SMITH'S THEORY OF SACRIFICE

Half the *Lectures of the Religion of the Semites* is devoted to Robertson Smith's discussion of the Semitic sacrifices, and although his theory is completely abandoned today, it exerted a great influence on many contemporary scholars, also outside the history of religions. In his theory of psychoanalysis, for example, Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) interpreted Robertson Smith's discussion of the supposed totemistic origin of the sacrificial meal as evidence of a primordial Oedipal disaster: the sons, envious of their father's dominance in the horde, killed him jointly to get access to the women. This event is 'repeated' in the eating of the totem animal (the father) in the sacrificial meal.²² Freud's interpretation, however, deserves to be mentioned for its popularity rather than for its scientific seriousness in the study of religion.²³

Evidently, the central source of Robertson Smith's theory of sacrifice was Leviticus which contains detailed descriptions of the various rituals prescribed for the Judaic sacrificial acts. These rituals were performed by the professional priests of the second temple of Jerusalem, but Robertson Smith emphasised that the rituals rested upon an older religious practice going back to a time when lay participation in ritual acts was prevalent (LRS, pp. 215–216).

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Among the types of sacrifices described in Leviticus, Robertson Smith concentrated on the common sacrificial slaughter (zébaḥ) in which the flesh was eaten while the fat and entrails were burnt. According to Robertson Smith the essence of this ritual was the communal sacrificial meal (LRS, pp. 238–239), and—following Wellhausen closely²⁴—he interpreted it as the establishment of a communion between men and the deity (LRS, p. 240).

The sacrificial meal was, in fact, to become the pivot in Robertson Smith's theory of Semitic sacrifice. It is well-known that his theory drew heavily on the so-called Nilus account of a camel sacrifice, and in the following I shall draw attention to some hitherto unnoticed aspects of Robertson Smith's use of the Nilus account.

Inspired by Julius Wellhausen Robertson Smith used the camel sacrifice as comparative evidence for his general communion theory of the Semitic sacrifice. Robertson Smith quoted the central passages of the Nilus account as follows,

Of all Semitic sacrifices those of the Arabs have the rudest and most visibly primitive character; and among the Arabs, where there was no complicated fire-ceremony at the altar, the sacramental meal stands out in full relief as the very essence of the ritual. Now, in the oldest known form of Arabian sacrifice, as described by Nilus, the camel chosen as the victim is bound upon a rude altar of stones piled together, and when the leader of the band has thrice led the worshippers round the altar in a solemn procession accompanied with chants, he inflicts the first wound, while the last words of the hymn are still upon the lips of the congregation, and in all haste drinks of the blood that gushes forth. Forthwith the whole company fall on the victim with their swords, hacking off pieces of the quivering flesh and devouring them raw with such wild haste, that in the short interval between the rise of the day star which marked the hour for the service to begin, and the disappearance of its rays before the rising sun, the entire camel, body and bones, skin, blood and entrails, is wholly devoured.

¹This must not be regarded as incredible. According to Artemidorus, ap. Strabo, xvi. 4. 17, the Troglodytes ate the bones and skin as well as the flesh of cattle.'

(LRS, p. 338)

According to Robertson Smith (LRS, p. 339) the essential parts of this ritual were,

- (1) that the blood was spilt on consecrated ground, whereby it could be transferred to the god,
- (2) that the blood and the flesh of the animal were eaten by the clan members and thereby incorporated into *their* blood and flesh.

The common meal consecrated the unity between man and god. Robertson Smith assumed that this deity was originally the clan's own god, the totem but he acknowledged that there was no direct evidence of this in the sources

(LRS, p. 275). ²⁶ He explained this by suggesting that the bedouins in the Nilus account—whom he called 'Saracens'—had ceased to sacrifice to their own clan deity in favour of the all-Arabic deity, the morning star (LRS, p. 282). ²⁷ Unfortunately, Robertson Smith could not find any direct evidence of a previous symbolic kinship between the Saracens and the camel (LRS, p. 286); yet he maintained that the many restrictions that the Saracens imposed on the killing of camels must be interpreted as a blood tie between them. This blood tie—or kinship—between a clan and a particular animal was the pivotal idea in totemism (LRS, pp. 286–287). By sacrificing a member of the clan, namely the totem animal, the desired communion was established (LRS, p. 360).

Although Robertson Smith's communion theory appeared to be an improvement of Tylor's gift theory from 1871, ²⁸ it soon came under attack and is generally abandoned today. Particularly, Biblical scholars have criticised his (and Wellhausen's) idea of the sacrificial meal as a joyous and happy clan feast (LRS, pp. 260–263); this interpretation, as stated in a modern Old Testament study, 'does not allow sufficiently for the element of solemnity in the early cult'. ²⁹ The very idea of a communion was already attacked in 1912 by the British classical scholar, Jane Ellen Harrison. She showed that Robertson Smith's prejudices concerning the sacred complicated his interpretation unnecessarily, because he introduced a hypothetical and invisible deity as a third part in the sacrificial meal. She proposed a more simple interpretation instead, namely that the sacrificial meal involved the transfer of mana from the slaughtered animal to the participants in the cult. ³⁰

Despite this criticism Robertson Smith's communion theory is of significant interest in the history of research, because it inspired no less than three scholarly traditions, represented by Frazer (in social anthropology), 31 Durkheim (in sociology of religion) and by Freud (in psychoanalysis), respectively. Freud's use of Robertson Smith's theory has been briefly touched upon, and Robertson Smith's significance to Durkheim's outstanding work in the study of religion, will be dealt with later. Before that, however, I shall revert to the Nilus account of the camel sacrifice which was quoted above. As will appear from the following analysis, Robertson Smith's use of this source in his theory of sacrifice and the criticism raised against it shed important light on a certain fundamental conception of religion.

ROBERTSON SMITH AND THE NILUS ACCOUNT

The most comprehensive criticism of Robertson Smith's use of the Nilus account is found in Joseph Henninger's 'Ist der sogenannte Nilus-Bericht eine brauchbare religionsgeschichtliche Quelle?' from 1955, ³² the main points of which are summarised below. This leads to a discussion of the great scholarly significance of the Nilus account, which forms a marked contrast to its doubtful value as a historical source.

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Henninger's first point of criticism concerns the authorship of the account, the so-called *Narratio*. ³³ He cites earlier critical reviews by Karl Heussi concluding that the author cannot be the fourth century eremitic monk Nilus from Sinai, to whom the authorship of the text was usually ascribed. The Nilus who lived from the end of the fourth century to the middle of the fifth century was actually head of a monastery in Galatia, and there is no evidence of his staying in a monastery in Sinai. The dating of the text is also doubtful; Robertson Smith wrote that it was a late fourth-century source (LRS, p. 281), while Henninger concludes that the account must be younger, from the fifth or sixth century, and that the author was an unknown monk who used Nilus' name as a pseudonym. ³⁴

This criticism concerning the origin of the Nilus account does not necessarily disprove the authenticity of the description of the camel sacrifice—the unknown 'pseudo-Nilus' might still be a reliable observer. However, the camel sacrifice occupies only a minor part of the complete account. It is summarised

briefly in the following.35

The monk, who calls himself Nilus, has retired to live in a monastery in Sinai together with his son, Theodulos. One day the bedouins take the monastery by storm, kill the monks and take Theodulos as prisoner. A terrible destiny is awaiting him, because the bedouins are cannibals and sacrifice young men to the morning star. Occasionally, however, the human sacrifice is substituted by a camel sacrifice which is performed as described by Robertson Smith and paraphrased above. Now, the most fortunate thing happens: the very morning when Theodulos is going to be sacrificed the barbarians oversleep, and as the sacrifice may be performed only when Venus still lights up the morning sky, Theodulos avoids death this time. Instead, he is sold as a slave, and after many tribulations, where he is exposed to hardships such as eating unclean food and dallying with women, he finally returns to the monastery in a happy reunion with his father.

Henninger credits Heussi for observing that this account has indeed the character of a novel, and he notes the typical Greek theme of the hero or heroine whose grim destiny is awaiting but who is saved by a miracle.³⁶ Henninger states correctly, however, that although a literary critique leads to a rejection of the authenticity of the account, we might still trust the ethnographical details which pseudo-Nilus has put into the story.³⁷

From an ethnographical point of view, however, the description of the camel sacrifice is open to severe objections. Henninger concludes that it seems unlikely that the camel sacrifice was performed in the presence of the captives, and the description can therefore not be considered a first-hand source. Turthermore, pseudo-Nilus presumably did not understand the language of the bedouins, because the monks feared the bedouins and had very little contact with them. Finally, the whole description deviates con-

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siderably in detail from what is known from other available sources on the life of the Arabian nomads of that time. Henninger particularly draws attention to the following points,

- (1) Nowhere in the ethnographical literature is it possible to find evidence suggesting that the sacrificial animal should be placed on stones, in particular not on 'stones piled together' as Robertson Smith stated independently of the Greek text. Stones do have religious significance but this is not the same as using them as an 'altar'. On the other hand, stone altars are described in the Old Testament which pseudo-Nilus knew well, of course. 40
- (2) There is no indication in other sources of the substitution of a camel sacrifice for a human sacrifice which is in fact also disputed by Robertson Smith.⁴¹ Camel sacrifices were probably common at that time, however.⁴²
- (3) In the description a leader of the ceremony appears. He introduces the hymn, leads the circumambulation and kills the animal. Such a priestly person does not fit with other facts about bedouin life; the closest parallel is the seers who guarded the holy places of the oases. These *sadana* lived permanently in the oases and did not migrate with the nomads. On the other hand, priests were common in ancient Greece and Israel.⁴³
- (4) The 'hymn' also appears unlikely, as hymns are unknown in ancient Arabian cult, but common in temple cults.⁴⁴
- (5) In the sacrifices of that time it was usual to let the blood pour into a hollow in the ground and not to drink it. When Robertson Smith emphasised the significance of drinking the blood of the sacrificial animal in order to strengthen the ties of kinship between man and animal (LRS, pp. 312–314), he could produce no other sources than the Nilus account in support of this statement.⁴⁵

In conclusion, Henninger finds that there are weighty reasons to doubt that pseudo-Nilus has had any personal knowledge of bedouin life. The description of the camel sacrifice is inconsistent with other sources on many important points. On the basis of this and the fact that the story reads like a novel, Henninger concludes that the Nilus account is useless as a source for the study of Semitic religion. This implies that practically all that was supposed to substantiate Robertson Smith's theory on the totemistic communion sacrifice must be rejected.

It may be argued that nobody accepts Robertson Smith's theory of sacrifice today, and that Henninger's criticism is mainly interesting from a historical point of view. However, I want to suggest that the most interesting aspect of this criticism of the Nilus account is not the rejection of its value as a

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source for the study of religion—after all, George Foucart brushed it aside as an 'anecdote' as early as in 1912. 48 No, the most interesting aspect of the Nilus account is that belief in its credibility as a reliable source has died incredibly hard. At a first glance the text appears trustworthy, paradoxically enough because of—and not despite of—the fact that it tells us more about the author and his time than of the ethnographical details which it pretends to relate. The author does not for a moment doubt that these nomads were barbarians and in all respects lived a barbarian life: as rude savages they did not boil, fry or smoke their meat but ate it raw. They often practised cannibalism, they had no division of labour, no crafts, no trade and earned their living by the sword. They drifted around in hordes, killed the animals on their way and lived, in brief, 'like dogs'. 49

Robertson Smith saw no reason to dispute this glorious picture of the barbarians; he rather supplemented it by stating, for example, that the Arabian sacrifices 'have the rudest and most visibly primitive character (LRS, p. 338). That Wellhausen⁵⁰ and Robertson Smith accepted the Nilus account is explainable, considering the general late nineteenth century view of non-European cultures. It is interesting, however, that posterity has not felt compelled to dissociate itself from that picture of Arabian nomads which the Nilus account presents. As emphasised by Eliade in his commentary on Nilus' camel and twentieth century man, the tale suits us quite as well as it suited both Robertson Smith and pseudo-Nilus.⁵¹

The Nilus account and its success express more than just contemporant fascination of our barbarous past, it also tells us something about what pseudo-Nilus and Robertson Smith understood by religion. When pseudo Nilus (or was it a different Nilus altogether?) is to describe the religious lift of these barbarians he must introduce concepts and cult items which enable his readers to understand that we are talking about religion. And to Nilus religion has to do with an altar, a priest, a hymn and the circumambulating crowd—because to Nilus religion is cognitively a Hellenistic and Judai (later Christian) phenomenon.

Nilus, or whatever his name was, does not stand alone with his difficultie in thinking the alien into a well-known pattern. As researchers of religion we also encounter descriptions of religions today in which gods, sould prayers, meditation, magic, sin, altars and spirits appear in a hotchpotch and this evidently characterises the author's cultural structuring rather than that of the people described. But our own superior attitude should not lead us to forget that in the future our use of established concepts, like cultured myth, may well be likewise criticised.

We may thus conclude that Nilus' account is not only a model of European thinking of 'the others' (cf. Eliade's interpretation above) but also a model of European thinking of religion, because it is based on the Judaic-Hellenistic

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concept of religion. Furthermore, the Nilus account was a model for Robertson Smith and his time in their view of the development of 'civilisation'. It is, indeed, a morally devotional myth of origin showing how we were once barbarians and how elevated we have become since then. It was particularly important for Robertson Smith that the Nilus account demonstrated the inferior stage of the original religion so that it may be understood how sophisticated the Christian concept of divinity really is.

In conclusion, the Nilus account can be regarded as a model at several levels which makes it possible to solve the contradiction inherent in the tale of the camel sacrifice. It is, in fact, surprising that Nilus discovered priests, hymns and circumambulating worshippers among these horrible barbarians, and that Robertson Smith in addition found that they had erected an altar. Considering the savage and inferior stage of the Saracens on the ladder of culture, it would perhaps have been more appropriate to ascribe to them a form of religion which was more different from that of the later, more civilised time. But this was unthinkable; when Robertson Smith had to think religion, even of the most primordial type, all these elements and an invisible deity had to be present during the cultic act. Consequently, the cult of the barbarians was made into a temple cult, with only the building itself missing.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CULT AND MYTH

Robertson Smith's most decisive contribution to the study of religion is without doubt his discussion of the relationship between cult and myth. As the first scholar he saw the cult as primary in relation to the myth in the religions of antiquity. This thesis, which he formulated and substantiated on a few pages in *Lectures on the Religion of the Semites*, was revolutionary among the scholars of religion of his time. With their background in a Christian theological tradition it was obvious to them that the religious acts—the rituals—were inferior to faith—the myths—also when the religions of the past were considered. Until Robertson Smith's time, therefore, the study of religion had primarily focused on the interpretation of myths (LRS, p. 16).

Robertson Smith repudiated the strong emphasis upon myth by stating that in the religions of antiquity the myths did not have the character of dogmas, which the worshippers were obliged to believe—the obligatory part was to perform the ritual acts as meticulously as prescribed in the religious traditions (LRS, pp. 17–18). The myths, which were accessory to the rituals and served as explanations of the origin or particular performance of the ritual, were not fixed but often varied.⁵³ In a given society it was possible, therefore, to find many examples of different, sometimes even contradictory, mythical explanations of the same ritual act. Consequently, Robertson Smith stated as a main rule that in antiquity it was the religious practice which constituted the firm and most invariable part of religion (LRS, p. 16).

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Robertson Smith forwarded this view with convincing clarity, although without any detailed empirical substantiation. He then proceeded to formulate the theoretical basis of his subsequent analysis of original Semitic religion

'So far as myths consist of explanations of ritual, their value is altogether secondary, and it may be affirmed with confidence that in almost every case the myth was derived from the ritual, and not the ritual from the myth; for the ritual was fixed and the myth was variable, the ritual was obligatory and faint in the myth was at the discretion of the worshipper.'

(LRS, p. 18

This view on the relationship between cult and myth has since then been one of the analytical pillars of comparative religion. In his book on Azter religion, *Teotl and *Ixiptlatli*, the newly retired Danish professor of sociolog of religion, Arild Hvidtfeldt, discussed Robertson Smith's treatment of cult and myth and concluded that most scholars have accepted Robertson Smith's approach of considering the cult primary in relation to the myth. ⁵⁴ Hvidtfeld noted, however, that this general acceptance has not been substantiated by further theoretical arguments but appears to be founded on the fact that Robertson Smith's approach has proven its value in its application on a large number of empirical cases.

Hvidtfeldt primarily regarded and used Robertson Smith's discussion of cult and myth as a methodological principle and stressed that Robertson Smith himself considered it as 'the method of our investigation'. ⁵⁵ Hvidtfeldt however, moved beyond that. He used the primacy of the cult as the keelement in a general model in comparative religion. ⁵⁶ This model is more of less implicit in the wordings of Robertson Smith and can be formulated as a model composed of the following two theses,

(1) The rituals are the oldest and most permanent part of religion, while the myths are the variable derived from the ritual.

(2) The worshippers themselves consider the myth as less important than the rituals.

With regard to the first thesis one may say, with Hvidtfeldt, that the question of which is oldest, the myth or the ritual, is comparable to the help and-egg discussion. There is no way of retrieving a meaningful answer this question.

The second thesis, which obviously infuriated many theologians, was formulated by Robertson Smith as follows.

'In ancient Greece, for example, certain things were done at a temple, as people were agreed that it would be impious not to do them. But if you have asked why they were done, you would probably have had several mutually contradictory explanations from different persons, and no one would have though

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it a matter of the least religious importance which of these you chose to adopt. Indeed, the explanations offered would not have been of a kind to stir any strong feeling; . . . '

(LRS, pp. 16-17)

This quotation is, however, just a statement without proof, and Robertson Smith actually never seems to have given any proof of it. He only concluded that 'mythology was no essential part of ancient religion, for it had no sacred sanction and no binding force of the worshippers' (LRS, p. 17).

This second thesis has also been attacked by non-theologians, for example as early as in 1912 by Jane Ellen Harrison who wrote,

'To Robertson Smith a myth was the ancient equivalent of that hated thing, a dogma, only unguarded by sanctions. Had it been granted him to tarry awhile among the Iowa Indians or among the Zuñis he would have told another tale. An Iowa Indian when asked about the myths and traditions of his tribe said . . . :

These are sacred things and I do not like to speak about them, and it is not our custom to do so except when we make a feast and collect the people and use the sacred pipe.'58

It seems reasonable to conclude that the burden of proof of the second thesis lies with Robertson Smith. He has not produced such a proof which does not, of course, mean that the thesis is necessarily wrong.

DURKHEIM AND ROBERTSON SMITH

The inspiration from Robertson Smith had the most epoch-making effect on the study of religion through the work of Émile Durkheim. In 1895 Durkheim first became acquainted with the work of Robertson Smith, ⁵⁹ and this led Durkheim to undertake a radical re-evaluation of his own attempts of treating religion from a sociological point of view. ⁶⁰

Durkheim's opus major in the sociology of religion, Les Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse from 1912, is permeated by Robertson Smith's principal ideas that the gods are part of society, and that the foundations of early religion are the rites symbolising the mutual solidarity of gods and men in an organic community.

Apart from the sociological view of religion Durkheim also borrowed Robertson Smith's now abandoned thesis that totemism was a general, initial stage in the development of religion in all cultures. Durkheim's interpretation of totemism deviated at one point, however, from that of Robertson Smith. While Robertson Smith assumed the existence of 'deities' right from the beginning of the history of mankind, Durkheim was of the opinion that in this early phase the clan worshipped the clan deity which was the totem, and that the clan therefore worshipped itself. Durkheim was thereby able to circumvent the problem of assuming the existence of independent deities in his theory.

THE HEIRS OF DURKHEIM AND THE CRITICISM FROM EVANS-PRITCHARD

As stated above, Robertson Smith basically saw religion as a social phenomenon where both gods and men were part of an organic entity, and he considered the unity and maintenance of society as the core of religion. These views were accepted and continued by the functionalist anthropologists, from Bronislaw Malinowski (1884–1942) and A. R. Radcliffe-Brown (1881–1955) in the 1920's to their successors several decades later.

In 1935, however, Malinowski dissociated himself from Durkheim's 'simple formula that God is society', 63 and in 1956 Evans-Pritchard raised a fundamental criticism of Durkheim's sociologistic concept of religion. Evans-Pritchard saw it as 'sociological metaphysics' to postulate that early human societies worshipped themselves, symbolised by the totem. 64 It was Durkheim, not the particular societies themselves, who made society into a deity. In continuation of Evans-Pritchard's argumentation it can be stated that although Durkheim had avoided the metaphysical element of Robertson Smith's theory, namely the postulated existence of a clan deity, this did not make Durkheim's theory less metaphysical. It is just as metaphysical to reject the existence of deities as it is to accept them.

In addition to this, Evans-Pritchard criticised Robertson Smith's theory of sacrifice for not reflecting the intrinsic ideas of early society,

'The most damning case against Smith's theory of a communion-sacrifice rests, however, on the reasoning that if all primitive sacrifices have the same features and the most fundamental of these is the *idea* of communion, then he should have shown that primitive peoples do, in fact, *have that idea* and that it predominates. He does not do this. He cannot do this.'65

This quotation is interesting, though not because Robertson Smith's theory of sacrifice is rejected. This had been done on several previous occasions, yet usually on its own premises. What is particularly interesting is that Evans-Pritchard rejected the theory by claiming that religion should primarily be understood and interpreted in terms of the indigenous categories of the particular culture under study. To Evans-Pritchard and many other social anthropologists, such as Godfrey Lienhardt, Franz Steiner, Edmund Leach, Victor Turner, and Mary Douglas, it became quite as important to analyse what people think as what they do. This should not, of course, be seen as a token of an individualistic understanding of religion but rather as an interest in uncovering conscious as well as unconscious collective concepts and symbols.

CONCLUSION

As stated in the beginning of this paper, it cannot be denied that William Robertson Smith is a major figure in the comparative study of religion. His

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illiam 1. His greatness is unanimously agreed upon, and at some time or other of their career most researchers of religion have had to evaluate his significance to their own field of research. This is remarkable, considering the fact that the majority of the specific results of Robertson Smith's work on Semitic religion soon proved to be untenable. His major theoretical contribution to the study of religion—his theory of sacrifice—has been widely rejected, both as a specific theory in the Semitic field and as a general theory in the history of religions.

What remains today is his thesis that the cult is permanent while the myth is variable. That has had the most profound significance to later research in the history of religions and social anthropology. Irrespective of the significance of his thesis, it seems unlikely, however, that this alone is the reason for acknowledging Robertson Smith's outstanding position in the history of religious studies.

It may thus be assumed that what has caused Robertson Smith's greatness is not the validity of his theories, because most of the time he erred. It is possible, though, to err at several levels of creative originality. Robertson Smith's significance shows itself in the fact that his errors ruptured established frames and led to new insight. Robertson Smith worked with something essential in what we call religion, and he had the calibre to treat the subject in a way which made the unthinkable thinkable.

To put it another way, William Robertson Smith was an original scholar because he summarised and represented the trends of his time, while at the same time being opposed to and transcending them. This qualifies him to his pedestal in the history of research, because researchers will never finish reflecting upon such a scholar's work. Once more it has been possible to go back to the Nilus account and to Robertson Smith's use of it to discover that it tells us something important about the ways in which we think about 'barbarians', 'civilisation', and 'religion', both in Robertson Smith's and in our own time. Therefore, William Robertson Smith's contributions to the study of religion grasp an essence of the field which means that also in the future it will be fruitful to return to his work.

NOTES

Part of this paper was presented at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Department of Comparative Religion, 28 January 1987. The general ideas have been presented in Danish only, in M. Warburg, 'Robertson Smith-Fixpunkt og innovator i religionssociologien', in T. Tybjerg (ed.), Religionssociologiske Perspektiver, Chaos. Dansk tidsskrift for religionshistoriske studier (special issue), Copenhagen, 1985, pp. 9-34.

For example, the following two works review the significance of Robertson Smith in social anthropology: T. O. Beidelman, W. Robertson Smith and the Sociological Study of Religion, Chicago, University of Chicago Press 1974, and

R. A. Jones, 'Robertson Smith and James Frazer on Religion. Two Traditions in British Social Anthropology', in G. W. Stocking, Jr (ed.), Functionalism Historicized. Essays on British Social Anthropology, History of Anthropology, vol. 2, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1984, pp. 31-58. In ecclesiastical history Robertson Smith and the Victorian Scottish theologians have recently been treated in R. A. Riesen, Criticism and Faith in Late Victorian Scotland. A. B. Davidson, William Robertson Smith and George Adam Smith, Lanham. University Press of America, 1985.

W. R. Smith, Lectures on the Religion of the Semites. The Fundamental Institutions. Edinburgh, Adam and Charles Black 1889. A second edition was published in 1894 and a third edition in 1927. The third edition was reprinted with a prolegomenon by J. Muilenberg, New York, KTAV Publishing House 1969. All references to this work in the following are abbreviated LRS and refer to the 1969 edition.

A very detailed, although slightly uncritical source for Robertson Smith's position in contemporary scholarship is J. S. Black and G. Crystal, The Life of William Robertson Smith, London, Adam and Charles Black 1912.

Black and Crystal, p. 77.

Ibid., p. 111.

7 Ibid., pp. 179-180.

8 Ibid., p. 247.

In general, Robertson Smith's theological position among the scholars of 'higher criticism' was cautious, if not conservative. See Riesen, pp. 115–119.

10 J. Wellhausen, Skizzen und Vorarbeiten, drittes Heft, Reste arabische Heidentumes, Berlin, Georg Reimer Verlag 1887, pp. 119-123. See also Robertson Smith's own introduction to LRS, pp. xvi-xvii.

11 Black and Crystal, pp. 146-148.

12 Ibid., pp. 126-129.

13 Ibid., pp. 242-243.

14 Ibid., pp. 302-313, 333-337.

15 Ibid., p. 455.

- 16 A complete bibliography of Robertson Smith is given in Black and Crystal, pp. 621-628.
- 17 W. R. Smith, The Old Testament in the Jewish Church: Twelve Lectures on Biblical Criticism, Edinburgh, Adam and Charles Black, 1881, 2nd revised edn, 1892.

18 Beidelman, pp. 38-39.

A characteristic example is found in Robert Nisbet's introduction to Durkheim's The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. The sociologist Nisbet, who was professor in humanities at Colombia University, wrote, 'Apparently it was about this time that Durkheim encountered the works of the English ethnologist Robertson Smith whose studies of the religions of the ancient Semites, among other works, had led him to the conclusion that the origins of religion are to be found, not in belief in spirits, in animism or other state of mind, but, rather, in the social act, in the rite or ceremony that symbolically binds the individual to his kinship community.' (E. Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, London, George Allen & Unwin, 2nd edn, 1976, p. vi. First italics are mine.)

20 Riesen, p. 124.

Beidelman alludes to the same, but in general terms only, by the statement. Evolution makes sense if one believes, as Smith did, in a chosen people of ag whom truths were slowly revealed over a long period of history.' (Beidelman, p. 38.)

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22 S. Freud, Totem und Tabu. Einige Übereinstimmungen im Seelenlebe der Wilden und der Neurotiker [1913], in Gesammelte Werke. Chronologisch geordnet, 3rd edn, Frankfurt am Main, S. Fischer Verlag 1961, Band 9, pp. 160-186.

23 Cf. M. Eliade, Occultism, Witchcraft, and Cultural Fashions. Essays in Comparative

Religion, Chicago, University of Chicago Press 1976, pp. 3-5.

24 Wellhausen, p. 122.

25 It is well known that Robertson Smith was much influenced by his friend, J. F. McLennan (1827–1881), from whom he accepted the presumptions that motherright was an earlier stage than father-right (cf., e.g. LRS, p. 278), and that totemism was an early religious phase through which all societies had to pass (cf., e.g. LRS, p. 124). Although these hypotheses on mother-right and totemism were forwarded earlier by Herbert Spencer (1820–1903), Lewis H. Morgan (1818–1881) and Edward Burnett Tylor (1832–1917), it was especially McLennan's influence which was important to Robertson Smith's theory of sacrifice, cf. Beidelman, p. 30. A specific example in the Semitic field is Robertson Smith's comparative analysis of the nature of the Arabic demon, jinn (LRS, pp. 119–134). He concluded from this analysis that it corroborated the hypothesis that the Semites also passed through the totemistic stage and that some of their deities were of totemistic origin (LRS, pp. 137–138).

26 It is noteworthy that Wellhausen was aware of Robertson Smith's hypothesis of an early totemistic stage in Semitic religion. However, Wellhausen found the hypothesis unproven and did not accept it in his own discussion of the nature of

the Arabic pre-Islamic deities (Wellhausen, pp. 176–178).

27 Cf. Wellhausen, pp. 36-40.

28 Robertson Smith's own criticism of Tylor's gift theory is found in LRS, p. 392.

29 R. J. Thompson, Penitence and Sacrifice in Early Israel outside the Levitical Law, Leiden, E. J. Brill 1963, p. 12. Thompson classifies all Old Testament references to sacrifice in groups according to the presence or absence of an element of 'sin' or 'solemnity' in the sacrificial description. He concludes that there is an overweight (2:1) of references reflecting a sense of sin or solemnity which should 'suggest the probability of an earlier connection between sin and sacrifice than Wellhausen allowed' (Ibid., p. 243).

30 J. E. Harrison, Themis. A Study of the Social Origins of Greek Religion [1912],

London, Merlin Press 1963, 2nd edn, p. 136.

31 A recent systematic analysis of the relationship between Frazer and Robertson Smith is given by Jones, cf. note 2. Robertson Smith's influence on Frazer who became his friend is also treated by R. Ackerman, J. G. Frazer. His Life and Work, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1987, pp. 58–63, 82–85, 228–233. Despite their mutual inspiration and close personal friendship their views differed still more from each other; for example, Frazer immediately adopted Robertson Smith's theory of sacrifice but later gradually abandoned it (Ackerman, pp. 229–230).

32 J. Henninger, 'Ist der sogenannte Nilus-Bericht eine brauchbare religionsge-

schichtliche Quelle?', Anthropos Band 50 (1955), pp. 81-148.

33 Ibid., pp. 88-94.

34 Ibid., p. 94.

35 The summary is based on Henninger's extracts of the Narratio.

36 Henninger, pp. 95–96.

37 Ibid., pp. 96–97. 38 Ibid., p. 97.

- 39 Ibid., pp. 97-98.
- Ibid., pp. 108–109.
 Robertson Smith discussed in detail the claim that a camel might substitute a

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- 41 Robertson Smith discussed in detail the claim that the character a human victim. He did not agree on substitution as such but concluded from the totemistic principle of kinship between humans and animals that the camel sacrifice was the oldest (LRS, pp. 262–265).
- 42 Henninger, pp. 116-117.
- 43 Ibid., pp. 119-121.
- 44 Ibid., p. 123.
- 45 Ibid., pp. 123-125.
- 46 Ibid., pp. 144-147.
- 47 Ibid., pp. 147-148.
- 48 G. Foucart, Histoire des religions et méthode comparative, Paris, Librairie Alphonse Picard et Fils 1912, p. 132.
- 49 Henninger, pp. 126-127.
- 50 Wellhausen, p. 37.
- 51 Eliade, p. 7.
- 52 It is beyond doubt that the theory of the primacy of ritual over myth is Robertson Smith's original idea. Before Robertson Smith the German folklorist, Wilhelm Mannhardt (1831–1880), had emphasised religious practice rather than religious ideas in his works, of which the most significant was Wald- und Feldkulte from 1875–1877 (W. Mannhardt, Wald- und Feldkulte, Erster Teil, Der Baumkultus der Germanen und ihrer Nachbarstämme, Mythologische Untersuchungen, Berlin, Gebrüder Borntraeger 1875. Wald- und Feldkulte, Zweiter Teil, Antike Wald- und Feldkulte aus Nordeuropäischer Überlieferung erläutert, Berlin, Gebrüder Borntraeger, 1877). Mannhardt, in fact, represented a break-through in folkloristics similar to that of Robertson Smith in the history of religions. However, there is nothing indicating that Robertson Smith was directly influenced by Mannhardt, although it is probable that he might have known of Mannhardt's work through Frazer, cf. Ackerman, pp. 81–82.
- 53 The use of the term 'accessory' for describing the relation of myths to rituals was originally forwarded in A. Hvidtfeldt, Teotl and *Ixiptlatli. Some Central Conceptions in Ancient Mexican Religion with a General Introduction on Cult and Myth, Copenhagen, Munksgaard 1958, p. 17. See below for further comments on this work.
- 54 Hvidtfeldt, pp. 14-15.
- 55 Ibid., p. 16.
- 56 Ibid., pp. 17-19.
- 57 Ibid., p. 16.
- 58 Harrison, p. 329.
- During this period Marcel Mauss (1872–1950)—himself later a prominent sociologist and anthropologist—was the only student following Durkheim's course on the origin of religion. In a retrospective essay Mauss recalled that 'we [Durkheim and Mauss] were contended with the work of Frazer and, above all, Robertson-Smith'. (M. Mauss, 'An intellectual self-portrait', in P. Besnard (ed.), The sociological domain. The Durkheimians and the founding of French sociology, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1983, p. 145.)
- S. Lukes, Émile Durkheim. His Life and Work. A Historical and Critical Study, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books 1973, pp. 237–240.
- 61 Ibid., p. 244, p. 450.

Durkheim, p. 206. 62

B. Malinowski, Coral Gardens and their Magic. A Study of the Methods of Tilling the Soil and of Agricultural Rites in the Trobriand Islands, vols I-II, London, George Allen & Unwin 1935, vol. II, p. 235.

E. E. Evans-Pritchard, Nuer Religion, Oxford, Clarendon Press 1956 (reprinted

1970), p. 313.

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als tral and nts 65 E. E. Evans-Pritchard, A History of Anthropological Thought (A. Singer, ed.), London, Faber and Faber 1981, p. 81, my italics.

MARGIT WARBURG is assistant lecturer in sociology of religion at the Institute of History of Religion, University of Copenhagen. Her main area of research is religious minorities, in particular Bahá'ís and Jews. She has published Iranske dokumenter. Forfølgelsen af bahá'íerne i Iran, Copenhagen, Rhodos 1985 [Iranian Documents. The Persecution of the Bahá'ís of Iran] and has co-edited Der var engang ... amol iz geven ... Jødisk kultur og historie i det gamle Østeuropa, Copenhagen, Gyldendal 1986 [Once upon a time ... amol iz geven ... Jewish Culture and History in Old Eastern Europe]. She is currently doing fieldwork and archival studies at the Bahá'í World Centre, Haifa, Israel.

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Survey Article:

THE BAHA'I FAITH 1957–1988: A SURVEY OF CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS

Peter Smith and Moojan Momen

This paper gives a general account of the developments in the Baha'i Faith over the last three decades. The period began with the Baha'i Faith as a little-known religion with a hereditary leadership of predominantly Iranian membership but with some spread to the West. At the present time the religion has been transformed into a much betterknown religion led by an elected council. It has increased some 20-fold in numbers and is now world-wide in membership. The major structural changes involved as the previous hereditary leadership at the international level was converted into the leadership of an elected council are analysed. The growth and development of the religion over this period are described and some statistical information is given. The central concerns of the religion during this time are described in terms of a number of motifs: polar, legalism, millenarianism, social reformism, universalism, liberalism, and martyrdom and sacrifice. An attempt is made to analyse some of the present problems facing the Baha'i community, both in terms of the persecutions that it suffers as well as the problems presented by its successful expansion, and to describe the ways in which it copes with these.

INTRODUCTION

The Baha'i Faith represents an interesting example of contemporary religious change. Originating as a sectarian movement within nineteenth century Iranian Shi'i Islam, the Baha'i Faith has developed into a religion of considerable scope and dynamism. Whilst elements of its Shi'i origins are clearly discernible in its corpus of beliefs and practices, the religion has transcended its Islamic roots. It is now a distinctive and independent religious movement, whose leaders claim for it the status of a new world religion. Validation for this claim may perhaps be found in the religion's impressive record of

expansion.² No longer confined to the Middle East, the Baha'is have established groups or communities in almost all of the countries of the world. Drawn from a great variety of religious and ethnic backgrounds, there are now in excess of four million Baha'is in the world. Of these, fewer than one in ten represent the religion's original Iranian constituency.

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Academic research on Baha'i has not kept track with these developments. In the West, initial scholarly interest in the movement flourished from the 1880s through to the 1910s. Thereafter there followed a lengthy period of scholarly neglect. This was brought to an end in the 1970s, the past 15 years or so witnessing a revival in Baha'i studies. This revival notwithstanding, few writers beyond the immediate circle of those involved in Baha'i studies seem to be aware of recent developments in the religion. The image of the Baha'i Faith which generally pertains is still that of an Iranian-based religion, although recognition of a significant American following is sometimes also made. This 'Iranian image' has been accentuated by the publicity accorded to the recent persecutions of Baha'is in Iran.

The purpose of the present article is to give a general account of developments in the Baha'i Faith over the past three decades, a period which has witnessed a number of major changes in the religion's leadership and organization; demographic base and distribution; and central concerns. We will also attempt to analyse the main problems and prospects that now confront it.

LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATION

The starting point for our survey is 1957, the year of the death of Shoghi Effendi Rabbani (b. 1897), the last of the hereditary Baha'i leaders regarded as divinely guided. In the 1860s, the Iranian notable, Mirza Husayn 'Ali Nuri (1817–1892) had made his claim to be a messenger or 'Manifestation' of God, taking the religious title Baha'u'llah (Glory of God). Before his death, he had appointed his eldest son, 'Abbas Effendi (1844–1921), who took the title 'Abdu'l-Baha (servant of Baha), to be the leader of his followers and the 'centre' of his covenant. 'Abdu'l-Baha in turn appointed his eldest grandson Shoghi Effendi as 'Guardian of the Cause of God' (wali amru'llah). He was to be the first of a projected line of hereditary 'Guardians'.

Each of these transitions in leadership had been fairly readily accepted by the majority of Baha'is. There had been factional opposition at each stage, but this had not been significant in numbers nor long-lasting, principally because in each case the succession had been clearly designated in writing. The main effect of the opposition was probably to emphasize to the majority of Baha'is the importance of 'firmness in the Covenant', and hence to reinforce the role of the hereditary leadership.

The situation in 1957 was different. Shoghi Effendi died unexpectedly during a visit to London, leaving no will and having appointed no successor.

It was potentially a major crisis. Shoghi Effendi had no children, and he himself had previously excommunicated his siblings and cousins for challenging his authority. There was no apparent way in which the line of succession could be continued. Those who assumed leadership of the movement at this time were the 'Hands of the Cause of God'. This group of 27 individuals had recently been appointed by Shoghi Effendi (between 1952 and 1957) and had been designated by him as 'Chief Stewards' of the Faith. In this capacity, the Hands instituted what was effectively a six-year interregnum, a period in which they oversaw the plans which had already been put in train by Shoghi Effendi. They announced that at the end of this period (1963), the Universal House of Justice would be established. Authorized in the writings of Baha'u'llah, this institution would again guarantee that 'the Cause' was in receipt of divine guidance.

At first these declarations were accepted throughout the Baha'i world, but in 1960 a significant movement of opposition emerged. Charles Mason Remey, a leading American Baha'i, who was both one of the Hands of the Cause and president of the International Baha'i Council, proclaimed himself to be the second Guardian. Rejected by his fellow Hands and the overwhelming majority of Baha'is, Remey was expelled from the Baha'i Faith. Nevertheless, his claim did gain significant minority support in some countries, notably France, the United States and Pakistan. However, Remey's followers soon became divided into a number of antagonistic factions, and by the time of his death (in 1974), the number of Baha'is who recognized his claims had greatly diminished. A few Remeyite splinter-groups continue to operate in the United States, albeit ignored by their erstwhile coreligionists.

For Baha'is, 1963 witnessed the reinstitution of direct divine guidance. In April, the members of the governing councils (National Spiritual Assemblies) of the then 56 national Baha'i communities gathered together in Haifa to elect the nine-man Universal House of Justice, henceforth the supreme governing institution of the Baha'i Faith. At their own request, the remaining Hands were not eligible for election. Whatever doubts may have been engendered during the period of the interregnum seem to have been readily dispelled. The belief in an authoritative centre to whom all could turn simply assumed a new form. As the House of Justice soon made clear, there was no scripturally sanctioned way in which further Guardians could be appointed.

On assuming office, the tasks that confronted the Universal House of Justice included several of an administrative nature. One task to which the House of Justice itself attached great importance was the definition of its own powers and responsibilities in a formal constitution which was adopted in 1972.⁵ In this document, the House established its authority over all other Baha'i institutions and confirmed the system by which the members of the

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House were to be elected every five years by all of the members of the National Spiritual Assemblies. The House of Justice has also greatly expanded the administrative apparatus of the 'Baha'i World Centre' (which has, since the exile of Baha'u'llah to Akka in Palestine by the Ottoman Turkish authorities in 1868, been located in the Haifa/Akka area). Various departments have been established to help the House of Justice in its work (secretariat, research, statistics, library and archives, etc.) and the number of office personnel based in Haifa has been expanded so that, from the handful of individuals so employed under Shoghi Effendi, there is now a body of over 370 staff and short-term volunteers, still a relatively small number considering the recent expansion of the movement. Since 1983, some of this activity has been transferred to a newly built administrative centre, a stately building constructed in quasi-classical style on the side of Mount Carmel.

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Other administrative developments under the Universal House of Justice concern the 'institutions of the learned' and various specialist agencies. According to its scriptural base, the Baha'i system of administration should comprise two separate sets of institutions serving under the head of the Faith. These are the 'Rulers', that is the locally and nationally elected Spiritual Assemblies, and the 'Learned', who comprise various individuals charged with the responsibility of advising the Assemblies and encouraging the rankand-file Baha'is. At the time of Shoghi Effendi's death, the Spiritual Assemblies were well established and widely spread, but the Learned, that is the individual Hands of the Cause and the Auxiliary Board Members who assisted them, were only newly established. Accordingly, the House of Justice has sought to strengthen these institutions, greatly increasing the number of Auxiliary Board Members (from 72 in 1957 to 756 in 1988), and creating two major new institutions: the Continental Boards of Counsellors (from 1968) to perpetuate the functions of the Hands of the Cause⁷ and to review Baha'i activities in each continent; and the International Teaching Centre in Haifa (from 1973) to supervise the activities of the Learned and to work on various projects allocated to it by the Universal House of Justice, particularly as related to the propagation of the Baha'i Faith. Auxiliary Board Members have also been authorized to appoint assistants (from 1973). The possibility that these various institutions of the Learned might foster the growth of what would be effectively a clergy has been sharply curtailed by the introduction of fixed terms of office for all those appointed.8

Several specialized agencies have also been established or reinforced. Chief amongst these is the Baha'i International Community (BIC), the body by which the Baha'is are accredited to the United Nations as a non-governmental organization. First established in 1948, the activities of the BIC have been greatly expanded in recent years. In 1967, a permanent Baha'i representation of the BIC have been greatly expanded in recent years.

sentative was appointed. Baha'i involvement with the UN now includes consultative status with UN's Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and Children's Fund (UNICEF), affiliation with the Environment Program (UNEP), Department of Public Information and various other bodies. Baha'i representatives have participated in many UN conferences on issues such as human rights, social development, the status of women, the environment, narcotic drugs, children, health, and disarmament. The BIC operates under the direct supervision of the Universal House of Justice.

Other specialized Baha'i agencies include a Haifa-based Office of Social and Economic Development (from 1983), an International Audio-Visual Centre, and the Canadian-based Association of Baha'i Studies and its affiliates (from 1975). The general tendency appears to be to allow these agencies (and the International Teaching Centre) an increasing measure of autonomy. The present over-all structure of Baha'i administration is illustrated in Figure 1.

EXPANSION AND DISTRIBUTION

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The overall pattern of Baha'i expansion is quite clear. Starting in the 1860s, a distinct Baha'i community developed among the remnant of the Babis, the adherents of Sayyid 'Ali Muhammad the Bab, the messianic leader whom Baha'is regard as the precursor of their own religion. The vast majority of Babis had previously been Iranian Shi'is, and initially this remained the primary constituency of Baha'i expansion. However Baha'u'llah's claims were strongly universalistic—he proclaimed himself to be the promised one of all religions—and Baha'i missionary endeavour was wide-ranging and effective. By the time of Baha'u'llah's death in 1972, new adherents had been gained among Iranian Jews and Zoroastrians, Arab Sunni Muslims, Levantine Christians and Persianized Indians. In addition, important Baha'i communities were developing among Iranian expatriates in Russian Caucasia and Turkestan.

Expansion beyond these essentially Middle Eastern groups began in the 1890s with the beginning of a Baha'i mission in the United States, and thence to Canada, Western Europe, Hawaii, Australia, New Zealand and Japan. Although small in numbers, these Western Baha'i communities, particularly those of North America, soon exerted a significant influence on the further development of the Baha'i religion.

Effective transcendence of these two 'worlds' of Baha'i activity—the Islamic heartland and the West—only began in the 1950s, in the period covered by our survey. Missionary endeavour on the part of Middle Eastern and Western Baha'is had led to the establishment of Baha'i communities in several parts of the non-Muslim 'Third World', initially among the Western-oriented urban minority. Conversions of larger numbers began in a few isolated areas

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


Figure 1. Present structure of Baha'i administration. Key: →, formal authority; ---, consultative relationship.

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in the 1950s⁹ and spread during the 1960s to most parts of the 'Third World'. The results were dramatic. As Baha'i teachers learned to adapt their message and missionary techniques to the situation of the unschooled masses of Third World peasants and urban workers, they completely transformed their religion's social base. Now, the great majority of Baha'is in the world are drawn from the popular classes of the non-Islamic Third World. Even in the well-established Baha'i communities of North America, recent infusions of minority group members (Blacks and Amerindians) has led to a significant change in the social base of the membership.

QUANTITATIVE GROWTH

Quantification of these changes is not easy. With any religious movement there are invariable problems of quantification unless the movement's own enumeration techniques are exceptionally efficient, or government censuses incorporate questions on religion. Even here there are often considerable problems of definition. Are gradations of commitment to be taken into consideration so as to differentiate between active and nominal members? Are the children of members to be included as well as adults? Is allowance to be made for the pattern of multi-religious adherence which is common in many parts of the world? These are, of course, problems that affect the estimation of numbers for any religion and are not confined to Baha'i statistics.

There are also more specific problems in the case of Baha'i statistics. In the West at least, the conceptualization of membership has changed. Up to the 1950s, children were often not even considered as part of the Baha'i community, and subsequently enumerations of 'Baha'i children' were usually incomplete. Only in 1979 did the Universal House of Justice indicate that all children of Baha'i parents were to be regarded as Baha'is for statistical purposes. More specifically, early enumerations of Baha'is in India after the onset of 'mass conversion' appear to have included only men. Again, a separate categorization of Baha'is whose addresses are unknown (that is, who are effectively no longer members of the community) is only a comparatively recent innovation and is confined to a limited number of national Baha'i communities. More generally, the areas of greatest growth have often been the areas in which much of the population is at best semi-literate and in which the Baha'i institutions lack the experience or resources for efficient enumeration. Even the highly efficient American Baha'i administration was unable to cope effectively with the mass influx of rural southern blacks which occurred in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Until recently, there was also a problem due to the non-availability of Baha'i membership figures. Thus statistics were given by the Baha'i authorities in terms of numbers of localities and Baha'i institutions 10 rather

than of individual Baha'is. This situation is now changing, particularly since a Department of Statistics was established at Haifa (1966). More accurate information, including better estimates of the number of Baha'is, is now becoming available. However, for the earlier period, the figures for the number of Baha'i institutions are themselves useful indicators of Baha'i expansion and distribution. Moreover, by a number of means, 11 it is possible to form reasonably accurate estimates for numbers over the past few decades.

Putting together the data that is available with our own estimates, the following picture emerges (see Tables 1 and 2). In the early 1950s, there were probably in the region of 200 000 Baha'is world-wide. The vast majority of these (over 90%) lived in Iran. There were probably fewer than 10 000 Baha'is in the West and no more than 3000 Baha'is in the Third World mostly in India, these last two figures being exclusive of children. Institutionally, we may be more precise. In 1954, there were 708 Local Spiritual Assemblies. In addition, there were 2409 groups and isolated Baha'is, making a total of 3117 localities in which Baha'is resided. There were 12 National or Regional Spiritual Assemblies (Iran; Iraq; Egypt and the Sudan; the Indian subcontinent and Burma; the British Isles; Germany and Austria, Italy and Switzerland; the U.S.A.; Canada; Central America; South America and Australia and New Zealand). Of the Local Spiritual Assemblies, 46.3% were in the Middle East, 38.3% in the West; and 15.4% in the Third World (see Table 1).

Table 1. Geographical diffusion and institutional expansion of the Baha'i Faith

	1954	1963	1968	1973	1979	1988
National Spiritual Assemblies	12	56	81	113	125	149
Local Spiritual Assemblies	708	3379	5902	17 037	23 624	19 48
Localities where			3302	17 037	23 024	
Baha'is reside	3117	11 092	31 883	69 541	102 704	112 137

SOURCES: For 1954; Baha'i World, Vol. 12, Wilmette, Ill., 1956, pp. 721–774. For 1963: The Baha'i Faith 1944–63: Information, Statistical and Comparative, compiled by the Hands of the Cause residing in the Holy Land, n.p., 1963. For 1968: Baha'i World, Vol. 14, Haifa, 1970, pp. 167, 560; The Baha'i Faith: Statistical Information (1844–1968), Haifa, 1968. For 1973: The Baha'i World, Vol. 15, Haifa, 1976, p. 291. For 1979: The Seven Year Plan (1979–1986): Statistical Report, Ridvan 1986, Haifa 1986. For 1988: personal communication: Department of Statistics, Haifa, dated by July 1988. The drop in the number of Local Spiritual Assemblies is mostly accounted for by a major re-organization of the Indian Baha'i community in 1987 whereby the area covered by each Local Assembly was increased to include several villages. As result, the number of Local Assemblies in India dropped from 15 448 to 4497.

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By the late 1960s, a great increase in the number of Baha'is had occurred. Conversions of large numbers of tribal or peasant peoples in various parts of the Third World had begun, and even in the West, as the decade drew to a close, there were appreciable infusions of new believers among youth. World-wide, we 'guestimate' that there may now have been about one million Baha'is. Of these, the largest single concentrations were in India and Iran, with perhaps a quarter of a million Baha'is in each. Elsewhere in the Third World there were probably over 300 000 Baha'is, mostly in Africa and Latin America. In the West there were about 30 000 Baha'is. Institutionally, by 1968, there were a total of 81 National Assemblies, almost 6000 Local Assemblies, and over 31 000 localities in which Baha'is resided. Of the Local Assemblies, 80% were in the Third World, 11% in the West, and 10% in the Middle East. The historically important areas of Iran and North America now together constituted only about 25% of the total Baha'i world community.

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Such a rapid increase in Baha'i numbers engendered its own problems. Most of the flood of new Baha'is were poorly educated, and many lived in rural and tribal areas with which effective communication was difficult to sustain. Many national Baha'i communities-including even the United States-experienced considerable difficulty in 'consolidating' the faith of their mass of new adherents. Towards the end of the 1970s, the rate of expansion slowed somewhat as Baha'i communities began to tackle these difficulties. The onset of the major persecutions of the Baha'i community in Iran in 1979 added to these problems. Quite apart from the paralysis caused to one of the most important Baha'i communities, the new Government regulations in Iran prevented the sending of money out of the country. As the Iranian Baha'is had been a major source of funds for both the upkeep of the World Centre and to support the Baha'i communities in poorer countries, a financial crisis also ensued.

The gradual resolution of these problems (see page 83) led to further periods of growth. The situation at present is that the Baha'i Faith is overwhelmingly a 'Third World' religion. Its major areas of expansion are at present India, South America (mostly among the native Amerindian population), the Pacific and some parts of sub-Saharan Africa. Some of the other areas that were witnessing rapid expansion in the late 1960s have been severely affected by political problems, including several countries in Africa (in particular Uganda) and South-east Asia (especially Vietnam and Indonesia). Nevertheless, as shown in Table 2, since 1968 there has been a large increase in numbers in all areas except the Middle East and North Africa. In the 'Third World', the increase in numbers has been more than five-fold with particularly marked increases in South Asia and Oceania.

By the late 1980s, there are, according to official Baha'i statistics, over

Table 2. Estimated Baha'i populations

	1954	1968	1988
(1) Middle East and North Africa	200 000	250 000	300 00
(2) North America, Europe & Anglo-Pacific	10 000	30 000	200 00
(3) South Asia	1000	300 000	1 900 00
(4) South-east Asia		200 000	300 00
(5) East Asia		10 000	20 00
(6) Latin America & the Caribbean	> 2000	100 000	700 00
(7) Africa (sub-Saharan)	al a di Ispado s	200 000	1 000 00
(8) Oceania (excluding Anglo-Pacific	to the fact.	5000	70 00
Total	213 000	1 095 000	4 490 00
Baha'is in Iran as percentage of total	94	22	
Baha'is in India as percentage of total	< 1	26	de name

The world has been divided into 'cultural areas' (following P. Smith, *The Babi at Baha'i Religions*, Cambridge, 1987, pp. 165–171). 'Anglo-Pacific' means Hawaii, New Zealand and Australia.

These figures have been derived through a combination of the following methods calculation of approximate numbers from the number of Baha'i organizations (for sources see Table 1); extrapolating back from the official figures for the number individual Baha'is provided more recently; estimates provided by informed Baha's and when the first draft of this paper was completed, a copy was sent to Department of Statistics in Haifa and the present table incorporates some of the statistical information given in the reply to this, dated 8 July 1988. With regard calculations based on the number of Baha'i organizations, the survey by A. Hampso 'The growth and spread of the Baha'i Faith', Ph.D., University of Hawaii, 1980, (st pp. 448-458 in particular) is a useful starting point. Hampson has derived a region sion formula for calculating the number of Baha'is from the number of LSAs and total localities where Baha'is reside. However, the regression formula that he uses based primarily on and is biased towards the smaller Baha'i communities of between 50 and 200 LSAs. This constituted the majority of Baha'i communities at the that he was doing his research but under-represents the larger Baha'i communité For research on the present-day Baha'i community, we have found it more useful derive two separate regression formulae: one for areas (1) and (2) above (excluding large) and separate regression formulae: one for areas (1) and (2) above (excluding large) Iran) and countries with less than 200 LSAs: Y = 1043 + 23.86X (if based LSAs); T = 1114 + 4. 81X (if based on number of localities) and one for the Countries of the Third World (if based on number of localities) and one for the countries of the Third World (if based on number of localities) and one for the countries of the Third World (if based on number of localities) and one for the countries of the Third World (if based on number of localities) and one for the countries of the Third World (if based on number of localities) and one for the countries of the Third World (if based on number of localities) and one for the countries of the Third World (if based on number of localities) and one for the countries of the Third World (if based on number of localities) and one for the countries of the Third World (if based on number of localities) and one for the countries of the Third World (if based on number of localities) and one for the countries of the Third World (if based on number of localities) and one for the countries of the Third World (if based on number of localities) and one for the countries of the Third World (if based on number of localities) and one for the countries of countries of the Third World (areas (3)–(7) above): Y = 10129 + 44.26X (if base)

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four million Baha'is world-wide. With the change in the definition of membership, this figure is now inclusive of men, women and children. The numerical dominance of the Third World is now even more striking, some 91% of the Baha'i population living in these areas. By contrast, Western Baha'is now comprise only 3% of the total, and Middle Easterners (mostly Iranians) about 6%. In terms of institutional expansion, by 1988 there were 149 National Spiritual Assemblies, almost 20 000 Local Spiritual Assemblies and over 112 000 localities in which Baha'is are resided. The distribution of these worldwide can be seen in Table 3.

EXPANSION AND DEVELOPMENT PLANS

This numerical growth has occurred within the context of formal plans with specific goals for the expansion of the Baha'i community. Initiated at a national level in the 1930s, the first international plan was instituted by Shoghi Effendi (Ten-Year Plan, 1953–1963), and since then the Universal House of Justice has set to date a succession of international plans: the Nine-Year Plan (1964–1973), Five-Year Plan (1974–1979), Seven-Year Plan (1979–1986) and Six-Year Plan (1986–1992). These plans have generally been highly successful and their various numerical goals have usually been surpassed.

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on LSAs); Y = 15588 + 9.94X (if based on number of localities). The figure for Iran has been estimated separately, see P. Smith 'A note on Babi and Baha'i Numbers in Iran' Iranian Studies, 17 1984, pp. 295-301. One factor that must be corrected for is the fact that these regression formulae and also most of the statements regarding the number of Baha'is in a country (prior to 1979 when the Universal House of Justice clarified the basis for statistics by instructing that all children of Baha'i parents also be included) relate only to adult Baha'is (over 21 years of age). Most census results and population estimates are given in terms of combined adults and children, and therefore, for comparative purposes, these estimates are also based on adults and children. Where the information available gives only the number of adults, the total has been increased by a factor derived from the demographic information in UNESCO Control of the total figure. UNESCO, Statistical Handbook 1985, Paris, 1985 in order to arrive at the total figure. The numbers obtained in this way have been checked against some individual countries. countries where the number of Baha'is at a particular time is known and they were found to be found to be accurate to within 25%. The Department of Statistics at the Baha'i World Centre is at present compiling far more detailed country by country estimates.

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Table 3. Bahai' statistics, July 1987

	World	Africa	America	Asia	Australasia	E
NSAs	148	43	41	26	17	9.50
LSAs	19 273	5984	5640	6 257	686	
Localities	116 707	37 021	26 712	39 321	2706	3
Total Baha'is	4455	992	877	2474	87	Lang
(in thousands)						

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Sub-divided by cultural areas: **NSAs** LSAs Localitie 12 83 Middle East and North Africa 986 The West: 3 2110 North America 8550 21 706 3087 Europe (including Eastern Europe) 3 251 592 The Anglo-Pacific The Third World Africa (sub-Saharan) 40 5957 36 886 Latin America & Caribbean 38 3530 18 162 31 780 South Asia 7 4957 South-east Asia 6002 6 1140 East Asia 688 4 104 Oceania 2114 14 435 Total 108 847 148 19 273

Source: Statistical Summary Tables: for semi-annual reports of July 1987, Hailz February, 1988; personal communication: Department of Statistics, Haifa, dated July 1988.

Besides detailing specific goals for the number and distribution (Assemblies and localities, these Plans have included other goals of both) quantitative and qualitative nature. These goals have included:

(1) The development of the Baha'i World Centre in the Haifa-Akka are through the acquisition of several properties connected with the live of Baha'u'llah and 'Abdu'l-Baha, the construction of the seat of the Universal House of Justice (1983), and the extension and beautification of the lands surrounding the Baha'i shrines;

(2) The collection and classification of the Baha'i sacred writings and their authoritative interpretations (by Shoghi Effendi) has been continued so that there are now in excess of 60 000 original documents copies held at Haifa: 12

(3) The translation and publication of literature. Baha'i literature had b

1988 been translated into 802 languages, and published in 520 languages; some of this published material consists only of small pamphlets but at least one book of 60 pages or more is now available in 111 languages and there is quite a substantial literature in several European and Indian languages as well as languages such as Swahili and Samoan;¹³

- (4) The construction of Baha'i Houses of Worship of which all but one of the seven presently built were constructed during the 1957–1988 period; 14
- (5) The establishment of Baha'i radio stations, seven to date: five in Latin America, one in the USA and one in Africa;
- (6) The fostering of the spiritual, communal and intellectual aspects of Baha'i life;
- (7) The proper functioning of Spiritual Assemblies;
- (8) The enhancement of the role of women within Baha'i administration and community life;
- (9) The strengthening of family life;
- (10) The education of children;
- (11) The initiation of socio-economic projects including those concerned with literacy, education, agriculture and health.

One of the areas in which there has been the greatest development in recent years is in the field of publishing. Up to the early 1970s, almost all of the books available on the subject of the Baha'i Faith in English and almost every other language 15 were either works by the central figures of the religion (i.e. sacred texts and authoritative interpretation) 16 or basic introductory books. Thus in January 1972, there were available for sale some 68 books in the English language of which 35 were either writings or compilations from the writings of the central figures and seven were children's books. Only 16 of these were published by independent publishers, the rest being by various Baha'i Publishing Trusts, which are organs of the National Spiritual Assemblies. During 1971, only four new books, one reprint and one children's book had been published. 18

By contrast, in October 1985, there were 214 books for sale in the English language, of which 50 were works or compilations of the writings of the central figures and 27 were children's books. ¹⁹ Of these 95 were from independent publishers. During 1984, 21 new books, five reprints and six children's books were published; 22 of these by independent publishers. ²⁰

CENTRAL CONCERNS

It seems clear that the past 30 years have witnessed a considerable change in the central concerns which have been important to the Baha'i community. Such changes have stemmed both from policy decisions by the Baha'i leadership, particularly the Universal House of Justice, and from changes in

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interest at the grass-roots. Given the centralized nature of the Baha'i community and the concern of the leadership to keep abreast of the situation at the grass-roots, these forces for change are necessarily interactive.

In mapping these changes, we will employ the concept of *motif* as describing the fundamental patterns of religious experience which characterize a particular religious movement.²¹ Modern Baha'i may be described in terms of seven such motifs: polarity, legalism, millenarianism, social reformism, universalism, liberalism, and the interlinked themes of martyrdom and sacrifice. Given the great diversity of the present-day Baha'i community, the popular elements of these motifs will vary widely. In this regard, although both authors have knowledge of Middle Eastern and Third World Baha'i communities, we will concentrate on the concerns of western Baha'is, as being those which are still most pervasive in the Baha'i world as a whole.

The polar motif. The regard for authoritative and charismatic leadership-what is here termed the polar motif—has been central throughout the entire course of Baha'i history. It is effectively enshrined in the doctrine of 'firmness in the Convenant'—that is, the belief that there is always a divinely appointed and validated centre of the Baha'i cause, and that it is an absolute duty of all Baha'is to be faithful and obedient to that centre. In turn, this doctrine is supported by the policy of excommunication of those 'covenant-breakers who vehemently oppose the authority of the centre. A major change in this motif occurred with Shoghi Effendi's accession to the leadership. The personalistic charisma exercised by Baha'u'llah and 'Abdu'l-Baha was deliberately replaced by a more legalistic charisma of office, and the Baha'is were increasingly encouraged to look at their religious institutions for authority and guidance.

By 1957, the polar motif was so firmly established, that both of the main responses to the crisis caused by Shoghi Effendi's death were structured by the desire for authoritative and charismatic leadership. The minority response involved Mason Remey's desire to continue the line of divinely guided Guardians. This may well have appealed to more Baha'is than it did, had it not been for the united and resolute opposition of the other Hands. As it was, for the majority of Baha'is, the promise of the restoration of scripturally sanctioned leadership through the election of the Universal House of Justice proved more attractive than the dubious claims of Mason Remey. The successful election of the Universal House of Justice in 1963 appears to have occasioned great relief, marking the end of a crisis of widely acknowledged severity.

Clearly, however, the substitution of an institution, the Universal House of Justice, in place of an individual leader resulted in a further depersonalization of charismatic leadership. Charisma has become further legalized and routinized. The individual members of the Universal House of Justice are

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greatly respected, but they do not personally bear the divine afflatus. In contrast to the period of Shoghi Effendi's Guardianship, unofficially circulated 'pilgrim's notes' do not constitute a 'Baha'i apocrypha' and there is little personalistic devotion to the members of the House. Nevertheless, the institutional charisma of the House of Justice continues to exert a strong appeal. For Baha'is, the House of Justice provides a source of direct divine guidance and as such represents a beacon of hope in a distracted world.

The strength of this appeal can perhaps be judged by the fact that, since 1963, there has been no significant opposition to the authority of the House of Justice, the number of declared Covenant-breakers having remained negligible. Attempts to attract support by the remnant of an earlier group of anti-organizational schismatics (dating from the 1930s) have been unavailing, as has a similar attempt by a small American splinter group of charismatic libertarians.

Legalism. The concern with divine law as a pattern for personal, communal and social life has been a basic element in the Baha'i religion since the appearance of Baha'u'llah's book of laws, al-Kitab al-Agdas, in c. 1873. However, up to now, the elaboration and implementation of such laws has been extremely limited. As yet, the Baha'i Faith does not possess an extensive framework of religious law such as is found in its parent religion of Islam. Although the Universal House of Justice is specifically empowered to enact supplementary legislation to the laws of the Aqdas, it has not as yet embarked on any major programme of legislation. As with Shoghi Effendi before it, the Universal House of Justice evidently prefers to state general moral principles and to emphasize the importance of individual conscience and decision-making, rather than to elaborate on the existing corpus of Baha'i law. It has, however, greatly increased the number of Baha'i legal texts which are readily available, and is at present preparing to publish for the first time an official English translation of the Aqdas and its supplementary

texts together with extensive annotations. The primary vehicle for the administration of Baha'i law is the system of local and national spiritual assemblies developed by Shoghi Effendi. When first established, many of these bodies displayed a distinct tendency towards over-administration, a trend which Shoghi Effendi sharply discouraged. Judging by the administration manuals put out by various National Spiritual Assemblies, we suspect that, at least in the West, the past 30 years have seen the development of a lighter approach to the administration of Baha'i law. There are doubtless still many Baha'is who would wish to emphasize and extend the prerogatives of the Baha'i administration, but such views appear

to be less dominant than they once were.

Millenarianism. This may be defined as the expectation of an imminent parousia or overturning of the current state of affairs. Quite commonly, such

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millenarianism shades off into less urgent and more general hopes for the establishment of millennial bliss. As systematized by Shoghi Effendi, the millenarian and millennial aspects of the Baha'i teachings centre on three interrelated elements: the 'Most Great Peace' foretold by Baha'u'llah, representing a spiritualized humanity united by Baha'i teachings; the 'Lesser Peace', a pragmatic, politically based world peace established by treaty among the nations; and an apocalyptic world-wide catastrophe, the exact

nature of which is not expressly defined.

Earlier generations of Baha'is often expected that the Most Great Peace would be soon established, but Shoghi Effendi defined it as a far distant millennial hope. The Lesser Peace and Catastrophe were regarded as more urgent eventualities however. When Shoghi Effendi died, there would seem to have been some welling up of apocalyptic expectation. This was most marked among the followers of C. M. Remey. Remey had long been inclined towards apocalypticism and, in the charged atmosphere of his challenge for the leadership, this element became prominent in his interpretations of the Baha'i teachings. Indeed, according to his doctrine of the 'great global catastrophe', cataclysmic movements of the earth's crust would shortly lead to universal devastation. A specific date was set for this, 1963, this being changed later to 1995. Apocalyptic expectations remain strong among the various Remeyite splinter groups. 22 Nothing as specific as this emerged among the mainstream Baha'is. There is an undercurrent of interest and speculation about the catastrophe among the mainstream Baha'is but this is discouraged by official Baha'i institutions and neither the date nor the nature of the catastrophe have ever been set (and are thus not subject 10 disconfirmation). The references to it by the Universal House of Justice take the form of a general critique of the present state of the world, and are used as a specific goad to sacrificial action on the part of the Baha'is in the work of constructing a 'new world order'. Optimism about the future peace seems to outweigh any apocalyptic pessimism, and overall, the balance towards optimism seems to be increasing.

At an official level, Baha'is are primarly committed to working for the Most Great Peace, a commitment that has continued to the present. Baha'i attitudes towards the Lesser Peace have however altered with time. The Baha'is used to regard this as something that would become a political necessity and be brought into being by the political leaders of the world and which was therefore none of their concern. Recently, however, the Universal House of Justice has indicated that the Baha'is themselves should play a role in the achievement of the Lesser Peace. In this regard, the issuing of the Universal House of Justice's statement, *The Promise of World Peace* (October 1985) to the 'peoples of the world' is highly significant. In this statement, the Universal House of Justice emphasizes the importance of religion as a

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source of order; gives its assessment of the factors militating against peace in the world at the present time; calls for the convocation of an assembly of the leaders of the world to consult about the means of bringing about peace through binding and enforceable treaties; and offers the Baha'i world community as a model of what can be achieved through unity and cooperation. The presentation of this message to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and to Heads of State throughout the world was a prelude to an intensive world-wide campaign by the Baha'is to bring this message to the attention of all. This has led to a far greater Baha'i involvement in various social groupings such as the peace movement. This involvement is all the more remarkable in that such movements have previously been regarded by most Baha'is as being too overtly political to permit their participation; this being because of the Baha'i insistence on the avoidance of involvement with party or partisan politics.

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Social reformism. Since the time of Baha'u'llah, the Baha'i hope for the future establishment of a millennial Kingdom of God on earth has been linked to a programme advocating specific social reforms and universal social principles. Elaborated by successive Baha'i leaders, this programme of reform includes such measures as the abolition of the extremes of wealth and poverty, the emancipation of women, universal compulsory education, the adoption of an international auxiliary language, and the fostering of means to promote the unity, harmony and spiritual development of the human race.

Until recently, however, the Baha'is confined themselves merely to advocating these principles rather than to applying them. Historically, it had proved impossible for the Baha'i communities in Iran (because of the hostile environment) and North America (because of lack of numbers and resources) to engage in extensive practical activity to realize Baha'i social goals. Prior to the 1970s, Baha'i activity in this area in Iran had been cut short through the closure of the Baha'i schools and the general atmosphere of repression, while outside Iran it was confined to the establishment of a few schools and some collaborative endeavours with humanitarian reform groups such as the American National Association for the Advancement of Colored People or, in Europe, the Esperantists. Baha'i communities were also able to promote the principle of gender equality within their own institutions, a particularly significant development in countries such as Iran where women have traditionally been unable to assume positions of religious leadership.²³

This situation began to change as the Baha'i communities of the Third World began to become more firmly established. The influx of a large number of peasants and tribal peoples made the problems of extreme social disadvantage a very real part of Baha'i experience and consciousness. Accordingly, social development projects were initiated in an increasing number of communities. These consisted of educational projects such as the

institution of tutorial schools, agricultural projects and, more recently, health projects.

This new phase of Baha'i activity was emphasized by the message of the House of Justice to the Baha'i world dated 20 October 1983. In this the Baha'is were urged to seek out ways, compatible with the Baha'i teachings, in which they could become involved in the social and economic development of the communities in which they lived. Baha'i communities in developing countries had already been extending the range of such activities for some time but the extent to which Baha'is should become involved in philanthropic activities not directly concerned with the propagation of their faith had always been a problematic area, particularly for Baha'is in the more developed countries. This message of the Universal House of Justice, together with the establishment in Haifa of an Office of Social and Economic Development, paved the way for a great increase in the planning and execution of projects both locally and internationally.

The results were impressive. Thus, in 1979, there were 129 officially recognized Baha'i projects concerned with aspects of social and economic development. Most (111) of these were 'tutorial schools'—rudimentary educational institutions concerned with fostering basic rural literacy, health, education and the like. There were also 10 academic schools (open to Baha'is and non-Baha'is alike). By 1987, the number of officially recognized development projects had increased to 1482. Nearly 770 of these were tutorial schools or literacy and vocational training programmes, but there were also a significant number of community development, health and agricultural projects. The total number of academic schools has also risen to 29 under direct Baha'i sponsorship and an additional 59 established as private ventures by individual Baha'is.²⁴

Although concentrated in the Third World, this surge of socio-economic development activity has also occurred in Baha'i communities in other parts of the world. In Europe and North America, it is likely that the Baha'is will work increasingly closely with various humanitarian and reformist group. Indeed it would seem likely that this whole area of social and economic development will assume increasing importance and become an established feature of Baha'i community life.

The Baha'i involvement with the United Nations has been referred to above. This involvement has served a number of purposes, including the provision of a platform for Baha'i reformist ideas, the gaining of international prestige and recognition, and the attainment of some means to seek international help in the protection of Baha'is suffering persecution in Iran and elsewhere.

Universalism. The Baha'i belief in the unique role and purpose of the Baha'i Faith in God's redemptive plan coexists with a belief in the universality

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of His guidance and grace to mankind. This universality underlies Baha'i exhortations to all religionists to practise tolerance for those with other beliefs. It also supports the practice of collaboration with other religionists on matters of mutual concern. In this regard, Baha'i involvement in interfaith collaboration and dialogue has increased during the period under review both because the Baha'i Faith has become better known and because the growing general awareness of the religious plurality in modern society has led to increased opportunities.

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In the early stages of Baha'i development, Baha'i universalism sometimes also embraced a very inclusivist conception of Baha'i membership. Many Baha'is then retained their existing religious memberships while thinking of their religion as a movement which was a 'spiritual leaven' among the religions rather than a distinct religion. 25 This early viewpoint was replaced by a far more exclusivist conception of membership during the leadership of Shoghi Effendi-membership of the Baha'i Faith became subject to formal registration and abandonment of other religious memberships was insisted on. In sociological terms, the religion became more sectarian.

There has been no return to the extreme inclusivism of the early Baha'i community, but the Baha'i membership principle has become more universalist in the past few years with the automatic inclusion of Baha'i children onto membership lists of the Baha'i community-a practice that was previously confined to Iran. Thus the former Western and Third World practice of Baha'i children 'contracting into' membership has been replaced by one of 'contracting out'. As the level of membership commitment is likely to vary considerably (as with any religion), this has the effect of making the Baha'i community considerably more inclusivist than has hitherto been the case outside the Middle East. Again, associated with the greater number of conversions in recent years, there has been a considerable relaxation in the standards of knowledge of the religion required of new believers before their declarations of faith are accepted. This also facilitates a greater inclusivism of membership.

Baha'i universalism also has missionary import. The belief that God's guidance has been received by all the peoples of the world has as a corollary the belief that Baha'i represents the fulfilment of all religions. The missiological implications of this belief as regards Islam, Judaism, Christianity and Zoroastrianism were elaborated by Babi and Baha'i writers prior to 1921. There was always an implicit extension of this belief to religions of non-Middle Eastern provenance, but it has only been in the past 25 years that this has assumed any substance. Thus, since the 1950s, Baha'i writers have sought to prove that their religion fulfils such millenarian expectations as of Hinduism, Buddhism, Mormonism and the North American Indian religions. 26

Another aspect of Baha'i universalism is related to the influx of large

numbers of new believers from the Third World. This has led to the emergence of new cultural styles within the Baha'i world. In this regard, the astonishing spread of the religion among lower-caste Hindus has been particularly significant. Growth has also led to an increased ethnic diversification of many national Baha'i communities. Whereas formerly the only foreign Baha'is commonly encountered in any given country were either Iranians or Americans, the increasing diversity in the Baha'i world community is beginning to make itself felt in the numbers of 'Third World' and other Baha'is travelling and residing outside their own countries leading to a strengthening of the feeling of universality.

Liberalism. Religious liberalism may be defined as the belief that religious knowledge should be compatible with the rationality of the modern world. This belief finds a considerable range of expression in contemporary religion, and is also associated with a characteristic tension with a tradition-oriented

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religious fundamentalism.

The Baha'i Faith has sometimes been presented as the epitome of religious liberalism, with emphasis being placed on its social and humanitarian principles and on its assertion of the essential harmony between religion and scientific rationality. The actual situation is more complicated than this, however. For alongside Baha'i liberalism, there has also existed a strong emphasis on the authority of the central figures of the Baha'i religion, and more generally on the authority of the Baha'i administrative system. This latter emphasis has limited the operation of Baha'i liberalism, and there has at times been a discernible tension between these two coexistent themes. Given the now general acceptance of the authority of the Baha'i administration, this particular tension does not appear to have been much in evidence during the past 30 years.

However, there is some evidence for the development of the classical liberal-fundamentalist tension in some Western Baha'i communities. This is a complex topic which requires more than the passing reference which we can give it here. As in most religions, and Christianity in particular, this tension has manifested itself most acutely as a result of the probings of modern critical scholarship.²⁸ Whilst Baha'i has avoided the traditional religious tension between religion and the physical sciences, the situation with regard to history is somewhat different. Although scriptural texts exist that point to an acceptance of critical scholarship, in practice there has tended to be a relatively uncritical acceptance of the authority of texts and an assumption of the uncomplicated purity of Baha'i history. This attitude has been challenged in the past 15 years or so by the development of modern academic studies of the religion by both Baha'i and non-Baha'i writers. The issues raised remain controversial and some of the responses have been distinctly 'fundamentalist' in tone. But with increasing exposure to these new

viewpoints, modern historical scholarship is gaining for itself a respected position with Western Baha'i communities and this may point towards a liberal resolution to this tension.

Martyrdom and sacrifice. In the Babi movement, as in Shi'i Islam, the theme of martyrdom in the cause of truth was linked to the belief that the faithful should struggle against the ungodly, even to the point of taking up arms. One of the most significant features of Baha'u'llah's transformation of Babism was his forbidding of holy war and his insistence that his followers not engage in militant or subversive activity. In place of holy war, he bade the Baha'is to engage in spreading their religion by non-violent teaching (tabligh) and the 'acquisition of spiritual influence'. The high station of martyrdom was, however, still extolled although the Baha'is were bidden to avoid it if they could by the exercise of prudence and caution (the Shi'i practice of denying one's faith if in danger, taqiyya, was, however, forbidden to the Baha'is). Periodically, the Iranian Baha'is have suffered persecution for their beliefs and many had died as martyrs up to the Iranian Revolution of 1979.

Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979, the persecution of the Baha'is in Iran has intensified greatly (see page 72). Details of the persecutions suffered by the Iranian Baha'is are transmitted in a direct and relatively undiluted manner through the Iranian Baha'i diaspora to the rest of the Baha'i world. One expression of this, among both Iranian and non-Iranian Baha'is, has been an emphasis on renewed dedication and service to their religion as an expression of support and identity with those who are denied the freedom to do other than to suffer and die for their religion. This has been a powerful theme, and one which is stressed by Baha'i institutions. It appears to have greatly increased the degree of commitment and solidarity of the Baha'i communities of the world.

PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

During the past 30 years, the Baha'i Faith has undergone a series of considerable transformations. The line of hereditary leaders has come to an end. The overall leadership of the religion has devolved upon an elected council (although this is still regarded as divinely ordained and guided). Subordinate to the centre of the Faith, an extensive administrative structure has come into being, in part at least in response to the increasing scale and diversity of Baha'i activities. At the same time, massive expansion of the religion has occurred, so that Baha'i claims to the status of a world religion now begin to appear credible. This expansion has also completely transformed the religion's social basis: what was formerly a predominantly Iranian religion with a small but significant Western following has become a world-wide religious movement, with its major membership in the Third World and with

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an enormous diversity of followers in terms of religious and ethnic backgrounds. Changes have also occurred in the religion's central concerns, particularly in terms of the growth of social activism.

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The overall impression is of a religion which has obtained a considerable measure of stability, but still possesses an impressive dynamism and potential for growth. Yet withal, the world Baha'i community is confronted by a number of major problems, both in terms of external pressures and internal realities.

The most obvious problem which confronts the Baha'i world at the present time is persecution, particularly in Iran. Baha'is have been intermittently persecuted in Iran since the religion's beginnings, but the situation since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979 has been particularly severe. Regarded by many Iranian government leaders as evil and misguided heretics, and/or partisans of the Shah, agents of Zionist and Western imperialism, or whatever, the Baha'is have been systematically persecuted and pressured to convert to Islam. Action against the Baha'is have included the execution of over 200 of their leaders, the imprisonment of several thousand others, the use of torture so as to force recantations of faith, the sacking and fining of Baha'is formerly in government employ, the expulsion of Baha'is from schools and colleges, the seizure of property, the desecration of graveyards and corpses, and the prohibition of all Baha'i activities and organizations. The Baha'is have protested their innocence, but to no avail. Thousands have fled the country, but for most Baha'is this is not an option.

Internationally, the effects of the Iranian persecution have been various. One that has been particularly serious has been the loss of contributions to the Baha'i fund, the Iranian Baha'is having previously been the major funding source for international Baha'i activities. We are not yet able to quantify the impact of this, but it is clear that it led initially to a major financial crisis and to an appreciable curtailment of Baha'i activities in some areas. This crisis was overcome by appeals to the Baha'is in the rest of the world for greater financial contributions and self-sufficiency. The success of these appeals can be judged by the recent completion of three costly construction projects: the headquarters building for the Universal House of Justice in Haifa (1983; cost \$28 million); the House of Worship in Samoa (1984; \$6.5 million); and the House of Worship in India (1986; \$10 million).

Another direct effect on the Baha'i world as a whole has been the outflow of Iranian refugees. This has greatly increased the Iranian Baha'i diaspora, thus providing many Baha'i communities with a direct contact and line of communication with their suffering co-religionists in the 'cradle of the Faith'. The outflow of refugees has also caused the Baha'i administration to have to acquire expertise in refugee resettlement problems, and in some areas where there are large concentrations of refugees, to problems of community

integration between local and Iranian Baha'is.

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More tangibly, the persecutions and the resultant diaspora have had psychological consequences, appearing to lead to an increased sense of international Baha'i solidarity and cohesion and to greater levels of dedication in sympathy with the Iranians.

The Iranian persecutions have been well publicized, but Baha'is have also suffered persecutions in a number of other Muslim countries, in part as a consequence of the location of their world centre in what is now the state of Israel. Thus in Egypt, all Baha'i activities were banned by President Nasser in 1960, a ban that has never been revoked and which has resulted in sporadic persecutions ever since (the most recent beginning in 1984). In Morocco also there were episodes of persecution in 1962–1963 and 1984, whilst banning orders have been made against Baha'i activities in Algeria (1969), Iraq (1970) and Indonesia (1972).

During the late 1970s, the Baha'i Faith was also banned in a number of countries in sub-Saharan Africa (Burundi, 1974; Mali 1976; Uganda 1977; Congo, 1978; Niger, 1978).31 This was principally the result of a campaign by a number of Arab countries. Since these countries were also by this time providers of development aid, this overt attack on the Baha'is was supported by covert moves such as linking the aid money to a particular country to the action that it took against the Baha'is. This was partially successful and a number of countries did ban the Baha'is for a time. However, the Baha'is were able to demonstrate to these governments that they were not agents of Zionism nor anti-Islamic and succeeded in having the ban reversed in all of these countries except Niger. Nevertheless, this caused a set-back in the expansion of the Baha'i Faith in many countries-particularly in Uganda which had had the largest Baha'i community in Africa but which suffered a complete ban under Idi Amin's regime followed by further difficulties due to the unsettled conditions after Amin's fall. The situation there has improved in recent years.

Besides direct persecution, the Baha'is have experienced difficulties in several countries in which there are or have been restrictions on the freedom of religion. Thus in almost all countries of the Soviet bloc, the Baha'i groups have been too small to secure permission to organize and conduct their activities, whilst particular historical circumstances have led to the collapse (in the 1920s–1930s) of the formerly large Baha'i communities of Soviet Turkestan and Caucasia³² and to the disbanding of the Baha'i organization in the formerly flourishing Baha'i community of South Vietnam (1978). Until recently, the Baha'is in these countries have also remained fairly isolated, contact with their co-religionists abroad often being regarded with suspicion. Civil unrest has also taken its toll, as in Kampuchea and Suriname.

Apart from the external problems of persecution and government restric-

tion, many national Baha'i communities have experienced problems related to their programmes of planned expansion. In this regard, there have been two contrasting situations. In some countries-notably most of Western Europe and Japan-there has been the problem of a very slow growth rate This has made the accomplishment of expansion goals extremely difficult and, given the strong Baha'i emphasis on missionary expansion, is likely to have engendered various 'psychologies of frustration'. At the other extreme many Third World Baha'i communities have experienced such a rapid increase in numbers that they have encountered considerable problems in consolidating the faith of their new adherents, especially when these are illiterate and geographically isolated. Local responses to this second situation have varied considerably. In South America, for example, Baha'i radio stations have been established in several countries. These have served no only to educate new Baha'is in the fundamentals of their religion, but also to spread the Baha'i teachings, and to give information to the whole population on literacy, health and agriculture.33 Elsewhere, in India for example, the Baha'is have established a network of rural tutorial schools and teaching institutes. Our impression is that overall these various responses have been fairly successful, thus providing many or perhaps most of the communities concerned with an active core of local adherents, a solid basis for further expansion, and to varying degrees an increasing level of stability, maturity and self-reliance. Such success has not however been universal and, in some countries, contact with thousands of former 'new believers' has been lost and

the rate of expansion slowed down.

Apart from problems related to numerical expansion, some Baha'i communities have experienced considerable frustration in their attempts to diversify their communities. In Western Europe, for example, the Baha'i communities remain predominantly white and middle class. Again in some Third World countries, the Baha'is have tended to draw a disproportionate number of their adherents from certain ethnic and tribal groups, thus limiting the desired universality of the religion.

A more general problem has been the development of distinctively Baha'i patterns of behaviour. Apart from Iranians, most Baha'is are first generation converts. Naturally levels of commitment vary widely and, in the absence of any communitarianism or of a paid priesthood, involvement in formal Baha'i activities is entirely voluntary and must compete with other 'spare' (nonworking) time activities. Thus Baha'i involvement often resembles that of other voluntary associations, and despite the existence of often high levels of commitment, the construction and maintenance of a shared Baha'i culture and consciousness remains problematic. Following Baha'i usage, we have consistently referred to Baha'i 'communities', but, in many areas, this term is a misnomer: the local Baha'is exist as a group of loosely associated individuals.

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Even where large-scale rural conversions have led to the existence of *de facto* local Baha'i communities (in the sense of a communal grouping with a high level of social interaction), the emergence of a distinctively Baha'i culture and consciousness remains difficult, and Baha'i norms regarding, say, the equality of the sexes, the abolition of caste prejudices or democratic consultation between community members, remain goals to be achieved rather than present realities.

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The final problem that we would mention is intellectual. Despite the recent increase in the attention paid to Baha'i scholarship, there is a general paucity of systematic studies of Baha'i doctrine. Despite—perhaps because of—the great wealth of authoritative Baha'i texts, there are few studies of Baha'i theology and philosophy. Again, there are very few attempts by Baha'i writers to engage in serious dialogue with other religious and philosophical traditions, or until very recently, to relate Baha'i social teaching to contemporary world realities. The one area of Baha'i scholarship in which a large amount of material has been produced is history and biography. Even here, much of the work is superficial and in some instances 'fundamentalist' in tone. Nevertheless, a solid body of serious work on Baha'i history has emerged, and together with recent work on Baha'i social teachings indicates the beginnings of a resolution to this problem. As in any religion, scholarly study remains of direct interest only to a minority, but has a wider influence throughout the religious tradition.

What then of the future? Prediction is always a perilous undertaking, but on the basis of our knowledge of the present-day Baha'i world, it seems reasonable to make a number of statements regarding the likely development of the Baha'i religion in the immediate future. Thus, it seems highly probable that the present predominance of the Third World as an area of Baha'i growth will continue and that as a corollary of this, Third World Baha'is will become an increasingly important element in the international leadership of the religion and in the patterning of Baha'i cultural styles. The present dominance of Iranian and Western leadership and cultural patterns will correspondingly decline, although both will remain important. Overall, we would expect that the present pattern of numerical expansion and gradual administrative consolidation would continue in most countries outside of the Middle East. Western Europe is likely to remain an area of relative weakness. New possiblities for limited expansion may open up in several communist countries. The situation in Iran is likely to remain bleak but, unless the level of persecution dramatically increases, we would expect the Iranian Baha'is to survive as a strong and viable religious community.

In terms of central Baha'i concerns, it seems probable that the present trend towards greater social involvement will continue and may well be accentuated. Baha'i involvement with the United Nations and cooperation

with various other social, religious and humanitarian organizations is also likely to increase. Given these developments and the increasing size of some local Baha'i populations, it seems plausible to expect the gradual development of some Baha'i political role, although given the Baha'i prohibition of party political involvement, we are uncertain as to what form this mightake. We would also expect some of the larger local Baha'i communities to begin to develop elements of a more distinctively Baha'i culture and consciousness. Baha'i may also begin to make a more significant contribution to wider social change in some countries in such areas as the increase of literacy, the emancipation of women, and the facilitation of inter-religious and inter-racial understanding.

There are other aspects of the present Baha'i situation which we would not expect to change dramatically in the immediate future. Thus, we would not expect to see any major changes in the overall structure of Baha' organizations and leadership nor in most of the central Baha'i concern which we have identified.

CONCLUSION

We now live in a period in which religious change has become commonplate New religious movements from a variety of religious traditions abound Movements such as Christian and Islamic fundamentalism have emerged a powerful forces within the established religions. In this context, the Bahal Faith is of particular interest in comparative religious scholarship. One of the first Western academics to study the Baha'i Faith, Professor E. G. Browned Cambridge University, commented in 1889 on the fact that one of the interesting aspects of studying the Baha'i Faith was the fact that one could observe closely the earliest stages of the development of a religion, something that it was no longer possible to do with the great established religions such as Christianity and Islam. This remark is all the more valid at the present time.

Unlike most of today's 'new religions', Baha'i now has a considerable depth of historical development. Again, it has survived the period of uncertainty and possible collapse that follows the death of the founder of any religious movement. Yet withal, Baha'i remains recent. Its origins are fairly readily open to historical enquiry and the crucial period of subsequent institutionalization, expansion and doctrinal development are a matter of contemporary record. These dual characteristics of historical depth and contemporaneity give Baha'i studies a far wider significance and interest than they at present enjoy. Moreover, as our article makes clear, its worldwide expansion also places Baha'i beyond the circle of Islamic and Iranian studies in which it has generally been placed.

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- There are several general introductions to the Baha'i religion written by Baha'is. Of these, the most comprehensive are: J. E. Esslemont, Baha'u'llah and the New Era, 4th edn, London, 1974; J. Ferraby, All Things Made New, revised edn, London, 1975; W. H. Hatcher and J. D. Martin, The Baha'i Faith; the Emerging Global Religion; San Francisco, 1984; J. Huddleston, The Earth is But One Country, London, 1980. A more critical and historical account is provided by P. Smith, The Babi and Baha'i Religions: from Messianic Shi'ism to a World Religion, Cambridge, 1987; while a short general outline may be found in P. Smith, The Baha'i Faith: a short introduction to its history and teachings, Oxford.
- 2 Support for this claim comes from a number of independent authorities. See for example the treatment of the Baha'i Faith in World Christian Encyclopaedia (ed. by D. Barrett), Oxford, 1982.

The International Baha'i Council was a forerunner of the Universal House of Justice, at first appointed by Shoghi Effendi, and later elected.

For an account of these developments see V. E. Johnson, 'An historical analysis of critical transformations in the evolution of the Baha'i World Faith', Ph.D. Thesis, Baylor University, 1974, pp. 342-354, 362-380.

The Constitution of the Universal House of Justice, Haifa, 1972.

During the period of Shoghi Effendi's leadership, a number of the tasks now performed in Haifa were delegated to the American National Spiritual Assembly.

Since only the Guardian was empowered to appoint the Hands of the Cause, this institution will effectively end with the death of the present incumbents.

Five-year term for all except the Auxiliary Board Member's assistants (usually appointed annually) and the remaining Hands of the Cause who were appointed for life by Shoghi Effendi.

These were (with approximate dates of the start of a rapid expansion in these areas): Uganda (early 1950s), Mentawei Islands (Indonesia, 1957), Bolivia (late

1950s), India (1961).

The basic unit of local organization is the Local Spiritual Assembly (LSA) for the election of which there have to be a minimum of nine adult Baha'is in the locality. When here are between two and eight Baha'is, they are called a 'group', while a single Baha'i in a locality is recorded as an 'isolated Baha'i'. When there are sufficient LSAs in a country (usually a minimum of four), a National Spiritual Assembly (NSA) may be formed. Locality figures include Assemblies, groups and isolated Baha'is.

See note under Table 2. 12

The Baha'i World, vol. 18 (1979-1983), Haifa, 1986, p. 98.

The Seven Year Plan (1979-1986); Statistical Report, Ridvan 1986, Haifa, 1986, p. 116 and personal communication from Department of the Secretariat, Baha'i

World Centre, Haifa, dated 10 July 1986.

A Baha'i House of Worship (Mashriqu'l-Adhkar) is a building dedicated to private prayer and devotional services only. At present there are seven in the world: Wilmette, Illinois, USA, 1953; Kampala, Uganda, 1961; Sydney, Australia, 1961; Frankfurt, Germany, 1964; Panama City, 1972; Apia, Western Samoa, 1984; New Delhi, India, 1986. 15

With the exception of Persian in which language there was a wider range of work

16 The writings of Baha'u'llah, the founder of the religion, of the Bab, who preceded him, and of 'Abdu'l-Baha, who was appointed as Baha'u'llah's successor considered sacred text while the writings of Shoghi Effendi are considered authoritative interpretation.

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These figures exclude a large number of booklets, pamphlets and leaflets. 17 Source: Catalogue of Literature, Baha'i Publishing Trust, British Isles, Januar

In the field of children's literature it is difficult to separate what should he 19 regarded as books from booklets. There are another 14 publications (booklets) colouring books, etc.) that might be regarded as children's books.

Source: Price List, Baha'i Publishing Trust, United Kingdom, October, 1984

Publications in English Bulletin, Nos. 1-3, 1984-1985.

Peter Smith, 'Motif Research: Peter Berger and the Baha'i faith'. Religion! 21

(1978) 210-234; idem, Babi and Baha'i Religions, p. 3.

Balch, Robert W., G. Farnsworth and S. Wilkins, 'When the Bombs dro 22 Reactions to Disconfirmed Prophecy in a Millennial Sect' Sociological Perspe tives 26 (1983) 137-158.

23 Approximately 26% of the national and international leadership of the religion is female at present. Personal communication from Department of Statistic

Haifa, letter dated 8 July 1988.

Report on Baha'i Development Projects, October 1987, Department of Statistic

Haifa, pp. 1, 71-76.

25 See Philip Smith, 'What was a Baha'i? An examination of the concerns of Britis Baha'is during the years 1900 to 1920', in Baha'i Studies in honour of the la H. M. Balyuzi (ed. by M. Momen), Los Angeles, forthcoming, and P. Smith Babi and Baha'i Religions, pp. 109-110.

26 See for example: Jamshed Fozdar, Buddha Maitrya-Amitabha has appeared, No Delhi, 1976; Kenneth D. Stephens, So Great a Cause, Healdsburg, Cal., 1971 William Willoya and Vinson Brown, Warriors of the Rainbow, Healdsburg, Cal

1962.

P. Smith, Babi and Baha'i Religions, pp. 112-114, 124-125.

As mentioned in the Introduction, there was a decline in academic interest Baha'i between 1920 and 1970. Since about 1970, however, there has been! resurgence of academic interest in Babi and Baha'i subjects. Thus only eight Ph.D. theses were produced on Babi or Baha'i subjects between 1920 and 197 whereas 12 were completed between 1970 and 1982 (Baha'i World, 1979-1961) vol. 18, Haifa 1986, pp. 890-891). An increasing number of papers have als appeared in various academic journals since 1978. Within the Baha'i communication itself there has also been an upsurge in interest in a more intensive study of the Baha'i Faith. The Canadian Association for Studies on the Baha'i Faith established in 1974 and was renamed, in 1981, the Association for Baha'i Studie (ABS) to reflect its international membership. In many other parts of the work Baha'i Studies Associations have been set up, some under the umbrella of the ABS, and some independent of it.

R. Cooper, The Baha'is of Iran, Minorities Rights Group report no. 51, revise edn. London, 1985. edn, London, 1985; G. Nash, Indian's Secret Pogrom, Sudbury, Suffolk, 1981 D. Martin, 'The Personnian, Iran's Secret Pogrom, Sudbury, Suffolk, 1981 D. Martin, 'The Persecutions,' Itan's Secret Pogrom, Sudbury, Suitoks, (1984), pp. 1–88: Raha'i International Page 1984, pp. 1–88: Raha'i International Page (1984), pp. 1-88; Baha'i International Community, The Baha'is of Iran' a report on the percentions of a reliable to the percentions of the percention of th on the persecutions of a religious minority, revised edn, 1982. For a discussion of some of the factors contains of some of the factors contributing to anti-Baha'i sentiment, see P. Smith,

and Baha'i Religions, pp. 178-180.

30 The Seven Year Plan 1979-1986; Statistical Report, Haifa, 1986, pp. 3, 96, 98.

31 The Baha'i World, vol. 17 (1976–1979), pp. 78–81, 147; and also personal communication from the late Dr Aziz Navidi.

32 See M. Momen, 'The Baha'i community of Ashkabad', in Central Asia: tradition and change (ed. by Shirin Akiner), forthcoming.

One of the most important roles of these Baha'i radio stations has however proved to be the fostering of native Amerindian culture which is in danger of being swamped by the Hispanic culture of the cities. See K. J. Hein, Radio Baha'i Ecuador: a Baha'i development project, Oxford, 1987.

34 See letter of E. G. Browne dated 1 January 1889 quoted in H. M. Balyuzi, Edward Granville Browne and the Baha'i Faith, Oxford, 1970, pp. 49-50.

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BOOK REVIEWS

David Smith, Ratnakara's Haravijaya: An Introduction to the Sanskrit Court Epic. Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1985, 322 + vii pp. Rs 200.

The author of this witty, literate, and scholarly book suggests that the *mahakavya* or Hindu court epic continued the traditions established by the great Epics—in particular, the *Ramayana*. The overriding concern was 'to proclaim the triumph of the hero and the defeat of the foe'. While these long poems normally dealt with the affairs of the gods, their intent was to glorify and, in a certain sense, to divinize the life and actions of their royal patrons.

In his first three chapters, Smith provides a general discussion of mahakavya. The first chapter places the Haravijaya in its historical context through a discussion of several antecedent works. The second chapter examines the stance taken to these works by theoretical writers on poetry. Considerable tension between working poets and scholastic poeticians is discovered. The former ignore the categorizations and prescriptions of the latter; the latter ignore the actual works produced by the former. Next, the author considers the role of mahakavya in courtly society. He argues that one of the functions of these works is like ritual; that is, to strengthen and provide a sense of security in an otherwise contentious and insecure society. These poems achieve this through eulogy. At the same time, poets are members of groups whose chief functions are play and irresponsible creativity. Poets unlike bards, but like gods and kings, had licence to create disorder. (The tension between order and disorder in royal society has been brilliantly analysed by David Shulman in his recent book, The King and the Clown in South Indian Myth and Poetry.) The authors of mahakavya, Smith suggests, enhanced the power, if not the clarity, of their works by taking on some of the qualities of the Vedas. They use these qualities to invoke contemporary powers—both kings and gods.

The following chapters discuss the *Haravijaya* itself. Smith begins with Ratnakara's own views of the work as expressed through several appended verses. In bold and assertive verses the poet advises the young king, his patron, to take this work as a model should he hope to attain the status of poet. In declaring himself to be a second Bana (the renowned seventh-century poet), Ratnakara seems to be asserting the existence of a new poetic tradition, one characterized by a 'bold grandeur of vision'.

Smith then turns to the structure of the poem and of the canto and verse. He shows that this long—some have suggested over-long—poem is 'harmoniously proportioned'. Various rhythms are set up through the treatment of subjects (the events of the poem) and themes (such as the mountain, ocean). The length and the simplicity or complexity of the treatment of these themes and the complex word play are all carefully manipulated. The core of the poem, Shiva's mystic union with Parvati, is preceded by a description of Shiva's world, by notification of Andhaka's (the demon king's) crimes against the gods, by Shiva's decision to send an envoy, and by the dalliance of his court. This is followed by a description of the envoy's journey, by the dialogue between the envoy and the demon, and by the climactic battle between the followers of the Shiva and Andhaka.

Smith devotes three chapters to the character of beings of the poem—the Ganal or courtiers of Shiva, the women, and the gods and goddesses. Through their various speeches the Ganas show themselves to be complex manifestations of the adult (bold, courageous and strong) and the youthful (boastful and lacking self-control). Their turbulent and potentially destructive energy manifests the Lord which they serve, and is only controlled by Shiva himself. In the Ganas' discussion of actions that might be taken against the Demons, and later in a debate between the Demons and the envoy, arguments for war alternate with those for policy. The logic of emotion, rather than that of rhetoric, is at play here; there is no consideration of politics or political theory. Smith argues that these powerful, unstable beings are similar to humans; they are also related to demons, who are 'indistinct mirror images' but inherently dangerous.

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Women-particularly highly eroticized women-are an integral part of the Haravijaya. In form and act they are supreme symbols of love, highly desirable for men. But as symbols they lack particular personality; unlike men, they have men. names. Instead, their physical parts take on moods (anger, jealousy, arousal) and appropriate actions of their own. These parts are described by a myriad of epithet which the author bravely enumerates. Yet, Smith notes, men are shadowy figure who do not express their love. Women are passionate and generally faithful; men are promiscuous and in constant motion on the fringes. But men release and control women's passion. Even the poet keeps a safe distance from women. In these section he adopts verse forms in which the second half of a line comments on the description in the first. The very importance of women requires that they inhabit a kind of inner landscape. Theirs is a world of pleasure, and to travel into it is to take a 'holiday from the intensity of the exterior world, from war and destruction. The journey takes Shiva's courtiers into nature on the slopes of Mt Mandara. Here, women and their lovers enjoy a new sense of community, a freedom from everyday constraints Dance, music, drama and, to a lesser extent, even ritual and immanent fertility are enacted. But nature is not entirely removed from the external world-ugliness impermanence, jealousy, betrayal, and fear of women's sexuality are also found here. Smith also analyses the meaning of allusions to ornament, Love's arrow, and fire

Smith notes that kavya often adopts an attitude toward the gods and goddess in which the awesome, the horrible, and the numinous are neutralized. The poet's display of his virtuosity may even arrogantly demean these divine beings. Karpt constrains, simplifies, and 'purifies' the content of rich and 'messy' puranic myth subjecting it to the tightly controlled art of the poet. For example, in the Haravijos the flowers and colours associated with gods receive as much emphasis as the gods themselves. The blue poison inbibed by Shiva (kalakuta) is a recurring motive when the poet plays with themes of love-sickness, the relation of Siva and Parvati, and the god's final triumph over the powerful demon which he himself had engendered. The white lotus seat of Brahma is another theme richly developed by the poet, who sometimes emphasizes the subordinate position of the 'grandfather'. Vishnu has a similarly ambiguous position. Portrayed in his terrible and powerful aspect as the manifestation of the man-lion at the beginning of the poem, the terrible power of the god is evoked through allusions to red and rubies. Nonetheless, Vishnu fades where the construction of the poem, the terrible power of the poem, the terrible power fades where the construction of the poem, the terrible power fades where the poem is the poem, the terrible power fades where the poem is the poem in the poem. obscurity at Shiva's final triumph. Untimately, Shiva is the focus of the poem. various forms are developed in introductory verses—as king, as dancer (in all exciting description), and as Parameshvara. The poet evokes the philosophic interconnections between Shiva and speech, the mantra, and light. The order of his displaced the gods. It is Shim? displaced the gods. It is Shiva's role to re-establish order.

In the central episode of the poem—the merging of Shiva and Parvati—through gradually relaxed tension the deities achieve the happiness of love, and through punning, the beauty of a developed drama. Candi, the terrible form of the goddess, becomes important in the final battle. A long hymn of praise emphasizes her terrible aspect but also her ability to give salvation. Smith finds evidence in the theology expressed by these verses that the poet was a follower of the Kaula path, a variety of Tantra focused on this terrific goddess.

At the climax of the poem, Shiva destroys the demon king and returns triumphant to his city. Smith shows convincingly that this version of the puranic myth not only strips it of highly charged content but also secularizes the story. Thus, the god's victory both glorifies the victories of the king's ancestors and is a model for Ratnakara's patron to emulate. At the same time, the poet makes of this simplified

account a sequence of elegantly and powerfully realized tableaux.

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Smith argues convincingly against some Western interpreters of Sanskrit poetry, that kavya contain a rich array of symbols which are powerfully interrelated. For example, a Freudian interpreter can find numerous sexual symbols in the churning of the ocean by Mt Mandara. While kavya employs stereotyped themes and images, these are symbols which a poet can manipulate to powerful effect. These symbols refer to mythic nature (e.g. flying mountains), 'the pure white form which is the manifestation of fame and beauty', oppositions which embody tensions, the lotus, and the mirror. Ratnakara employs few symbols from the first category; he avoids those connoting human fertility. Jewels are symbols more frequently employed. Fame and beauty are qualities of men and women respectively which are conveyed by a number of symbols. The moon and its disfiguring spot, and the ocean which contains the submarine fire are primary among symbols which convey tension; these are greatly elaborated in simile and metaphor. The lotus is a tensive sexual symbol in conjunction with the fickle male bee, but elsewhere harmoniously combines strength and weakness, beauty and decay. The poet also elaborates symbolic associations of his own; for example, the play of his name, which means 'ocean', with aspects of that vast and all encompassing symbol.

Smith suggests that the use of puns is the most noteworthy feature of Ratnakara's style; through such word play the poet imparts his personal skill and energy. Puns, Smith suggests, have particular explosive energy which destroy pure rasa and create more profound emotion. While double meaning is probably an important feature of duplicitous courtly society and discourse, within the poem, it evokes the fusion of Shiva and Parvati. Puns also play on the imperfection and tension which result from the separation of the divine pair. Equally important, through puns Ratnakara equates the creation of the divine unity by Shiva and of a beautiful play by the poet. Ratnakara often uses puns to break apart reality, to make it indecisive. Puns may also refer to the ambiguous political reality of the day—the uncertainty of his young patron's position, the witty battles of courtiers who struggle through the language of indianal part of the supplied that the supplied in the poet.

In his introduction, Smith notes that court epics have been denigrated by many students of Indian poetry, and ignored altogether by most modern readers. In particular, the length of the *Haravijaya* and its apparent repetition of well-worn formulas of plot and expression have discouraged many potential readers. Smith places the work in the culture of a particular court with particular political circumstances; he shows how the poet manipulated plot, and dramatic and expressive conventions. It is to Smith's credit that this volume convincingly demonstrates the original.

originality and baroque beauty of Ratnakara's poem.

JOHN M. FRITZ University of New Mexico D. H. Killingly, The Only True God: Works on Religion by Rammohun Ro Newcastle upon Tyne, Grevatt & Grevatt, 1982, 48 pp. Price: £3.20.

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The Bengali brahmin, Rammohun Roy, was a central figure in the modern reinter. pretation of the Hindu religious tradition. Dr Killingly states in his introduction that 'the aim of this little book is to make Rammohun's work more accessible' (p 6). This accessibility is both linguistic and thematic. Linguistic, in that the four pieces are translated for the first time from the Sanskrit and Bengali, and thematic in that, although the selections are from different works and from Rammohun's lesser known writings, they all deal directly 'with the worship of the only true God' (p. 3). The four selections are arranged in chronological order and date from Rammohun's early years in Calcutta, 1815 to 1818. Two are taken from textual commentaries in which Rammohun reinterprets Hindu Sanskrit religious texts in the light of his reformed Hindu monotheism, and the other two are replies to orthodox Hindu pandits who were opposed to such reinterpretation. Rammohun was an anti-accretionist, who held that beneath the later negative additions of 'ritual, myth and rules of purity' (p. 3) there lay a pure rational Hindu theism. These later elements being understood by Rammohun as concessions to 'people of

limited understanding' (p. 4).

The first section is from Rammohun's earliest Bengali work (1815), his brid commentary on the Vedānta Sūtras. Killingly selects eight short sections for translation. He writes that 'since much of the commentary (Rammohun's) merely summarizes Sankara, the most interesting parts are those in which Rammohun departs from Sankara's interpretation' (p. 7). It is, however, not at all clear that the selected passages are, in fact, from the 'ten per cent' of passages that do deviate from Sankara's commentary. It would have been helpful if Killingly had incorporated material from his article in this journal (Religion, 11, 1981, pp. 151-169) in order to provide an extended discussion and explanation of these deviations. Such a discussion might have allowed the reader to grasp more clearly Rammohun's apparently inconsistent understanding of the relation of God to the world ('By calling all these God, the Veda intends to convey the idea that God is all things' (Rammohun. p. 8)). Rammohun's arguments will be disappointing to those familiar with Śańkara's Brahma-sūtra bhāṣya, in that the high level of philosophical argument and the variety of interpretive methods are reduced to the much simpler level of the attempt 10 prove that Rammohun's monotheism is supported by a correct Vedic reading and that idolatry is ruled out by such a reading. Rammohun's interpretations are selective and dogmatic and display his lack of sympathy for traditional Hindu worship and perhaps, also his lack of knowledge concerning ritual matters.

The third translation is of Rammohun's preface to the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad Rammohun writes that 'The Mandukya Upanisad ... describes in great detail from beginning to end, how poorly qualified people who wish to know God may worship him with the aid of the syllable Om' (Rammohun, p. 23). In a similar fashion to his treatment of 'idolatry' he undermines the traditional import of both the sacred syllable and ritual worship. Rammohun redefines the vedāntic distinction between higher and lower knowledge, again further comment on this, and the differences in presentation in Rammohun's English and works in Indian language

would have been welcomed.

The second and fourth selections are replies by Rammohun to orthodox Hindu opponents. Both opponents are Kṛṣṇa devotees and take issue over the question of Rammohun's claim that Kṛṣṇa is limited by qualities and thus is not to be held as

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identical with God. These two replies show Rammohun at his polemical best and give the clearest account of his view of the Hindu tradition as a whole.

It is rather a pity that Dr. Killingly chose to produce such a short volume, in that his five and a half page introduction does little to situate Rammohun in his social and historical context. The brevity of the introduction helps foster the idea that Rammohun's criticism of contemporary Hinduism wholly originated with Rammohun, himself. I would have been interested to learn more of his relationship with his guru, Hariharānanda, who wrote a commentary on the Mahānirvāṇa Tantra, a text (written between 1775 and 1785) which advocated many of the same reforms as Rammohun, such as the abolition of sati, the removal of caste restrictions and the barrier on widow remarriage, in the interests of a reformed Hindu monotheism. A larger book would have allowed Killingly to develop his portrayal of Rammohun's religious ideas and further textual selections would have allowed the reader to discern the relationship to, and development of, Rammohun's account of the 'worship of the only true God' and the range of his related concerns.

It is rather annoying to come across errors, for example, letters omitted and lines repeated, when it is so very easy on word-processor-produced materials to delete and correct mistakes.

As it stands, this volume offers a useful introduction to Rammohun's thought and the translations are clear and read well. We can only hope that Dr Killingly will return to this subject in the future and that such researches will appear in a more substantial form.

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MIRCEA ELIADE AND THE 'HISTORY' OF RELIGIONS

K. Rudolph

(Translated by Gregory D. Alles)

Mircea Eliade is certainly a most fascinating writer. As a scholar, he ranges widely throughout the field of the history of religions (*Religionswissenschaft*). In his native Rumanian he is recognized as a writer of fiction—his 'Prose Fantasies' were published in Bucharest as late as 1969–specifically, as a writer who joins literature and mythology in an intimate union. It is difficult to know what to admire most in these literary works: the poet and his imagination, or the scholar who presents, or rather, applies, his material in such an uncommon medium. One of the most captivating examples of this 'modern mythology' is the tale, *Pe strada Mântu-leasa*.

Despite its great significance, however, Eliade's literary activity, which began about 1930 and continued throughout his life, has been little used. Eliade's Rumanian roots, to which he alludes occasionally even in his scholarly works, probably contribute more to his books than has been recognized in the past. Clearly, it will be necessary in the end to set Eliade's literary production side by side with his scholarly work, even though not many can read Rumanian, and Eliade's literary works, such as the *Forêt interdit*, are not easily found.

Such an account of the development of Eliade's world of thought remains a task for the future, and a task that will not be easy. It is easier to place Eliade's ideas on the history of religions, as we have come to know, them in a corpus that has been growing steadily since the end of World War II (to be exact, since 1949), in the context of the European tradition of the history of religions. Eliade makes use of certain traditional concepts that he has modified somewhat and expressed in an original fashion. In this article, originally written in Eliade's honor, I examine these concepts critically.

Eliade thinks of himself as a historian of religions. In the foreword to one of his major studies, *Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy*, he makes several remarks about his understanding of the history of religions (*Religionsgeschichte*). Beginning with the observation that a 'religious phenomenon' is conditioned by and dependent upon history, Eliade proceeds to search for its 'transhistorical' meaning, because 'the *history* of a religious phenomenon cannot reveal *all* that this phenomenon, by the mere fact of its manifestation, seeks to show us. . . .

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there is always a kernal that remains refractory to explanation, and the historia indefinable, irreducible element perhaps reveals the real situation of man irreligior the cosmos, a situation that, we shall never tire of repeating, is not soleh because "historical" (p. xiv).

Eliade is preoccupied with this inexplicable side of religion: religion; reversi phenomena 'reveal the boundary-line situations of mankind', which the kinds o history of religions can alone 'decipher' properly. 'It is the historian dahistori religions who will make the greatest number of valid statements on a religion its man phenomenon as a religious phenomenon—and not as a psychological, social studies. ethnic, philosophical, or even theological phenomenon' (p. xv). On this point from the Eliade distinguishes himself sharply from the 'phenomenologists', who reject great no the work of comparison and only 'approach' the phenomenon, 'divining its notion meaning' (ibid.). By contrast, 'the historian of religions does not reach a Eliade' comprehension of a phenomenon until after he has compared it with thousand any de of similar or dissimilar phenomena, until he has situated it among them. ... stone, a Accordingly, he 'will not confine himself merely to a typology or morpholog process of religious data; he knows that "history" does not exhaust the content of: religious phenomenon, but neither does he forget that it is always in History- influen in the broadest sense of the term—that a religious datum develops all its sponta aspects and reveals all its meanings. In other words, the historian of religions any tin makes use of all the historical manifestations of a religious phenomenon in human order to discover what such a phenomenon "has to say"; on the one hand, he 'modal holds to the historically concrete, but on the other, he attempts to decipher of the whatever transhistorical content a religious datum reveals through history also a (p. xv).

Thus, for Eliade, the history of religions addresses the transhistorical-the truly religious—as well as the historical aspects of religion. For him its work is above all comparative, using comparison to grasp the religious meaning of a 'phenomenon'.6 Therefore, he joins various methods together: history, the phenomenology of religion (in the sense of comparative and systematic studies) and even the philosophy of religion (in the sense of 'comprehending essences ['Wesenserfassung']). 'The history of religions is not always necessarily the historiography of religions. . . . we are not obliged to practise historiography in order to claim that we are writing the history of religions' (p. xvi). Eliadi blames the polyvalence of the term 'history' for this misunderstanding. He would like to assign to the 'history' of religions 'the philosophical and general meaning of "history" (ibid.). The 'specific plane of manifestation' of all religious facts is 'always historical, concrete, existential, even if [these facts] are not always wholly reducible to history' (ibid.). It is the 'remainder' that the historian of religions must deal with, in distinction from historians, ethnologists sociologists, and psychologists; that is, he must 'decipher the properly religious meaning of one or another fact' (p. xvii). Eliade reproaches present-day

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the historians of religions for having placed greater emphasis on 'history' than on 'religion'. B He himself does not much emphasize the chronological moment, because for him the irreducible 'core' of religions transcends history; as hierophany'—Eliade's word for this 'core'—it is always repeatable and reversible' (p. xviii). 'Though a history of religion exists, it is not, like all other the kinds of history, irreversible' (pp. xvii-xviii). In Eliade's thought, it is the ahistorical concept of 'the Sacred' that possesses a 'transhistorical character;' its manifestations are the sole subject matter that the history of religions ocial studies. 'It could be said', we read elsewhere, 'that the history of religions oint from the most primitive to the most highly developed—is constituted by a ejed great number of hierophanies, by manifestations of sacred realities'. 9 It is this g is notion of 'the Sacred' as independent of time that fundamentally conditions ch ¿ Eliade's conception of the history of religions. Such a notion does not recognize and any developmental stages: 'the manifestations of the sacred', whether in a ... stone, a tree, or a god(!), are always the same; only 'the forms taken by the ologi process in man's religious consciousness differ' (p. xvii).

Here we are dealing with an objective and subjective process: history cannot influence this process to any great extent; 'history does not paralyze the spontaneity of hierophanies' (p. xix). They are able to irrupt independently at any time and in any place; the historical moment merely offers a 'situation of humanity' in relation to 'the Sacred', while the hierophany expresses a 'modality of the sacred'. Eliade frequently speaks, of course, of the 'influence of the historical moment', and he states that 'every hierophany we look at is also a historical fact', 11 because 'every manifestation of the sacred takes place in some historical situation', 12 but for him this is fundamentally a matter of the

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What distinguishes the historian of religions from the historian as such is that he is dealing with facts which, although literal, reveal a behavior that goes far beyond the historical involvements of human beings.'13 It is these 'situations over and above his historical condition' that Eliade seeks to comprehend and to describe in the history of religions; they belong to 'man in his totality' as much as to temporal circumstances. 14 Eliade's notion of 'the Sacred' justifies his attempt to describe the ahistorical side of religion: 'the dialectic of the sacred permits all reversibilities; no "form" is exempt from degradation and decomposition, no "history" is final'. 15 In this dialectic, individuals and communities are treated the same way: they are always and everywhere potential locations for the manifestation ('revelation') of the sacred. Quite independently of any particular 'cultural moment', one can experience 'the fullest revelation of the sacred to which the human condition is capable of acceding' (ibid.). That these revelations cannot always be identified in pure form (by the historian of religions?) is the result of 'human behavior in respect to that dialectic' (ibid.). But the study of such behaviour is the task not of the 104 K. Rudolph

historians of religions but of the sociologist, the psychologist, the moralist all of the philosopher (ibid.). It is sufficient for the historian of religions 'to obser later. that the dialectic of the sacred makes possible the spontaneous reversal of religious position' (ibid.). The results of historico-cultural ethnology are for a of little use; 'the spontaneity and, in the last analysis, the ahistoricity of religi Critic life' (my emphasis) is independent of them. 'For all history is in some mean laws a a fall of the sacred, a limitation and diminution'.16

From the preceding quotes one sees quickly and clearly that Eliadel as se abandoned the traditional manner in which the history of religions has he School conceived without altogether abandoning the idea as such. 'The histon 'creat religions is not merely a historical discipline, as, for example, are archeological (5) th numismatics. It is equally a total hermeneutics, being called to deciphera of W explicate every kind of encounter of man with the sacred, from prehiston creat our day'. 17 With the introduction of the term 'hermeneutics' (the an seen interpretation) into his more recent works, Eliade has been able to express! R. R. real concerns better: he is not concerned with historical work, as such—that only presupposed and abundantly used—but with the interpretation of uniquely 'religious', insofar as we encounter it in traditions and testimonia Eliade wishes to broaden the work of the historian of religions or to define a new way. The history of religions is to be enriched by means of a dimensi that has until now been neglected, in order to distinguish it in this way for other disciplines, such as ethnology, sociology, or psychology. Inasmuch hierophanies disclose the 'boundary situation[s] of man', the task of the historian of religions is fulfilled 'primarily by throwing light upon the boundary situations'. 18 As Eliade conceives of the history of religion Religionsgeschichte . . . als Religionswissenschaft), it is characterized not only the field that it studies, 'religions and facts about religions', but also through certain approach to the timeless content or 'meaning' of religion, from whi its hermeneutics derives.

In reconceiving the history of religions in this fashion, Eliade clearly pursu the goal of transforming the discipline of studying religions historically in kind of 'universal study'. On the basis of its claim to conceive of the essential human in the form of the religious—that is, of 'homo religiosus' as the unique human—19 the discipline Eliade has in mind can contribute to a mind can contribute to a humanism', to 'renewal' of humanity today. 20 To achieve this goal, the histo of religions, as a 'total discipline', must not only integrate and articulate results of all relevant disciplines; it must also be closely allied with 'phenomenology' of religion, a term that Eliade uses in the same sense! Raffaele Pettazzoni.²¹ In this way, the history of religions is able to open path to a philosophical anthropology that discloses a mode of 'being in world' that is not divorced from the 'experience of the sacred' or for 'religious consciousness' and its structures. 22 Here Eliade thinks about

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ralist all of the 'presystematic ontologies,' about which I will have more to say obse later.

It is important to note the models after which Eliade models his programme aret for a renewed history of religions:²³ (1) modern literary criticism—the 'New frelig Criticism'—which sees in a work of art an autonomous creation with its own meas laws and structures and which explicates its 'hidden message' and its 'transpersonal experience of reality';²⁴ (2) art as a means of altering consciousness, iade as seen, for example, in surrealism;²⁵ (3) the discovery of India by A. has be Schopenhauer, who introduced a 'second Renaissance' into Europe; 26 (4) the iston 'creative hermeneutics' of an Erasmus, a Jacob Burckhardt, or a Nietzsche;27 eolog (5) the 'spiritual techniques' associated with the religio-historical hermeneutics of Walter F. Otto and Rudolf Otto;28 (6) finally, the great syntheses and creative works of the early days of the history of religions in the 19th century, as ne an seen in the works of Friedrich Max Müller, Andrew Lang, James G. Frazer, pressi R. R. Marett, and Lucien Lévy-Bruhl.²⁹

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A checkered and varied gallery of ancestors thus parades before us, and we could increase its ranks without much further effort; for example, we could add depth psychology and Gestalt psychology to the ranks. To Eliade's mind, this efine in parade of ancestors lends a certain legitimacy to his attempt to treat the history of religions as a 'pedagogic', as a 'maieutics', and as a 'source of creativity'-30 the heading under which Eliade also discusses the discipline's latent critical ability.31 On the basis of its universal breadth, the history of religions claims the privilege of being able to discern the spiritual unity of humankind from archaic times to the present, and even of being able to grasp that unity at its most profound and most elevated. 32 To this extent, the history of religions can render service to the emerging global culture, to the 'planetization of culture'. The history of religions should not only furnish 'contributions' to that culture; it should itself create cultural values. As a result, Eliade declares war on specialization in the history of religions. He convicts the philological and historical tradition of this discipline on the charge of being a wrong turn that led away from the discipline's own meaning. Dilettantism, reductionism, and journalistic tendencies also come in for his scorn. 33 He conjures up instead the 'creative synthesis', as it is found in all great works, although he neglects to mention that a number of philological and historical studies from the 19th century belong among such 'great works'. Only by keeping these goals in mind, Eliade thinks, can the history of religions be preserved from a trend toward greater specialization and less autonomy. 34 Eliade's own writings provide examples of his precepts. The majority of his books are just such syntheses (based, of course, on foundations laid by 'specialists'), most recently, his final, multi-volumed work, The History of Religious Ideas (1976-1980). In fact, Eliade's writings do more than provide examples; they have set the standard to which future works will have to aspire.

Eliade's programme transgresses the previous bounds of the history religions—Religionswissenschaft as much as Religionsgeschichte—in seve ways. Eliade left us no work devoted to methodology and no 'theoretic foundation' similar to Joachim Wach's Religionswissenschaft, written for 'Habilitation' at Leipzig in 1924. As a result, it is not easy to determine how historical study of religions (Religionsgeschichte), the history or 'science' religions (Religionswissenschaft), and the phenomenology of religionrather, the comparative or systematic study of religion—relate to each other his work. As previous citations have made clear, Eliade generally employst term 'history of religions', which he apparently borrows from the Fren 'histoire des religions'. The literal equivalent to the German Religionswise schaft ('science des religions' or 'science religieuse') is not widely used in Romance languages; and in the English-speaking world, there is a great deal terminological confusion, so that in some circles the German Religionswiss schaft has been retained for lack of any adequate English equivalent. Recent some have resumed the practice of the first pioneers in the field and translate Religionswissenschaft as 'the science of religion', although to do so now break with traditional usage. 35 The designation 'religious studies' is popular, butin too vague, for even theology can find a place in 'religious studies'. So far as can tell, when Eliade uses the designation 'history of religions', he refers to broader discipline known in German as Religionswissenschaft (the journal the he founded is also called History of Religions). In that discipline Eliade als includes the comparative or phenomenological study of religion, although does not explicitly distinguish it as such. To the extent that I have represent Eliade's position accurately, he works primarily as a 'phenomenologist' religion' or as a comparativist or systematist (vergleichender [systematischt Religionswissenschaftler) who claims for his work the title 'history of religions If one presupposes for such an endeavour the principles that guided Gerards van der Leeuw and his phenomenology of religion, the situation becomes eve clearer: van der Leeuw, too, thought that the task of the phenomenology religion was 'to illumine the inner structures of religious phenomena'. 36 To sure, Eliade distances himself from van der Leeuw to the extent that reproaches van der Leeuw for having no interest in 'the history of religion structures', but in that very critique, Eliade's own conception of 'history,' itse more philosophical than historical, comes into play. And it is in Eliade conception of 'history'—he feels his use of this term is subject to mis understanding³⁷—that the peculiar manner in which he uses the phrast 'history of religions' can be most clearly seen.

In Eliade's view, the history of religions is concerned not with historical processes in the context of political, economic, cultural, and social conditions but with the 'history' of the transhistorical structures of religious meanings, 'hierophanies' or 'kratophanies', we could also say of religious 'ideas'. Thus, i

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is a 'history of ideas' in the old sense of the term, as evidenced in the very title of Eliade's last work, The History of Religious Ideas. Eliade no longer conceives of the history of religions, as a programme for scholarly work, in terms of philological and historical investigation—as scholars have conceived of the discipline ever since the days when it was founded by Friedrich Max Müller, a philologist. Eliade conceives of the history of religions in terms of a 'structural analysis of religious consciousness' that explicates the 'manifestations of the sacred' throughout all of human history. The history of religions must pursue the 'modalities of the sacred', not in their specific, cultural, and historical contexts but in manifestations that transcend history, culture, and time. To that end Eliade employs the comparative method, a method characteristic of the history of religions that was initially derived from the study of language. But Eliade employs this method to a new end. He uses it to try to recover lost elements of religious meaning. 'Religion' and 'religious facts' are to be stripped of their temporal, historical, and cultural cloaks and revealed in their proper. transtemporal religious significance. Here Eliade advocates a kind of phenomenological 'intuitive perception of essences' (Wesensschau). 38 All of his works serve this principle. They are treasuries whose contents-the results of Eliade's work-detail what religions and religious 'phenomena', from the beginning to the present day, can contribute to eternal values and ideas. As I have observed already, it is this purpose that is responsible for Eliade's ahistorical category of 'the sacred', which in turn makes it impossible for Eliade to view the history of religions as a historical, cultural process in a more precise sense—a point to which I will return.

There is still another factor that plays a decisive role in Eliade's conception of the history of religions, a factor that is ultimately rooted in his worldview. As early as 1949, Eliade expressed quite sharply his aversion to history, especially to 'historicism', in his highly original book, The Myth of the Eternal Return, whose title in the second edition, Cosmos and History (1959), articulates the direction of the argument much more clearly. 39 The 'terror of history', about which Eliade writes there, is certainly a major obstacle in his understanding of history, an understanding that I cannot discuss in detail. It is nurtured, on the one hand, by Eliade's own experiences—especially his sojourn in India and his profound immersion in Indian thought, above all, the practice of yoga40—and, on the other hand, by his personal inclination, perhaps occasioned by his experiences in India, toward Nietzsche's antihistorical 'Myth of the Eternal Return'. 41 In this book Eliade suffers from the fatigue that overcame the first post-war generation in Europe after 1918, a weariness with historical understanding. This generation's antihistorical attempt to reconceive the meaningfulness of history in terms of the 'kairos', of 'totality' and 'Gestalt', and also in terms of 'myth' cast its shadow over Eliade's development (this point would merit more detailed scrutiny). It seems remarkable, then, that the man who praises the 'abolition' and 'scorn' for historian' found among archaic humanity would like to be understood as 'historian' of religions. ⁴² When Eliade claims the name 'history of religions' for the recovery of the 'archaic', the 'prehistoric' or 'ahistoric' under the guise of cosmically oriented agricultural religion (see below), he attempts to tie the history of religions to a programme that would not only rob it of a firm basis in philology and history but would also bind it to a one-sided view of humaning and the world, to the narrow view of a romantic, crypto-religious vision the cannot be harmonized with the discipline's aspiration to universality and with its critical distance as a science. ⁴³

II

Eliade's thought clearly rests upon several elements that had already appeared in his earliest writings on the history of religions and that are apparent fundamental components of his worldview. Among them are the following: (I the opposition between the 'sacred' and the 'profane' as the basis of religion and as a basic feature that pervades the history of religions; (2) symbolism at the primary means of religious expression; (3) prehistory (the archaic age) at the fundamental, indeed, the decisive epoch in the history of religions; and (4 homo religiosus as the allegedly ideal form of humanity.

A brief, critical survey of each of these ideas in turn will show that the sustain Eliade's ahistorical tendency and shape his conception of the history religions, and that they even contain a specific philosophical anthropology and ontology.

(1) Prior to Eliade, Emile Durkheim had established the division between the 'sacred' and the 'profane' as a sign by which we could recognize religion amazingly, when Eliade mentions Durkheim, he never takes this aspect of Durkheim's writings into account.44 We do not need to consider here the sociological 'reduction' to 'collective thought' that plays such a decisive role Durkheim's works. What is significant is that the 'sacred' and 'profane' and distinguished and identified in a community. They are not matters of individual choice. Eliade, too, 'reduces' on a grand scale: the history of religions's 'reduced' to a dualism of 'sacred' and 'profane', 'myth' and 'history', 'cosmos and 'chaos', 'reality' and the 'unreal', and other similar pairs that often remind us in a general way of Claude Lévi-Strauss's binary oppositions. Of course Eliade is much less interested in the 'profane' than in the 'sacred' or the 'holy There can be no doubt that the 'god-father' of Eliade's 'sacred' is the categor that Nathan Söderblom and especially Rudolf Otto used as the primary designation for the religious, 45 even if Söderblom's and Otto's category has been modified in details. 46 The reduction of religion to the 'sacred' occupies controversial place in the history of religions. On the one hand, it seeks to solve the age-old problem of the definition of religion; on the other, it promote

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ry has pies a solve motes tendencies of a religio-philosophical, theological, and apologetic character. 47 When Eliade adopts the term, then, it immediately brings several problems along with it: what do we mean by 'sacred'? Can religion, its diversity reduced. really be so described and defined? Does not such a designation require further explanation and will not the 'reduction' that is sought lead to absurdity, since it is simply not sufficient for distinguishing the 'religious' from the 'nonreligious?' Eliade does not leave us entirely in the dark concerning what he means by the 'sacred'. In place of this term he also frequently employs the term hierophany ('manifestations of the sacred'), resuming the older usage of J. Reville and E. Goblet d'Alviella. 'Hierophany' refers to the 'modalities of the sacred', that 'manifest' or 'reveal' (phainomai) themselves in various objects (in Eliade's view, any object can be a vehicle for the manifestation of the sacred). This 'sacred'—a singular, supernatural, transhistorical Something—48 is, in the religious view, 'power,' 'reality', 'enduringness and efficacity'. 49 In distinction from the 'profane', it is real; it is that for which homo religiosus longs in his activity and thought. Above all, it is connected with the structuring of the cosmos, its order or 'orientation'. Eliade stresses that 'hierophanies' have given and continue to give human beings certainty and order in the midst of the chaos of the non-sacralized, profane world. He speaks in this regard of the 'irruption' that introduces the sacred into the homogeneity of space and time; the 'opening' that permits access to another sphere (such a sphere does not need to be thought of as only transcendent). As a result, shamanism has been profoundly attractive to Eliade, for it is an archaic technique for breaking through time and space with the help of ecstasy. Its ideological effects extend far beyond the actual practice of shamanism per se, as in the symbolism of 'ascent' and the 'world tree'. 50 Eliade describes and analyses hierophanies in their spatial, temporal, natural, and existential manifestations-true to his conviction that at heart they disclose a single reality, even if their forms have been influenced by history and culture and as a result display an unfathomable number of particular expressions.⁵¹ In doing so, he assigns the greatest possible significance to certain concepts that constitute an abstract plane above the 'world of forms' and that thus apply universally (ascent, descent, centre); he also uses certain metaphors that correspond to those concepts, such as the world tree, heat, and knots. In addition, the world of nature totally dominates the structures that Eliade identifies—its domination is clearly a heritage of the nature-mythology and nature-philosophy of the 19th century. History as a locus for hierophanies is seen only in the context of Judaism and Christianity, 52 but it plays no real role even there. In these religions, too, the truly religious is found in the overcoming of history in the liturgical calendar and the reference to the symbol of the crucified, in the resumption, or rather, the continuation of archaic symbolism. 53 Eliade associates a break with nature-religion pure and simple with the discovery of agriculture, the most important break before the industrial revolution.⁵⁴ But even here the perspetive of the fruitfulness of nature and of human beings dominates. For Eliade the most essential hierophanies and 'kratophanies' (the term he prefers for dynamistic' or 'preanimistic' phenomena) derived from archaic times (so below).

This objective side of the sacred corresponds to a side that is clean subjective, that of consciousness. The 'sacred' is, for Eliade, 'an element into structure of consciousness and not a stage in the history of consciousness, 351 is the content of religious experience, its accumulation through millenia enables human beings to detect the sacred as it manifests itself, to distinguish from the profane and to include it in the treasure-chest of its experience Eliade never makes clear the way in which the 'objective' and the 'subjective correspond—a failing that is part and parcel of his deficient attitude towar theoretical reflection. ⁵⁶ The subjective pole refers to an instrument of intuition that must be possessed and employed not only by the 'religious' but also historians of religions, as Eliade describes them, as they 'decipher' the world religious and mythical symbols (see below). The (latent) presence of the sacred in consciousness also explains, in Eliade's mind, how new or repealed discoveries of the 'sacred' and its 'hierophanic' structures can occur, despite the process of 'desacralization,' which is understood as a decline, as 'pro fanization,' 'historicization', and 'demythologization'. Eliade often speaksi this context of 'archetypes,' of a trans-conscious or 'subconscious'; thus, he not entirely uninfluenced by C. G. Jung, even if he is not completely dependen upon him. 57 As a result, it is difficult to discover a clear answer to the question are we dealing here with a religious 'disposition', the old religious a prion? I Rudolf Otto's writings, too, we have the same difficulty in trying to distinguis the subjective and objective factors of the 'holy'.

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Strictly speaking, Eliade's thought does not allow the possibility of genuine and thorough desacralization or secularization: as an element consciousness, the sacred is not simply an earlier stage of consciousness. The 'archaic' persists; humanity is always its 'prisoner'. Therefore, there always the possibility of an 'irruption' of the sacred into the 'profane', of the 'disclosure' of the 'religious' or of the 'sacred' even in the secular strands modern culture. Neither the 'sacred' nor the 'profane' actually cease rather, there is 'the complete camouflage of the "sacred"—more precisely, identification with the "profane", which now again is judged to be 'the sold but important, religious creation of the modern Western world'.

These opposites, therefore, are dialectical poles of a world-historical process that possesses a certain continuity, even though we can never formulated genuine history of religions based on them. The discontinuity, which creates the manifestation of the sacred and its desacralization or profanization, implicated in it. The abstract category of the sacred tolerates no history, only




Figure 1. The world of the religious according to Eliade.

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visions and intuitions. If we consider this conception graphically (see Figure 1), the sacred forms a 'core' of being and of consciousness; it combines with the profane to produce only a pseudo-history: the history of the horizontal and vertical relations of the 'inner core' to the 'external' events. The history of religions is a discontinuous recounting of hierophanies, kratophanies, and theophanies (in Eliade's view, 'magico-religious materials' can be nothing more than these) in chronological order under the heading of 'creative moments' in any given tradition. 61 Such is the history of homo religiosus, of his appearance and of his hidden reality (see below). The sequence, as Eliade follows it in his History of Religious Ideas, reveals the nature of this 'history' very clearly. Eliade makes a futile attempt to preserve some sort of historical continuity. He is content with describing the rise and history of religious beliefs and activities in the scope of individual cultures and peoples. But it is very difficult to discern what holds the material together, except for the continuation of the 'archaic', which contains everything already. The multiplicity of hierophanies, their 'irruptions' and creative unfolding or rediscovery in the world of religions is a chaotic sea of external, historical courses. Other handbooks, too, outline similar courses of history.

(2) Now I come to 'symbolism'. So far as I can see, this is the only theme that Eliade thought merited a methodological discussion. ⁶² The world of religious symbols—especially in mythical traditions—is for him the chief form that the manifestation of the sacred assumes. 'Symbolization' and 'hierophanization' are fundamentally two sides of the same coin. Thus, symbols as 'ciphers' of (religious) 'reality' are the principal subject matter for the history of religions, and as a result, hermeneutics becomes the discipline's primary method, at the

expense of all the methods of history, sociology, philology, and psychology. Eliade aspires to grasp a symbol's deep structure, its transtemporal meaning which contains the 'core' of any hierophany. An understanding of symbols opens an avenue of approach to religious 'reality', to the 'sacred' in its multiplicity (its 'modalities'), but also—and this Eliade stresses—to the experience and the 'elucidation' of existence that the symbol expresses. Symbols disclose 'the borderline situations of mankind': in that sense they are above time, always capable of being experienced and employed. ⁶³ Inasmuch as symbols open for humankind an approach to the cosmos (symbolization is equivalent to making a cosmos!), they give us meaning and free us from pure subjectivity.

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We see clearly the lofty position the symbol has in the structures of Eliade's thought. For him, homo religiosus is, at the same time, 'symbolic man'; with and through the symbol—which includes ritual, too—human beings communicate with the 'sacred'. 'Images and symbols', then, form the primary content of Eliade's books. ⁶⁴ They are the chief source for the analysis of the religious view of the world, and they allow Eliade to approach the latent 'history' of hierophanies and 'religious ideas'. 'After all, it is the presence of the images and symbols that keeps the cultures "open"'. ⁶⁵

I cannot discuss here the entire issue of symbolism, or rather, the study of symbols, in the history of religions. 66 Eliade reminds us that symbols should not be underestimated in a positivistic fashion, but he extends their significance too far. Indeed, he actually limits the history of religions to a hermeneutics of symbols. He does not define 'symbol' sharply enough; he does not distinguish it from 'sign', 'image', 'metaphor'. In fact, Eliade's notion of symbol is almost broad enough to encompass all forms of religious expression. Ritual, too, becomes primarily symbolic activity, to say nothing of myth. Moreover, Eliade does not often distinguish between the original significance of a symbol and its later interpretations and explanations. The tradition of a symbol, is actual history, is assigned only a subordinate place. Eliade 'universalizes symbols by tearing them apart from form and content. He sees the historical context as of secondary importance, although it 'localizes' the symbol and bestows on it a specific content (corresponding to the developmental stages of all cultures). Eliade is chiefly interested in the (often only superficial) transtemporal, transhistorical 'content' of a symbol's religious structure, although he knows full well its historical associations, as in the case, for example, of an arrival and the case is the case of the cas agricultural symbol. Without the dynamic relation between historical individual and eternal-universal structures, the religious symbol has little significance even for homo religiosus: homo religiosus relates to both polés existentially.67

Eliade also gives us no detailed discussion of the decline of religious symbols or their disappearance or their full impact upon non religious, profane images

For him, there is, as in the case of the 'sacred' itself, only a waning of the symbol. In this process, the role of the (individual's) 'value-consciousness', which is necessarily implicated in determining the validity of symbols and whose alteration or disappearance resulted in the end of the world of symbols, too, is just as decisive as the alteration of social or culture-historical structures. Eliade raises about the 'logic of symbols'—their multivalence and their power to integrate—may serve as propositions from which future research into symbols may begin. Nevertheless, they often transgress the bounds of work in the history of religions proper or, as I have said already, they blur those limits. In no case can the history of religions use such questions as a 'maieutics' or a 'metapsychoanalysis' to reawaken or to renew archaic mythical symbols, in order thus to discover a way to get at 'the true reality of the world'. With H. Biezais, we must maintain that 'the history of religions is a stroll through the cemetery of dead religious symbols'.

(3) As I have mentioned already, the crucial point for Eliade is his notion of 'archaic time', which Eliade understands to be the time of early, mythicoreligious humanity: the world of the genuine homo religiosus (see below).72 Actually, Eliade never clearly specifies what he means by 'archaic time', since it is not only a 'historical' category but also a structural, indeed, a philosophical and ontological category. 73 From the first volume of Eliade's History of Religious Ideas, we might infer that in essence 'archaic time' refers to the stone age (paleolithic to neolithic) (cp. ch. 1-2). In that period the essential traits of the 'modalities of the sacred' already became visible. With 'hominization', the structuring of space began, for being human presupposes a vertical posture (p. 3). Prehistoric humanity was fully human; it experienced dreams, visions, and fantasies in their full, proper forms (p. 4). With the help of extant remains, markings, and burials, it is possible to form some idea of the religious outlook of this period, an outlook with which we are familiar from the mentality of hunters: animal sacrifice, an afterlife, rebirth, rituals, festivals, shamanism or, to be more precise, ecstasy (as the primal phenomenon of religion!), myths, the role of the feminine, the cycles of the moon, indeed, experiences of transcendence through the 'recognition' of the sacrality of the sky and the atmosphere (pp. 22-28). Eliade also talks about the role of work, tools, technology, and the division of labour (pp. 3-4, 6-7): in the process of sacralization, they do not occupy a dominant position, but they contribute to the conception of 'kratophanies' (p. 6). Eliade's already complex picture of the thought-world of early humanity also takes into account its psychological condition (pp. 27-28).

Specific alterations or amplifications in the field of religious experience appeared during the course of the 'longest revolution, the discovery of agriculture' (ch. 2, pp. 29–55). Here, too, Eliade refers to the role of work and technology (pp. 32–35). The domestication of animals, handicrafts, agricul-

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ture, and metallurgy define the new 'hierophanies': cosmogonies based on a 'primal murder' or a 'primal theft', the homologization of women and vegetation, human beings and plants, 'mother earth—the whole world of agricultural religions, which Eliade associates with a 'cosmic religion' (p. 40) whose central thought is that of periodic renewal and repetition (in imitation of the botanical realm), 'biocosmic' conceptions and religious valorizations of space, all of which continue still today among peasants and constitute an essential aspect of 'archaic religion'. The cosmologies, eschatologies, and messianisms that will dominate the East and the Mediterranean world for two millenia have their deepest roots in the conceptions of the Neolithics' (p. 42).

During the period from the neolithic to the iron age, religious ideas intermingle with the history of civilization. 'Each technical discovery, each economic and social innovation, it would seem, was 'doubled' by a religious meaning and value' (p. 44). A 'grandiose Neolithic spirituality' (p. 51) dominated the early European cultures, above all South-east Europe (Eliade's homeland), but it can be discerned now only in fragments. The earliest written texts reveal entirely new and different traits, which centre on the city, kingship, and priests (p. 51). The contribution of the iron age is a mythology of metals (pp. 52–55), above all the discovery of the 'telluric sacredness' (p. 53) and of the 'mastery over time' through the alteration of nature in the process of smelting (p. 61).

This brief summary not only sheds light on Eliade's own dependence upon historical research but also shows how concerned he is to elaborate the 'archaic' in purely historical terms. Nevertheless, one does not have such a sharp picture if one compares Eliade's History of Religious Ideas with his earlier works, such as The Myth of the Eternal Return or Patterns in Comparative Religion. The 'archaic' dwindles as time passes, but it maintains itself sporadically (historically!) even into our own time (in the societies of non-literate peoples and in Asiatic and south-eastern European peasant communities) This archaic heritage has been enriched and shaped by the 'culture-religions' of ancient peoples, which the next installment of the History of Religious Ideas addresses—a difficult period to delimit, one that we can identify, at the earliest, with the beginning of the literate city cultures of the ancient 'class' societies'. According to Eliade, 'all culture is a "fall" into history, and is, by the same token, limited'. 75 Therein lies the reason that Eliade also uses the expression 'archaic' in yet another sense: as the ontological opposite of 'modern'. This usage defines the term's boundaries. 'Modern man', like 'archaic man', is an ideal-type. In Eliade's thought, these two exist in a kind of 'dialectical tension', 76 and they express two fundamental, mutually exclusive modes of human being. Eliade does not describe the transition in any detail. The 'modern' is simply the recent: it begins with the Reformation, Humanish the Renaissance, and historical awareness. 77 At the same time it brings about

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the 'fall' from the paradise of the archaic 78 that had already been anticipated sporadically: through abandoning archaic modes of thought and action, above all through the 'collapse' into historical consciousness, into the 'irreversibility of time', the inescapability of progression, the 'non-repeatability' or linearity of time, into inflexible necessity, individuality, the loss of the 'eternal paradigms' of myth and religion, and into the profane.79 The liberating and meaning-giving appeal to the paradigmatic 'time of origins' (illud tempus) in myth and ritual, which serves to 'transcend' time and history and so actually brings about the timelessness and ahistoric character of archaic humanity. homo religiosus, is the foil that Eliade sets up to homo historicus. This is the sum total of his history of religions, a kind of personal confession. To expose this duality, polarity, or antinomy is to address what are Eliade's own concerns. He stands squarely on the side of the 'archaic' and believes that the 'modern' is a false and fateful path to the loss of meaning, a path we can escape only be returning to the archaic. (This attitude was fostered by Eliade's own experience in India of being 'submerged' in the sources of Being and of being separated from the 'world of becoming' and from the 'terror of history.')80

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Can this view of 'history' be grounded in or justified by the history of religions? It is clear that Eliade has allowed certain value-concepts to infiltrate his efforts in the history of religions, value-concepts that, strictly speaking, serve our prevailing image of the world. Any attempt to limit religion to the (naturistic) archaic and to its world of images (symbols) that also attempts to separate religion from 'history' (as if history, too, could not be subject to sacralization⁸¹) does not derive from the historical study of religions or from the history of religions more broadly speaking (Religionswissenschaft). As Carsten Colpe reminds us: 'once the historicity of a phenomenon has been perceived, it is no longer possible to interpret its individual details as archaic', 82 as the 'pattern' or 'myth and ritual' school tried to do (Eliade also tells us very little about how his thought relates to this school). Eliade's undiscriminating juxtaposition of 'archaic' and 'modern' requires an historical correction: it is a value-laden, static, ahistorical concept. The archaic may be conceived as sacred not only to the extent that it is an historical phenomenon, to the extent that human beings are seen as relating to it in specific, historically conditioned ways, but also to the extent that it is itself only too often historical and must be unmasked as an imposter that is unconsciously re-projected into hoary prehistory and is then continually regenerated through the re-acquisition of religion', 83

(4) It remains to address the key figure that I have already mentioned frequently: homo religiosus. This ideal type in Eliade's picture of the world takes its vitality not only from archaic religiosity but above all from its antithesis, homo areligiosus or historicus. Raffaele Pattazzoni, in the papers that he left behind at his death, had already placed Eliade and his vision of

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humanity in the context of earlier, similar attempts to establish a one dimensional image of 'early' or 'primal humanity' as the antitype to cone temporary, modern, humanity:

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James George Frazer: magical, prereligious humanity Wilhelm Schmidt: premythical humanity Lucein Lévy-Bruhl: prelogical humanity Carl G. Jung: archetypal humanity Mircea Eliade: precultural, cosmic humanity.⁸⁴

For Eliade, homo religiosus is humanity at its truest. His thought circle about homo religiosus; the reawakening of homo religious through the history of religions is his life's ambition. Just as the archaic consciousness continues to be the domain of the holy, with all the fundamental religious structures, so home religiosus continues in concealed fashion. Here we almost encounter a Gnostic concept: the true, divine man—the 'primal man'—is preserved in fallen earthly, profanized human beings until it is reawakened through the transcendent 'call' of liberating 'recognition' (gnosis). In Eliade's thought, the voice is the voice of the old symbols and their deciphering through the history of religions, which in this way—through 'maieutics'—becomes practical.⁸⁵

Eliade thinks of the shaman as the typical representative of homo religiosus,2 person who through ecstasy can break the barriers to transcendence, just as the gnostic saviour destroys the barriers of the celestial planes from above. In other ways, too, creative religious personalities are representatives of this type of humanity, a type which discovers, actualizes, and realizes the sacred.8 Here Eliade limits true, proper religion to an elite, as many other historians of religions have also done, especially those in Rudolf Otto's school-prophets, mystics, founders, and heroes. Such a limitation has had fateful consequences in the history of religions, for it has led to a distorted history, a history of great personages. Such a measure of value is a presupposed and biased standpoint that precludes objectivity and that cannot do justice to the historical facts Eliade identifies 'religious humanity' with an entire epoch, the archaic, as indeed other theoreticians before him had-borrowing this idea either from the biblical notion of a primal, paradisaical state or from Rousseau's notion of the 'noble savage'. Eliade is himself fully aware of this heritage. 87 He does not completely overlook homo faber and the different psychological types that can be identified as early as the paleolithic, different types which complement Paul Radin's observations that tribal societies are not so homogeneous. 88 Still, this awareness does not produce any changes in Eliade's scheme. There has nevel been and never will be a homo religiosus who merges completely into a cosmic sacrality in order to transcend 'history' and 'time'. 89 Humanity is multiple this is its true secret / this is its true secret: homo faber, sociologus, politicus, religiosus, historicus. make a single aspect of humanity into a transtemporal, 'ideal' type is not

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compatible with the universality and complexity of human possibilities and characteristics. The history of religions knows this well enough, thanks to research in sociology, psychology, and ethnology that Eliade often attacks. In any case, to undervalue and ignore research in these areas leads us into false alternatives.

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nultiple; ricus. To pe is not III It becomes clear that in Eliade's history of religions we encounter very specific values and a philosophical anthropology and ontology that transgress the bounds of an empirical study, bounds within which the history and phenomenology of religions belongs. Eliade's writings are characterized by fluctuations between and the confusion of various levels of reflection—analysis, the search for meaning, the comprehension of essences, and evaluation—that render his work vulnerable and mislead the reader. 90 When Eliade turns to his analysis, and even when he is simply presenting source materials, philosophical and normative judgments already intermix with descriptive statements. Eliade does not carefully distinguish nor does he reflect methodologically upon the various levels of interpretation. Only the 'normative background' makes his works intelligible. Strictly speaking, Eliade's history of religions merely serves to illustrate a prior ontology, anthropology, and soteriology. 91 Subjective judgments, personal experiences, and personal confessions influence Eliade's data92 and lead to the sort of 'reduction' that Eliade himself wishes to renounce and fight against. 93 He actually identifies himself with the religious perspective that he portrays: the goal of his thought is homo religiosus as the truly human in past, present, and future. The history of religions becomes despite Eliade's protests to the contrary—the means for realizing this goal. It helps to create a new, religio-philosophical anthropology, behind which we can detect a hidden soteriology, that strives to free human beings to be truly human.94 In this procedure, Eliade discusses only certain sides of the history of religions—primitive and eastern spirituality, yoga and other mystical-ecstatic experiences, Platonic (and especially neo-Platonic) teachings, theological assertions regarding the 'fall' and 'salvation', incarnation as the localization of the sacred—and, in normative fashion, he assigns to them absolute status as constituting a universally valid notion of religion—I have noted all these points, but each of them merits more detailed investigation. 95 Articulated in a manner that is not only ahistoric but also anti-historic (more precisely, antihistoricistic) and to that extent also pessimistic—a 'flight from being' (in opposition to Paul Tillich's 'Courage to Be'), 96 Eliade takes his stand against the modern and strives to be delivered from its forces—from the 'terror of history'—in a return to the eternally present—though now hidden—archaic religious activity: the sanctification of the cosmos and our submersion in the eternal truths of its world of images. 97

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This is, without doubt, a fascinating project, above all because it is carried out not in an abstract philosophical and theoretical vein but in monographs the highest literary quality and as contributions to the history of religions. Eliade adds even further literary value to the discipline's works—and thereby increases their effect upon with the general public—by deliberately vying with earlier leading lights in the history of religions. But the discipline of the history of religions, too, was overburdened with philosophical, theological, and religious problems and questions, from which it extricated itself only with difficulty. Eliade's works are documents of an impressive effort-informed by an astounding degree of knowledge and erudition—to protect the universal claim and character of the history of religions and to prevent its decay into different schools, research programmes, philologies, sociologies, and psychologies. To my mind, this effort is his chief contribution—this effort together with the attempt to secure for the history of religions its own position in the universe of the human studies by grasping firmly the 'uniqueness' of its subject matter, an attempt that shall always meet with diverse responses. The discussion of this attempt has been elevated by Eliade to unheard of prominence in the history of religions.

In 1986 death deprived us of this untiring writer. The rich harvest that he might still have reaped would have added to a monument that even now we can neither take in at a glance nor encircle with our steps, a monument to a passionate engagement with a new vision of a humanity in touch with its religious roots.

NOTES

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^{*} This article originally appeared as 'Eliade und die "Religionsgeschichte" in one of three German Festschriften that Hans-Peter Duerr edited on the occasion of Mircea Eliade's 75th birthday: Die Mitte der Welt: Aufsätze zu Mircea Eliade (Frankfurt/Main Suhrkamp, 1984, pp. 49–78). Professor Duerr invited contributors to write a critical essay on Eliade or on a theme that Eliade had discussed, so as to set a precedent for a new kind of Festschrift. The plans for an American edition of—or rather, an American selection from—the Festschrift, to be published by the University of Chicago Press under the leadership of Wendy D. O'Flaherty, have by now excised almost all contributions to the German edition that were critical of Eliade; as a result, it will simply replicate the model of the traditional Festschrift. I venture to doubt that such was the desire of Eliade himself, who is unfortunately no longer among us. Eliade was always kind enough to tolerate justified criticism.

¹ Cp. Calinescu, 'Imagination and Meaning: Aesthetic Attitudes and Ideas in Mircea Eliade's Thought', Journal of Religion 57 (1977), pp. 1-15; G. Dudley III, Religions on Trial: Mircea Eliade and His Critics, Philadelphia, 1977, pp. 27ff.; and the contributions of V. Ierunca, G. Spaltmann, V. Horia, and G. Uscatescu in Myth and Symbols: Studies in Honor of Mircea Eliade, J. M. Kitagawa and C. H. Long (eds), Chicago 1969, pp. 343-406.

Such allusions are especially pronounced in Eliade's Cosmos and History: The Myth of the Eternal Return, trans. by Willard R. Trask, New York, 1959, see p. 152, n. 11.

A beginning has been made by D. A. Doering, A Biography of Mircea Eliade's Spiritual and Intellectual Development from 1917 to 1940, Ph.D. dissertation. University of Ottawa 1975. Compare now, too, M. Eliade, Autobiography I: 1907-1937: Journey East, Journey West, San Francisco, 1981, on which, see Ivan Strenski, 'Love and Anarchy in Romania', Religion 12 (1982), pp. 391-403. I have not had access to Ioan P. Culianu, Mircea Eliade, Città della Editrice (Assisi, 1978).

What follows presents the results of a graduate seminar on 'Eliade and the History of Religions', which I conducted in the autumn semester, 1981, at the University of Leipzig. I would like to thank those who took part for their contributions, especially K. Nowak, H. Mürmel, and D. Pollack. A survey of all Eliade's works is not available. For bibliography, see D. Allen and D. Doering, Mircea Eliade: An Annotated Bibliography, New York, 1980; and Mircea Eliade, C. Tacou, G. Banu.

and G. Ch. Demersay (eds), Paris, 1978, pp. 391-409.

Le Chamanisme et les techniques archaiques de l'extase, Paris, 1951. References in the text refer to the English translation by Willard R. Trask, Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy, Princeton, N. J., 1964. Cp. similar statements in Eliade's Images and Symbols: Studies in Religious Symbolism, trans. by Philip Mairet, New

York, 1969, pp. 27ff.

This often-used term in the history of religions comes originally from idealistic and phenomenological philosophy and linguistics; it presupposes the dualism of 'essence' and 'manifestation', 'internal' and 'external', 'centre' and 'shell', and thus it is most suited to Eliade's phenomenology of religion. In my opinion, this term violates the historical character of the history of religions and introduces the philosophical question of the 'essence' of religion, which does not belong to the tasks of this discipline. The term is often used out of habit and without reflection. I prefer to speak of 'religious things' or 'religious facts', as Eliade also does occasionally (cp. Images and Symbols, pp. 29ff.; Shamanism, pp. xivff.). On this problem, cp. H. Seiwert, 'Uber den Gegenstand der Religionswissenschaft', unpublished manuscript, and "Religiöse Bedeutung" als wissenschaftliche Kategorie,' Annual Review for the Social Sciences of Religion 5 (1981), pp. 57-99.

Cp. also Images and Symbols, pp. 29-30.

Ibid., p. 29.

Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion, trans. by Willard R. Trask, New York, 1959, p. 11; cp. the very similar statement in Myths, Dreams, and Mysteries: The Encounter between Contemporary Faiths and Archaic Realities, trans. by Philip Mairet, New York, 1967, p. 124.

Mircea Eliade, Patterns in Comparative Religion, trans. by Rosemary Sheed, New

York, 1963, pp. 2,7,10.

Ibid., pp. 3, 462. Cp. also Mircea Eliade, The Quest: History and Meaning in Religion, Chicago, 1969, p. 7: 'There is no such thing as a "pure" religious datum, Outside of history . . . Every religious experience is expressed and transmitted in a Particular historical context'; Images and Symbols, pp. 31ff.; Patterns, pp. 462 and 464 Faces 464. From statements such as these one could deduce what, for example, Richard von Dille. von Dülmen claims in Geschichte und Gesellschaft 6 (1980), p. 40: 'Religion is inconcein III inconceivable apart from human social activity and society; consequently, it can only be understood in the context of the historical formations and their preconditions, formations and preconditions in which it originates or from which it

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derives social and political significance. . . . A historical investigation of religio thematizes religion as a social phenomenon and analyzes religion in terms of the social interests that it serves'. Such an investigation does not operate with magnitude of religion given along with the essence of humanity' in order to gras the religious phenomenon as purely religious, as holy and numinous', rather that 'its central function as a means of orientation in the social process'. A historica treatment simply cannot avoid such 'reductions'!

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19 Patterns, p. 2.

Images and Symbols, p. 32. 13

Ibid., p. 33. 14

Shamanism, p. xviii; cp. Patterns, p. 389: 'All time of whatever kind "opens" on the 15 sacred time-in other words, is capable of revealing . . . the absolute, the supernatural, the superhuman, the superhistoric'; as a result, 'economic and some changes are not enough in themselves to account for religious phenomena as sudi (ibid., p. 464).

Shamanism, p. xix; Myths, Dreams, and Mysteries, pp. 153-154 (here the historic 16 limitations that the Sacred experiences in its historicization are compared with Christian thoughts on the incarnation of Christ; the ideological background Eliade's thought is thus revealed—a theological concept, apparently from the

Greek orthodox Christianity of Eliade's background).

17 The Quest, p. 58.

18 Images and Symbols, p. 34. To this corresponds Eliade's conviction that there's no such thing as an 'objective history of religions'; which is a subjective bias For Eliade, 'objectivity' is simply 'the fashion of thinking in our times' (ibid p. 28).

19 The Quest, p. 8.

Cp. two essays reprinted ibid., 'A New Humanism', pp. 1-11 (originally in History of Religions 1 [1961], pp. 1-8) and 'Crisis and Renewal', pp. 54-71 (originally) History of Religions 5 [1965], pp. 1-17). Also instructive on this topic is Images et Symbols, pp. 34-37, where Eliade ascribes to the history of religions an obstetric or maieutical task: 'the history of religions could bring forth a new man, mor authentic and more complete' and 'would . . . help rescue modern man from hi cultural provincialism and, above all, from his historical and existentialist relativism (p. 35). On this side of Eliade's thought see especially Ulrich Berner, 'Universal' geschichte und kreative Hermeneutik. Reflexionen anhand des Werkes con Mirce Eliade', Saeculum 32 (1981), pp. 221-241.

21 The Quest, pp. 8-9.

- 22 Ibid., p. 9.
- 23 Ibid., pp. 4f., 61ff.
- 24 Ibid., p. 4. 25
- Ibid., pp. 65f. 26 Ibid., pp. 55f.
- 27 Ibid., pp. 60, 64.
- 28 Ibid., pp. 61f.
- Ibid., p. 58, and in more detail, 'The History of Religions in Retrospect: 1912 at 29 After' (ibid., pp. 12-36).

Ibid., pp. 66ff.; Images and Symbols, pp. 35ff. 30

- 31 The Quest, pp. 67f.
- 32 Ibid., p. 69.
- 33 Ibid., p. 70.

34 Ibid., p. 71. On these issues, cp. my Historical Fundamentals and the Study of Religions.

This expression was used, among others, by F. Max Müller in Chips from a German Workshop, vol. 1, London, 1897, Preface, and in Introduction to the Science of Religion, London, 1873. This usage is consistent with Müller's denial that he was advocating a 'naturalistic, empirical method' in the manner of the natural sciences (cp. W. Schmidt, Kritik der Theorie der Religion bei Max Müller, phil. Diss. Leipzig, 1896, pp. 9f.). E. Burnouf's La science des religions, 2nd edn., Paris, 1872, was translated into English under the title The Science of Religion, London, 1888. Today, the term 'science of religion' is used by Ninian Smart, among others. See his The Science of Religion and The Sociology of Knowledge, Princeton, 1973.

The Quest, p. 35; Images and Symbols, p. 29, where Eliade speaks explicitly of Professor Van der Leeuw, who has done so much for the phenomenology of religion, and whose many and brilliant publications have aroused the educated

public to a renewal of interest in the history of religions in general'.

37 Shamanism, pp. xvii-xix.

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8 Cp. D. Allen, 'Mircea Eliade's Phenomenological Analysis of Religious Experience,' Journal of Religion 52 (1972), pp. 170–186, esp. 186, and Structure and Creativity in Religion, Religion and Reason 14 (The Hague, 1978), pp. 196ff., esp. p. 202. When Eliade separates himself from philosophical phenomenology (e.g., Merleau-Ponty), he takes only a small step. For in his view the history of religions is still concerned with the 'meaning' of phenomena 'and seeks to reconstitute the ideology in which they are assumed and given value' (Myths, p. 88). Eliade's ahistorical, phenomenological concern is also revealed quite clearly in a brief note in Patterns: 'Underlying the history, development, diffusion, and changes of any hierophany is its basic structure'. The scarcity of the evidence (in this case for the mythology of the sun) makes it difficult to state this claim with any greater precision; but Eliade is 'not of course speaking of "historical" connection, but of typological symmetry' (p. 145, n. 1).

Cp. especially. Cosmos and History (n. 2), pp. 139–162. In the Foreword, Eliade expressly refers to this book as 'an introduction to the philosophy of history' (p. xi). Such a view is present already in Patterns, ch. 11–12, pp. 388–436. Eliade ascribes 'a relatively minor part' in the history of human consciousness to 'historic awareness'. 'The more a consciousness is awakened, the more it transcends its own

historicity' (Images and Symbols, p. 33).

Cp. e.g., Images and Symbols, pp. 71–73, where Eliade discusses the 'terror of time' in Indian thought; all of ch. 2, 'Indian Symbolisms of Time and Eternity', is highly instructive concerning Eliade's outlook. The same is true of Myths, pp. 43–46, 53–56, and 149–154, where Eliade emphasizes the connections between Christian and Indian views of time. Naturally, Eliade's book on Yoga, a key writing in his corpus, is fundamental to a consideration of this topic. Eliade himself admits in his Foreword to Allen's Structure: 'By way of conclusion, I must add that my understanding of religious symbolism was greatly enhanced by my stay in India' (p. ix). On the influence of India in Eliade's thought, see esp. Dudley, Religion on Trial, pp. 105ff

Cp. Karl Löwith, Nietzsches Philosophie der ewigen Wiederkehr des Gleichen, Stuttgart, 1956. On Nietzsche's influence on Eliade, see T. J. J. Altizer, Mircea Flind.

Eliade and the Dialectic of the Sacred, Philadelphia, 1963, pp. 89ff. and 176ff.

Cp. F. Engel-Janosi in Denken über Geschichte, Wiener Beiträge zur Geschichte der Neuzeit 1, Vienna, 1974, pp. 22ff.

Cp. K. Rudolph, 'Die "ideologiekritische" Funktion der Religionswissenschaft Numen 25 (1978), pp. 17-39, and Historical Fundamentals and the Study Religions, New York, 1985, pp. 59-77.

44 Cp. The Quest, pp. 12f., 14f., 19, 12ff.; Images and Symbols, p. 23n. From Dudle pp. 139f., we can establish a certain proximity of Eliade's 'sacred', conceive structurally, to Durkheim's thought. On the latter, see Durkheim's The Elementon

Forms of the Religious Life, New York, 1965, pp. 44ff.; cp. R. A. Nisbet, 7 Sociology of Emile Durkheim, New York, 1974, pp. 172ff.

Cp. The Quest, pp. 23, 34, 46; Sacred and Profane, pp. 8-10; Myths, pp. 123-18 (which discusses quite clearly the relation of Eliade's thought to Rudolf Otto and to his 'penetrating analysis'); Altizer, p. 24; Dudley, pp. 64, 85, 139f.; Allen, p. 61, 120f; and S. S. Acquaviva, Der Untergang des Heiligen in der industrielle Gesellschaft, Essen, 1964, pp. 24ff.

46 Cp. especially Dudley, p. 140; Allen, pp. 218-219 (with criticism of M. I. Ricketts). There is call for a more detailed investigation of the differences are agreements between Eliade and Otto. Eliade emphasizes that 'reason is present in the most primitive hierophanies, and religious experience is not a primitive

incompatible with the intelligible' (Patterns, p. 126).

Cp. the anthology edited by C. Colpe, Die Diskussion um das 'Heilige', Wege de Forschung 305, Darmstadt, 1977; see further the thematic bibliography of R Courtas and F.-A. Isambert, 'La notion de "sacré", Arch. Sc. soc. des Rel. 4: (1977), pp. 119-138. For a recent critic, see especially G. Schmid, Interessant will heilig, Zurich, 1971.

Cp. Sacred and Profane, p. 11: 'In each case we are confronted by the same mysterious act—the manifestation of something of a wholly different order,? reality that does not belong to our world, in objects that are an integral part of our natural "profane" world'. Myths, p. 125: 'The great mystery consists in the very fu that the sacred is made manifest (sic); for ... in making itself manifest the sacre limits and "historicizes" itself'. In doing so, it ceases to be absolute (Eliade actually uses the example of the incarnation of Jesus Christ). Patterns, p. 459 'Sacredness is, above all, real. The more religious a man is the more real he is' (sit)

49 Sacred and Profane, p. 12; Patterns, p. 126 ('religious life, which we may summarily define as the experience of kratophanies, hierophanies, and theophanic affects the whole of man's life'); Myths, p. 126 ('Every hierophany is a kratophany

a manifestation of force' [sic]).

Cp. Shamanism, pp. 466ff.; Images and Symbols, pp. 45-46, 48, 166 (when shamanism and Christianity are juxtaposed).

51 Sacred and Profane, pp. 14-16.

Cp. ibid., pp. 110-112; Myths, p. 153 (through the incarnation, history itself becomes a theophany). In Eliade's History of Religious Ideas, 3 vols, Chicago 1978–1985), see ch. 14, 25, and 28. The 'terror of history' is given a religion significance by the Hebrew prophets (vol. 1, pp. 354–356). Here we see Eliade deficient understanding of the relation between history and religion; cp. Bianchi, The History of Religions, Leiden, 1975, pp. 187-188.

53 Cp. Sacred and Profane, pp. 110-112; Cosmos and History, pp. 102-112 [OK?] Images and Symbols, pp. 160-172 (on the archaic roots of Christian symbols) Myths, pp. 29-31 (on mythical elements in the Christian liturgy that corresponded the archaic understanding the archaic un the archaic understanding of time); 'History of Religions and "Popular" Culture. History of Religions 20: 1–2 (1980), pp. 1–26, especially 11ff. (on archaic elemens

in Christmas carols); Altizer, pp. 59ff.

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Sacred and Profane, p. 126; History of Religious Ideas, vol. 1, ch. 2, pp. 29-55. 54

History, vol. 1, p. xiii. Cp. Dudley, pp. 50ff.

56 On this problem, see M. L. Ricketts, 'The Nature and Extent of Eliade's 57 Jungianism', Union Seminary Quarterly Review 25 (1970), pp. 211-234, and 'In Defence of Eliade', Religion 3: 1 (Spring, 1973), pp. 13-34, especially 24ff.; Dudley, pp. 63ff.; Allen, pp. 210f.; the relationship is emphasized heavily by E. Sharpe, Comparative Religion, New York, 1975, pp. 214ff. There is pertinent material in Images and Symbols, ch. 1, pp. 27-56, where the history of religions is made into a 'metapsychoanalysis' (p. 35). The 'transconscious' and 'subconscious' appeared already in Patterns, pp. 454-455, along with 'an "easy" imitation of the

present in the 'transconscious'. Cp. Sacred and Profane, pp. 204-205; Patterns, pp. 431-434.

Cp. especially Myths, pp. 23-38 (on the myths of the modern world) and Occultism, Witchcraft and Cultural Fashions, Chicago, 1976, where Eliade examines a series of contemporary cultural currents and traces them back to 'sacred' precursors.

archetype', by which Eliade means the return to archaic models, which can also be

History, vol. 1, p. xvi. Fundamentally, this is a consequence of Eliade's 'pansacralism', that also strives to break open the 'hard kernel' of seculariza- tion. The archaic-religious is active in the subconscious or transconscious as an inner, undetected remnant in the midst of the secular world. The human being is 'forever the prisoner of his own archetypal intuitions. . . . Man's concept of the absolute can never be completely uprooted: it can only be debased' (Patterns, pp. 433-434). The history of religions comprehends these hidden structures of consciousness and thus becomes a sort of psychology (ss n. 57 above). In Eliade's view, modern man, against his own will, opposed himself to history, 'even when he sets out to make history, and even when he pretends to be nothing but "history" (Images and Symbols, p. 35). The realization of man 'as a whole and universal being' results from consciously and unconsciously 'reliv[ing] the archetypes' (ibid., pp. 35–36). 'With the aid of the history of religions', modern man might discover the way to realization through 'the symbolism of his body, which is an anthropocosmos' (ibid., p. 36). Eliade echoes these thoughts at the beginning of his History of Religious Ideas: the human body is the original model of orientation, and with that orientation the history of religions begins (vol. 1, p. 3).

Patterns, p. 434; History, vol. 1, pp. xiii-xiv.

'Methodological Remarks on the Study of Religious Symbolism', in The History of Religions: Essays in Methodology, Mircea Eliade and Joseph M. Kitagawa (eds), Chicago, 1959, pp. 86-107. Cp. Dudley, pp. 55ff., and Allen, pp. 140ff. On the connection between Eliade's conception of literature and his interpretation of symbols or, to be more precise, of myths, see especially Calinescu (n. 1 above), pp. 7ff.

63 Images and Symbols, pp. 174-176. Thanks to the symbols, the real existence of archaic humanity 'was not the broken and alienated existence lived by civilized man to-day' (Patterns, p. 456, sic). The context of such words is the flowering of

post-war French existentialism. Cp. the title Images and Symbols and the key chapter in Patterns entitled 'The

Structure of Symbols', pp. 437-456. 65

Images and Symbols, p. 174. Cp. O. Bollnow, 'Religionswissenschaft als hermeneutische Disziplin. Methodenprobleme der Religionswissenschaft, die Welt der Symbole', Symbolon. Jahrbuch

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für Symbolforschung, n.s. 4 (1978), pp. 23-48, especially 35ff (Bollnow critiques Eliade pp. 40ff.); H. Biezais (ed.), Religious Symbols and their Functions, Stockholm 1979, especially the instructive contribution of the editor, 'Die Hauptproblemede' religiösen Symbolik', pp. vii-xxix (deals with Eliade only in passing); J. Skorupski Symbol and Theory, Cambridge, 1976; U. Berner, 'Der Symbolbegriff in der Religionswissenschaft', in Bibliographie zur Symbolik, Ikonographie und Mythology vol. 1, Beitrage zu Symbol, Symbolbegriff und Symbolforschnung, M. Lurker, (ed.) Baden-Baden, 1984, pp. 17-27. For a critique of Eliade's 'pan- symbolism', ser I. M. Kitagawa, 'A Past of Things Present: Notes on Major Notifs of Early Japanese Religion', History of Religions 20: 1-2 (1980), pp. 25-42, which argues for a 'nonsymbolic understanding of symbols' in ancient Japan.

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Emphasized, as I see it, by Allen, p. 169; cp. Bollnow, pp. 41-42. 67

- Cp. Biezais, pp. xxff., especially p. xxvii; R. Holt, 'Gottessymbol und soziale Struktur', ibid., pp. 1-14, especially pp. 11f.; S. Acquaviva (n. 45 above), passim Eliade treats the 'degradation of symbols' in Patterns, pp. 440ff., but he also write: 'A symbolism does not depend upon being understood; it remains consistent in spite of every corruption and preserves its structures even when it has been long forgotten' (p. 450). Such a statement is reminiscent of the Platonic theory of ideas Ugo Bianchi sees here one of Eliade's biggest mistakes (History of Religions, p. 188). The truth is quite different from what Eliade envisions: 'Religion, religiosity, or "religious phenomena" can be defined in themselves in terms d form and content but not generally. They can only be described and analyzed adequately in terms of the social ordering in which the concrete manifestations appear and in which they become, for both individuals and societies, actual religious institutions and elements of a collective consciousness. . . . The structure, teachings, and significance of religion changes along with the developmentol historical systems and the development of structures of need and of conditions of consciousness; for religious elements turn out to be articulations of these systems and structures and needs' (R. von Dülmen, Gesellschaft und Geschichte 6 [1980]. p. 42).
- 69 Discussed in more detail by Allen (pp. 159-169), who refers to Patterns, ch. 13, where Eliade formulates his theory of symbols. Eliade's position had already been taken in late antiquity: 'The tendency to reduce the expressions of a culture to 3 single meaning led necessarily to a science of the symbol, in which hermeneutics played a decisive role' (R. Mortley, Gnosis 1, in Reallexilcon für Antike und Christentum, vol. 11, col. 495).

Images and Symbols, pp. 35ff. and 175ff.

Biezais, p. xxvi; cp. his 'Die heilige Entheiligung des Heiligen', in Alcheringa odt die beginnende Zeit, H.-P. Duerr (ed.), Frankfurt/Main Oumran, 1983, pp. 164-190.

On this, see Altizer, pp. 41ff. and 58; Dudley, pp. 67f. and 78ff.

Cp. Images and Symbols, p. 33, where Eliade equates 'archaic' with 'integral human behavior', which the historian of religions is trying to understand.

which Christianity has reshaped but not altogether eliminated. Cp. 'History of Religions and 'Paralla Market and Paralla Market Religions and "Popular" Cultures' (n. 53 above), and M. Popescu, 'Eliade and Folklore' in Mathematical Company (n. 53 above), and M. Popescu, 'Eliade and Folklore' in Mathematical Company (n. 53 above), and M. Popescu, 'Eliade and Folklore' in Mathematical Company (n. 53 above), and M. Popescu, 'Eliade and Folklore' in Mathematical Company (n. 53 above), and M. Popescu, 'Eliade and Company (n. 53 above), and M. Popescu, 'Eliade and Company (n. 53 above), and M. Popescu, 'Eliade and Company (n. 54 above), and M. Popescu, 'Eliade and Company (n. 54 above), and M. Popescu, 'Eliade and Company (n. 54 above), and M. Popescu, 'Eliade and Company (n. 54 above), and M. Popescu, 'Eliade and Company (n. 54 above), and M. Popescu, 'Eliade and Company (n. 54 above), and M. Popescu, 'Eliade and Company (n. 54 above), and M. Popescu, 'Eliade and Company (n. 54 above), and M. Popescu, 'Eliade and Company (n. 54 above), and M. Popescu, 'Eliade and Company (n. 54 above), and M. Popescu, 'Eliade and Company (n. 54 above), and M. Popescu, 'Eliade and Company (n. 54 above), and M. Popescu, 'Eliade and Company (n. 54 above), and M. Popescu, 'Eliade and Company (n. 54 above), and M. Popescu, 'Eliade and Company (n. 54 above), and M. Popescu, 'Eliade and Company (n. 54 above), and M. Popescu, 'Eliade and Company (n. 54 above), and 'Eliade and Co Folklore', in Myths and Symbols (n. 1 above), pp. 81-90.

Images and Symbols, p. 173. 75

76 Altizer, p. 58.

Cp. The Quest, pp. 37ff.; History of Religious Ideas, vol. 3. Eliade took his degree in

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Rumania in 1928 with a thesis on the philosophy of the Renaissance from Ficino to Bruno. Already then Eliade was interested in the retention of religious elements from neo-platonism and hermetic literature. Cp. now Eliade's *Auto-biography*, vol. 1, pp. 118 and 128.

Cp. Cosmos and History, pp. 91-92; Myths, pp. 59-72.

79 Cp. Cosmos and History, passim; Sacred and Profane, pp. 207ff.; Myths, p. 154: 'By the "fall into history" we mean the modern man's having become aware of the multiple "conditioning" by history of which he is a victim.

Evidence assembled by Dudley, pp. 105ff.; expressed especially clearly in Myths,

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81 Cp. History, vol. 1, ch. 14, especially pp. 354–356 on the religious value of the 'terror of history'. According to Acquaviva, 'it is not possible to determine with certainty whether an experience of the sacred is rooted in a positive or a negative attitude to history' (p. 166). As a result, he thinks that the identification of the sacred and religious with an antihistoric attitude, and of the profane and areligious with an historic attitude, is untenable.

32 C. Colpe, Theologie, Ideologie, Religionswissenschaft, Munich, 1980, p. 36. Since for Eliade 'almost all the religious attitudes man has, he has had from the most primitive times', there is really 'no break in continuity from the "primitives" to Christianity. The dialectic of the hierophany remains one, whether in an Australian churinga or in the Incarnation of the Logos' (Patterns, p. 463). In both cases we are dealing with a 'manifestation' of the sacred, whose ahistorical, abstract character is clearly visible.

Colpe; cp. also J. Z. Smith, 'The Wobbling Pivot', Journal of Religion 52 (1972),

pp. 134-149, reprinted in Map is not Territory, Leiden, 1978, pp. 88-103.

In Studi e Materiali di Storia delle Religioni 31 (1960), p. 53. These papers, which Angelo Brelich edited ibid., pp. 23-55, are a critical and enlightening reading of Eliade's Cosmos and History, Images and Symbols, Myths. Cp. also Bianchi,

pp. 185ff.

To be sure, Eliade cautions that 'one could never pretend that rational study of the history of religions should, or could, be substituted for religious experience itself', yet he continues, 'but even for the Christian consciousness, a maieutics effects by means of the archaic symbolism will bear its fruit' (Images and Symbols, p. 36). On the relation of Eliade's thought to gnosis or Gnosticism, especially to the Hermetic text called Poimandres, see now Robert A. Segal, The Poimandres as Myth. Scholarly Theory and Gnostic Meaning. Berlin, 1986 (Religion and Reason 33), pp. 61–82 (An 'Eliadian' Analysis of the Poimandres).

Images and Symbols, p. 33: Mystics, the sages of every era, but especially those of the orient, break the fetters of the historical consciousness to penetrate to the 'totality of life'. After several initial qualifications, Eliade expresses the same view in Myths, ch. 4, 'Sense-Experience and Mystical Experience among Primitives',

pp. 73-98.

Myths, pp. 39-56; cp. also H. Plischke, Von den Barbaren zu den Primitiven, Leipzig, 1925 and the anthology edited by G. Stein, Die edlen Wilden, Frankfurt/ Main, 1984

See Radin's Primitive Man as Philosopher, New York, 1927; Gott und Mensch in der Primitiven Welt, Zurich, 1953, especially ch. 3-4; and Die religiöse Erfahrung der

Naturvölker, Zurich, 1951.

Cp. the ethnological critique of J. A. Saliba, 'Homo religiosus' in Mircea Eliade, Leiden, 1976, especially ch. 3-4 (and my remarks on Saliba in Theologische

126 K. Rudolph

Literatur Zeitung 104 [1979], cols. 16–18). G. Kehrer writes: 'The religion humanity of the past—apparently an ineradicable notion—and the so-called primitive cultures have probably never existed' (in Religion und Moral B. Gladigow (ed.), [Düsseldorf, 1976], pp. 80f.). The ideological—critical writing of E. Topitsch preserve all the required nuances in showing how the thought patterns of early humanity both attest to and critically reflect upon their dependence upon the world, nature, and society. See especially his Vom Ursprung und Ende der Metaphysik Vienna, 1958 (paperback edn., Munich, 1972), and further, Mythos, Philosophie, Politik. Zur Naturgeschichte der Illusion, 2nd edn., Freiburg Br., 1969.

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D. Allen has pointed to this in his sharp-sighted analysis, in conjunction with the hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur; see ch. 7, pp. 201ff., and even earlier, his article in Journal of Religion 52 (1972), pp. 170–186, especially pp. 182ff. Also op Dudley, pp. 84ff., on 'The Normative Thrust'. I have not had access to 6. Evangelista, Ideologia e fals conscienza in M. Eliade, Master's Thesis, University of Siena, 1974–1975 (I am indebted to R. J. Zwi Werblowsky, Jerusalem, for this reference).

91 First remarked on by Altizer, pp. 18f. and 23ff.; now cp. Allen, pp. 223ff. Already in *Patterns*, Eliade expressed the opinion that it would be prudent to 'pur the problem [concerning the problem of *mana*] in ontological terms' (pp. 22-23). This ontological, philosophical orientation dominates all his descriptions; he himself calls it a 'panontism' (ibid., p. 459). Calinescu (n. 1) speaks of Eliade's aesthetic worldview, his aesthetic view of religion and his aesthetic ontology (pp. 14-15).

92 Allen, pp. 238f.; Journal of Religion 52 (1972), p. 185.

93 Cp. Dudley, pp. 132ff.; Allen, p. 242; also J. Y. Fenton, 'Reductionism in the Study of Religions', Soundings 53 (1970), pp. 61–76, especially pp. 68–69.

94 Cp. Allen, pp. 243ff.; Adriana Berger, 'Eliade's Double Approach: A Desire for Unity', Religious Studies Review 11 (1985), pp. 9-12.

95 Altizer, passim; Dudley, pp. 84ff., especially 91ff., 105ff. (on India); Allen, pp.

220ff.; Saliba, pp. 164ff.; Bianchi, p. 190.

Dudley, p. 89. Eliade sees in Christianity a path to that which overcomes 'obstacles . . . on the path of salvation', which for today's Christian are simply 'History, the terror of History': suffering, '''fear and anguish''', even in history. Today, it is not possible to 'disengage oneself from the wheels of History, unless by some audacious acts of evasion' (Myths, p. 154). On Eliade's 'antihistorism', see also G. Dudley, 'Mircea Eliade as the "Anti-Historian" of Religions', Journal of the American Academy of Religion 44 (1976), pp. 345-359 (a comparison with Foucault) and now D. Allen, 'Ist Eliade antihistorisch?', in Die Mitte der Well.

H.-P. Duerr (ed.), Frankfurt/Main, 1984, pp. 106–127.

We should not overlook Eliade's roots in the Greek Orthodox Church with its meditative traditions and its icons as incarnations of the sacred. These roots form

the 'deep background' to Eliade's phenomenology of religion.

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Zoroaster, Manichaeism, and on methodology and terminology of Religionswissenschaft. He is a member of the Saxon Academy of Sciences in Leipzig and of the Royal Danish Academy of Sciences in Copenhagen.

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IN NOSTRO TEMPORE: On Mircea Eliade

R. J. Zwi Werblowsky

The article, whilst paying homage to the insights and perspectives which Eliade has brought to the study of religions, also criticises some of his assumptions, generalisations and methods (e.g. the role attributed to Shamanism, the homologisation of eastern mysticism ('The Buddhist monk') and palaeolithic religion, the ahistorical view of history including his mistaken interpretation of 'cyclical time' and the role ascribed to an alleged founding event *in illo tempore*). Drawing attention to the eastern orthodox form of Christianity as the background of Eliade's thinking, the article expresses doubts concerning Eliade's influence. A scholar of Eliade's calibre may 'get away' with things that are not necessarily acceptable when rehashed by his epigones.

The Editor of this volume has expressed the wish that contributors would not produce a 'Jubilee Volume' of the usual type, i.e. a collection of learned research papers. What he had in mind was a collection of essays dealing with the personality and work of Mircea Eliade rather than presenting the results of original scholarship. One could not help thinking of the French term for 'Jubilee Volume'-hommages à. Clearly a homage to Eliade can do justice to its subject only by subjecting his work to critical reflection rather than starryeyed admiration and hymns of praise. Such critical reflection is a special necessity for all those who (like the writer of these lines) feel bound to Eliade by ties of profound friendship but nevertheless have their problems with certain aspects of this method and 'phenomenology'. I hasten to add that the technical terms phenomenology and phenomenological do not occur with any frequency in the Eliadean corpus. Moreover, the present writer denies the existence and possibility of a 'phenomenology of religion' stricto sensu. Nevertheless Eliade's method may be described as phenomenological (in a rather broad, imprecise and almost metaphorical sense), not least because of its explicit and programmatic antireductionism and—not unrelated to the latter—its commitment to the distinction between 'explaining' and Verstehen. It need hardly be pointed out that the quest of 'signification' or 'sense' is anything but a monopoly of the phenomenological schools or of those tracing their pedigree to Dilthey or Simmel (although some self-appointed disciples of Eliade do not seem to be aware of this fact). Even a structuralist inspired by linguistics and very definitely hostile to any kind of Geistewissenschaft and phenomenology like Cl. Levi-Strauss could write 'l'analyse formelle pose immédiatement la question:

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sens'. Perhaps the whole problem can be expressed in the words that served as the title of a once very celebrated and widely read book on semantics: The Meaning of Meaning.

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Eliade is a cultural phenomenon in nostro tempore, for the influence of his immense and massive work—massive not only in terms of its overwhelming quantitative power but also in its density, i.e. in the sense in which van der Leeuw used this epithet in connection with 'myth'-extends beyond the confines of Religious Studies. You do not have to be a Marxist to know that quantity can, at a certain point, become quality. Some critics have said that when you have read two of Eliade's works you have read them all. But this is undoubtedly a half-truth, since it is precisely Eliade's astonishing productivity, comparable only to the equally astonishing breadth of his knowledge and reading, that accounts for the aforementioned massive power of this work. To this we should add another consideration. Eliade explicitly conceives of the study of religion as a decisive contribution to the contemporary cultural process in nostro tempore, its struggle with the modern-scientistic impoverishment of human existence and its efforts to regain an adequate spirituality. In other words, the study of religions should be a contribution towards a new humanism, as Eliade himself put it in the lead-essay to the first number of the journal History of Religions (1961) of which he was one of the founders. This desire of a 'repristination' of dimensions of human existence that have been repressed by modernity and have sunk back, as it were, into the transpersonal unconscious (the similarities to the thinking of C. G. Jung and the Eranoscircle, which extend to the concept of 'archetype', much used in Eliade's earlier work but found by him independently of Jung, are obvious in spite of basic and important differences) render Eliade's work not only 'tendentious' (in the best sense of the word) but also very problematic. At any rate, there is no doubt that Eliade's starting point is the historical situation of modern, western man in nostro tempore, i.e. the historicity of human existence. This renders Eliade's essentially non- historical or ahistorical method extremely paradoxical. The paradox is unwittingly illustrated by the use of the term History of Religion, and it is no accident that Eliade's Traité d'Histoire des Religions (cf. also his The Quest: History and Meaning in Religion, 1969) appeared in English under the more adequate title Patterns in Comparative Religion.

Needless to say, a History of Religions which starts from the historicity of human existence and yet is essentially ahistorical has its substantive as well as methodological problems. How 'historical' is Eliade's concept of history? Here, Eliade's spiritual and religious background (including, in particular, Rumanian Christianity) probably plays a significant, though as yet insufficiently explored, role. It is only this background which, it seems to me, can throw some light on his influential work on 'The Myth of the Eternal Return',

his ambiguous attitude towards history, as well as his yearning for eternity. Perhaps an analysis of this book could yield much for a better understanding of Eliade's oeuvre in general. Eliade is no philosopher and does not mean to be one. Yet he constantly moves at the margins of philosophy, sometimes to the detriment of his religionswissenschaftliche intentions. Hegel and other philosophers are amply quoted, but the important contributions of O. Cullmann (theology) and K. Löwith (philosophy) regarding time-and-history are not even mentioned. Eliade's immense erudition which arouses in his readers a sensus numinis renders the lacunae, which are perhaps the symptoms of unconscious selectivity, even more striking. Thus, Eliade, like some others, makes much ado about cyclical renewal (including death and resurrection) as it was allegedly enacted on a mythological basis in the Babylonian New Year rites (the akitu). Eliade completely ignores the fact that the text VAT 9555, inadequately translated by Zimmern in 1918, and serving as a basis for all this theorising, hardly permits this interpretation (as has been shown, e.g. by von Soden in Zeitschr. f. Assyriologie, N.F. xvii, 1955). He also ignores the fact that the hypotheses regarding a ritual New Year's drama (including ritual fight, etc.) in the Temple of Jerusalem are, to put it mildly, more than dubious. But far more important than these finnicky details (although scholars would do well to take to heart the dictum of A. Warburg 'it is in the details that God dwells') is the underlying general assumption. Many decades ago Jane Harrison had described every cultic act as being "pre-done" and "re-done" at the same time, i.e. not unique but corresponding to a timeless pattern, though she did not speak of archetypes or atemporal structures. If Jane Harrison is right, we should perhaps consider the possibility of the one, great foundational act in illo tempore being a secondary mythological reduction of precisely such a timeless pattern. Incidentally, this objection against Eliade was advanced long ago by T. H. Gaster.

More important and more weighty, however, in my opinion, are certain objections to Eliade's view of the cyclical rhythm of the 'archaic' experience of the world as an attempt to escape the 'terrors of history', whereas the linear concept of time allegedly faces them bravely. Perhaps the truth is the other way round: the linear conception of time is a pathetic attempt to mitigate the terror of history by viewing time as a sequence of meaningful and goal-directed events (with or without divine providence). The cyclical pattern can be something in which you are safely and securely held. But it can also be experienced as a total absence of meaning, a deadly and suffocating vicious circle of

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which you either encounter with a heroism bordering on nihilism (as Nietzsch well realised) or from which you are 'saved' by the irruption of goal-directed historical time. I do not wish to be misunderstood here as arguing in favour the opposition linear-cyclical. I am leaving this question open. My 50k purpose was to show how some of Eliade's theses that have become almost axiomatic commonplaces in much contemporary discourse are in realing highly questionable.

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Eliade's humanism, i.e. his programme of a recovery of buried levels of spirituality, of a broadening of our horizons to fit our present historical situation, and of transcending our cultural provincialism (meaning our western mentality), requires attention, or even a return, to the primordia depths of the 'archaic' on the one hand and to the exotically alien (e.g. the hin religions of Asia) on the other. This juxtaposition, too, is extremely dubious, is illustrated by Eliade's masterly but nonetheless unsatisfactory attempts combine yoga and shamanism. (Cf. the critical remarks of D. Snellgrove in the Journal of the Asiatic Society, 1966, and R. Gombrich in Religious Studie. 1975.) Eliade does not hesitate to juxtapose the spirituality of 'Asia and the archaic world' or the experience of the 'paleolithic hunter and the Buddhis monk', the tertium comparationis evidently being their presumed non-western non-modern existential experience. One is reminded here of G. van de Leeuw's preoccupation with, and his use of, the 'primitive religions'. Van de Leeuw chose this term not because of any occidental arrogance, but quit simply because he took his material from Lévy-Bruhl and from the account given of tribal religions by the ethnologists and anthropologists. (Chrono logically van der Leeuw's anthropology ended with Malinowski.) Van de Leeuw never asserted that the structures described by Lévy-Brhul subsequently vanished and disappeared; on the contrary they were permanent structure though they play a different role in the so-called higher cultures. Fortunately, van der Leeuw was not bothered in the least by the mischievous and super cilious criticism directed at Lévy-Bruhl by younger anthropologists who fact were saying essentially the same (as Evans-Pritchard pointed out as early as 1934) only in a more modern and pretentious jargon. As C. G. Jung once put it to me, referring to the well-known 'revocation' in the Carnets: 'Lévy-Bruh allowed himself to be terrorised by the violence of the criticisms levelled at him

Eliade prefers 'archaic' to 'primitive', which means that in addition to ethnological and anthropological data he also resorts to prehistoric material viz. to the extremely dubious hypotheses and speculations emitted with regard to prehistoric religions. If van der Leeuw's use of 'primitive religions' raised many questions, not least because of its implicit assumptions regarding developmental psychology, Eliade's invocation of the 'archaic' experience mentality and spirituality does so to an even greater degree. We are skating here on the very thin ice of pure speculation, especially as most contemporary

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scholars would reject as mistaken and illegitimate all comparisons between prehistoric cultures and contemporary societies 'without writing' (the current favourite term replacing 'primitive societies'). Hence also the name of the 'International Association for Ethnological and Prehistoric Religions' provokes more amusement than puzzlement. We are probably safe in assuming that the reference is to religions that are mainly studied by ethnologists and anthropologists. You are then left free to ask whether scriptural religions, studied mainly on the basis of their sacred texts and theological literature, should be called 'philological religions'.

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The use of the category of the 'archaic' and its application to a variety of religious forms and symbols (axis mundi, cosmic trees, shamanist and rebirth symbols, and other Eliadean archetypes) has provoked much sharp and even vicious criticism. Whilst the sharp and nasty criticism (e.g. E. Leach) easily catches more attention and even panders to academic sensationalism-and, needless to say, almost automatically calls forth apologetic rejoinders from faithful disciples-the quiet and solid criticism of the kind exemplified by Gombrich's aforementioned article is far weightier. (Eliade himself, incidentally, never engages in polemics, and never allows adverse criticism and attacks to divert him from his creative work which he considers as his vocation.) To the general criticism should be added the Ideologiekritik to which every author is exposed who seeks the archaic, non-apollonian, primordial roots. One is reminded here of Thomas Mann's reaction to Bachofen: 'nocturnal enthusiasm, a Joseph-Görres-complex of earth, people, nation, the past and death. . . . a revolutionary obscurantism'. Moreover, every liberal and 'enlightened' type of rationalism, as well as every leftist or 'progressive' ideology, dismisses authors of this kind as fascists or crypto-fascists, in addition to counting them among the propagandists of an irrational occultism and/or decadent mysticism. The case of C. G. Jung is a classic example. (I have dealt elsewhere with the question of C. G. Jung's antisemitism and his attitude to the Third Reich.) Eliade too has not been spared this kind of attack. His attitude to occultism can be easily studied by reading the relevant chapters in his Occultism, Witchcraft and Cultural Fashions, 1976. More troublesome are the accusations (without, it should be added, conclusive evidence) concerning his membership in the Iron Guard—the same Iron Guard that also plays such a significant background role in his novel The Forbidden Forest. But the lacunae in Eliade's deliberately fragmentary diary Fragments d'un Journal remain disconcerting. Especially students interested in Eliade's early activity in the circle of the literary and intellectual elite in the Bucharest of the thirties will be grievously disappointed, for everything bearing on the subject has been omitted.

Several years ago an M.A. thesis submitted to the University of Siena (Ideologia e falsa coscienza in M. Eliade) 'proved', to the satisfaction of its Marxist author and con estremo rigore filologico, the temi nazo-fascisti di Eliade.

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Without taking up here the various biographical and ideological accusations it should nevertheless be said that a personality of Eliade's stature, whose work possesses such cultural radiation, influence and weight, certainly deserves serious intellectual biography which would also investigate his ideological political and literary-publicistic development in the Bucharest of the thirties This would require a study not only of Eliade's essays in various journals and magazines, but also the writings of the literary and political circles with which Eliade was engaged in the exchange of views, discussions and polemics. These essays and articles are glaringly absent from Eliade-bibliographies, including Mircea Eliade: A Bibliography published on the occasion of an Eliade. Symposium held in 1979 by the Department of Religious Studies at the University of California at Santa Barbara. In view of the fact that there are students in the United States who are learning Rumanian with the sole aim of doing research on Eliade, it is doubly puzzling that his early essays are nowhere mentioned. I know only very few of these articles since they cannot be found in Western libraries and it is extremely difficult to obtain photocopies from Rumania. Nevertheless, the short bibliography which I have compiled and the few articles which I have read (most of them published in Vreme 1934) are extremely instructive in several respects. They certainly prove that Eliade was never antisemitic. On the contrary, when it came to the Jews he did not hesitate publicly to oppose his revered master and guru, the arch-fascist ideologue Nao Ionescu, and to argue that the Jews could not possibly be a people cursed and damned by God. Of even greater interest is the fact that the Eliade of the early thirties still completely identifies with eastern (Byzantine) orthodoxy. Eliade's arguments are neither liberal nor humanist but theological He argues (against Nao Ionescu and the popular tradition of Eastern Orthodoxy) that according to the teaching and theology of the Fathers-if properly understood—the Jews cannot simply be cursed indiscriminately, since such a doctrine would set a priori dogmatic limits to the unlimited freedom of divine Grace (sic!).

Mention has already been made of the fact that Eliade's work has become the subject of innumerable studies and dissertations, of rejection as well as of enthusiastic praise and admiration. Over twenty years ago Thomas J. Altizer published his Mircea Eliade and the Dialectic of the Sacred (1963), and the last years alone have seen a plethora of books (e.g. I. P. Culianu, Mircea Eliade, 1977; G. Dudley III, Religion on Trial: Mircea Eliade and his Critics, 1977; A. Marino, L'Hermeneutique de Mircea Eliade, 1980). Many of these publications help to illuminate another of the difficulties of doing justice to Eliade's work.

Eliade has many enthusiastic admirers but no 'disciples' in the strict sense. This may be due to his introvert personality and to his moving humility which, considering the inexhaustible productivity of the man and the scope of this influence, appear incomprehensible. Unlike his predecessor in the History of

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Religions chair in Chicago, Joachim Wach, whose influence was due not so much to his writings as to his charisma as a teacher (Rainer Flasche has shown in his excellent monograph Die Religionswissenschaft Joachim Wachs, 1978, that Wach remained influenced, throughout his life, by his experiences as a youth in the circle of Stefan George with the high value that it attached to the master-disciple relationship), Eliade's influence is due to his literary output. But the critical evaluation of Eliade's work suffers, in nostro tempore, from an unavoidable weakness. I am referring here to the immense hiatus between Eliade's rich, almost highbred and overdeveloped central European origins and the abysmal ignorance and primitiveness of many of his disciples. I am emphasising Eliade's central European origins because they impart a very special cachet to his cultural scope. The Rumanian element perhaps deserves special emphasis: a 'romance' culture surrounded by Slav and Balkan cultures, and, moreover, connected to the German and Austrian cultural heritage through its Habsburg history. Add to this the special relationship of Rumania to French culture and we get a slight idea of the complexity of Eliade's background. If one of the aforementioned dissertations on Eliade is entitled Religion on Trial this can only mean that the well-meaning author, carried away by enthusiasm for the master, could not even distinguish between religion and the Eliadean type of study of religion. It is, after all, the latter and not 'religion' that is being taken to court by Eliade's critics. In one publication about Eliade (who is responsible for the popularity of the expression in illo tempore) mention is made several times of illus tempus (sic), which invites depressing conclusions regarding the knowledge of Latin, not only among Eliade's students but also among the proofreaders of some university presses. One author quotes twice (first as a motto of his book, and then again by way of conclusion) the observation of 'the philosopher Lakatos' to the effect that the owl of Athena was flying out at dusk only. Lakatos probably took it for granted that every student would know the origin of this aphorism, and hence did not bother to mention Hegel. Even in his worst nightmares Lakatos probably never envisaged a generation of PhDs that would ascribe this aphorism to him. Sic in nostro tempore! I may seem to be making much ado about nothing and wasting time on trifles, but these details, ridiculous as they are, are also symptomatic of the wide gulf separating Eliade's culture from that of a new generation of authors who not only claim to be Eliade's disciples and successors but who, as academic teachers, also arrogate to themselves the role of administrators of Eliade's legacy.

Having said this, we can perhaps put our finger on the central dilemma raised by Eliade's oeuvre. His critics may be right in many details and even points of principle. But all this is more than counterbalanced by the value of the total work and by the wealth of perspectives and insights which it opens. But precisely because only an Eliade can indulge with (relative) impunity in

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Eliadean Religionswissenschaft, those who try to do so without being Eliadeare embarking on an undertaking that is doomed to failure. Fortunate Eliade is an Eliade, and that is why he more than deserves the gratitude of students of religion. The deep affection in which he and Christinel are heldeal their friends should be mentioned here, for the good order as it were, he shall not be enlarged upon in a context in which emotional exhibitionis would be out of place.

NOTES

1 The present essay originally appeared in German, in a Jubilee volume dedicated Mircea Eliade under the title Die Mitte der Welt, edited by H-P. Duerr appublished by Suhrkamp-Verlag in 1984. The English version should have beer rewritten and edited so as to comply with the conventions of a scholarly journal The author has nevertheless preferred not to tamper with the text and to present its original character of a contribution to a Festschrift.

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THE SECRET NOSTALGIA OF MIRCEA ELIADE FOR PARADISE: OBSERVATIONS ON THE METHOD OF THE 'HISTORY OF RELIGIONS'

Ansgar Paus

Mircea Eliade uses in his analyses of the history of religions a complex methodology called by him 'creative hermeneutics'. This methodology has benefited from the suggestions of numerous modern authors (including R. Otto, C. J. Jung, S. Dasgupta) and from theoretical elements in various disciplines. The fundamental principle of interpretation behind Eliade's science of religion methodology has hitherto remained hidden. The following article is able to show that his methodology is linked with a special theological interpretation of the Byzantine theory of icons.

'He made a more enduring impact on the western, especially German, cultivated public than on historians of religions proper or theologians'. In these words Mircea Eliade characterised the influence of the religious thought and the structural descriptions of religious phenomena offered by Rudolph Otto.¹ To a certain degree this observation can be applied to Eliade himself. The fascination of Eliade's books in the field of the 'history of religions' has guaranteed them, like those of Otto, considerable vogue among non-specialists. Both authors have exercised an immense influence upon members of totally diverse intellectual and cultural spheres. On the other hand, their works have been received among scholars of religion, and in professional circles, with remarkable reserve manifesting itself sometimes in violent criticism. Yet, even here their influence has not been inconsiderable.²

A recognition of the relationship between these two scholars of religion is not unwarranted. The thought of both revolves around the experience of the sacred. The search for access to the numinous mystery is united for both in the experience of an awful yet, at the same time, fascinating power. The esteem that Eliade manifests for Rudolph Otto does not, however, allow us to overlook the difficulty of comprehending Otto's theoretical religious or philosophical programme. Probably Eliade's interest in this programme was limited, for his endeavour was directed to the comparative interpretation of manifestations of the sacred as found in the relevant documents, monuments and events of the whole history of mankind. For this purpose Eliade took over certain theoretical

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systems of thought as well as terminological stock in trade. This was particularly the case with Otto's book *The Idea of the Holy (Das Heilige)*. Beyond the allowed himself to be influenced by, among others, Emile Durkheim and

Roger Caillois.

For Eliade the sacred is absolute. As the 'sacred' emerges from its absolute. transcendent sphere, and so to speak 'alienates itself', the universally valbinary structure of the sacred and the profane is realised in the mental world those who receive such manifestations of the sacred. The semantic value of sacred and the profane carries, in accord with Eliade's basic conception religion, strong ontological characteristics. Whilst for Eliade the 'sacred' is. the final reckoning, a transcendent reality, for Rudolph Otto the 'holi represents a transcendental psychological fact. Otto names this, as is well known, 'the religious a priori'. Only on the basis of transcendental idealist can it be presumed to be accessible to human understanding. However, Eliale displays scant interest in these assumptions and their relation to the 'sacred' For him the sacred bears the character of a metacosmic ontic ultimate ground This is merged with the self as the innermost of man. Yet it can appear in even cosmic manifestation and in perceptive knowledge or religious experience, or every historical level, without becoming identical with that with which coalesces. The manifestations at various levels of the cosmos and history named 'hierophanies' reveal themselves as historically limited emanations manifestations, or 'modalities' of the 'sacred'. The holy, as a sacred power makes its energy or its 'life' flow into the forms and shapes of nature and culture. Such manifestations of the 'sacred' are encountered, for example, i symbols, rites, myths, divine forms, sacred and venerated objects, cosmologic consecrated men, animals, plants, sacred places, etc. The 'sacred' itself, or it itself, remains invisible and unknowable. It is for the human understanding the ultimate darkness, the 'wholly other'. Its emanating force or energy manifest or visible in an individual, is not without reservations identical with itself, but is, nevertheless, a valid and effective manifestation of its essence.

Philosophically, the 'sacred' can be defined as the universal being. It over arches all particular being, penetrates it and unites it to a universe of religious manifestations. Basically the sacred inheres in the particular being. A very special process of human perception through mystical ecstasy, shamanistic trance or some other unusual type of knowledge is needed in order for it to be grasped. These few examples allow the differences between the theoretical religious approach of Eliade and Rudolph Otto to appeal clearly. It may be that in the phenomenologically orientated religious history of Eliade basic ideas from the philosophy of Husserl, Dilthey and Heidegger can be discovered. It would also be possible, from a particular viewpoint with the philosophy of religion of Otto. But one can say with certainty that at least with regard to Otto, despite all superficial appearances, there is a

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marked methodological difference between Eliade and Otto, based upon divergent principles.4

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Eliade adopts numerous theoretical religious and philosophical ideas from what is for him an extraneous context. He endows them with a new meaning according to his religious integrative methodological consciousness. The methodological conditions implied by this eclectic practice lead the reader into not inconsiderable difficulties in comprehending the author's intentions. Thus, after using the term 'archetype', Eliade feels himself bound to declare that any apparent affinity between his theory of religious history with the depth psychological theory of archetypes by C. G. Jung is without foundation.⁵

Using every methodological resource that appeared to him to be capable of service Eliade endeavoured, with his 'creative hermeneutics', to offer an interpretation and explanation of the meaning of the religious data in the history of religions. Sociological, psychological or natural science principles are not decisive for his interpretation of myths, symbols and rites of human cultures. At first glance it is hard to grasp the special features of 'creative hermeneutics'.

Very gifted from a literary point of view, Eliade had an instinct for taking up questions of interest for the history of religions from a variety of disciplines such as philology, philosophy, anthropology and psychology, as well as phenomenology and sociology, to name but some, along with methods, parts of methods and other aspects that stimulated him. His eclectically focused gifts for synthesis, together with his enormous knowledge of the history of religions, led to a complex individual method which is difficult to grasp.6 Superficially observed one can discover possible primary sources for his methodological consciousness in the religious theory of Rudolph Otto and C. G. Jung's work on archetypes. During his three years of residence in India Eliade studied in depth certain schools of Indian metaphysics. These he discussed in detail with the famous historian of Indian philosophy, Surendranath Dasgupta. 7 The philosophical explanation and foundation of methodological design fed from these mines of information confronts the scholar with not inconsiderable difficulties. For a deeper understanding, therefore, a rational foundation must be sought and found. Upon it all the apparently incoherent methodological fragments can be built. As such it constitutes the integrating nucleus of all Eliade's hermeneutical initiatives. It can be demonstrated that Eliade took his interpretive principle of all religious phenomena neither from the science of religion nor from any of the philosophical disciplines. He was, in fact, indebted for it to his own specific theology.

In any event the reader should note carefully that the emphatic impulse of Eliade's thought is directed towards reopening for his 'profane' fellow citizens, particularly those of Western civilisation, the lost entry to the archaic periods in the history of mankind. There, in his opinion, the interface of man with the sacred was not yet severed and was, theoretically,

unspoilt. Persons, things, symbols and rites bore immediate revelatory and inspirational qualities. Thereby they 'belong in some way to a different order of being, and therefore any contact with them will produce an upheaval at the ontological level'. 8

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In principle, Eliade holds that experience of the sacred is possible in every epoch of human history. Although burdened with excessively powerful rational discursive pressures man can, in an age of technology such as our realise this experience. However, the condition for the realisation of this experience of the reality of the sacred is, for Eliade, the readiness to adopt on the part of man seeking the sacred, a less theoretical and much more practical approach. Through this, via the 'sacraments', he unites in enthusiasm and ecstasy with being or the sacred. His own personal religious practice thus also enables the historian of religions best of all to discover the sacred in all the appropriate data of the cosmos and history.

The exercise of 'creative hermeneutics' implies not so much rational, discursive analysis but much more a practical realisation of the religious experience, in association with rites and symbols, myths and forms. The religious practice of the scholar implies some aesthetic, religious and intuitive vision of the character of 'creation'. Therein the reasons for the being of all that exists will be revealed, in particular their relation to the ultimate being on 'God'. In this way the scholar of religion himself exhibits a cosmic religiosity. He achieves the capacity to recognise this in all the obtainable facts of the history of religions, and thus to understand them.

The key to the understanding of the methodological complex of Eliade's works in the history of religions cannot be found in philosophy, as has already been pointed out. The fractured relationship of Eliade with transcendental idealistic phenomenology was commented on long ago. Indeed the religious phenomena that appear in the 'Life world' of the 'homo religiosus' need interpretation. But even philosophical phenomenology cannot offer such an interpretation.9 No special significance can be attached to concepts which Eliade borrowed for his creative hermeneutics from anthropology of a certain school of psychology whereby the interpretation of religious phenomena in the light of psycho-analysis might be expected to yield meaning. Eliade's often-repeated claim that a specific 'archaic' ontolog' underlies every theoretical and action-orientated religious system therefore astonishes the reader not a little. The answer to the question as to the nature of this ontology with its reference to Plato, remains inadequate. The perplexity of the search for the appropriate key to the interpretation of Eliade's method has, in fact, led to the use of the attributes 'mystic' of 'romantic' 11 'romantic', 11 terms which are intended to describe his scientific procedure. One can, however, demonstrate that the key to the understanding of the whole of Eliade's religious, historical material, seen from his perspective of judgement

lies in a theology, ¹² or to put it more precisely, in Byzantine Icontheology. Alongside modern concepts, drawn from the most varied disciplines and accompanied by their contemporary context, Eliade presents aggregates of thought of the religious or mystical experience of Orthodox Byzantine Christianity in relation to the icons. These theological ideas form for Eliade integrating principles of research in the comparison of the historically most varied religious fields. Thus he tries to establish hermeneutically the logical structure of the symbols and 'to discover the function of symbolism in general'. ¹³ The influence of the Byzantine theology of images on the conception of the hierophanies in the works of Eliade cannot be ignored. The proof of this hypothesis can be drawn from Eliade's biography and from specific iconological viewpoints.

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First, it should not be forgotten that two scholars in Bucharest exercised a lasting influence on the young Eliade above all others, Nae Ionescu (1890-1940) whose student Eliade was, 14 and even more so Nichifor Crainic (1889-1972). The latter held the chair of Mystical and Ascetical Theology in the faculty of theology at the University of Bucharest. During Eliade's student days both professors were rated as 'the undisputed spiritual authorities of religious orthodoxy in Rumania'. They were convinced that 'Orthodoxy was the most important characteristic of the Rumanian spirit' and that 'an imposed "Westernisation" of Rumanians by the political leaders would be a mortal sin'. 15 For both, Orthodox Byzantine Christianity was the determining spiritual mother-earth of Rumanian culture. It seems certain that in his youth Eliade identified himself with a clerical Eastern Orthodoxy and that theological impulses of thought exercised a lasting influence upon him. 16 Certainly, these religious components formed one thread in the rich tapestry of Eliade's whole cultural personality in which Rumanian culture was united with that of Germany and Austria. But the stamp which he received from Rumania's Orthodox Christianity was lasting.

When Eliade's affiliation to the Byzantine cultural circle is borne in mind and evaluated, a new light is cast upon the methodological components of his history of religions. The vital intellectual concept of this culture was always a 'theological' one. Philosophy was only practised in an eclectic manner. No philosophical system was ever taken over as a whole or had a continuous principle for the explication and interpretation of theological content worked out from it. One selected, rather, elements of the thought of this or that Platonic, Neoplatonic or Aristotelian writer. In much the same way Eliade's method also displays some eclectic characteristics. These may be seen in the use of this or that philosophical or scientific 'system' for his interpretive procedure with myths and symbols. He himself called his method 'integrative'. However, this means basically eclectic. What is relevant for Byzantium can be applied precisely to Eliade. 'For a priori one would not

expect a unified and fully worked out theological method in Byzantium. Even reflection about method seldom progresses beyond rhetorically fine sounding fomulae'. ¹⁷ Such a method understandably creates an impression of dilettantism.

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Eliade's concept of the science of religion displays a perplexing affinity with the concept of theology or theological teaching in bygone Byzantium The theology in question here was not understood as a discipline carefuln separated from other scientific subjects. On the contrary it saw the security of its very existence only in relation to the entire scientific universe. 'Necessarily, it languished in isolation. Furthermore, it needed its link to its milieu in the broadest sense of the word. The continual interchange and lasting interplay of ideas, whether provocative or simply fruitful enriches even school of thought. What is valid for science as such, is also valid for its nexus with the totality of cultural and everyday life into which it is inserted or should be. This is indeed relevant for theology in a special degree, because and as far as it proposes itself as the interpretation of a doctrine of salvation, and as long as it wants to be that'. 18 Eliade's spiritual formation through Byzantine 'theology' in general finds its clear, scientific methodological expression in his integrative procedure. This includes all possible scientific domains that could be in any way connected with the phenomenon of religion. The scholar of religion has, according to Eliade, to occupy himself with these 'sectors' and ponder over the results of research in them. He must accept with equanimity the accusation of 'dilettantism' and, if the occasion arises, plead the use of a 'total hermeneutics'. 19

Thereby Eliade realised de facto the 'scientific concept' of Byzantine theology as it flourished in his home surroundings in Rumania.20 There he recognised that 'cosmic Christianity' had been realised in 'the beliefs of the rural populations of southeast Europe and of the Mediterranean'. 21 In general, he knew the mystical writings of Eastern theologians. From them he drew his preference for a negative theology, with its distrust of the more rational efforts of Western theologians to elucidate spiritual realities. The theology of the Byzantine spiritual world displayed a marked resemblance to myth, particularly to pictorial representations. A continuity of Byzantine civilisation with the Greco-Roman past is confirmed with the testing of Byzantine spirituality in the cult of images. The force of popular tradition was so strong in its own time that it eliminated Stoic or Neoplatonic objections to the image cult by intellectual or rationally inclined critics.²² This was demonstrated again in the lyrical writings of Nichifor Crainic who is 'stamped by the spirit of a mystical, nationalistic Orthodox authenticity'. ²³ Eliade not only lived upon the iconotheological world of Byzantium but he also took from it the matrix or basic interpretative framework for his scientific, religious 'total hermeneutics'.

Certainly Eliade did not intend to offer any specifically Christian theor

logical interpretation of the innumerable images and symbols which the history of religions represents. On the contrary, his research intentions can be gauged by the following aim which he set for the historian of religions. In the perspective I have chosen, one thing alone is important'. Every new evaluation 'has always been conditioned by the actual structure of the Image, so much so that we can say of an Image that it is awaiting the fulfilment of its meaning'. Thereby Eliade implicitly clarified his basic accord with the distinctive 'Eastern' doctrine of images. This never limits an image merely to a functional representation 'of the being with a substantial participation (μετοχη) in the object . . . thus εἰχών does not imply a weakening or a feeble copy of something. It implies the illumination of its inner core and essence'. The Orthodox teaching on images, based on Platonic and Neoplatonic foundations, determined to an important degree the course of Byzantine theology. It was, as is well known, the main cause of serious dogmatic and political conflict in the eighth and ninth centuries.

Eliade drew upon this formal iconic theology whose unmistakable content can still be recognised in the most recent phase of the spiritual and cultural history of Orthodox Christianity. From it Eliade borrowed the decisive interpretive framework for his integrative comprehension of myths and

images, or his 'creative hermeneutics'.

Let us sketch rapidly the fundamental formal elements of the image cult, constructed on the basis of the pagan Greco-Roman image worship in the Byzantine Christian area.²⁷ Its analogous translation into the methodological construction of the 'creative hermeneutics' of Eliade is obvious.²⁸

(1) An image or an $\epsilon i \chi \acute{\omega} \nu$ ('hierophany') is not in itself God in his essence ('sacrum'), but its expression. The figure visible in the picture to the onlooker comes close to the form of the invisible 'Archetype'²⁹ of this figure. The relation between the image and its archetype or prototype is thought of as cosmic and timeless. Just as the moon receives its light from the sun, so the image corresponds to the prototype. Yet between the image and the archetype, despite the similarity of the one to the other, no identity of essence exists

(2) The outlines of divinity represented in the image can be engraved dimly on the mind and held in the memory. Images are therefore a suitable pragmatic means for the illustration of theological content which is incapable of being circumscribed. (The profound disputes and theological discussions in the Byzantine world, and the political polemic of Iconoclasm, erupted around this pragmatic view. The West was scarely touched by this controversy.)

(3) An image, a statue or an icon is a material, terrestrial or cosmic receptacle for divine power, energy or life. In the middle of empirical space

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took igious and in empirical time these material things create places or topoi for the breakthrough of a spiritual power, which itself transcends our world. Nevertheless, it is present at the actual moment in the material ('miraculous portrait'). Images are therefore, without detriment to their material form, endued with a divine power. They are revelations of transcendence, which alone is venerated and taken from the images. The Orthodox icon bears the character of a theophany and finds in that its justification. It leads the beholder through itself and, by its presence, to community or union (communio) with transcendent reality, and thus away from empirically experienced space-time (theognosy). Icons share the structure of a 'sacrament', that is to say, they function as efficacious tokens of a real presence. Their function lies in the anamnesis of the divine. This is to set in the present time that which took place 'illo tempore' and now finds its expression in the image. As a result, they are 'sacred' and not 'profane' images.³⁰

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(4) The ultimate theological reason for the justification of the veneration of images in Byzantine Christianity, as also of pictorial representations of divine realities in general, lies in the fact that God became man. The absolute unearthly sacred person conjoins to the corporeal bodily form of an earthly human being. In this manner a unique basis for his continuous, lasting earthly presence in the likeness is created. God and Man in one person, this 'coincidentia oppositorum' represents the christological foundation of the theology of icons. Its analogous application to Man and the Cosmos leads to the discernment that there is no single created object that must be excluded from being the image of the invisible God, without thereby needing to take on the character of an idol, or more precisely a graven image.

These iconological elements, taken together, form the framework upon which Eliade, as a historian of religions constructs his 'creative hermeneutics'. He practises, so to say, an 'Iconosophy' of the religions. For Eliade this represents a standard of interpretation from which there are no exceptions. In the light of the Byzantine theology of icons all images and symbols, rites and myths in religious and cultural areas outside Byzantium were then interpreted. At the same time it was suggested that the Byzantine doctrine of icons, in its fusion with the outlook on life of the Rumanian husbandman, reflected the state of consciousness of archaic man. Thereby Eliade bestows on his methodological approach to the history of religions not only a strong theological accent but also reconstructs a special 'Theology'. Eliade poses a question (as has already been seen in the discussion of his fundamental work 'Patterns in Comparative Religion') 'whether one had understood the hidden message of the book, "the theology" that is implied in the history of religions, as I myself understand and interpret it'. Image, symbols and

myths are for Eliade 'something of a theological order . . . outside Time and History'. They are 'forces that may project the historically conditioned human being into a spiritual world that is infinitely richer than the closed world of his own "historic moment"'. 33 According to Eliade's conception, it would be of the greatest importance 'to rediscover a whole mythology, if not a theology, still concealed in the most ordinary' everyday life of contemporary man'. 34

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Thus, it becomes clear once more that the science of religion, or history of religions in the form of 'creative hermeneutics', is developed under the control of a special theological a priori. This is not in the sense that Eliade allows himself to accept the 'concept of religion', or the logical structure of a symbol, without relation to any concrete realisation in form, purely from the human reason. On the contrary, he takes over the 'universal concept' or the 'structure' of the religious symbol, myth, rite and image from the Byzantine Icon theology. Through precise observation of the manifold iconic materials and through personal religious acquaintance with holy icons, 35 Eliade discovered his universally valid historically neutral principle of interpretation. He was also aided towards this discovery through abstractions of the invariable from an ample abundance of examples and comparison of typical types of icons. Thus he sought this pictorial, theological 'universal concept' without exception in all the historically and culturally diverse image and symbolic fields. With such a methodological focus Eliade obviously deserts the territory of an empirically directed religious science. This, as a principle, must have a connection with theological explanatory models.36

Without going into the individual methodological problems that Eliade's work poses for the science of religion, one can sum up at this point. For Mircea Eliade the dealings with images and symbols, rites and myths on the part of 'western' civilisation bear the stamp of an empty nominalism. This is on account of its rationalistic enlightenment pathos and its unvarnished utilitarian thought in connection with pedagogic-didactic aims. Eliade recognised the same 'logical structure' as operative in all the elements of the history of religions, without regard to their historical and constitutional differences. This 'structure' makes it possible that through the material condition of the individual earthly thing (rite, myth, etc.) the immaterial prototype (archetype) becomes present in a platonically or neoplatonically interpreted mode of existence. Without doubt Eliade's understanding of symbols is the enduring manifestation of an attitude to the image, having its rationale in the Byzantine world of the Eastern Orthodox Church. For this, Western theology and science has, during the course of history, been unable to display any comprehensive understanding. Although Eliade, with his concept of the 'history of religions' and 'creative hermeneutics' stands 'on the on the ground of a typical Byzantine, watered down, minimal tradition'37

he endeavours in the realisation of his own existence to blend the acquired 'western' cultural knowledge with Christian religiosity nurtured by Orthodoxy. Thereby he was able to gain access to experiences of existence other than Christian, as, for example, Hinduism.³⁸ His intellectual personality thus reflects a lived 'coincidentia oppositorum'. In it East and West meet, in so far as Eliade filtered the orthodox popular piety of a Rumanian peasant through the scientific, theoretical, rational sieve of western culture His own religious quest, on which he was mainly silent and only rarely revealed with due caution, 39 marks him as a seeker of an encounter with God by means of images and signs. Without doing violence to the facts. Eliade can therefore be classified as a secularised mystic of Byzantine Christianity. His philosophical thought moves on a general platonic-like plane of ontology. If one imagines Eliade engaged in the Byzantine dispute about images, one might depict the difficulties he would fall into with his pantheistical, neoplatonic clothing of the relationship between God and Man. Eliade's literary and scientific works on religion emanate from personal religious experience. This constitutes the gauge for his evaluation of texts and documents in religious history. Eliade's longing for a life of fulfilment penetrated by the sacred dominates each of his works. In them his nostalgia for a lost paradise is manifest. His decisive reservations concerning Jewish and Christian religion, particularly as regards rational Western theology, do not prevent Mircea Eliade from being regarded also as a historical witness in the present tense world situation, to the effort to mediate between Western and Eastern Christianity.

NOTES

1 M. Eliade, The Quest, History and Meaning in Religion, Chicago and London, 1969, p. 23.

The sources for the study of Eliade have multiplied to such an extent that it is scarcely possible to take all of them into account. Cf. D. Allen and D. Doeing, Mircea Eliade, An Annotated Bibliography, New York, 1980. The following recent studies deserve special mention in this context: Hans Peter Duerr (ed.), Sehnsucht nach dem Ursprung, Zu Mircea Eliade, Frankfort, 1983; idem (ed.), Alcheringa oder die beginnende Zeit, Studien zu Mythologie, Schamanismus und Religion, Frankfort, 1983; idem (ed.), Die Mitte der Welt, Aufsätze zu Mircea Eliadt, Frankfort, 1984. Eliade's activity as a novelist remained shrouded in obscurity for a long period, as few readers were able to cope with the Rumanian language, but his novels deserve serious attention in any general assessment of his work. It is Eliade himself who stresses this important condition of interpretation of his ideas of religious theory; cf. M. Eliade, 'Notes for a Dialogue', in J. B. Cobb (ed.), The Theology of Altizer, Critique and Response, Philadelphia, 1970, col. 235f.

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Cf. M. Eliade, Patterns in Comparative Religion, London and New York, 1958 (original title: Traité d'Histoire des Religions); idem, 'Observations on Religious' in M. Flinds (ed.) Religions); idem, 'Observations on Vork. Symbolism', in M. Eliade (ed.), The Two and the One, London and New York,

1965, pp. 189-211.

An appropriate discussion of the methodological implications of Eliade's 'creative hermeneutics' for the history of religions has not yet been produced. The following treatments are unfortunately inadequate: António Barbosa da Silva, The Phenomenology of Religion as a Philosophical Problem, An Analysis of the Theoretical Background of the Phenomenology of Religion, in General, and of M. Eliade's Phenomenological Approach, in Particular, Uppsala, 1982. Cf. also Guilford Dudley III, Religion on Trial, Mircea Eliade & His Critics, Philadelphia, 1977, pp. 33, 64, 85, 130, 140. K. Rudolph, 'Eliade und die "Religionsgeschichte", in H. P. Duerr (ed.), Die Mitte der Welt, Frankfort, 1984, pp. 49-78, 60f, was able, however, to elucidate important problematical methodological perspectives in Eliade's work. C. Colpe, Theologie, Ideologie, Religionswissenschaft, Demonstrationen ihrer Unterscheidung, Munich, 1980, p. 293 (cf. p. 49), is exceptional in his detection of the sharp contrast between Eliade and Otto, in stressing that Eliade's route 'leads out of the Kantianism via Rudolf Otto's interpretation of the Philosophy of Religion based on Kant and Fries towards the conservative ontology of the sacred'.

5 Cf. Eliade, Cosmos and History, The Myth of the Eternal Return, New York,

1959, p. VIIIf.

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Explicitly Eliade hardly ever developed the method openly and confirmed it. Implicitly, however, it determines the course of the analyses and of the hermeneutical processes of Eliade's 'history of religions'. Cf. Charles H. Long, 'A Look at the Chicago Tradition in the History of Religions: "Retrospects and Future" in J. M. Kitagawa (ed.), The History of Religions, New York, 1985, pp. 87-104, 93.

Cf. Eliade, Introduction to D. Allen, Structure and Creativity in Religion, Hermeneutics in Mircea Eliade's Phenomenology and New Directions, The Hague, 1978, VII-IX. The conglomeration of methods and ideas has always been recognised and has been responsible for a good deal of confusion in research. Cf. on this point, e.g. Olof Pettersson, 'The Dilemma of the Phenomenology of Religion, Some Methodological Notes to a Great Problem', in O. Pettersson & H. Akerberg, Interpretating Religious Phenomena, Stockholm, 1981, pp. 41-45.

M. Eliade, Patterns in Comparative Religion, p. 17.

D. Allen, Structure and Creativity in Religion, p. 108f., justly observes that the classification of Eliade with the group of philosophical phenomenologists is inadmissible. One may even pose the question whether his mode of interpretation of the religious phenomena can be defined as 'phenomenological': cf. particularly p. 190 ff.

Cf., for example, Eliade, Cosmos and History, p. 34: 'Hence it could be said that this "primitive" ontology has a Platonic structure; and in that case Plato could be regarded as the outstanding philosopher of "primitive mentality", that is, as the thinker who succeeded in giving philosophic currency and validity to the

modes of life and behavior of archaic humanity'.

This is the opinion of Thomas J. J. Altizer, Mircea Eliade and the Dialectic of the Sacred, Philadelphia, 1963, pp. 84, 30; on this point cf. D. Allen, op. cit., p. 129. The considerable affinity of Eliade to the theology of the Orthodox Church has

been observed and stressed; cf. Altizer, op. cit., p. 37: 'First, we must take account of Eliade's roots in Eastern Christendom; although it is never stated explicitly, one can sense in Eliade the Eastern Christian's hostility to the rational

spirit of Western "theo-logy".

Eliade, 'Observations' (cf. n. 3), p. 201.

Cf. for this Ioan Petru Culianu, 'Mircea Eliade und die blinde Schildkröte', in Die Mitte der Welt (cf. n. 2), p. 224: 'The first scholarly works of Eliade are dominated by three ideas, which also form the fundamental ideas of Ionescu's metaphysics: the state of redemption, which represents the highest freedom from every historical limitation and a paradoxical experience of death, whilst the human subject is still biologically alive; the function of the religious symbol, and, finally, the problem of alchemy . . . The problem of religious symbolism, which occupied pride of place in Ionescu's metaphysics, was equally one of the most recurring research themes for Eliade—both as essayist and historian of religions'.

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Culianu, op. cit., p. 225. Among the works of Crainic one finds such typical 15 titles as 'Orthodoxy and Ethnocracy' and 'Nostalgia for Paradise', to mention only two; cf. such a title as Eliade's 'The Quest for the Origin'.

Cf. R. J. Zwi Werblowsky, 'In nostro tempore', in Die Mitte der Welt (cf. n. 2), p. 135. Eliade remained faithful to his commitment to the church even later on He was unwilling to dispense with the church's blessing on his marriage. The wedding ceremony took place in a Paris drawing room on 9 January 1950, as Eliade noted in his diary Im Mittelpunkt, Vienna, 1973, p. 64, 'because the Rumanian Orthodox church is still closed'.

H. G. Beck, Das byzantinische Jahrtausend, Munich, 1978, p. 166. 17

Beck, op. cit., p. 167. 18

Cf. Eliade, 'Observations' (cf. n. 3), p. 193f. 19

Eliade noted in his diary on 8 November 1959: 'Today when I was leafing 20 through my Patterns in Comparative Religion, I lingered especially over the long chapter on the sky gods; I wonder if the secret message of the book has been understood, the "theology" implied in the history of religions as I decipher and interpret it'. (No Souvenirs, Journal 1957-1969, San Francisco, 1977, p. 74). Cf. also Altizer, op. cit., p. 37 and passim, who is never tired of underlining Eliade's dependence on the Byzantine spiritual universe.

Eliade, No Souvenirs, pp. 267, 261, 286.

21 Cf. L. W. Barnard, The Graeco-roman and Oriental Background of the Iconoclastic Controversy, Leiden, 1974, p. 81.

23 Crainic, Nichifor, in: Brockhaus Enzyklopädie, vol. IV (1968), p. 193.

Eliade, Images and Symbols, Studies in Religious Symbolism, London, 1961, p. 159f.

Hermann Kleinknecht, 'The Greek Use of εικών in G. Kittel and G. Friedrich 25 (eds), Theological Dictionary of New Testament, vol. II (1965) p. 388f. — Cf. on Jan this point Walter Elliger, Die Stellung der alten Christen zu den Bildern in den ersten vier Jahrhunderten, Leipzig, 1930, and Hans Willms, EIKON, Eith begriffsgeschichtliche Untersuchung zum Platonismus, Münster, 1935.

Cf. Hans-Georg Beck, Kirche und theologische Literatur im byzantinischen Reich, 26 Munich (2nd edn), 1977, pp. 279–368, 296–306. Further from the same authors Von der Fragwürdigkeit der Ikone (Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der

Wissenschaften, Philos.-Hist.Klasse, part 7), Munich, 1975.

Cf. Barnard, op. cit., pp. 85 and 101f.—Cf. on this subject Klaus Wessel. 'Bild', in Reallexikon zur Byzantinischen Kunst, vol. I (1966), cols. 616-662, and I Kollwitz 'Bild III (abriest') har Kunst, vol. I (1966), cols. 616-662, and I J. Kollwitz, 'Bild III (christlich), in Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum, vol. [1954], cols. 318-341. One with the color of the c (1954), cols. 318–341. One may also consult: Hilde Zaloscer, Vom Mumienbild Illon, Wiesbaden, 1969, and the Institute of the Ikone, Wiesbaden, 1969, pp. 31–46, and Leonid Ouspensky, Theology of the low, New York, 1978.

After his Patterns Eliade added to his philosophic-theological privileged method scarcely new elements. Therefore the following works are sufficient as means of argument for our hypothesis: (1) Patterns in Comparative Religion, ch. 1, 13; (2) 'Observations on Religious Symbolism' (cf. n .3), particularly pp. 201–208; (3) Images and Symbols.

The semantic value of this expression is basically different from its use in

modern research.

It is certainly not lacking in significance, that this distinction between 'sacred' and 'profane' was already established by the Acts of the Council of Nicaea, II (787), to cite but a single witness. Cf. Mansi, Sacrorum Conciliorum nova et amplissima Collectio, vol. 13, p. 728, where those are condemned who 'neque inter sacrum et profanum ullum discrimen posuerunt'. This conciliar text formed the standard for the theology of images which the Orthodox Churches were to follow in all the later centuries. Cf. for the whole question Pierre Miquel, 'II. Théologie de l'Icône', in Dictionnaire de Spiritualité, vol. VII, Paris, 1971, cols. 1229–1239. The assumption that Eliade was indebted to his own basic religious instinct for this binary principle of the distinction of 'sacred' and 'profane' as iconologically self-evident is not in contradiction to the view that in reading Emile Durkheim's The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (Die elementaren Formen des religiösen Lebens, German translation, Frankfort, 1981, cf. p. 61f.), he came across this, in many ways, standard 'definition' of religion for a scientific investigation based on these two concepts.

31 Cf. n. 20.

32 Eliade, Images and Symbols, p. 12.

33 Ibid., p. 13.

34 Ibid., p. 18.

35 Cf. Eliade's entry in his diary under 27 September 1946, in Eliade, Im Mittel-punkt, p. 23f.

66 Cf. K. Rudolph, 'Die Problematik der Religionswissenchaft als akademisches Lehrfach', in *Kairos* IX (1967), pp. 22–42 and X (1968), pp. 290–291.

37 H. G. Beck, Von der Fragwürdigkeit der Ikone, p. 30.

The difficult problems involved in this interpretation of alien religious symbols have been indicated by Dietrich Seckel, Jenseits des Bildes, Anikonische Symbolik in der buddhistischen Kunst, Heidelberg, 1976. The complications inherent in the use of Eliade's method on non-Christian symbolic complexes have been partially demonstrated by Agehananda Bharati, 'Eliade: Privilegierte Information and anthropologische Aporien', in Sehnsucht nach dem Ursprung (cf. n. 2), pp. 32–58.

Of., for example, the entries in his diary for 21 February 1955 (Im Mittelpunkt, p. 133) and during his stay in Florence in September 1957 (Im Mittelpunkt,

p. 157).

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DISCUSSION

STEPHEN A. KENT AND THE MYSTICISM OF THE EARLY QUAKERS

R. A. Naulty

Kent's (Religion, 1987, 17, 251–274) contention that William James reduces mysticism to psychology rests on partial evidence; Kent underestimates the mysticism of George Fox and the early Quakers; the same kind of mysticism that occurs among early Quakers can be found in St Bernard of Clairvaux (1090–1153), Pascal (1623–1662) and the Sufis. Consequently, the content of the mysticism of the early Quakers is not culturally bound by the context of mid-17th-century England as Kent suggests. Moreover, these instances render it unlikely that the mysticism of the early Quakers is due to relative deprivation. The Quaker meeting for worship as a vehicle for mysticism and prophecy, and mysticism as a factor in the spread of early Quakerism are discussed.

The thrust of Kent's argument against the presence and power of mysticism among early Quakers is clear enough. In the abstract of his article he writes 'this article argues that interpretations of Quakerism (and by extension, of the other religious collectivities) should be based primarily upon historically grounded, social-psychological frameworks'. This obviously leaves it open that interpretations of Quakerism might be based secondarily on mystical experience. However, even that intractable implication is denied on the second page of his article. 'Rather than viewing Quakerism as the consequence of either people's direct experience of God or of their uniquely sensitive emotional constitutions, contemporary emphasis on mid-17th-Century English society identifies Quakerism as merely one of several reactions to social, political, and economic tensions that pervaded England during that era'. This claim is repeated on the last page of his article where it is stated that Quakerism's mysticism is one of repute:

Quakerism's reputed mysticism both emerged out of and reflected its adherents' psychologically felt but socially rooted frustrations and reformist hopes, and the content of their religious experiences remained bound by the cultural dimensions of mid-17th-century England.³

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In this article I shall argue that the mysticism of the founder of Quakerism George Fox, and his immediate followers is real and not merely reputed Moreover, I shall argue that it cannot be explained as beind due to 'relative deprivation' as Kent suggests, since closely similar forms of mysticism occur in cultures in which relative deprivation is absent. And since very similar forms of mysticism occur in other cultures, the content of these experiences in not bound, as Kent alleges, by the cultural dimensions of mid-17th-century England. Finally, I shall suggest research which might reveal how important mystical experience was in the spread of Quakerism.

First, though, is the question of William James's alleged reduction of mysticism to psychology. According to William James, the 'more' with which we are concerned with mysticism is, in its closer or 'hither side the subconscious continuation of our conscious life', and Kent adduces that as evidence of James's reduction of mysticism to psychology. But that simply ignores what

James says of this 'more' on its further side:

The further limits of our being plunge, it seems to me, into an altogether other dimension of existence from the sensible and mere 'understandable' world. Namely the mystical region, or the supernatural region, whichever you choose. So far asout ideal impulses originate in this region (and most of them do originate in it, for we find them possessing us in a way for which we cannot articulately account), we belong to it in a more intimate sense than that in which we belong to the visible world, for we belong in the most intimate sense wherever our ideals belong. Yet the unseen region in question is not merely ideal, for it produces effects in this world. When we commune with it, work is actually done upon our finite personality, for we are turned into new men, and consequences in the way of conduct follow in the natural world upon our regenerative change. But that which produces effects within another reality must be termed a reality itself, so I feel as if we had no philosophic excuse for calling the unseen or mystical world unreal. 5

No wonder James was congenial to a thorough-going mystic like Rufus Jones. On page 265 of his article, Kent quotes from Geoffrey Nuttal's The Hold Spirit in Puritan Faith and Experience, 'it is imperative to allow the characters so far as possible to speak for themselves . . .' That is excellent advice, and shall take it. Listen to George Fox telling of his own experience as he was led away to jail, '. . . I was ravished with the sense of the love of God, and greath strengthened in my inward man. But when I came into the jail where those prisoners were, a great power of darkness struck at me; and I sat still, having my spirit gathered into the love of God'. 6 Not only was George Fox a mystic, he conceived himself turning his followers in that direction, 'And having turned them to the Spirit of God in themselves . . . that would lead into all Truth. That Fow had moved.

That Fox had mystical expectations of his followers becames clearer in his letters to them: 'So here the God of love will in your hearts come to be shed abroad... So that ye may come to know the saints' state, unto whom all things

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were become new'. 8 And, more concisely, 'Live in the life of God and feel it'. 9 It is doubtful whether mystical advice has ever been more trenchantly given.

It does not follow as a matter of logic that Fox's mystical hopes for his followers were realized. But, as a matter of fact, they seem to have been. Thus, Marmaduke Stephenson wrote in 1655 'I was filled with the love and presence of the living God, which did ravish my heart when I felt it, for it did increase and abound in me like a living stream, so did the life and love of God run through me like a pleasant ointment giving a pleasant smell'. And William Leddra wrote in 1661, 'so doth the life and virtue of God flow into every one of your hearts, whom he hath made partakers of his divine nature; and when it withdraws but a little, it leaves a sweet savour behind it'. So also James Nayler in 1660. Is Isaac Pennington, probably in the 1670s said, 'I feel union with him, and his blessed presence every day'.

Kent maintains that Quakers' organizational development 'reflects the protest element of their social doctrines' rather than 'the mystical content of its members' message'. However, organizational development may reflect more than one thing. And one would ordinarily expect organizational development to reflect its purpose. The purpose of that peculiarly Quaker institution, the silent meeting for worship was, in the words of Fox, 'to feel the Seed of God among you'¹⁵ which might develop in ways that were both mystical and prophetic, thus 'for that brings all your souls into peace, into oneness into God', ¹⁶ and might (lead) 'forth to exhort, or to reprove'. ¹⁷

It appears then, that the mysticism of the first generation of Quakers was real, and not merely reputed. Further, Kent's claim that 'Quakerism's reputed mysticism . . . and the content of (Quakers') religious experience remained bound by the cultural dimensions of mid-17th-century England' would seem to come to grief in the fact that mystical experience of the same content can be found in mid-17th-century France. Thus, Blaise Pascal wrote:

All bodies together, and all minds together, and all their products, are not worth the least prompting of charity. This is of an infinitely more exalted order. From all bodies together we cannot obtain one little thought; this is impossible, for thought is of another order. From all bodies and minds together we cannot obtain one prompting of true charity; this is impossible, for charity is of another, supernatural order, 19

Worse, from the point of view of the mysticism-is-caused-by-deprivation thesis, St Bernard of Clairvaux was a mystic of the same type, and he was a supreme manifestation of the culture of his age, one of the great political orchestrators of his time, a kind of super Henry Kissinger. St Bernard describes his mystical experience as follows '... then between God and the soul shall be nought but a mutual dilection chaste and consummated, a full mutual recognition, a manifest vision, a firm conjunction, a society undivided,

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and a perfect likeness. Then shall the soul know God even as she is known; the shall she love as she is loved; and over his bride shall rejoice the bridegroom knowing and known, loved and beloved'. 20

St Bernard of Clairvaux (1090-1153) is an important counter-instance Kent, since St Bernard's mysticism is of the same kind as that of Fox and the early Quakers, and St Bernard represents Western Christianity in a trium phant, expansionist phase, whereas Fox and his disciples were struggling emerge from an embattled persecuted phase. St Bernard was a love mystica the early Quakers were, and he emphasized the practical, moral consequence of the experience of God's love, just as the early Quakers did. St Bernard sale 'a man who feels this way will not have trouble in fulfilling the commandment to love his neighbour. He loves God truthfully and so loves what is God's... Whoever loves this way, loves the way he is loved, seeking in turn not what his . . . '21 St Bernard, despite his preaching the Second Crusade (which hedi at the Pope's command), was a great conciliator, as the Quakers were to be Fox adverts to the practical consequences of mysticism: 'Therefore in the Light dwell and walk everyone in particular; then ye will have unity without another, and grow up to be trees of righteousness, the planting of the Lord. Love mysticism is prolific in Islam '. . . almost every mystical poet in Islamha expressed the idea that "the lover must be in the way of love",23 write Annemarie Schimmel in Mystical Dimensions of Islam, and the idea that the love which bound them together should flow into the wider social environment, exists there too.24 The basic point here is that one who loves other seems this good.

It might be objected that St Bernard, Pascal and the Sufis had some of the ambitions frustrated and were to that extent victims of deprivation. The Second Crusade, with which St Bernard was intimately associated, failed, Por Royal was isolated and contained by surrounding Catholicism, and the Sufficient on occasion, ran into violent opposition. But the Sufis were persecuted because they were mystics, not mystics because they were persecuted. And St Bernard on the whole was a success from the time when he first rode in to join the Cistercians with thirty companions; early in his career he solved a serious papal schism, enlisting the support of the formidable Henry Plantagent of England, and thereafter he advised kings and popes from a position eminence, subdued Abelard, and spectacularly contributed to the wildfire expansion of the Cistercian Order. 25 Pascal had stunning successes in world of learning. Why should his and St Bernard's mysticism be a 'reaction to failure? More to failure? Most people, especially great ones, attempt more than they achieve and become socially frustrated. Why are they not all mystics, if relative social deprivation causes must be socially frustrated. deprivation causes mysticism? Perhaps St Bernard and Pascal were mystic because, like Fox and his followers, they sought the seed of God within and then learned to company them learned to company the seed of God within and the seed of God within a seed of God within then learned to commune with the Seed in a personal way, so that it happened

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as the 14th-century Augustinian Canon Walter Hilton wrote in almost the same words as Fox and Stephenson, that they 'can see by their understanding the truth which is God and see spiritual things with a soft sweet burning love in (them) which is so perfect that by the ravishing of this love (they) are united for a time to God'.26

Although the content of the mystical experience of the early Quakers was not bound by the cultural dimensions of mid-17th-century England, other aspects of Quakerism plainly come from there. The model of church government was simply appropriated, with some changes, from forms of Puritanism. The Quaker mode of ministry arose by reaction against Puritanism, since Fox wanted to do away with all preaching. And the Quaker idea of themselves as located within the prophetic stream of inspired utterance comes, via the religious genius of George Fox, from the Biblicism of the period. How the mystical and the prophetic interact within Quakerism is as yet an untold story. and it would seem to offer an extraordinarily rich field of study.

The early Quakers, like the monks in St Bernard's monasteries, Pascal's associates at Port Royal, and the monks and nuns in the Carmelite monasteries of St Teresa and St John of the Cross, were gathered in small intimate communities, and all of these, with the exception of Port Royal, spread rapidly. It is difficult to believe that the excitement and energy of mystical experience in such communities had no effect on their social forcefulness and spread. However, the point does not have to be left to speculation, as research can be made into Quaker growth points now in quest of mysticism, and findings might usefully be cross-checked against studies of charismatic groups and Sufi brotherhoods. Once the extent of the power deriving from mystical experience has been ascertained, the focus might then shift to the social support conditions which sustain these groups, or conversely, weaken and isolate them. Such a study would be a study of the ecology of the growth points of a mystical movement.

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MYSTICISM, QUAKERISM, AND RELATIVE DEPRIVATION: A SOCIOLOGICAL REPLY TO R. A. NAULTY*

Stephen A. Kent

After reaffirming previous comments concerning the psychological reductionism of William James' interpretation of mysticism, this article, like its predecessor, concludes that early Quakerism and other forms of 'mystical' expressions are best interpreted as products of their cultures. Feelings of collectively-held relative deprivation frequently provide the social stimuli that lead people to believe that they have direct experiences of God or a transcendent reality.

Rarely do sociologists of religion and religious studies scholars discuss their differing views on mysticism, even though this (presumed) phenomenon plays a pivotal role in the processes of both spiritual and social life. On a professional basis these sets of academics usually belong to different scholarly organizations and societies, and as a result present papers to their own professional audiences. Likewise, sociologists of religion and religious studies personnel maintain independent academic journals, and most of us have our hands full simply trying to stay caught up in our own areas. I am sensitive to the issue of poor communication between the two groups because my academic appointments have been in sociology departments even though all of my advanced academic degrees are in religious studies. R. A. Naulty's informed comments on my paper, therefore, initiate an unusual opportunity to discuss a topic of considerable importance to both sociologists and religionists. Naulty's article prompted me to re-examine my interpretation of James, but I stand firm on it as well as on the conclusion that Quakerism, and by extension, other forms of mysticism, are best interpreted as products of their cultures. Within particular cultures, collective feelings of relative deprivation frequently provide social stimuli that lead people to believe that they have direct experiences of either God or a transcendent reality.

Naulty does an accurate job of highlighting my basic claims. Naulty indicates correctly that: (1) I charged James with psychological reductionism;² (2) I advanced the position that recent interpretations of early Quakerism

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^{*}Author's note: I wish to thank Elaine M. Seier and Lori Shortreed for their helpful editorial suggestions.

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have diminished (if not ignored) earlier claims about Quakerism's mystical roots (i.e. that it was the result of people's 'direct experience of God'); (3) in place of these mystical claims, I proposed that early Quakerism be viewed as the result of social-psychological pressures that were unique to a particular period in English history. Furthermore, Naulty identifies my position (in order to challenge it) that (4) the established social psychological concept of relative deprivation provides an adequate explanation of the early Quakers' (alleged) mysticism; and (5) this theory probably explains other cases of mysticism as well. I will address each of our points of dispute in turn, and will conclude my reply to Naulty with some reflective comments on the relationship of sociology to the study of religious mysticism.

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First, however, let me go right to the heart of the matter. By referring to the Quakers' mysticism as 'reputed' and 'alleged', am I in fact denying that it was real—am I denying that it actually occurred? Am I making a similar denial when I indicate that the best view of Quakerism comes after locating its members' mystical claims within the specific socio-cultural context of Interregnum England? The simple fact is that, on philosophical grounds, I cannot make such a bold denial. If there is (a) God, and if God speaks or reveals Itself to people, then maybe It often does so to persons who feel disprivileged by their social circumstances. While this scenario is philosophically possible, it holds no promise as a methodological research strategy. It is a statement of faith, not of science. A researcher cannot blindly accept people's claims of divine revelation, since no irrefutable and exclusive evidence can ever be mustered in their support.

A more *plausible* explanation of mysticism, and one that is wholly defensible on social scientific grounds, identifies it as a human expression of the mystics socio-cultural location and experience. From this secular, socio-cultural perspective we acquire the analytic tools to study the human conditions that foster mysticism's expression, and therefore have no reason to dislocate causal explanations into a realm of the supramundane. The compelling logic and the resultant findings of social scientific investigations provide interpretations that many people accept as conceptually adequate unto themselves, and as a result the proponents of supernatural mysticism feel both threatened and uncomfortable. If a threat to both religious studies and faith lies in social scientific explanations of mysticism, then it derives as much from the methodological weakness of divine explanations as from the strength of secular ones.

JAMES, MYSTICISM, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL REDUCTIONISM

To resolve the question (if it can be settled) of James' possible reduction of mysticism to psychology, two separate tasks must be performed. First, we must agree upon what James himself believed about mysticism and

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psychology, and then we must determine how James translated this belief into the contents of his Gifford Lectures (and subsequently into *The Varieties of Religious Experience*).

Perhaps the clearest statement that James made of his personal belief about mysticism and psychology appears in a letter that he composed on 16 June 1901, the day before he was to give his tenth lecture. Written to Henry W. Rankin, it is of especial interest as it contains James' rejection of a fundamental doctrine in Christianity: 'I believe myself to be (probably) permanently incapable of believing the Christian scheme of vicarious salvation, and [I am] wedded to a more continuously evolutionary mode of thought'. He went on to add a clear statement about what he believed he was arguing in the Lectures, and this statement is in accord with Naulty's citation of a passage from Varieties:

The mother sea and fountainhead of all religions lie in the mystical experiences of the individual, taking the word mystical in a very wide sense. All theologies and ecclesiasticisms are secondary growths superimposed. . . . I attach the mystical or religious consciousness to the possession of an extended subliminal self, with a thin partition through which messages make irruption. We are thus made convincingly aware of the presence of a sphere of life larger and more powerful than our usual consciousness with which the latter is nevertheless continuous. 8

Clearly from this passage James believed that the realm of mysticism was separate for the most part from people's psychological dimensions, yet able to enter into those dimensions from time to time.

If it were adequate to leave the matter here, then I would agree with Naulty that James did not reduce mysticism to psychology. The issue, however, must be pursued further, since the methodology that James insisted must be used to study mysticism was irrefutably psychological and nothing more. This insight into James helps explain the persuasive tactic that he used in the chapter, 'Religion and Neurology'. By first presenting extreme reductionistic interpretations about the nature of religious life that his audience opposed and that he refuted (those which equated religion to various bodily functions), James 'was able to win a hearing for his own more moderate reductionism. . . . He was also able, continuing the task which belonged to his times and to his own personal Vocational development, to emphasize the distinction between physiology and psychology and to make his vigorous claim for the propriety of purely psychological investigation of religious experiences'. Thus James quoted H. Maudsley in order to conclude that 'not its origin, but the way in which it works on the whole, is Dr Maudsley's final test of a belief. This is our own empiricist criterion; and this criterion the stoutest insisters on supernatural origin have also been forced to use in the end. . . . In the end it had to come to our empiricist criterion: By their fruits ye shall know them, not by their He asserted, in essence, that pragmatism was to be the judge of

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In his chapter on 'Philosophy', James raised the possibility of establishing a 'science of religions', ¹¹ and he returned to this aspiration in the conclusion of his book. When he attempted to formulate hypotheses that would be useful in such a science, he asserted that '[w]e must begin by using less particularized terms; and since one of the duties of the science of religions is to keep religion in connection with the rest of science, we shall do well to seek first of all a way of describing the 'more', which psychologists may also recognize as real. The 'subconscious self' is nowadays a well-accredited psychological entity; and l believe that in it we have exactly the mediating term required'. ¹² The next paragraph of the text is the one that I quoted in my initial article about religion being 'on its hither side the subconscious continuation of our conscious life'. ¹³

Even earlier in the 'Conclusions', James stated clearly that religion was to be studied within a psychological framework, thereby foreshadowing his equation of mystical experience with the subconscious self for the purposes of study. After admitting that the 'thoughts' or doctrines of religious traditions vary enormously, he nonetheless contended that '[t]he theories which Religion generates, being thus variable, are secondary; and if you wish to grasp her [sic] essence, you must look to the feelings and the conduct as being the more constant elements. . . . This seems to me the first conclusion which we are entitled to draw from the phenomena we have passed in review. The next step is to characterize the feelings. To what psychological order do they belong? Undoubtedly these and other passages led the prominent Quaker William Littleboy to be 'seriously alarmed' upon his reading of Varieties; 15 and they certainly provided the basis for my allegation that James was psychologically reductionistic.

The extent to which Dr Naulty and I disagree on the issue of James' psychological reductionism indicates the conceptual confusion and rambling nature of *Varieties* itself. However important the book was in its time, and however entertaining it is to read, *Varieties* simply cannot serve as a basis for a systematic study of mysticism or religion in general.

QUAKER MYSTICISM AND RELATIVE DEPRIVATION

I will now consider three of Naulty's assertions. First, I will examine the claim that George Fox's mysticism was real (i.e. was a genuine experience of God). Second, I will consider the related position that Fox's allegedly 'genuine experience of God' was not merely a reflection of a unique socio-political period in English history. Third, I will analyse Naulty's opinion that early Quaker mysticism cannot be explained through a relative deprivation interpretation. The clearest way to proceed is to offer some preliminary continents about relative deprivation theory, show how its concepts appear

dramatically in the writings of prominent early Friends, and then address specifically the question of Fox's mystical claims.

Although details differ slightly among particular relative deprivation theories, the definition of the term given by Faye Crosby captures the basis of them all. For her, relative deprivation is 'a felt grievance resulting from an unfavourable comparison to another person or group regarding the possession of "X". In addition, people must believe that the achievement of their wishes or aspirations is feasible 17—they must think that they have a good chance of getting what they want and deserve—before sociologists apply the term to a given set of circumstances.

Given the importance of a group's belief in the feasibility of its goalachievement, a group enters a perilous period if members develop grave doubts about the possibility of its eventual success. I call these periods of doubt 'crises of feasibility' because they occur when members of a social movement conclude that they will not be able to satisfy the aspirations that, up until then, they felt they would attain through their collective efforts. 18 Feelings of despair and futility are, of course, possible reactions to these crises, but other responses involve transforming the frustrated aspirations into a religiously millenarian framework. In doing so the frustrated groups now believe that their heretofore frustrated aspirations will still be attained, but through divine intervention. A millenarian interpretation of events is especially likely when the frustrated people operate and think within religious (especially Christian) frameworks. These people are likely to have visions and religious experiences that reinforce their sense of divine mission, and they are likely to issue prophetic warnings against the people or groups whom they believe are their oppressors. This well-defined social pattern explains the cause and the content of early Quaker mysticism.

The Quakers' mysticism emerged out of, and its content reflected, the politically frustrating situation of England in the 1650s. To appreciate this insight, we must look at the period of rising expectations during the English Civil War of the previous decade. Many parliamentary supporters during that struggle believed that, if they were to emerge as victors against the King, then their leaders would institute widespread social, political, and religious reforms. After the parliamentary leaders under Oliver Cromwell (1599–1658) attained victory and gained control of the country, however, the anticipated reforms were not legislated. Particularly disappointing was the government's refusal to allow religious worship according to one's conscience, which necessarily would have meant the abolition of the state-supported religious system kept afloat by obligatory tithe payments. The controversial tithe system required, according to parliamentary legislation, that people pay roughly ten per cent of their land value, agricultural yield, or income to either a landowner or (in most cases) the local church minister. The impact on people's livelihood

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was significant, if not at times dire, and opposition to the tithe system served as the basis for much of the Quakers' social platform during the 1650s. Moreover, tithe-opposition became the central principle around which Quakers launched a persistent campaign against policies that disadvantaged the poor by favouring the wealthy and powerful. A noted historian of early Quakerism, Barry Reay, has pointed out that, 'for many [people], Quakerism became not only (as [Hugh] Trevor-Roper has observed) "the ghost of decreased Independency", but also a possible haven for those involved in anti-tithe activity in pre-Quaker days. . . . Many Quakers had had a background of anti-tithe activity'. 19

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To be concise, people after the English Civil War who had expected important reforms to occur were sorely disappointed with their new leaders. Believing that they had fought for fundamental changes that politicians were now denying them, many of these people experienced crises over whether their leaders would ever put the desired policies in place. Caught in a dilemma of wanting reforms that they now believed were being unjustly denied them by powerful persons in political office and military leadership, these frustrated people developed a unique millenarian ideology in the form of the Quaker faith through which they were able to sustain their hope. In a deeply religious society, Quaker millenarianism emerged out of people's frustration and quickly attracted others who were quickened by its message. God, they believed, would now initiate the fundamental changes that their unscrupulous leaders had promised but withheld.

To verify this pattern, I will let the Quakers speak for themselves, as Naulty suggests I do. Among the clearest early Quaker statements of frustrated reformist aspirations that transformed into religious millenarianism is a 1656 work by George Fox the Younger (d. 1661). (A former parliamentary soldier who converted to Quakerism, Fox was called 'the Younger' so as not to confuse him with his famous namesake.) In an articulate and concise tract to 'the Officers and Soldiers of the Armies in England, Scotland and Ireland', he described himself as one 'who for several yeers [sic] was amongst you, and had a great zeal (as some of you once had) against Tyrants and unjust Laws'. ²⁰ Fox the Younger began with a reiteration of the godliness of the parliamentary soldiers and their rebellious cause in the 1640s:

Remember, how at the beginning of the late Wars in these Nations, that many of you were of the lowest of the people according to the accompt [i.e., account] of men, and were poor and contemptible in the eyes of your Enemies... But I bear you Record that then many of you had a zeal for God and against his enemies... 21

Prominent among the oppressive enemies of the godly were the tithe-receiving ministers:

and... some of you were come so far as to see the Priests [i.e., tithe-receiving ministers] to be enemies to the truth, and such as deceived the people, and our zeal waxed hot against them and their Idolotry... [A]nd you saw that the Priests laid heavy burthens [i.e., burdens] upon the people, and oppressed them greatly in forceing them by an unjust Law to give them the tenth of their labours. 22

These righteous soldiers promised God and the people that if they were victorious they would then abolish tithes and other oppressions. For this reason, many citizens supported them:

After they won the Civil War, however, the parliamentary soldiers failed to keep their promises:

But now the love of the Lord unto you & the day of your distresse by you is forgotten; and your vows and promises which you made unto God and man are neglected by you, for as great or greater oppression and burthens yet remain upon the people as was then. . . . 24

The reason that they had reneged upon their promises was because they had succumbed to their own lusts and personal desires:

what simplicity and tenderness that was once in some of you, is destroyed and murthered by the lusts of the flesh which is highly exalted in you, and that zeal (that was once in some of you for God, and against his enemies, and those unjust Laws which by them were made and upheld) is now lost. . . . 25

The soldiers were called upon to repent in their hearts for their unrighteousness, and their repentance would lead them to support immediately the social reforms, such as tithe-abolition, that they had promised:

So come to the Light of Christ in all your consciences. . . and with it search your hearts and trie your waies, and it will shew you your backslidings and the evil of your doings; and repent speedilie and do you first wor[d]s, and return to your integretie, and do violence to no man. . . . 26

If, however, the soldiers refused to repent, then (in a typical statement of Quakers' resentment) God would smite them down:

But if you refuse to return unto the Lord. . . and pay your vows to him: Verily the living God will arise and set free the oppressed, and destroy their oppressors. . . , and he will cast you off, and by his own power will he bring you down and destroy you and root you out. 27

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Many other Quaker tracts from the early period make similar points about victorious parliament and army that turned away from their early promises of reform, and which would suffer God's wrath for doing so. In this vein are tracts written by Isaac Pennington, who was one of the people Naulty cited as a Quaker mystic. 'The Account of all the Blood which hath been shed lies somewhere', Pennington warned in 1659. 'Was it [i.e. the Civil War] a thing of Nought? Was it of no Value? Nay, It was precious in the sight of the Lord many (yea very many) in the singleness and simplicity of their hearts losing their lives for the Cause. And yet how soon had you forgot all this, casting in and the Cause [of freedom of conscience] behind your backs, and setting up yourselves!'²⁸

Naulty also mentions James Nayler as another Quaker mystic, but he, like Fox the Younger, was a former parliamentary soldier who was deeply disturbed over the victors' political failings. In a tract that Nayler intended to distribute to the members of the Nominated Parliament, he wailed, '0 England! How is thy Expectation failed, now after all thy Travels? The People to whom Oppression and Unrighteousness hath been a Burthen, have long waited for Deliverance, from one Year to another, but none comes, from one Sort of Men to another'. ²⁹ This basic lament is repeated, in different words, several times throughout the tract, but in its final passages it gives hope to the oppressed and the despairing:

Wherefore awake, all you to whom Oppression is a Burthen, whom the Proudhaw trodden upon; and you have been as People without Hope; neither have known any Way to look for Help, for every Man hath become vain. Now arise up out of all your earthly Expectations, and stand up to meet the Lord our Righteousness, who is risen to deliver his People. . . , and to Gather them from among the Heather and them that have made a Prey upon them, because they have not known Him, who will save them [?] 30

Clearly Nayler believed that politicians' refusal to initiate the long-awaited reforms placed them beyond redemption.

Still another important early Quaker, Edward Burrough, wrote © Cromwell and his officials in 1657:

for you do not relieve the Oppressed, neither do [you] remove Oppressors, as you ought to do, and as the Lord requires of you: What, hath the abundance of this World's glory, and its treasure, quite overcome and stolen away your hearts wholly from all sense and feeling of the unjust Sufferings of your Brethren, who have in times past, as faithfully as your selves, served their Nation with their Live and Estates, to the purchasing of this Peace and Freedom out of the hands of Opposers; and such may now justly claim the benefit of this Peace and Freedom and to have a part with you therein, even by Birthright and by Purchase, and also by Promise from some of your selves: But alas! while they have waited for it, and

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thought peaceably to enjoy the same under you, are many of them entrapped into as great Bondage as ever. . . 31

To rectify this condition of oppression, Burrough offered to Cromwell and members of the Council of State the following advice: 'And therefore my Friends, let this great Enemy to your Persons, Government, and whole Nation, to wit, *Persecution for Conscience sake*, be speedily removed, lest the Anger of the Lord break forth against you, and repentance be too late'. ³² Quakers, in sum, felt that they had a mission from God to warn recalcitrant officials of their imminent damnation unless they instituted the reforms that they had promised the nation.

Fox, who is early Quakerism's best-known figure, participated in these prophetic denunciations. In 1655, for example, he stormed against a litany of perceived ills and burdens. 'O England and the Islands', he thundered, 'and such as be about thee, whose Judges judgeth for rewards, and Priests [i.e. ministers] preach for hire [i.e. tithes], and Prophets prophesie for money, and whose Divines [i.e. preachers] divine for money. . . for this cause is England on heaps, as Jerusalem became'. Later in the same piece he demanded, 'Away with all such that take Tythes from poor people, and get treble [i.e. triple] damanges if they will not pay them', and he repeated similar charges and demanded appropriate remedies in other tracts.³³

Fox's clearest statement of political frustration and reformist hopes appeared in a 1659 statement directed *To the Parliament of the Comon-wealth [sic] of England...* As had other Quakers, Fox reiterated the hopes for reforms that he and others had invested in Parliament's struggle against the King, and then stated his sorrowful condemnation of the government for not having kept its political promises. 'Friends', he began:

It is acknowledged that the Lord God. . . hath done great and honourable things by you. . . , insomuch that many mountains have been abased, and many sturdy oakes have been cut done, and many cruel Lawes have been made void, and even the way of the Lord, and the way of the coming of his Kingdom hath seemed to be prepared. . . [And] there have been many fair promises and pretenses made by many of you, like as if the kingdom of Jesus had been at our door, ready to have entered in[to] our Nations, whereby many good hopes we have had to have been made [sic] a perfect free people ere this day. ., and that we might have sitten [sic] together in peace and unity, and in freedom from all oppressions of our enemies.

But alas, alas, this Glorious work of Reformation hath been interrupted before our eye[s], and the precious buds and good appearance of Glorious fruits hath withered and blasted in our sight, so that our good hopes hath perished, and our Freedom hath been intercepted, through the evil doing of many unfaithful men. . . . [C]louds of darkness hath overshaddowed [sic] the Nations again, and the good hopes of the faithful people have been drawn backwards, and the Reformation stopped, and your own vowes promises and pretenses have remained unfulfilled, and we are yet an oppressed people. 34

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Following this lament about Parliament's unwillingness to fulfill its Civil War promises, Fox offered it a fifty-nine point programme of the reforms that he felt would have set the nation aright. Along with his religious contemporaries, Fox shared feelings of anger and deep disappointment over unfulfilled political and social reforms, and these feelings of disparity between aspirations and reality demonstrate clearly what sociologists call 'relative deprivation'. These feelings, moreover, were central to his religious expression, as seen in both his writings and his actions.

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Having located Fox and other important Quaker contemporaries within the socio-political context of their age, we now turn to another issue about which Naulty and I have widely differing interpretations—was Fox a mystic, a prophet, or both? While I see no reason for viewing Fox as anyone more than a charismatic prophet, Naulty suggests that he also deserves a place within a long and venerable line of mystics. Of course many persons before Naulty have argued similarly, not the least of whom is the respected historian of Puritanism, Geoffrey Nuttall. Nuttall insisted, for example, that for Fox and several other prominent people from the 1650s, 'the Divine presence and the sense of being caught up in God's love in Christ are prime factors in their religious experience'. 35

I do not dismiss lightly either his or Naulty's mystical claims for Fox, but dismiss them I must, at least with regard to their social scientific utility. Furthermore, I do so because they rest on the assumptions that Christianity is, in essence, true, and that Christ is the Son of God with whom one can have personal, mystical contact. A sociologist could offer an alternative to these assumptions by pointing out that Christianity itself began as a response to widespread and deep currents of relative deprivation amongst Palestinian Jews, and that perhaps Jesus was not the messianic deliverer that many of his followers believed him to be. Feelings of relative deprivation—first over Jesus's failed messianic mission and then over his failure to initiate his 'second coming'—are at the heart of the Christian religious tradition.

RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND EARLY CHRISTIANITY

The relative deprivationist interpretation of early Christianity that first appeared in 1975 was an act of intellectual courage, since, as the author realized, '[a] combination of theological, cultural, and historical factors has conspired to create a protected enclave for this particular religion'. Writing at a time when both academic and popular publications were flooded with analyses of new, strange, sectarian groups and their charismatic, messianic leaders, the author of this innovative New Testament study, John Gager, had:

become fascinated with the prospect of reexamining early Christianity in light of modern religious movements that have flourished, so to speak, in the laboratories of sociologists and anthropologists. Increasingly, I became convinced that insights

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drawn from the study of these movements were not only applicable to early Christianity but also, and more significantly, that they held the promise of a genuinely new understanding of this particular religion.³⁷

Part of this 'genuinely new understanding' was the identification of relative deprivation as a vital force in the lives of early Christians.

Gager's deprivationist interpretation of early Christianity appears in a chapter subsection called, appropriately, 'Earliest Christianity as a Millenarian Movement'. He begins the chapter by pointing out the New Testament origins for the titles of two classic studies of cargo cults, 38 and then mentions the passing references to the millenarian nature of early Christianity that appear in the works of the anthropologist Anthony F. C. Wallace, and the cultural historians Norman Cohn and Yonina Talmon. 39 Using Talmon's definition of relative deprivation as an "uneven relation between expectation and the means of satisfaction", Gager concludes that '[t]this concept of relative deprivation sheds light on several important aspects of earliest Christianity'. 40 These aspects include its prepolitical character, the participation in it of persons who were above the lowest social strata, and its necessary location 'within the tradition of apocalyptic Judaism, which itself represents a paradigm case of great expectations followed by repeated disappointments'. 41 A few pages further, Gager undertakes an extended analysis of both conversion to early Christianity and the early movement's missionary efforts according to the deprivationist-related (and somewhat dated) theory of cognitive dissonance.42

Gager's study suggests that at the foundation of Christianity is a religious vision whose content derives from social and political disadvantage and despair. While he adroitly avoids reflecting on the nature of religious vision among Jesus' disciplines, he suggestively mentions, 'there are some indications that some of his own followers saw in him the fulfilment of their political dreams. . . . [A] remarkable passage in Luke 24:21 reports the following lament of two disciples after Jesus' death: "We had hoped that he was the one to redeem [i.e. purify, liberate, and restore] Israel". After his death and the additional failure of the expected millenarian arrival, members of the Christian community probably convinced themselves that they had achieved partial fulfilment of their expectations, using such 'standard forms [as] sacraments, meditation, asceticism, and mystical visions', 44 along with 'a form of therapy' provided by the Book of Revelations.

If true, then Gager's analysis supports, in dramatic fashion, my proposal that relative deprivation provides a conceptually adequate tool to explain religious mysticism. ⁴⁶ It also reinforces my opinion that the continued nonfulfilment of Christian millennialist dreams places relative deprivation at the heart of that particular faith. How, or even *if*, this insight could help explain the reputed niysticism of Blaise Pascal and Bernard of Clairvaux I cannot say,

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Naulty puts forward the claim that 'St Bernard of Clairvaux (1090–1153) in an important counter-instance to Kent, since Bernard's mysticism is of the same kind as that of Fox and the early Quakers, and St Bernard represent Western Christianity in a triumphant, expansionist phase, whereas Fox and his disciples were struggling to emerge from an embattled persecuted phase. This claim, however, is inconsistent with Naulty's own acknowledgement that Bernard recruited vigorously for the Second Crusade, and this fact should have motivated Naulty to investigate the military events that necessitated the call.

Far from being a phase of Western expansionism, Christendom was suffering grievously under the sword of the Turks. Roughly two decades after successfully invading Syria and Asia Minor in 1071, the Turks, with assistant from the Hungarians, massacred a substantial portion of Christianity's first crusaders. Even though the first Crusade ultimately proved successful with the recapture of Edessa (1097), Antioch (1098), and Jerusalem (1099), Pope Eugene III (with Bernard's help) had to call a second Crusade in 1144 when Edessa fell back into Turkish hands. Fernard's own interpretation of these threatening events stressed that they were God's punishment for the Christians' sins, but that He [sic] provided them 'with a means of salvation through the crusade'. While I shall not try to explain the Second Crusade through a contrived application of relative deprivation theory, suffice it to salvation the religious 'mysticism' of the period would be fruitfully interpreted against the social backdrop of these momentous military and cultural events.

Although Naulty views the matter differently, I see little relationship between the devastation that the Christian armies suffered in this crusade and our discussion about Bernard's reputed mysticism—except on one point. Bernard's rationalizations for the armies' failures reveal a pattern used by many frustrated people whose expectations suffer defeat. 'The reward of our warfare is not of (this) earth, not from below', Bernard propounded, 'its prize is far away and from the uttermost lands'. 49

Of considerable importance is Naulty's belief that 'St Bernard of Clairvaux was a mystic of the same type' as early Quakers—'a love mystic'. Naulty's assumption is that the reality of mysticism is true since it appears in similar form across a considerable span of time and cultures. Associating, however, Bernard and the Quakers as 'love mystics' is peculiar for several reasons, two of which have to do with an appreciation of early Quaker history itself.

First, the early Quakers themselves took great pains not to be religiously associated with the Catholics—the very thing that Naulty is doing. They had both social and theological reasons for doing so, and they denied with

persistent zeal any spiritual or worldly connections between themselves and the Church from Rome. 50 George Fox and nine other prominent Quakers, for example, published (probably in 1655) a book entitled A Declaration Against all Poperie and Popish Points, 51 and Fox followed it one year later with another publication, unabashedly titled A Warning from the Lord to the Pope and to all His Train of Idolatries: with a Discovery of his false Imitations, and Likenesses, and Traditional Inventions, which is not the Power of God. And a Testimony against his foundation, to the overthrow of the whole Building: and a Witness by the Spirit of God against his Dead-Worship of Dead Idols; and the false Imitation of false Crosses, which is not the power of God unto Salvation, but delusion unto damnation. 52 In sum, the early Quakers themselves rejected the very thing upon which Naulty insists—that they and the Catholics were 'of the same type' of mystics.

The second reason why I question Naulty's unified classification of Quaker and Catholic mysticism is that a renowned writer on mysticism, Evelyn Underhill, specifically separated the two 'mystical' experiences. '[N]o Quaker teacher creates the impression which we receive, e.g. from St Augustine, Ruysbroeck, or St John of the Cross, of the soul's entrance into a supernatural order "above reason but not against reason" which exceeds the resources of speech'. She added that 'the Absolute is truly self-revealed under symbols; in [the Quaker] case, the negative symbols of ineffable Being, in the [Catholic], the homely and positive signs of a manifested and self-giving love'. 53 No reason exists why we should accept Underhill's word over Naulty's, but this basic disagreement between two students of mysticism who are writing about the same groups suggests how impressionistic many of the discussions are about the topic. Laden with metaphors, frequently divorced from social and cultural context, and reliant upon consciously composed tracts, mystical determinations of individuals and groups remain uneven and unreliable.54

RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND THE RISE OF SUFISM

Among the individuals and groups that Naulty presents in an attempt to refute my claims, only the Sufis arose and flourished in a predominantly non-Christian culture. As Naulty sees them, 'the Sufis were persecuted because they were mystics, not mystics because they were persecuted', and Naulty cites work from the respected Islamicist, Annemarie Schimmel, to support the contention that they demonstrated 'love mysticism' (akin to the Quakers). Presumably Sufism is supposed to be one example of 'closely similar forms of mysticism [that] occur in cultures in which relative deprivation is absent'. No historical documentation, however, is cited to support the assertion about Sufism flourishing in populations in which relative deprivation was absent, and in fact the evidence suggests otherwise. Relative deprivation contributed

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The precise origins of Sufism are obscure, and scholars do not overlook the ascetic tendencies within both the theology of the Koran and the life of the Prophet. The first groups, however, to translate these tendencies into idea logical doctrine seem to have been reacting against the tyrannical but luxunious rule of the Ummayads (i.e. members of the Prophet's tribe) who dominated Islam after the assassination of Ali in 661. After discussing, for example, the possible influence that Muhammad himself might have had on the emergence of Sufism, Kenneth Cragg indicates that 'a further factor in the emergenced the Sufis was revulsion at the moral laxities and luxuries of the Umayyad Caliphate in its metropolis at Damascus, compromises which ... well dismaying enough to provoke political unrest and theological questioning. Likewise, an early study of Sufism indicates that '[a] further reason for the adoption of a life of asceticism is to be found in the political condition of the period immediately following the reigns of the first four khalifas [successors] Muhammed]. For there were many pious Muslims who, becoming disgusted with the tyrannical and impious rule of the Ummayad Khalifas, withdrew from the world to seek peace of soul in a life of seclusion'.56 Finally, Annemanie Schimmel, in the same study that Naulty cites, informs us that the 'ascenic tendencies' which led to Sufism emerged out of '[t]he resistance of the pious circles to the government'. This resistance:

grew stronger and was expressed in theological debates about the right ruler of the faithful and the conditions for the leadership of the community. The negative attitude toward the government engendered during these decades has significantly shaped the feeling of the pious throughout the history of Islam; the Sufis would often equate 'government' with 'evil'. 57

Those who specialize in early Islamic affairs are more capable than me in identifying the precise political and theological factors at work here, but it appears that a considerable number of the Muslims who became the earliest Sufis had expectations about both politics and the direction of their faith that were not being satisfied by members of their theocratic polity. In sociological language, the earliest Sufis suffered relative deprivation.

Given the social conditions under which it originated, it is not surprising that Sufism's greatest popular appeal was to the disprivileged segments of Islam. We know, for example, that popular Iranian Sufism by the late 8th century reflected 'the tension between requirements for spiritual salvation, as specified by Sufi mystical philosophy, enjoining both avoidance and transcendence of this world, and the vociferous demands of the mass of the lay members of Sufi congregations for this-worldly action. Because of these demands, any religious movement was likely to become "politically conditioned" to a significant

degree'. 58 Popular Sufism, therefore, nurtured millenarian political action, especially millenarianism that focused on the return of the Mahdi—Shi'ite Islam's messianic figure. As Said Arjomand's impressive study of Iranian Islam indicates, 'by admitting the possibility of immediate contact with God, [Sufism] provided a fertile ground for the growth of undisciplined religiosity, and heightened the receptivity to apocalyptic and 'exaggerated' claims to mahdihood and (incarnation), similar to those found in the history of Shi'ism.... 59

In 18th-century India we also see how the receptivity of the population to Sufi-influenced mysticism was conditioned by dire political and social circumstances. Our source for this information is, again, Annemarie Schimmel. She tells us that:

[j]ust as the new spirit of Urdu poetry developed in 18th-century Delhi, while the leading mystics looked for ways to lead their followers out of the darkness of the political situation, thus in Sind, too, the 18th century can be called the most important period for the formation of mystical poetry and prose, and for the activities of saintly persons whose works were meant to give spiritual nourishment to the suffering people. Thus, the 18th century, politically perhaps the most saddening phase of Indo-Muslim civilization, proves to be the most fertile period in terms of religious literature—very similar to the situation in the 13th century, when the larger part of the Islamic Empire was devastated by the Mongol hordes, and yet the greatest mystical poetry and theory was produced between Cairo and India: it is as though a strange balance of power produces such effects'. 60

Sociologists of religion, however, believe they know the nature of that 'strange balance of power'—it is society itself, whose religions provide both hope for a divinely inspired salvation and relief to those who feel like pawns in large and destructive political dramas. Whether through other-worldly mysticism or this-worldly apocalypticism, salvational religion embodies the aspirations of people who often are caught in social forces over which they have little control and often cannot even influence. Mysticism, in sum, is a social product, and the extent that cross-cultural similarities exist simply reflects the recurrent plight of disprivileged humanity.

CONCLUSION: TOWARD A SOCIOLOGY OF MYSTICISM

To argue as I have that religious mysticism is purely a social product is not to commit the sociological equivalent of James' psychological reductionism. Unlike James' claims, the sociological argument conceptualizes both the actors' particularistic facts and the experts' historical interpretations into comparative patterns from which predictions can be made. We can predict, for example, that when disprivileged people who think in religious terms experience political frustration regarding their socio-political aspirations, then outbreaks of millenarian mysticism are likely to occur. When studying these

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cases, therefore, scholars should pay particular attention to the social climate in which mysticism appears. Otherwise we overlook the social causes that provide the context for the mystical visions and the messages that the mystical convey.

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For their part, sociologists of religion may wish to direct more attention to the study of mysticism per se, since the phenomenon can be well integrated into established sociological literature on the development of religious concepts about God. Robert Bellah's application, for example, of 'the evolutionary idea to religion', provides a framework for seeing mysticism in a developmental perspective. Bellah stresses that '[i]t is not the ultimate conditions [oi humans' lives] or, in traditional language, God that has evolved, [n]or is it man in the broadest sense of homo religiosus'. It is, rather, 'religion as symbol system' that changes in identifiable patterns, 61 and these changes often represent themselves in new mystical visions.

Note clearly, however, that I follow Bellah in avoiding the question of the true nature of God. By insisting on a sociological interpretation of mysticism, l am neither denying nor affirming the Divine's existence. I am saying that what people believe are godly experiences, and most certainly those godly experiences that occur under conditions of pressing social strain, are more wisely interpreted as their own reified hopes. Such an interpretation says nothing about either the existence of, or the true nature of, 'the Divine', since about such topics sociology must remain respectfully silent.

NOTES

1 I was not able to ascertain whether Naulty actually is a religious studies professor, but Naulty's arguments are the type that reflect a religious studies perspective They provide, consequently, an excellent opportunity for dialogue between religious studies and sociology.

Stephen A. Kent, 'Psychological and Mystical Interpretations of Early Quaker ism: William James and Rufus Jones', Religion 17 (1987), p. 254.

- Kent, 'Psychological and Mystical Interpretations', pp. 252, 266, see 262-266. Kent, 'Psychological and Mystical Interpretations', pp. 252-253, 265-266.
- Kent, 'Psychological and Mystical Interpretations', p. 266.

Kent, 'Psychological and Mystical Interpretations', pp. 252-253. Henry James (ed.), The Letters of William James I, Atlantic Monthly Press, pp. 149-150; pp. in Condensation of William James I, Atlantic Monthly Press, Land pp. 149–150; rpt. in Gardner Murphy and Robert O. Ballou (eds), William James on Psychical Research, New York, Viking Press, 1960, p. 264.

Psychical Research, pp. 264-265.

James E. Dittes, 'Beyond William James', in Charles Y. Glock and Phillip E. Hammond (eds). Provided the City of the Company of the City of Hammond (eds), Beyond the Classics? Essays in the Scientific Study of Religion, New York, Harner & Page 1972 York, Harper & Row, 1973.

William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, pp. 19-20, London, Longmans, Green and Co. 1909. Longmans, Green, and Co., 1902, p. 19–20, rpt. with revisions, 1910 (emphasis in the original).

James, Varieties, p. 455.

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12 James, Varieties, p. 511.

James, Varieties, p. 512 (original emphasis); Kent, 'Psychological and Mystical

Interpretations', p. 255.

James, Varieties, p. 504. Worth mentioning, too, are James' comments about Pragmatism and Religion', which appeared as a chapter in his 1907 study on the pragmatic perspective. On pragmatistic principles, if the hypothesis of God works satisfactorily in the widest sense of the work, it is true. Now whatever its residual difficulties may be, experience shows that it certainly does work, and that the problem is to build it out and determine it so that it will combine satisfactorily with all the other working truths'. After, however, modestly referring to his earlier study of 'man's religious experience' (i.e. Varieties), he asks that 'you will perhaps exempt my own pragmatism from the charge of being an atheistic system. I firmly disbelieve, myself, that our human experience is the highest form of experience extant in the universe'. Once again we see the inescapable ambiguity between James' intent and his methodology. (William James, Pragmatism, and Four Essays from 'The Meaning of Truth', p. 192, New York, Meridian, 1907 rpt., 1955.)

The Quaker Collection, Haverford College Library, Collection no. 1130, Box 3 Letters 1899-1902. Folder: Letters to [Rufus M. Jones], 1902. [John Wilhelm Rowntree to Jones, 11 December 1902]; cited in Kent, 'Psychological and

Mystical Interpretations', p. 256.

16 Faye Crosby, 'A Model of Egotistical Relative Deprivation', Psychological Review 83: 2 (1976), p. 90.

W. G. Runciman, Relative Deprivation and Social Justice. Los Angeles, University

of California Press, 1966, p. 10.

Stephen A. Kent, 'Puritan Radicalism and the New Religious Organizations', in Comparative Social Research 10, Greenwich, Connecticut, JAI Press, 1987, pp. 11, 13, 22; 'Slogan Chanters to Mantra Chanters: A Mertonian Deviance Analysis of Conversion to Religiously Ideological Organizations in the Early 1970s'. Socio-

logical Analysis 49: 2 (1988), pp. 104-118.

Barry Reay, 'Quaker Opposition to Tithes 1652-1660', Past and Present 86 (February, 1980), p. 100; see Bruce Gordon Blackwood, 'Agrarian Unrest and the Early Lancashire Quakers', Journal of the Friends Historical Society 51: 1 (1965), pp. 72-76; Stephen A. Kent, 'Relative Deprivation and Resource Mobilization: A Study of Early Quakerism', British Journal of Sociology 33: 4 (December, 1982), pp. 529-544. A concise and balanced overview of studies on early Quakerism is in H. Larry Ingle, 'From Mysticism to Radicalism: Recent Historiography of

Quaker Beginnings', Quaker History 76: 2 (Autumn, 1987), pp. 79-94.

George Fox the Younger, Compassion to the Captives . . ., containing Unto you the Officers and Soldiers of the Armies in England, Scotland and Ireland, London, Thomas Simmons, 1656, p. 16. The pattern of movement from the ranks of the parliamentary army to the ranks of Quakerism is well known and easily understandable, given the soldiers' frustration over the government's refusal to initiate the expected reforms for which the soldiers believed they had risked their lives in battle. Margaret E. Hirst's The Quakers in Peace and War (New York, George H. Doran Co., 1923, pp. 527-529) lists ninety-two Quakers who had been either soldiers or seamen during the Civil War, all but five of whom had been parliamentarians. Friends House Library, London, has more complete lists of seamen and sold: and soldiers who converted to Quakerism in its 'Index of Occupations'. The index names at least twenty seamen who converted, but does not indicate how many of them found in the many of the one hundred and them fought in the Civil War. All but a few, however, of the one hundred and

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seventy-eight soldiers in its records fought in the parliamentary army. Many more not named. See . C. converts were former soldiers, but they simply are not named. See, for example the numerous citations under 'soldiers convinced' in the index to George Fox, It. Journal of George Fox (ed.), Norman Penney, New York, Octagon, 1694, rpt. 191 1975; C. H. Firth and Godfrey Davies, The Regimental History of Cromwell's Arm 2 volumes, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1940, pp. 134, 234-235, 247-248, 258, 272 394–395, 440, 493, 503, 656–657, and 659. General George Monck, commander the English army in Scotland during the 1650s, considered Quakers among his troops to be potential mutineers, and therefore cashiered as many of them as he could. Quakers, no doubt like the Levellers and the Agitators during the 1640s, were thought to be a threat to army discipline. As Firth and Davis indicate, 'Monck entirely agreed with [Colonel William] Daniel that Quaken were "neither fitt to command or obey, but ready to make a distraction in the army, and a mutiny uppon every slight occasion" (quoted in Firth and Davis Regimental History, pp. 493-494).

Fox The Younger, Unto you the Officers and Soldiers, p. 10. 21

- 22 Ibid., p. 10.
- Ibid., pp. 10-11. 23
- 24 Ibid., p. 11.
- 25 Ibid., p. 12.
- 26 Ibid., p. 14.
- 27 Ibid., pp. 14-15. Isaac Pennington the Younger, To the Parliament, the Army, and all the We 28 affected in the Nation, who have been faithful to the Good Old Cause, [no page
 - number], London, Giles Calvert, 1659; see also To the ARMY 1659, Folio, rpt. in The Works of ... Isaac Pennington ... Vol. I, pp. 330-331, 3rd edn, London James Phillips, 1784.
- James Nayler, A Lamentation (By One of England's Prophets,) over the Ruins of the Oppressed Nation (1653/4), rpt. in A Collection of sundry Books, Epistles and Paper written by James Nayler, p. 99, London, J. Sowle, 1716.
- Nayler, A Lamentation, in A Collection, p. 107. An additional example of a 30 deprivationist statement by Quakers appears in Anonymous, To the Generals, and Captains, Officers, and Souldiers of this present Army..., p. 1, London, p. 1, publisher, 1658. The authors refer to themselves as 'The Faithful Friends of the Common-wealth, and well-wishers for the Peace and good Government thered who have undergone many great Battels (with you) for the purchasing [of] Peace and Freedom in the Temporal and Spiritual liberties in the body and Spirit They go on to lament, 'what oppression by Tithes, and what oppression in Laws doth abound, what oppressions are there abounding through the Lawyers and through unjust Judges? Even the whole land mourns under it, and was it not be your hearts once to be a second to be a seco
- your hearts once to have Corrected and Regulated these things'. Edward Burrough, To the Protector and Council (1657), published in Good Council and Advice Rejected by Divid I'm and Council (1657), published in Good Council (1657), published 31 and Advice Rejected by Disobedient Men. . ., rpt. in The Memorable Works. Edward Burroughs, p. 563, London, no publisher, 1672, pp. 551-583 (emphasis poriginal) original).
- Burrough, To the Protector and Council, in Works, p. 564 (emphasis in original). 32
- George Fox, A Warning to the World, (1655), pp. 5-8; quoted in Geoffrey Nuttall, Overcoming the World, The Boundary of the Ports. Nuttall, 'Overcoming the World: The Early Quaker Programme', p. 151, in Derb. Baker (ed.), Studies in Church II. Baker (ed.), Studies in Church History 10: Sanctity and Secularity: The Church the World, Oxford Basil Block W. 100 Sanctity and Secularity: The Church of Foxist the World, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1973, pp. 145-164. For highlights of Fox

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social and political demands, see Barry Reay, 'The Quakers, 1659, and the Restoration of the Monarchy', *History* 53 (1978), pp. 193, 195; W. Schenk, *The Concern for Social Justice in the Puritan Revolution*, Toronto, Longmans, Green & Co., 1948, pp. 121, 122, 124.

34 George Fox, To the Parliament of the Comon-Wealth of England, Fifty-nine Particulars laid down for the Regulating things, and the taking away of Oppressing Laws, and Oppressors, and to ease the Oppressed, London, Thomas Simmons, 1659.

Geoffrey F. Nuttall, 'Puritan and Quaker Mysticism', Theology (October, 1975), p. 525.

36 John Gager, Kingdom and Community: The Social World of Early Christianity, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1975, p. xi.

37 Gager, Kingdom and Community, p. xi.

The cargo cult studies are Peter Worsley, The Trumpet Shall Sound. A Study of 'Cargo' Cults in Melanesia, 2nd Augmented Edn, New York, Schocken, 1968 (from 1 Cor. 15:48–52: 'Behold, I show you a mystery: we shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed, In a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trump, [for the trumpet shall sound, and the dead shall be raised incorruptible, and we shall be changed.])'; and Kenelm Burridge, New Heaven New Earth, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1969 (from Rev. 21.1: 'And I saw a new heaven and a new earth: for the first heaven, and the first earth were passed away, and there was no more sea'). Worth mentioning is that Burridge summarized the conversion story of the famous Quaker, James Naylor, on p. 3, and later (in a section on the sexual attractiveness of male prophets to women) stated that he 'is surely more properly evaluated as a prophet in terms of the millenarian atmosphere that accompanied the victories of the Parliamentary armies—in which he had served and fought with distinction—than by the fact that women extolled the beauty of his eyes and found him sexually attractive' (p. 161).

Gager, Kingdom and Community, p. 20; citing Anthony F. C. Wallace, 'Revitalization Movements', American Anthropologist 58 (1956), p. 267 ('Both Christianity and Mohammedanism [sic]... originated as revitalization movements'); Norman Cohn, 'Medieval Millenarism [sic]: Its Bearing on the Comparative Study of Millenarian Movements', p. 33 in Sylvia L. Thrupp (ed.), Millennial Dreams in Action: Studies in Revolutionary Religious Movements, New York, Schocken, 1970 ('for many of its early adherents Christianity was just such a [millenarian] movement'); and Yonina Talmon, 'Medieval Millenarianism: Its Bearing on the Comparative Study of Millenarian Movements', p. 33, in Sylvia Thrupp (ed.), Millennial Dreams in Action. Studies in Revolutionary Religious Movements, New

York, Schocken, 1970.

Gager, Kingdom and Community, p. 27, quoting Talmon, 'Pursuit of the Millennium', p. 137 (her emphasis). Gager also mentions the utility of relative deprivation theory for New Testament studies in 'Shall We Marry Our Enemies? Sociology and the New Testament', Interpretation 36 (1982), pp. 262–263; and see his review essay on three early Christianity books in Religious Studies Review, 5: 3 (July, 1979), p. 180. In contrast to Gager, I am among those persons who believe that 'social scientific analysis of the New Testament somehow poses a threat to the authority of Scripture and thus to faith itself ('Shall We Marry Our Enemies?

'...', p. 257). See, however, Charles L. McGehee, 'Spiritual Values and Sociology: When We Have Debunked Everything, What Then?, The American Sociologist 17 (Feb.

17 (February, 1982), pp. 40-46.
Gager, Kingdom and Community, pp. 27-28. In the same year Gager was insisting

that earliest Christianity had to be located within the apocalyptic Jewish tradition Paul D. Hanson, a Hebrew Bible/Old Testament scholar, published an examination of that apocalyptic tradition. Although Hanson judiciously avoided using the term, relative deprivation, in his book, The Dawn of Apocalyptic (Philadelphia Fortress Press, 1975), the logic behind the concept could have provided him with an interpretive tool from outside the narrow confines of biblical criticism. Like Gager, Hanson revealed his debt to then-contemporary sects for stimulating his study, and his observations are suggestive to persons favourable to relative deprivation theory. 'To increasing numbers of observers it is becoming apparent that the dawn of a new apocalyptic era is upon us. Especially among those designated "the counter-culture", but not excluding many who continue oversly to live out their roles in the institutions of society, there is arising a profound disenchantment with the values and structures of our way of life' (p. 1). A few paragraphs later he observes that '[f]rom among the ranks of such ponderers a number, experiencing complete alienation from the crumbling structures, with drew into apocalyptic sects given to visions of the imminent collapse of this order and the dawn of a new era. These sects-the Hari Krishna, the Process-are rediscovering the vitality of the apocalyptic visions of the past; indeed, they are producing apocalyptic literature before our own eyes' (p.3). When he specifically analysed early apocalyptic literature, his findings about one period fit easily into a relative deprivation framework. 'By the mid-5th century [B.C.E.] the visionary group's evaluation of the capacity of historical events as carriers of the salvation hope had grown so bleak as to engender the conviction that restoration could occur only after a disruptive and devastating series of events in which Yahweh would annul the order established at the creation of the world, supplanting it with a new paradisaical order of harmony and prosperity' (p.405). This argument parallels the one that I am making about social and political frustration providing the ideological content within early Quakers' mystical experiences.

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Gager, Kingdom and Community, pp. 37-49; see Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, Stanford, California, Standford University Press, 1957, Leon Festinger, H. W. Riecken, and S. Schachter, When Prophecy Fails. A Social and Psychological Study of a Modern Group That Predicted the Destruction of the World, New York, Harper and Row, 1956. One should mention that an extensive discussion and gradual qualification of cognitive dissonance theory has gone on in the sociology of religion at the same time that cognitive dissonance theory became but one aspect of attribution theory. A cognitive dissonance model, however, lurks behind my discussion of the crises of feasibility that I identify in early Interregnum England and the early 1970s in the United States. See Kent, 'Puritan Radicalism'

pp. 10, 13-14, 18-22; Kent, 'Slogan Chanters to Mantra Chanters'. Gager, Kingdom and Community, p. 23 (brackets in original). 43

Ibid., p. 49.

45 Ibid., pp. 50-56.

Kent, 'Psychological and Mystical Interpretations', pp. 252-253. For a relative deprivationist interpretation of the rise of Jainism, see Burridge, New Heaven New Earth, pp. 86-96, especially p. 95.

J. Richard, 'Crusades', pp. 506-507, in New Catholic Encyclopedia Vol. 4, Toronto, McGraw-Hill 1967 47

McGraw-Hill, 1967.

Giles Constable, 'The Second Crusade as Seen by Contemporaries', Traditio IX, New York, Fordham Press, 1953, rpt. in Giles Constable, Religious Life and Thought (11th-12th Centuries), 2007, rpt. Thought (11th-12th Centuries), p. 247, London, Variorum Reprints, 1979.

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49 Bernard quoted in Constable, 'The Second Crusade', p. 267.

For discussions about how the Quakers' opponents associated them with Catholics as part of a diabolically subversive plot, see Stephen A. Kent, 'The "Papist" Charges Against the Interregnum Quakers', Journal of Religious History 12: 2 (December, 1982), pp. 180-190; and Ian Y. Thackray, 'Zion Undermined: The Protestant Belief in a Popish Plot during the English Interregnum', History Workshop 18 (Autumn, 1984), pp. 28-52.

51 George Fox, Francis Howgil, Edward Burrough, Alexander Parker, Thomas Aldam, Anthony Pearson, Gervase Benson, Thomas Rawlinson, Robert Rich [and] Robert Dring, A Declaration Against all Poperies and Popish Points..., no place or printer, no date [but probably 1655], listed in Joseph Smith, A Descriptive

Catalogue of Friends' Books. .., p. 649, New York, Krause, 1867, rpt. 1970.

52 Listed in Smith, A Descriptive Catalogue, p. 651.

53 Evelyn Underhill, Worship, p. 313, New York, Harper Torchbooks, 1936 rpt., 1957.

54 I shall not attempt to review the vast literature on mysticism, nor try to write a history of the efforts to systematize its reputed forms in order to facilitate its comparative study. Suffice it to say that the continued veneration given to conceptually unclear works such as James' Varieties hinders these efforts.

55 Kenneth Cragg, The House of Islam, p. 66, Encino, California, Dickenson Pub-

lishing Company, 1975.

56 John A. Subhan, Sufism: Its Saints and Shrines, p. 10, 1938 [?], rpt. 1970, New York, Samuel Weiser. A more popular account of Islam by Time-Life Books also states that '[i]n effect, [Sufism] was a reaction, not only against the rationalists, but against a tyrannical government seemingly supported by orthodox religious leaders'. (Desmond Stewart and the Editors of Time-Life Books, Early Islam, New York, Time Incorporated, 1967, pp. 86–87). Finally, the Islamicist F. E. Peters says, cryptically, about the origins of Sufism that 'the deeds of the civil war [against the Ummayads] brought Muslims to introspection. . . .' (Allah's Commonwealth, p. 416, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1973.)

57 Annemarie Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam, Chapel Hill, North Carolina,

University of North Carolina Press, 1975, pp. 29-30.

58 Said Amir Arjomand, The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam, pp. 67-68, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984; see also J. Spencer Irmingham, The Sufi Orders in Islam, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1971, pp. 94, 111, 238-241, 253.

⁵⁹ Arjomand, p. 67, see p. 82.

Annemarie Schimmel, Pain and Grace: A Study of Two Mystical Writers of

Eighteenth-Century Muslim India, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1976, pp. 26-27.

Robert Bellah, 'Religious Evolution', p. 21 in Bellah, Beyond Belief: Essays on Religion in a Post-Traditional World, New York, Harper & Row, 1970; also see Gerhard Lenski and Jean Lenski, Human Societies: An Introduction to Macrosociology, Toronto, McGraw-Hill, 1987, pp. 90, 195–199. In his wordy essay, 'Religion as a Cultural System', Clifford Geertz unknowingly uses a relative deprivation framework to discuss how religious symbols in part account for 'the gap between things as they are and as they ought to be' as well as 'the gap between what we deem various individuals deserve and what we see that they get'. See Geertz, 'Religion as a Cultural System', in M. Banton (ed.), Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion, London, Tavistock Publication, 1966; rpt. in Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, New York, Basic Books, 1973, P.106.

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REVIEW ARTICLE

A NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF RELIGION

Mircea Eliade (ed. in chief), Charles J. Adams, Joseph M. Kitagawa, Martin E. Marty, Richard P. McBrien, Jacob Needleman, Annemarie Schimmel, Robert M. Seltzer, Victor Turner (eds), Lawrence E. Sullivan (associated ed.), and William K. Mahony (assistant ed.), *The Encyclopedia of Religion*. New York, Macmillan, and London, Collier, 1987, 16 volumes. \$1,200.

To undertake to review a sixteen-volume encyclopaedia makes one sympathetic with the defence that James Mill gave in the preface to his History of British India (1817) for his temerity in writing a comprehensive interpretation of Indian culture and history. He was aware of the criticisms that would be made because of his seeming lack of qualifications: he had never been to India, he had no knowledge of Indian languages, and he was not a specialist in any field of Indian studies. One of his defences was that people who knew India at first hand were always prejudiced either for or against it; another was that a life devoted to the collection of specialized facts and to acquiring languages was incompatible with 'those powers of mind which are most conducive to a masterly treatment of evidence'. So, he concluded to his own satisfaction, a cursory review of this vast subject was justified since 'Life is insufficient for more'. And so with the happy certainty that no one has visited all the civilizations, commands all the languages, or knows all the facts encompassed by this Encyclopedia, your reviewers set about their task.

As we examined this work, we recognized that it is extremely unlikely that another encyclopaedia of religion on this scale will appear in English for at least another generation. In other words, it has pre-empted the field, foreclosing the use by others of a severely limited pool of financial and scholarly resources. The editors and publishers bore, therefore, an unusual responsibility, since if they did not compile a work of respectable scholarship they would be preventing the need being met by other scholars and publishers. Let us say at the outset, that, like many others who confronted this massive work, we began our examination with many doubts and negative criticisms, but we have concluded that it will indeed provide a generation of users with valuable summaries and analyses of the best of current scholarship in the field of religion. There are, as is inevitable in a work of this kind, lacunae in terms of entries, some odd Judgements and opinions, and no doubt specialists in some of the more arcane fields will find errors of fact, but it fulfills its primary function of being of service to an important constituency, that is, readers who need accurate, dependable information and interpretative analyses based on scholarly research in fields in which they are not specialists on a line of the service of

specialists or who do not have ready access to a large library. How difficult that task of service is to fulfill is suggested by the definitions tentatively given, with many qualifications, in the article on 'Religion' by Winston L. King in the $E_{ncyclopedia}$. To justify the use of the term 'religion' to cover many varieties of human experience in many disparate cultures throughout human history, he suggests that religions can be seen as attempts 'to order individual and societal life in terms of

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culturally perceived ultimate priorities'. This is so broad a definition that it can be made to include almost every human activity at some time or place, and an encyclopaedia of religion is in danger of becoming a universal encyclopaedia. This is particularly true given another definition provided by Mircea Eliade, editor in chief, that the history of religion is 'the story of the human encounter with the sacred,' for sacred itself becomes an all-encompassing term. But Eliade and his fellow editors have solved the problem in the time-honoured and necessary way of making words like 'sacred' and 'religion' mean just what they choose them to mean, neither more nor less. In this case, the understanding of the term religion is made to cover, in Eliade's words from his preface, 'a great network of historical and descriptive articles, synthetical discussions, and interpretive essays that make available contemporary insight into the long and multifaceted history of religious man' (I, p. xii).

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'Religious man' is a curious expression, implying at first glance that the encyclopaeda will be informed by the conviction that there is a dichotomy between religious and non-religious individuals. This is clearly not the case, for according to Joseph Kitagawa, one of the editors, when Eliade became involved with the encyclopaedia he had hoped that it would be the capstone of his idea of 'total hermeneutics', a framework for interpreting all of human experience (I, p. xv). Kitagawa does not say so explicitly, but this grand vision could not be realized, possibly because neither the editors nor contributors accepted without considerable reservations Eliade's formulation of 'sacredness as the unique and irreducible essence of all religious experience' (XII, p. 285). While the editors assumed that there is no such thing as a purely religious phenomenon, but only human phenomena, Kitagawa is insistent, nonetheless, on the correctness of Eliade's formulation that human experience cannot be understood without attention to its religious component. 'Against reductionism' might have served as the watchword of

the enterprise.

In reviewing what Eliade called 'the network of articles and essays' that make up the Encyclopedia, a number of questions provided a focus. One series of questions that forces itself upon a reader concerns the relationship between this new encyclopedia and the one that has held the field for so long. Hastings' Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics. Does the new one replace the old? What are the differences between the two in terms of rigour of scholarship? Are there points of view or ideological differences that are determinative of content as well as of interpretation? While it would not be profitable to make a comparison with Hastings central to a review of the new encyclopaedia, it will be useful to refer back to it at a number of points. Other questions are of a kind that must be asked of any encyclopaedia. How comprehensive is its coverage, especially in terms of its self-definition? How accurate is the factual information and, moving into disputable territory, are the value judgements and expressions of opinion based on sound theoretical and scholarly knowledge? This is especially important when opinions and interpretations in articles touch upon areas outside the writer's area of specialized competence. Relating to all these issues, is the question of intended constituency. Isin meant to be used by specialists in their own fields, by scholars who want information from areas other than their own, or for that creature who is as illusive as the Grail, the general reader? And finally, fundamental to the purpose of this and of any encyclor paedia, is the information presented in a way that is readily accessible to the intended audience?

Collections of information in convenient, encapsulated form have been part of the intellectual history of the world, both in Asia and Europe, for at least two thousand years, but the use of the word encyclopaedia for such a collection was first used in Europe in 1559. Many encyclopaedias, however, included in their titles such words as

'speculum' (mirror) and 'imago' (image), indicating that the authors intended their works to be more than repositories of facts; they were to reflect the best thought of their times while being instruments of change and progress. Thus the Encyclopédie of Denis Diderot (1751–1765) propagated the ideology of rationalism and enlightenment that was seen as the vanguard of the future. Hastings and his collaborators in the Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics (ERE), the first volume of which was published in 1908, were far less self-conscious of being the mirror of their world, and the preface (in contrast to that of the new Encyclopedia) is brief and factual to the point of being laconic. Hastings does suggest reasons, however, for the demand at the end of the 19th century for reference works, and these indicate that his Encyclopaedia was indeed a mirror of the times. One was that higher standards of education compelled teachers, as Hastings put it, 'to verify their references'. The other reason was the enormous increase in knowledge of the religion and cultures of other societies that made necessary a specialized work on religion and ethics (I, p. v).

Behind these mild phrases are the marshalled works of the German scholars who had transformed historiography and biblical criticism in the 19th century. As a result, one of the glories of the ERE is the meticulous attention paid to giving references for statements of both fact and opinion, including lengthy footnotes and detailed bibliographies from the major European languages. There is no question that the ERE looks more scholarly than the new volumes. An easy example is the very first article, which is, fittingly enough, 'alpha and omega', but using the Greek letters. There are no concession to the lay reader as W. O. E. Oesterley, the great biblical scholar, shows why the phrase is probably derived directly from the Hebrew text, and not from the Septuagint. The Greek and Hebrew are not transliterated, much less translated, and it is also assumed that the reader will be familiar with the peculiarities of the 1st century script. There is no entry, incidentally, for the phrase in the new encyclopaedia, and a splendid article on the religious significance of alphabets seems not to mention it. To

redress the balance, the ERE does not have an entry on alphabets.

Is the new Encyclopedia, then, less firmly rooted in the great tradition of academic scholarship? Only prolonged usage will be able to give a satisfactory answer, but a partial one is suggested by Hastings's second reason as to why a specialized work on religion and ethics was needed, that is, the astonishing new discoveries about the past made in the 19th century. Perhaps 'discovery' is a misleading word; Columbus did not discover America, he only made possible its appropriation by the Europeans from the people who already possessed it. In a very real sense the ERE was an analogous appropriation of the cultural and religious traditions of the non-European world by European scholars. This idea of the use of the non-western world by the West has been, especially since the publication of Edward Said's widely read Orientalism (1978), a subject of much discussion. Stated in an over-simplified manner, Said's thesis was that the Orient, and indeed the whole concept of the non-western world as the 'Other', was a creation of western scholars as a mode of discourse to legitimize the political dominance of the West. Hastings and his contributors, who constitute a roll-call of the most distinguished scholars of Europe and America, can be seen in this reading as using the new knowledge of the non-western world, which is so prominently reflected in the ERE, in this in this process. It can be argued, for example, that the influence of Darwin's theory resulted in a peculiar fascination, evident in many of the articles in the ERE, with questions of origins. The theories in regard to the origins of such things as animism, ancestor worship, polytheism, the Indian caste system, etc. are often contested or ignored by ignored by modern scholars, and the charge is made the arrose from a western, indeed OL. indeed, Christian bias, that religion evolved toward the true form of monotheism.

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Whether or not this charge is true, it has at least, in the words of Owen Lynch, the anthropologist, 'humbled our pretensions, and shaken our sense of importance to the world and humanity. It has forced us to ask, "What are we doing, and why?" Joseph Kitagawa's response to that question in his foreword to the Encyclopedia is that the mental world of the contributors to the two works is different, with 19th-century scholars seeing the world from the perspective of European cultural and political dominance. The great contrast between the ideology that informs the ERE and the new Encyclopedia, then, is that whereas the earlier scholars saw the non-Western world as sources of religious data to be used within their own methodologies, after World Warll non-Western peoples 'rightly began to insist on participating in the global effort to develop adequate interpretive schemes for apprehending the entire religious expenence of mankind' (I, p. xiv). One has to ask, however, whether the shift in point of view that is obvious enough in the new Encyclopedia was really due to participation in the scholarly process by the non-Western peoples? It is hard to escape the conviction that the shift was due, not so much to new data from such finds as Qumran, Nag Hammadi. and Mohenjo Daro, as to the insights that have come to religious studies from such seminal work as that of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Freud, and Jung. One can make similar lists of anthropologists, like Geertz and Lévi-Strauss, who have done field work in other cultures, and still be left with the impression that the undeniable shift in interpreting religious phenomena has come about, not so much from a more global scholarship, as from fundamental changes in the questions asked and by whom they are asked. A random sampling of articles suggests something of the nature of these shifts as well as the general character of the Encyclopedia.

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One of the most dramatic examples of this shift can be seen in the articles on Hinduism in the two encyclopedias. The one in ERE was written by William Crooke, a government official with great knowledge and experience of Indian religion and culture. The article has much detailed information about Hindu beliefs and practices, most of it based on the work of the great 19th-century scholars. In his concluding section, however, he turns to a number of questions that were of great interest to foreign observers of India at the end of the 19th century. One was the relation between Hinduism and morals, and Crooke, following a well-established pattern, declared that Hinduism exercises little influence on morals; 'probably the most effective rule of morals for the average Hindu is the Indian Penal Code'. Another much discussed issue was the fate of the caste system in an India influenced by Western ideas; unlike many Western observers he thought it would endure because of 'the immobility and ignorance of the rural population'. As for the religion itself, he wondered how long the ancient deities could hold their own in a modern world. Rome was always in the background of the thinking of the British in India, and he thought some new religion might arise in India as it had in Rome to replace the old gods. In the new encyclopaedia, Alf Hiltebeitel's article on Hinduism is a model of scholarly erudition, and he gives little space to the issues that fascinated Crooke. A modern educated Hindu would find Crooke's article deeply offensive, seeing it as the product of Western insensitivity and bigotry, while he would see in Hiltebeitel's a calm and rational approach to religious phenomena. The difference is not really due to increased knowledge, but to a shift in mentality; Hiltebeitel could not have written his article at the beginning of the 20th century nor could Crooke have written his at its end.

The treatments of Ch'an and Zen Buddhism are also interesting examples of the shift that has taken place in religious studies in the 20th century. Neither get individual entries in ERE, but through the index one is led to the article on Japan, where equal space is given to Zen and Roman Catholicism. In de Groot's article on Buddhism in

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China, there is much information on Buddhist monasticism, but no mention of Ch'an. This oddity surely reflects the later interest by the West in Zen, partly due to the work of D. T. Suzuki. In the Encyclopedia, by way of contrast there are numerous references to both Zen and Ch'an as well as major articles, both by Heinrich Dumoulin.

Concepts are more difficult to deal with in an encyclopaedia, as is amply illustrated by the treatment of 'conscience' in the two encyclopaedias. The ERE has subsections on the concept—Babylonian, Egyptian, Greek, Roman, Jewish, Islamic. Christianity appears to be absent, but this is not really so, for it is treated in the introductory section where the author, James Hyslop, makes it clear that conscience as understood in the West is a product of Christian thought. At the same time, and symptomatic of that attitude noted above, he wanted to make the concept compatible with the thought of Darwin and Spencer. To preserve the Christian distinction between man and animal, based on the assumption that animals did not have a conscience, he proposed as a solution that evolution had organized 'elements otherwise separate into a systematic tendency to act in the direction we call conscience'; but the origin of conscience is not so important, he argues, as 'its validity as a function of the mind'. The underlying precept here, that questions of origin are never questions of validity, was one that people found extremely useful in coming to terms with the new theories and new knowledge that were threatening to sweep away their world. It was not only Arnold who heard the long withdrawing ebb of the Sea of Faith.

Michael Despland's article in the new work is different in style and content, but he too is concerned with the origin of the conscience, and finds it in 'three articulations of human experience', the Hebrew Scriptures, the writings of Cicero, and those of St Paul. Unlike the older examination of the concept, he makes no real attempt to look at other traditions, but firmly declares that 'the notion of conscience as internal organ is not found outside Christianity'. This is a narrow definition, and with the emphasis on 'organ' may be true, but surely dharma fulfills much the same function in Indian religion as conscience does in Christian thought. Ake Hultkrantz, who contributes the excellent article on the religion of North American Indians, has identified 'conscience' as an important component in their thought. Even if irritating in some respects, Despland's article, is, like most of the longer ones in the Encyclopedia, far more readable than those in Hastings, and, in this case, has what can only be described as evangelical warmth when he tells the reader that since God meets us in the lowest among our brethren, 'only in these meetings are found the birthplace of morality and the voice of God'. One would be hard put to find such a sentence in ERE; for better or for worse, the writers were anxious to be as scientific as Spencer or Huxley. The older article is, in fact, more 'scientific', but here as elsewhere it would be misleading to say that one article was better than the other. They are, rather, complementary, and a student should go to both. Another example of a somewhat similar kind is the pair of articles called 'metamorphosis' in ERE, and 'Shape Shifting' in the Encyclopedia.

The Encyclopedia has one category of articles that seems to have no counterpart in the ERE, entries that are described in the 'Synoptic Outline', (Vol. 16, p. 120), as those that concern 'objects, symbols, practices, beliefs, themes, and motifs that are observable transreligionally, that is as elements of more than one religious tradition'. Perhaps these entries, more than most, reflect the specific contribution of Mircea Eliade to the study of religion in the 20th century. One that may be mentioned as illustrative of the category is by Samuel Klausner on violence. The subject is given a summary and a somewhat historical treatment, with the central theme perhaps summed up by the statement that 'Religious culture helps identify the evil to be attacked'. This is an important observation but it is not developed. The emphasis is on Christian history,

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he shift ividual e equal nism in however, without reference to contemporary legitimization of violence by religious groups in Israel, Iran, India, and Ireland, not to mention the bombing of abortion clinics in the United States. Another article that we thought belonged in this category of articles that had no counterpart in ERE drew our attention by its unlikely title: 'Spittle and Spitting'. Written by Annmari Roonberg, it is the kind of article one finds when looking for something else, and gets diverted by it. It has, in fact, a counterpart in ERE, but under 'saliva', which hints at the difference between the two sets of books. We become aware of this article because Roonberg cites it in her bibliography, a further proof of how complementary the old and new volumes are.

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Pleasant and unexpected surprises in *The Encyclopedia of Religion* are three articles under the general rubric of Literature. Anthony C. Yu's article entitled 'Literature and Religion' is an erudite discussion that ranges widely in space and time, concluding with an intelligible comment on Deconstructionism. Nathan A. Scott, Jr examines the religious dimensions of modern literature, concluding that even in the most secular of writers 'the great symbolic forms of Christendom never simply disappear from the reality of the psyche'. The third of the articles, 'The Novel as Secular Literature', is by Robertson Davies, a novelist whose own works illustrate his contention that the novel's connection with religion should be through morality rather than faith or revelation.

Another category is articles that are missing from both encyclopaedias. There is no article on primitive religions, although, to be sure, there are many references in both sets to the phrase as it occurs in different entries. Eliade uses the word 'primitive several times in his preface, and comments that the most significant advance in religious studies has been in the understanding of 'primal' religions, so it would have been useful to have had a writer confront this protean concept. All such complaints, however, are elegantly covered by Kitagawa's statement that they are 'melancholy reminders that that any encyclopaedia, including this one, begins to grow obsolete almost before it is published' (I, p. xiii).

We had made a considerable list of missing entries until the index volume arrived, and we discovered almost all of them were in fact covered in longer articles or under other headings. All historical accounts of the making of encyclopaedias emphasize that accessibility through indexes and cross-reference is a modern development, and the material in this one, we are pleased to be able to report, has been made easy to use by

internal references in the articles as well as in the superb index volume.

While the editor in chief and the other editors were responsible for the decision on articles to be included and on the selection of contributors, the index volume is no doubt the work of the editorial staff at the publishing house. They are responsible for the clarity of the format and the immensely complicated task in a work of this kind of standardization of spelling and transliteration as well as checking for internal accuracy. The publishers and editors have been generous in acknowledging the many people involved, but there is a tradition of anonymity in the publishing world that refrains from identifying too closely the responsibilities of senior staff members. Charles E. Smith, the Vice-President of Macmillan, initiated the project and it is probably safe to assume that Claude Conyers, the Senior Project Director, and Mark Cummings, an associate director who is himself a scholar of Chinese culture, had much to do with the overall excellence of the publication.

Among the features of the index volume is a directory of contributors, with their academic affiliations and the titles of the articles they have written. An important feature of the encyclopaedia is that all articles, even the shortest ones, are signed, so that one has some sense of the authority behind them without the nuisance of consulting another volume, as is the case with the *Britannica* and some other

encyclopaedias. There is also an alphabetical list of all the articles with the authors, giving an important clue to the rigour with which the editors sought out contributors. Then there is a section entitled 'Synoptic outline of Contents', divided into two main sections, one called 'The Religions', and the other 'The History of Religions'. This feature of the *Encyclopedia* at first did not appear to be very useful to the reader, but more careful examination suggested it will repay careful study by teachers for ideas for courses. This is followed by the remarkably thorough index, and it is no exaggeration to say that it is the key to the maximum usefulness of the work.

Usefulness must be the final criterion for judging any reference work, and that in turn depends upon its intended constituency. Teachers of religion courses and their students are surely a major portion of that constituency, but teachers of history and anthropology will also find many articles that are succinct, authoritative, and readable. For the authority and accuracy of the articles, the reader must trust, first of all, that the editors were conscientious and knowledgeable in their choice of writers, and then that the writers performed their tasks responsibly. Because of this, it is possible to say that The Encyclopedia of Religion achieves something of what Eliade had in mind when he wrote in his preface, 'to know the great variety of worldviews assumed by religious man, to comprehend the expanse of his spiritual universe, is, finally, to advance our general knowledge of mankind'. To return to Mill in our first paragraph, surely life is insufficient for more than that.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Jim Obelkevich, Lyndal Roper and Raphael Samuel, (eds), Disciplines of Faith: Studies in Religion, Politics and Patriarchy. London and New York, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987, xvi + 581 pp. £10.95.

A major theme running through this important collection of essays is the contribution that religion may make to the emancipation of depressed groups such as women and migrants. Several essays address the questions of women's role in religious movements and whether Christian churches subjugate or liberate women. James Ault's vivid examination of an American Baptist church (Chapter 2) shows that, despite the sect's rhetoric of male supremacy, women's role in the group certainly cannot be simplified to one of subordination; Rickie Burman, on women in Jewish religious life in Manchester (3), establishes that women's primacy in domestic rituals endowed them with religious leadership; and Gail Malmgreen, dealing with women and the family in Cheshire Methodism (4), indicates that, at least in new religious movements, women may enjoy exceptional opportunities for emancipation and leadership. This view of Methodism's potential for women is strongly supported by Henry Abelove in 'The sexual politics of early Wesleyan Methodism' (6) and by Robert Colls's work on the Primitive Methodists in the Northern coalfield (21), which depicts women 'coming up in gusts with the right to know and to speak'.

Only when we come to Luisa Accati's classic piece of traditional radical anticlericalism, 'The Madonna in 17th-century Catholic Europe' (5) do we find much support in this collection for the feminist view of religion summarised by the editors as 'a prime and undifferentiated force of oppression' of women. The conclusions about women's status in churches to be drawn from Cornelie Usborne's 'The Christian churches and the regulation of sexuality in Weimar Germany' (7) are at best ambivalent: male-dominated churches certainly held women back, for example, over the rights of unmarried mothers, but the German churches' opposition to prostitution's degradation of women to 'sex objects' surely has a more enlightened resonance.

The highly institutionalised clergies of Tridentine Italy and Weimar Germany may well have sought, and largely achieved, the subjugation of women, but when we look at the extensive area allowed in virtually all variants of Christianity for uninstitutionalised charisms we find a different story. Thus, Phyllis Mack, in her imaginatively conceived comparison of three widely separated movements—franciscans, Quakers and Gandhians (8)—reveals how inspirational religiosity nourishes feminine features. This process ought not to be seen as the outcome of some stereotyped link between women and the inspirational, men and the rational, but rather as the product of women's historical reliance on charismatic credentials because of their exclusion from formal and academic authentications. Indeed, Victorian mediums, as Alex Owen demonstrates (9), actually exploited stereotypes of women's passivity, illness and purely maternal sexuality in order to exercise ministry in a religion where, it goes without saying, inspiration was paramount.

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As we move back again to the Christian churches, we continue to find evidence in As we move back again this symposium of religion acting as a liberating rather than a subordinating f_{010} for women. For example, Stephen Barton maintains, in his analysis of 'Paul, religion and society (11), that women played a 'prominent role' in the Christian church right from the start. Individual women were certainly to the fore in the Christianity of the middle ages, their prominence underwritten, again, by charismatic validation Examples are St Catherine of Siena, St Bridget, Margery Kempe, and Guy Boanas's and Lyndal Roper's subject, Santa Francesca Romana (12), whose entirely orthodox visionary piety—completely endorsed by the Church—allowed her—like Savonarolato call into question the widely accepted Italian Renaissance veneration of the patriarchal family. Luther's coarse cynicism about female saints, nuns and sisters. his denial of any intellectual life to women, his denigration of Mary the student of Christ and demotion of Mary the Mother of God, and his re-masculinisation of religion through his abandonment of the affective piety in which some medieval women had played a dominant role, all marked a major loss for women and the part they played in religious and social life (Merry Wiesner, 'Luther and women: The death of two Marys''. As for Calvinism, there is no glimpse at all, even in its earlier, more open, phase of an active role for women in the Reformation in Edinburgh examined by Michael Lynch (19).

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Yet, partly through returning to medieval roots, for instance to her heroine Catherine of Siena, Josephine Butler, as Alison Milbank shows (10), was able to derive 'unassailable authority' from her mystical and prophetic resources. Thus, a group of highly authoritative articles in this collection suggests that the relationship between women and religion—more specifically, Christian religion—has been more complex than is sometimes suggested, that Christian religion—the collection is mostly about that—may provide women with a voice in social situations where it might otherwise be totally denied them, and that the inspirational forms of religion historically most likely to do this are not confined to the churches and groups which

are usually stuck with the label 'radical'.

This book's theme of liberation also emerges in studies of religion's role in relations between the individual and the family, potentially a primary oppressive mechanism for women and the young. The patriarchal family whose dominance was challenged by Santa Francesca Romana was strongly re-asserted and bolstered up with baroque ceremonial in Counter-Reformation Piedmont (Angelo Torre, 'Village ceremonial life and politics in eighteenth-century Piedmont'). Young people seeking to escape the often suffocating embrace of the family may well take refuge in religious sects—though these may turn out to be even more totalitarian than the patriarchal family. In the end, though, there seems little possibility of actually escaping the family: not only do religious groups like Ault's Baptists (2) and Malmgreen's Methodists (4) use a familial vocabulary to express sectarian intimacy, but sects like the Moonies, studied by Eileen Barker (14), are largely made up of young people living out family values acquired in childhood—just as Ault's Baptists 'reconstruct... [conservative] patterns of family . . . life', patterns often, it seems, having immigrant Italian origins.

A trio of essays—still linked to the overriding topic of human liberation—has to do with 'Colonization and Resistance': Inga Glendinnen on Franciscan missionaries in 16th-century Mexico (15), Tristan Platt on the Devil's Cult amongst Bolivian miners (16), and Terence Ranger on religion in the Zimbabwe guerilla war (17). Glendinnen doubts whether Christianity could be 'transplanted' into a culture vastly different from that of the Spanish missionaries; Platt captures the richness, con-

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has to ionaries 3olivian ar (17). e vastly s, complexity and the Christian elements of the Ameroindian religious synthesis; and Ranger reveals that Christianity (though co-existing with spirit mediums) was successfully transplanted into an evolving and stratified peasant society whose various needs it met and to whose political struggle it generally lent support.

Another feature of this symposium's leitmotif of religion and the human condition is a treatment of what religion does for an identifiable segment of the underprivileged—if, often, psychologically rather than, or as well as, materially so: migrants. These of course include women migrants, like those amongst Burman's Manchester Jews (3) and McLeod's New York Irish (22), women who found at most emancipation and at least consolation from the ancestral religion that the immigrants brought with the rest of their meagre luggage. However, neither for women nor for men does the experience of migration have any automatic function in confirming religious loyalties: for mobile Frenchmen, migration completed the divorce between peasantry and Church already set in motion by political and cultural antipathy (Roger Magraw, 'Popular anticlericalism in nineteenth-century rural France'-23). On the other hand, where religion was coincident, as it was amongst the New York Irish, with ethnicity and solidarity in a hostile environment or with language and culture, as amongst the Valleys Welsh Methodists examined by Christopher Tuner (20), then it was certainly included in the emigrants' baggage. However, in the host society the religious loyalties of immigrants could not be taken for granted in any passive way. The most strenuous efforts, including vigorous church building, had to be made to prevent apostasy into rival forms of Christianity, to avert dechristianisation, and to defeat the kind of schism, in the Polish American community, depicted by John Bukowczyk (24).

One of the strongest alignments between an immigrant group and 'its' church—one already cemented in the mother country by oppression—was the alliance between the American Irish and the Catholic Church, a partly political alliance from its inception in Ireland and consolidated as such by the tripartite coalition—or the virtual identification—in New York between the Irish, the Democratic Party and the Church. In a group destined generally speaking to do fairly well out of the American experience, Catholicism was less a way of coping with destitution than a means of getting on, through respectability (Hugh McLeod, 'Catholicsm and the New York Irish, 1880–1910'—22). The very solidarity between the American Church and the Irish may have been a factor, though Bukowczyk does not say so explicitly, in alienating a substantial group of Polish Americans, many of them miners, who found a fervent and egalitarian Christianity in the Polish National Catholic Church (21).

Whereas Polish American anti-clericalism produced a profoundly religious heresy, French peasant anti-clericalism opened the door to irreligion (Magraw—23). The cycle was that clerical political conservatism alienated much of the peasantry—though the regional picture was patchy—into an alliance with the ostensibly radical force of bourgeois liberal republicanism, thus hardening clerical conservatism into the kind of reactionary politics that led to the Italian Church's unmistakeable, if erratic, alliance with Fascism (John Pollard, "A marriage of convenience": The Vatican and the Fascist region.

Fascist regime in Italy'—32).

Yet the pattern of French anti-clericalism and irreligion is by no means uniform and is very much a product of France's Counter-Reformation and Revolutionary histories. In the cultural domain, Catholicism was stronger amongst peasants in those areas where priests stood up (surely more than a 'masquerade'?) in defence of regional culture. All in all, though, French curés were caught in a trap: semi-educated opponents of traditional vernacular culture, they could never persuade a petit-bourgeois intelligentsia that they were anything but superstitious obscurantists. Yet

the ultimate in deception was anti-clericalism itself—a stream of false consciousness with inverted bigotry as the basis for a mésalliance between plebeians and capitalism. The ersalz, insubstantial and illusory quality of anti-clericalism as a radical ideology also comes out in Tom Gallagher's article on the Church and the Estado Noto in Portugal (33), especially in contrast with the positive socialism propagated in Italian villages (Franco Rizzi, 'Socialist propaganda in the Italian countryside'—30).

It is difficult to find in the French and Portuguese cases much of the affinity between socialism and Christianity hypothesised by the editors in their introduction and there was a tendency in Lunacharsky's Russian ideology to see socialism as itself a new, rival ('fifth') religion (Chris Read, 'The God-builders in prerevolutionary Russia'—29). However, it is the English case that actually undermines Christopher Hill's argument that 'God the Great Leveller' abandoned England after the 17th-century, leaving its radicalism secular ('God and the English Revolution'—25). After all, the Chartist preachers Joseph Rayner Stephens, and even more William Hill, a duo whom Eileen Yeo skilfully compares with the liberation theologian Gutierrez (26), brought to their task an Old Testamentarian prophetic awareness of imperatives to justice in this world. Likewise, John Macmurray's sense of Christianity's Jewish roots made him also conscious of Judaeo-Christianity's insistence on temporal salvation—a liberation theology (David Ormrod, 'The Christian Left and the beginnings of Christian-Marxist dialogue, 1935–45'—28).

This is an extensive and catholic collection of essays, including fascinating contributions by Scribner on art and the Reformation and by Obelkevich on music and religion in the 19th century. The contributions are generally about Christianity and its offshoots, and though it would be unreasonable to ask for any additional essays to the thirty-five, the omission of pieces on, for example, Islamic messianism or Jewish fundamentalism makes the banner heading 'Studies in religion . . .' sound just a trifle presumptuous. The editors are to be congratulated for assembling a symposium none of whose individual contributions fails to absorb and/or provoke the reader. Perhaps a little more needs to be done to relate shared themes in individual essays, for example the images, in Sheridan Gilley's study of Patrick Pearse (31) and in John Bukowczyk's article on Polish Catholicism (24), of two Catholic countries as suffering Christs or Marys. Spelling and printing errors, some of them gross and even misleading, unfortunately, abound; the price of the volume, however, is reasonable and should secure it the wide readership it deserves.

MICHAEL MULLETI University of Lancastet Wa

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S. Liebman and E. Don-Yehiya; Civil Religion in Israel; Traditional Judais^{nl} and Political Culture in the Jewish State. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London. University of California Press, 1983, x + 308 pp. \$24.95.

The principal topic of this neatly organized and clearly written book by two political scientists from the Bar-Ilan University, are the forms and transformations of 'civil religion' in Israel, during the period of the pre-state Zionist settlement in Palestine and Israeli statehood. The focus of the authors' theoretical interest is the changing relationship between the symbols of traditional Jewish religion and the political culture during that period. The authors approach the problem in a remarkably systematic

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JLLETI Lancaster

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political s of 'civil stine and changing al culture ystematic way, drawing their theoretical framework (pp. 1–12) mainly from the phenomenological approach to religion in sociology. They define (traditional) religion as 'a system
of symbols which provides ultimate meaning through reference to a transcendent
power' (p. 1). Civil religion also 'projects a meaning system, expressed with symbols',
but its distinguishing mark is that 'at its core stands a corporate entity rather than a
transcendent power', even though it may also refer to the latter (p. 4). Its object is the
'sanctification of society' (p. 5), the provision of a 'sacred legitimation of the social
order'. This definition comes very close to the Durkheimian idea of religion as society
worshipping itself. As the authors well recognize, however, it conspicuously omits God,
who becomes at most a mere name (p. 136–137). This conception of civil religion thus
differs significantly from that of R. Bellah who reintroduced the concept into modern
sociology, and in whose view civil religion expresses the fact that, in American political
theory, 'ultimate sovereignty has been attributed to God' (Beyond Belief, 1970, p. 171).

The authors describe four forms of civil religion in Israel, which stand in a rough historical sequence (but the temporal boundaries between them are blurred): Zionist-socialism and revisionism, which preceded the establishment of the state; statism (Heb.: mamlachtiut), the civil religion which was sponsored by the young state in the years after its establishment, and which contains significant similarities with other state-centred civil religions in the new states of the Third World; finally, the 'new civil religion,' which in the authors' view is dominant in contemporary Israel, and which, in contrast to the earlier forms of the civil religion, incorporates significant elements of traditional Judaism, but deflects the reference of its symbols from the divinity to the nation. The conceptualization and detailed description of this form of the civil religion, and the contrast between it and traditional Jewish religion, is the most important analytical and empirical contribution of the book.

The principal ideas, symbols and ceremonies accompanying each of these forms of the civil religion are described in detail, with special emphasis on their relationship to and strategy of reformulation of the symbols of traditional Judaism. These strategies are analysed in terms of a simple three-fold conceptual scheme: the civil religion can either confront traditional symbols with new, contrary ones, dissolve them or reinterpret them (pp. 19–21). The first two strategies were implemented by the earlier forms of the civil religion. Reinterpretation is the strategy used by the new civil religion. This, as the authors show, brings it closer to traditional Judaism, attracts religious Jews to a much more significant participation in the centre of Israeli society, but also creates new kinds of a strategy and the strategy and the strategy are already to the strategy of th

kinds of problems which are discussed in the concluding chapter.

The authors, though committed to traditional Judaism, are careful to take throughout the book a neutral stance towards the various forms of Israeli civil religion. They permit themselves a somewhat hesitant expression of their feelings towards the new civil religion only in the concluding chapter: they are unhappy with its contents, but recognize that Israel, unlike some contemporary European countries, could not exist without some form of civil religion—so that the new one is better than none.

The importance of this study lies in the first place in its careful analysis of the complex relationships between Zionism and Judaism, state and religion, and the secular and religious camps in Israel. Of particular interest is the authors' demonstration of the continuous decline of universalism and the sustained ascent of particularism in the transition from revolutionary Zionist-socialism to the new civil religion. This was accompanied by a change in the image which Israel desired to project to the world at large: from a 'normal' state, equal to all the others in the family of nations, to a centre of world Jewry. In the latter image, Israel is seen as suffering, at the hands of the contemporary gentile world, from the same hatreds and persecutions by

which Jews had been afflicted, on an individual level, before the establishment of the state. The authors cogently point out that the myth of anti-semitism has thus become the basis on which the new civil religion views the place of Israel in the world. More than anything else, this testifies to the failure of Zionism to 'normalize' the Jewish people. However, the authors, as can be seen from their curious reluctance to give the 'new civil religion' a name, hesitate from drawing the explicit conclusion which their analysis indicates, and which is painful even to reflective adherents of 'classic' Zionism namely, that Israel ceased, to a significant extent, to be a Zionist state, and that the dominant 'civil religion' of the present post-Zionist period is in fact 'neo-traditional nationalistic Judaism'. This closely resembles the 'civic' religion of contemporary Thailand in which the referents of the symbols of traditional Buddhism were also deflected onto the Thai nation (see F. E. Reynolds, 'Civic Religion and National Community in Thailand', J. Asian Stud. 36:2 (1977), pp. 267–282). In the process Israel has lost its Zionist pretensions, but also much of its distinctive attractiveness among the new states of the world.

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This brings us to the major conceptual problem of the book: what is the theoretical status of the concept of 'civil religion' as used by the authors? In their extensive discussion of symbols and ceremonies associated with Zionism and the state of Israel. the authors have amply documented the similarities between religion and political ritual. They have also convincingly demonstrated that, in the latter, the referents of the symbols are deflected from the traditional religious entities, the nation. But does this produce a civil religion? The term was certainly used in the literature in an ever wider and vaguer sense since Bellah revived this originally Rousseauian concept. I would not quibble about this expansion of its use were it not that in the case of Israel-and probably also in many others—its indiscriminate use may cause some serious misunderstandings. For Rousseau, the correct 'civil religion', is the political expression of the social contract, expressing the sentiment of sociability, recognizing a powerful wise and benevolent Divinity who is not the god of any particular religious confession. This crucial idea was taken over by Bellah; it expresses the fundamental universalism of civility as the 'sacred' dimension of the secular (i.e. not theocratic) state. But precisely this universalism has become increasingly diminished in the evolution of Israel's 'civil religion', as the authors convincingly show. Over the years, Israel became increasingly 'uncivil' as a narrow, neo-traditionalistic nationalism was substituted for the earlier, universalistic conceptions prevalent in Zionist-socialism, but not missing completely even in revisionism. Israel's 'civil religion' is the nationalistic religion of the Jews, and hence cannot embrace Israel's Arab citizens, whose 'minority' status is a poignantly political expression of this fact. It is not the common political dimension of all the religions practised in Israel, as in American civil religion. While the authors are very clear about that, the empirical content of their work thus puts into question the appropriateness of their terminology.

My last point relates to the problem of the dynamics of transition from one to the other of the various forms of the civil religion—as described by the authors. While they show that the various forms of the civil religion (except revisionism) enjoyed dominance in a roughly chronological order, the social causes and mechanisms of transition between them remain insufficiently analysed.

Syayism is presented as a 'sponsored-civil religion', intended to further the integration of the mass immigrants. The authors claim that it was never accepted by the population at large, but it is insufficiently clear why this was so. The transition to the 'new civil religion' is related, in a general manner, to the presence of large numbers of newcomers with a 'traditional' outlook. The factors, however, which hindered their 'integration',

in the sense of their adoption of an essentially secular, modern, Western outlook of the earlier versions of political Zionism, remain largely unexplained; and so does the return to Jewish traditionalism among many of the offspring of secularized Western Jews. The very fact that the authors have identified a central trend of cultural and political change among the Jewish population of Israel is a significant and timely contribution to the study of Israeli society, and one which should prove fruitful for the formulation of new problems for investigation in the future.

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John S. Guest, *The Yezidis*, London and New York, KPI, 1987, xv + 284 pp + 50 plates. £25.

The Yezidis never failed to excite curiosity and interest in the minds of those who came to know them. The study of their religion has undergone little change during the last hundred years, and now makes little advance with the appearance of the work under review. The author promises little to enlarge on what has already been written. The most recent work on this subject is an interesting article by Ebied and Young, 'An Account of the History and Rituals of the Yazīdīs of Mosul (Muséon 85 (1972)', pp. 848–522), to which the author refers (p. 262).

The book includes an index, a useful Genealogy of the Chol family, two appendices, and a remarkably detailed bibliography of various useful items, obscure and neglected archives, dissertations, published works in Arabic, Persian, Turkish and other languages, and also government official documents. Such a full bibliography bespeaks the author's extensive knowledge of, and a keen interest in, the history of the Middle East and his personal contact with eminent Yezidi personalities.

There is still much uncertainty about the Yezidis' name and origin. Some scholars have ventured to link them with the Umayyads as the last remnant of the pro-Umayyad sect which combined practical aspiration with gnostic piety, (Carl Brockelmann, History of the Islamic Peoples, London, 1949, p. 106). They claim that their religion antedates Islam; for, when they were urged by the ulema to revert to their ancient fold of Islam, they retorted "For was not Nebuchadnezzar a Yezidee? Rather have you strayed away from us than we from you" (p. 127). The author rightly leans toward the other more rational interpretation, viz, the connection of their name with the Persian yaz(a)d, meaning 'supreme being' (p. 31). Be that as it may, they are considered by the Muslims as a dissenting community, separated from from 'ummat al-muslimin (The Muslim Community), and therefore they found themselves consigned by their nominal rulers to dār al-harb 'the abode of war', as Professor Cunningham opined in his foreword (p. xv). Those who speculate that the Yeridi and the revision of two Yezidi religion is not unlike Sufism support their claim by the existence of two development of the support their claim by the existence of two developments of two de developments in the Yezidis' teachings, namely, the devotion or worshipping of saints and the saints are saints are saints and the saints are sain saints and the formation of orders in all Sufi fraternities. Both are common to the heretics as well as to the true believers.

The two sacred books they have, given in translation form, in Appendix I of this book, are Kitāb al-Jalwa (Book of Revelation) and Meshaf Resh (The Black Book). The former, according to G. R. Driver (BSOAS, 2, 1921–23, p. 511), is kept in the Yezidi village of Ba'idri and the latter at Qasr 'Izz al-Dîn, but he qualifies this by

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remarking that there is some doubt as to their authenticity. Several versions of these books are claimed to have been discovered by scholars; some were in Syriac and some in Arabic. The controversy that followed gained notoriety as in the case of Alphonse Mingana—Père Anastase the Carmelite; both were the victim of their own over enthusiasm. The author leaves us with the suggestion that 'the manuscripts may yet be hidden in the rarely visited Sinjār hills' (p. 153). It would appear that no scholar has ever had access to these documents. The present reviewer thinks back to the time when he spent two years (1939–1941) among the Yezidis as District Medical Officer in 'Ayn Sifnî, and can affirm that neither could he gain such access in spite of his personal dealings with the Yezidi hierarchy and his close contact with members of the Shaikhan Mir family in his professional capacity. 'The Yezidis', says the author, 'are reluctant to discuss religious matters and they tend to mislead a questioner by telling him what they thought he wanted to hear' (p. 29).

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Apart from the secrecy of the whereabouts of their sacred books, the Yezidis also confuse the scholars with regard to the original name of their Malek Tawus 'Peacock Angel'. Driver, in his letter to The Times (5 September 1924) suggests that the name Melek Tawus is a corruption of Tamuz—the Babylonian god of vegetation. The shift m > w is common enough, both letters being labials. It is not improbable that a syncretic religion, which borrowed so much from Islam, Judaism, Christianity and Sabaeism, should have taken over from Babylonian religion the worship of Tamuz whom the Greeks adopted in their pantheon as Adonis, the lord, in fact the title Melek. 'The connection', says J. W. Crowfoot, 'is that the Tawus is not merely a banner, but is itself an object of worship' (Man, I, 1901, p. 146). The Yezidis have been subjected to taunts and ridicules that they worship Satan 'abadat al-shaylān. The legendary Satan is a being wholly distinct from the theological Lucifer. He is never ennobled by the sullen dignity of the Fallen Angels. The Yezidis believe that Lucifer, the Fallen Angel, has been forgiven by God and reinstated as a chief angel.

Although the book is not a complete history of the Yezidis, and it does not pretend to be, it is, nevertheless, a useful work of reference for any student interested in that one particular region of the Ottoman Empire, the south-eastern region; for here we find remnants of old established minorities—precipitations of nations—with their religion, history and peculiarities. The Yezidis constitute but one such minority, which, in spite of small numbers (150,000) has remained faithful to its religious beliefs and practices. Yezidi strength lay in their having lived in such inaccessible parts of northern Iraq, eastern Anatolia and the Caucasus. The Yezidi remained attached to the land. As a member of an agricultural community with very little village craft, he was like the yeoman farmer who, with his family, worked a yardland or so of a strip in the open field, and lived in a primitive cottage. It is evident that Mr Guest has devoted a major portion of his book to the history of the Yezidis and giving animated and interesting details of their early encounters with the outside world, particularly with native Christian villages. He also describes their contact with the British Anglican missionaries and their American Presbyterian rivals.

In passing, the author refers to the Assyrians of the Nestorian Church who suffered cruelly at the hands of their oppressors, the Ottoman Turks. For, it was in the wake of Ibrahim Pasha's (son of Muhammad Ali of Egypt) victories against the Ottoman army that the neighbouring Kurdish tribes turned on the Christian Assyrians. The Kurds were led by Bedr Khan Beg, who was the real incarnation of all brutal and degraded passions. It was in 1843, and after having called a missionary, Dr Grant, for urgent medical treatment, that he and his tribesmen descended, from the neighbouring hills, on the Christians and sacked their villages. Such pillage occurred

whilst the authorities in Constantinople were too far away to listen and their soldiers too idle to lift a finger to stop the massacre. However, a belated punitive expeditionary force, commanded by the Croat General Osman Pasha and aided by a Yezidi contingent, put an end to Bedr Khan and his followers. A few years later, in 1854, the Ottomans were fighting the Russians and turned to the Kurds for help, who then rallied as Muslims to the call of the jihād ready to fight the infidels.

Finally, any opinion regarding archeology in Iraq must take into account the remarkable discoveries made by Layard and Rassam in the Nineveh area, and the author has rightly devoted a special chapter to these two indefatigable characters. For it was at the end of 1852 that Mr Hormuz Rassam was requested by the trustees of the British Museum to return to Mosul, and to place himself under the superintendence of Sir Henry Rawlinson for the purpose of taking charge of the excavations, which had been partially done during the previous year by his brother Mr Christian Rassam. Through their work, Layard and the Rassams came to know the Yezidis very well and were instrumental in ameliorating their condition. Much of their success was due to the remarkable tact and judgment with which they managed their native workmen, and the peculiar influence which they exercised over the government officials. Doubtless, the career of these gentlemen has been extraordinary and without parallel. There are illuminating side-lights on the efforts of various personalities, British and otherwise, who helped the Yezidis to gain a status of a recognised religious identity within the realm of the Ottoman Empire. This was granted despite opposition of the Muslim clergy who urged Abdul Hamid to force the Yezidis to embrace Islam.

The author may be criticised for some superfluous historical references. However, it would be ungrateful to lay the book down without an expression of thanks to Mr Guest for what seems to have been a genuine labour of love, and for the exhausting effort he has made to a subject of deserving interest.

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Milton C. Sernett (ed.), Afro-American Religious History: A Documentary Witness. Durham, North Carolina, Duke University Press, 1985, xxii + 504 pp.

This is a large collection of documents on black religion in the United States from the African background through to 1979. There are fifty-one documents, many of them quite long (although several might be regarded as scholarly pieces, even if dated); their quite long (although several might be regarded as scholarly pieces, even if dated); their quite long (although several might be regarded as scholarly pieces, even if dated); their quite long (although several might be regarded as scholarly pieces, even if dated); their quite long (although several might be regarded as scholarly pieces, even if dated); their quite long (although several might be regarded as scholarly pieces, even if dated); their quite long (although several might be even to this reviewer, but there the documents, and more of the authors, are well known even to this reviewer, but there are many surprises and prizes. I found the section on black churches in the ante-bellum are many surprises and prizes. I found the section on black churches in the ante-bellum are many surprises and prizes. I found the section on black churches in the ante-bellum are many surprises and prizes. I found the section on black churches in the ante-bellum are many surprises and prizes. I found the section on black churches in the ante-bellum are many surprises and prizes. I found the section on black churches in the ante-bellum are many surprises and prizes. I found the section on black churches in the ante-bellum are many surprises and prizes. I found the section on black churches in the ante-bellum are many surprises and prizes. I found the section on black churches in the ante-bellum are many surprises and prizes. I found the section on black churches in the ante-bellum are many surprises and prizes. I found the section on black churches in the area of the authors, are well known even to this reviewer, but there are many surprises and prizes. I found the section on black churches in the prizes. I found the section on black churches in the prizes. I found the secti

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In his introduction, Professor Sernett laments 'the inability of the documents to speak for themselves' and then disclaims his own responsibility as translator, settling for the minimal task of 'semaphore-like. . . signal[ling] attention to important issue and themes'. These issues and themes, six in number, are intelligently if briefly discussed, but with no real effort to identify particular linkages between themes and the documents selected. The reader, however, is urged not to be passive! Of course, reader, should not be passive, and the documents are in fact well chosen and should elicit lively interest; but editors should do more for their readers than Professor Sernett has offered here.

ROBERT M. BLISS
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Religion (1989) 19, 197-210

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The Body in Buddhist and Hindu Tantra: Some Notes*

Geoffrey Samuel

The Buddhist and Hindu Tantras employ a non-dualist conceptualization of body and mind based upon the anatomy of the 'subtle body' with its 'centres' (cakra), 'channels' (nādī) and flows of 'energy' (prāna) and differing greatly from conventional Western modes of thinking about body and mind. The Buddhist Tantras add the central concept of bodhicitta, which is conceived of as both a motivational state and a pattern of energy-distribution within the 'subtle body'. The Tantric terminology forms part of a set of techniques for learning new modes of operating with the human nervous system and thus the body-mind totality. The social and cultural implications of such techniques, and more specifically of the Tantric sexual practices, are examined for both India and Tibet. It is suggested that transformation in 'consciousness' and transformations in 'society' such as those connected with the Tantras should be see as aspects of a single process, neither reducible to the other. The Tantric lineages preserve centuries of experience in the use of alternate states of consciousness and body-mind techniques within complex literate cultures. As Western interest in such processes grows, the Tantras provide an obvious resource, but if we are to learn from them we need also to consider them in relation to their original social and cultural milieu.

INTRODUCTION

The Tantras are a well-known, if not always well-understood, part of Hindu and Buddhist religious practice. It is also well known that modes of conceptualizing the body (more accurately, the body and mind as a totality) are of central importance in the Tantras. In a recent survey of the role of the body in Indian religion, Friedhelm Hardy refers to these 'esoteric' traditions as 'drawing heavily on ideas and practices typical of folk religion, but developing [their] own metaphysics and physiological models. The 'metaphysics' and the 'physiological models', along with their social consequences, are my subject here.

As Hardy pointed out, we can find in the Tantras a continuum of attitudes stretching from an emphasis on the manipulation and control of

*This paper was first presented at 'The Body: A Colloquium on Comparative Spirituality', Lancaster University, 8–11 July 1987.

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dangerous spiritual entities, the 'magical' side of Tantra if you like, to a emphasis on the classical Buddhist and Hindu goals of Enlightenment of Liberation (bodhi, mokṣa). The methods of Tantra can be and are used for either purpose. My own familiarity is primarily with the Buddhist tradition of Tantric practice, the Vajrayana or rDo rje theg pa as the Tibetans cal it, but this paper has a comparative dimension, and I shall be talking about both Buddhist and Hindu Tantra.

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I shall be considering in particular the role in the Vajrayana of bodhicilla an important concept in Mahayana Buddhism generally and in the Tibetan traditions more specifically. The primary meaning of this term is usually given as 'altruisitic motivation', or something of the kind. However bodhicitta is more than what we normally understand by a 'motivation'.

In fact it is important to be aware in all this discussion that the people we are talking about are using terms from an 'indigenous psychology' which does not map at all exactly onto Western philosophical or psychological categories. This is true for Hindu and Buddhist concepts before the Tantric period, and is even more so for the new modes of thinking associated with the Tantras themselves.

Bodhicitta is a kind of citta, in other words it is a state of 'mind' in a very wide sense. One might say that it is a state of the total patterning of cognitive, emotional and motivational aspects of consciousness. It is defined as the state in which one desires to achieve Enlightenment (bodhi), not merely to relieve one's own sufferings in saṃsāra (which would be the classical Hinayana motivation, in the Tibetan perspective), but in order to free all sentient beings in the universe from their sufferings.

For the Tibetans bodhicitta is the defining mark of the Mahayana of 'Greater Vehicle'. It is the specific characteristic of the bodhisattva, and the necessary precondition for the attainment of the full and complete Enlightenment of the Buddha. Bodhicitta already has this central importance in the non-Tantric Indian Mahayana literature. Shantideva's extended praise of bodhicitta and of its transformative properties in the Bodhicaryāvatāra is a well-known example:

As a blind man may obtain a jewel in a heap of dust, so somehow, this Thought of Enlightenment [bodhicitta] has arisen even within me.

This elixir has originated for the destruction of death in the world. It is the imperishable treasure which alleviates the world's poverty.

It is the uttermost medicine, the abatement of the world's disease. It is a tree of rest for the wearied world journeying on the road of being.

When crossing over hard places, it is the universal bridge for all travellers. It is the risen moon of mind (citta), the soothing of the world's hot passion (kléá).

However a further and radical transformation in the concept of bodhicitta becomes evident with the growth of the Vajrayana. Bodhicitta in the Vajrayana is not simply a motivational state, however encompassing, but a quasimaterial substance which can be manipulated through the internal processes of Tantric yoga. The 'arousing' or 'awakening' of bodhicitta, which was already an important component of pre-Tantric Mahayana practice, thus became homologized with the raising and concentrating of this bodhicitta-substance within the practitioner's central 'channel' (situated along the spinal column).

As is well known, the sexual union of male and female is used in the Tantras both as a symbolic representation of the enlightened state and in some cases as a form of yogic practice. This provides a third layer to the meaning of bodhicitta, in which its awakening and the subsequent process of attaining Enlightenment can be treated as equivalent (metaphorically or in

actuality) to the stages of sexual arousal.4

All this is likely to leave Westerners more than a little confused. We are not very used to conceiving of a motivation as an non-material substance that can be moved around within the body. The confusion is worsened when this substance becomes conflated with the very material physiological processes of sexual arousal and orgasm. It is perhaps understandable that many commentators have either focused on the allegedly antinomian and orgiastic aspects of these practices or assumed that the Tantric practices are no more than a pretext for the ancient and popular human activity that they sometimes incorporate. Michael Edwardes, for example, suggests that the famous Indian monastery of Ajanta, dating from around the 2nd to 7th centuries A.D., was 'a sort of leisure-centre for the rich, a country club offering that most attractive of mixes—spirituality and sex'.5 The noted Tibetanist David Snellgrove also insists on the orginstic nature of Indian Tantric Buddhism in his recent survey Indo-Tibetan Buddhism, although he concedes that what the Tibetans later made of these practices 'may in some respects be something different'.6

I shall have more to say on this subject later on. For the present I shall merely note that the similarity between the psychobiology of sexual and mystical experience is quite well established, so that the idea of using sexuality to represent or stimulate mystical insight is entirely plausible. It is anybody's guess who came to Ajanta, or why they came, but the whole complex of ideas around bodhicitta deserves the effort to understand it on its own terms. Here, as elsewhere, there is much to be said for the anthropological principle that behaviour in another culture that appears bizarre at first sight may well make sense within its own context of thought.

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SUBTLE BODY PRACTICES IN THE TANTRIC TRADITIONS

It is interesting that it is only the Buddhists who describe the internal processes of Tantric yoga in terms of bodhicitta. As far as I know there is no real Hindu analogue here. However the processes themselves occur in recognizably similar forms within both Buddhist and Hindu Tantric practice. We do not know, at any rate at present, whether these practices originated in Hindu or Buddhist circles, to the extent that such a distinction makes any sense at all in the relevant period (around 4th–6th centuries A.D.). During these centuries the Buddhists would have been one of a number of 'renouncer movements', to use Hardy's terminology, and the Tantra developed among all of these movements in a way which we are unlikely ever to be able to trace in detail. It is in the nature of esoteric traditions, after all, that their origins tend to be well hidden.

There are, however, intriguing possibilities of influences from the similar internal practices of Taoists in China. Some of the early teachers in the Siddha medical tradition in South India were apparently Chinese, and there are persistent hints of Chinese connections in both Indian and Tibetan literature. The role of prāṇa in the Indian traditions is very similar to that which ch'i had assumed at a slightly earlier date in the Chinese tradition. Prāṇa itself, as Peter Connolly has demonstrated, had been a central concept in the Vedas, but in that context it was not thought of in terms of energy flows within the body to be manipulated in meditation. 10

These practices developed along with the Tantras. They seem first to have appeared as a supplement to the so-called 'deity-yoga' practices. Deity-yoga involves the visualization and evocation of one or another Tantra deity, generally leading to the mediator's self-identification with that deity. Such forms of meditation were a natural enough development from practice found in some of the later Buddhist sutras, and they were the basis delighborated by Buddhist Tantra as it was transmitted to China, Japan and South-East Asia. 11

However, a sub-group of Indian Buddhist Tantras, the so-called Anutatara Yoga or Supreme Yoga Tantras, have two stages, of which the deity-yoga is only the first. The second consist of the internal practices I have already mentioned, in which the currents of $pr\bar{a}na$ comprising the 'subtle body' are manipulated and redirected. The main aim is the concentration of these currents in the central channel or $n\bar{a}d\bar{i}$ which runs up the spinal column through a series of locations, the well-known cakra, literally 'wheels', from each of which subsidiary $n\bar{a}d\bar{i}$ or channels radiate.

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The Anuttara-Yoga Tantras now form a major part, in fact the most important part, of Tibetan Tantric practice, but they never, as far as we know, came to the Far East, and their practice is confined to Tibetans, Mongolians and Newars, along with their modern converts. These are also the Tantras in which the duality of male and female aspects comes to take a central role, and in which sexual intercourse is used in some cases as a technique of meditation.

Both the subtle-body practices, and the sexual techniques, became important in the Hindu Tantric tradition as well. From the 7th–11th centuries the Tantras were handed on by a series of teachers called the Siddhas. Some of the same Siddhas occur in both Buddhist and Hindu Tantric lineages, and there was evidently considerable overlap between the various traditions. The Tibetans acquired the Tantric lineages from India mainly in the 11th and 12th centuries, and have continued to develop them until the present day.

THE CAKRAS AND THE SUBTLE BODY

Now meditations on the *cakra* have become part of the general modern occultist, esoteric, New Age vocabulary. The primary source here is Theosophy, and within most of these contemporary groups the *cakra* (nādī and prāṇa tend to play a rather minor role if they are mentioned at all) are seen as definite physical structures within the body, and are indeed often correlated with specific anatomical structures.

I do not think that we need assume that the use of concepts such as cakra, nādī and prāṇa by the Siddhas or by their subsequent followers in the East implies a similar belief in the physical existence of corresponding structures within the body. The Tibetans at any rate are aware that there are significant discrepancies between the descriptions in different traditions. While the varying descriptions might be, and today occasionally are, explained as appropriate for different meditators, the co-existence of apparently irreconcilable descriptions in and of itself is not seen as a problem. Each description is valid in its own context. Such a view might be expected in a society where the substantiality of the observed world is itself constantly being questioned, but it demonstrates that the physicality of the cakra and nādī is simply not an issue.

I would suggest that if we are to make any real sense of these procedures we are better off moving away from any misplaced concreteness with regard to the cakra and nādī. It is more illuminating to consider these structures, as Alex Comfort suggested some years ago, as a kind of map and guide to the human central nervous system as seen from the inside. ¹⁴ The interesting thing about such a map is that it is dealing with both 'body' and 'mind', and that it is not just a holistic description of the 'body-mind', but a guide to operating simultaneously with both 'body' and 'mind'.

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The connection between body and mind is quite explicit within the Tibetan Buddhist tradition, and at least implicit within the Hindu tradition. The mind rides on the currents of prāṇa; where the mind goes, prāṇa goe. Here the word I translate as 'mind' is once again Sanskrit citta (Tibetan sems), a term that encompasses emotions and motivations as well as cognitive factors. Mind and prāṇa are inseparable, one of the pairs of dualities to be transcended that are so important within Anuttara Yoga Tantra, and which provide its answer to the apparent conflict between wisdom and skill-in means, voidness and compassion. There are systematic descriptions of what happens to prāṇa and mind, and how they interrelate in ordinan circumstances, in sleep, in dreaming, at the time of death, and at the time of attainment of Enlightenment. 16

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THE STRUCTURING OF BODY-MIND

Now, we don't in our ordinary everyday usage see 'mind' as intertwined with 'body' in anything like this way. Nor, I think, for all the cultural differences, do modern Indians or modern Tibetans. Nor, I presume, did Indians at the time when the Tantras originated. To do so is a consciously acquired skill, and it cuts across the common-sense, everyday structuring of experience.

There is an assumption underlying my discussion of these ideas which shall now attempt to spell out explicitly. I do not believe that there are in fact any natural, pre-given, ultimately real distinctions between mind and body, subjective and objective, self and other, consciousness and matter The distinctions we make doubtless depend to some degree on aspects of human biology, such as the available human sensory modalities, but we learn them individually on the basis of the culture within which we grow up. Short of committing ourselves to a particular set of religious or scientific dogmas, we can have no guarantees that they are true. I think this general approach, which you may find vaguely neo-Kantian or perhaps neo Madhyamaka, can be developed into a reasonably consistent account of human knowledge as a social phenomenon, though I shall not attempt this here. 17 What I do want to stress is that it is possible to treat mind and body, psyche and soma if you prefer, not as distinct, if mutually interacting elements, but as a genuine unity which we learn to divide in particular and individual ways. These different ways of dividing up the mind-body unit cannot be separated from the ways in which we deal with our experience generally, the ways in which we individually learn to make sense of our physical and social environment.

If we adopt this kind of perspective it then becomes possible to ask what the consequences may be for the individual—or the social group—of learning to operate with and to divide up the body—mind in particular ways. In fact it is essential to be able to ask such questions, because it is only in

this way that we can treat techniques like those of the Tantras as more than ethnographic curiosities, odd pieces of behaviour with no possibility of being related to our general understanding of the human condition. If we accept that we are in fact talking about techniques for restructuring the self and the emotions, of realigning the relationship between one human being and others, then what the Indian and Tibetan Tantric practitioners are doing becomes something which may have direct consequences for individual and society.

This is actually what the practitioners have been telling us all along. This is not necessarily to say that the consequences of performing the practices are exactly as described in the traditions. That, however, is an issue that can scarcely be addressed until we allow that the techniques may have real effects on those who practise them.

If we now turn to look more closely at the Hindu and Buddhist 'subtle body' practices, I think it is clear that these are concerned with an overcoming and rejection of the regulations and social behaviour of conventional society. The explicit aim is, after all, to become a liberated being; someone beyond the bounds of karmic conditioning, beyond the limits acquired in his or her life so far—in the Hindu or Buddhist conception, in an infinite series of previous lives.

In Hindu society, Tantric practitioners of the kind we are discussing are generally wandering sādhu who have explicitly rejected home, family, and the networks of social obligations of ordinary Hindu life. The Tantric techniques are designed to bring about an inner renunciation or withdrawal parallel to the outer renunciation their practitioners have already made. Tantric practice is, in the Indian context, another variety of tapas, of austerity, through which magical power is achieved, ultimately the power of liberation from all of one's previous karmic conditioning. In redirecting the energy-flows from their habitual patterns, practitioners are above all discutangling the flows of desire, which have until that point kept them locked within their social context.¹⁸

This is true as far as I can tell of Hindu Tantra today, and we can presume that it was equally true of the period in which these practices took shape in the 4th-6th centuries. Certainly, references by Brahmanical writers of the time to the Kapalikas and other wandering Tantric ascetics emphasize the antinomian aspects of these practitioners. They are feared and made fun of, and regarded as both repulsive and dangerous. 19

Agehananda Bharati, that well-known Austrian practitioner of Hindu Tantra, and in more recent years cultural anthropologist of Indian religion, has commented that Tantric practice has no moral implications. If you are selfish, egotistic and exploitative before you undergo Tantric training, you will be the same after you finish, though of course you may now be better

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To the extent that there is a moral dimension to modern Hindu Tantric practice—and with many Hindu Tantric teachers there certainly is such a dimension, despite Bharati's statement—it derives from the Tantric student's submission to his or her guru. The guru, the Tantric teacher, provides the moral orientation to which the student is required to submit. To be a student is to become part of the guru's mission, which may indeed have a genuing social and humanitarian dimension.

BODHICITTA AND THE BUDDHIST TANTRAS

If we can plausibly read this kind of situation back into the early Indiaperiod, and particularly perhaps into the socially and politically chaotic time of the later Siddhas, with the Hindu and Buddhist states of North Indiagradually collapsing under the effects of the Muslim invasions and of the economic disorders consequent on the loss of long-distance trade routes, the Buddhist Tantric insistence on inserting bodhicitta into the centre of the system makes a great deal of sense. Bodhicitta is, after all, an explicitly ethical and social quantity: it is the desire to save living beings from their sufferings.

The role of bodhicitta, and of the related term tathāgatagarbha, had also developed in the preceding centuries in ways which make the new Tantric role of bodhicitta seem a natural development. Tathāgatagarbha is usually translated 'Buddha-nature'. It is a central concept in a group of sutras and shastras originating perhaps around the 3rd or 4th centuries, the most important being the Uttaratantra (also known as the Ratnagotravibhāga), text held to have been revealed by the future Buddha Maitreya to the great Indian Buddhist scholar Asanga. The general idea is that the potentiality for Buddhahood is present in all beings and all phenomena, and that the attainment of Enlightenment is equivalent to the uncovering and revealing of this Buddha-essence within us. ²¹

If the potentiality for Buddhahood is within all of us, then bodhicilla is also obviously there to be awakened. The fullest development of this line of thought perhaps appears in a text which is probably of late Indian original but is known only in Tibetan translation, the Kun byed rgyal po'i mdo of 'Sutra of the All-Creating King'. The 'All-Creating King' is bodhicitta, seed here quite explicitly as the underlying principle of the entire universe.

Then Bodhicitta, the All-Creating King, proclaimed: 'I am the Creator of all phenomena in the past [...]. If I were not pre-existent, phenomena would be have a point from where their existence could start. If I were not pre-existent there would be no King who creates all phenomena. If I were not pre-existent no Buddha would ever be. If I were not pre-existent, no Doctrine would ever be. If I were not pre-existent, no entourage would ever be. '22

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The Kun byed rgyal po'i mdo was to become one of the principal texts of the Tibetan school of rDzogs chen. In all Tibetan schools, however, bodhicitta has become a vital part of practice. This is especially true in Tantric practice. Tibetan Tantric ritual sequences always commence with both the verses of Refuge and the verses for the arousing of bodhicitta. Bodhicitta vows are an essential preliminary to Tantric practice, and meditations to develop bodhicitta are of importance in all Tibetan traditions.

At the same time the presence of *bodhicitta* right at the centre of the most subtle Tantric yogic processes meant that these processes could scarcely be divorced from their Buddhist ethical and moral context and used simply as a source of magical powers, as seems to have happened in India.

In fact things went in quite the opposite direction. I have described elsewhere how lineages of what were in effect hereditary shamanic practitioners adopted the Tantric practices and gradually became converted into the central Buddhist functionaries of a quite new and different system, that of the Tibetan lamas, who were to be at once spiritual leaders and magical practitioners for the Tibetan lay population.²³ One could spell all this out in much greater detail through an analysis of ritual texts and of the biographies and writings of the early lamas, but here I shall simply note that this development took place.

It occurred in a specific social, economic and political context, and it is important to see that the linkages here go both ways. A particular set of ritual procedures may enable a particular social development, but that development has social preconditions as well. The Buddhist Tantras were, after all, present in 12th-century India too, but they were to disappear altogether from the Indian sub-continent, with the exception of a small community in the Nepal valley. What I suggest we need to understand such historical processes is a mode of analysis in which transformations in 'consciousness' and transformations in 'society' are seen as intimately related to each other—in fact, as aspects of a single process, neither aspect being reducible to the other.

THE SEXUAL PRACTICES OF TANTRA: INDIA AND TIBET

I shall illustrate this point briefly by looking at another aspect of the Hindu and Buddhist Tantric practices: the use of sexual techniques. Here we return to the second stage of the complex of ideas around bodhicitta mentioned in the Introduction. The sexual practices, which are found in both Buddhist and Hindu Tantras, employ the supposed homology between the transformations undergone by the subtle body in sexual intercourse and in the achievement of enlightenment.²⁴ In more western terms, one might say that the alternate states of consciousness created through the controlled use of sexuality are used as a way of breaking through conventional views of reality.²⁵

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These practices exploit a well-developed symbolism within which Enlightenment or liberation is represented as the overcoming of complementary aspects of reality. These aspects are visualized as male and female and identified at the level of the human body-mind with the two major channels on either side of the central channel. Thus 'male' and 'female' here are two modalities that are present in all individuals, whether biologically male or female although in this particular context they may be seen as polarized between the two partners.

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The use of sexuality as a spiritual technique in a tradition that has a strong orientation towards renunciation, celibacy and ascetic practices suggests a deliberately antinomian tinge to these practices. This may well have been true in India, both in the early period and in more recent times. It appears to be much less time in Tibet, and it is this difference on which I want to

There are, of course, differences today between the *philosophical basis* of Vajrayana Buddhists of the Tibetan tradition and Hindu Tantrics in India. As Bharati noted, the male–female symbolism in the Buddhist Tantras usually (not always) equates male with the 'active' pole of compassion and skill-in-means, whereas the female corresponds to the 'passive' pole of wisdom (insight, $prajn\bar{a}$) and voidness. In the Hindu Tantras the female (fakta, 'power') is the active polarity. ²⁶

These differences are I think relatively insignificant compared to the vast difference in social context between the two societies. Thus in modern India, as Bharati once more has pointed out, the female partner, despite her nominally active role, is essentially a passive instrument used by the male in his own pursuit of psychic power. Her spiritual development is not really what the practice is about. She is an accessory needed by the male partner for his spiritual practice.²⁷

In Tibet this is not the case. Male and female partners are each involved in their personal spiritual practice, and it is not unusual for women to become respected spiritual teachers in their own right. 28 It is surely no coincidence that Tibetan women generally are far more free, much more open to pursue their own lives and purposes, far less prone to be regarded as mere accessories to their fathers, husbands or sons, than women in contemporary India. 29

An equally striking contrast can be seen in the general social attitude to Tantric practices. In modern India, Tantra has bifurcated into the so-called 'right-hand' and 'left-hand paths' (dakṣiṇāmārga, vāmamārga). The right hand practices are respectable, orthodox, and in fact simply an extension of the standard Indian ritual vocabulary. Fully orthodox Brahmin priests in Kashmir and South India perform right-hand Tantric rituals on a daily basis. The left-hand practices are heterodox, antinomian and unconventional.

The sexual practices fall into this left-hand category, as might be expected in a society as puritanical and sexually restrictive as contemporary India. In general, left-hand practices can be characterized in Indian terms as highly polluting. They are totally incompatible with the life of an orthodox Brahmin priest, though not necessarily with that of a sādhu, who is not bound by the moral restrictions of ordinary life.

Orthodox attitudes to left-hand practices are a complex mixture of fear, disgust and fascination. They are seen as evil, horrifying, and also as potentially very powerful. More westernized Indians are likely to reject them as primitive and/or decadent, and certainly as unworthy to be regarded as a genuine spiritual tradition. It is only in very recent years that the interest of some western scholars in these traditions has begun to provoke a partial reevaluation.

In Tibet, the whole complex of attitudes regarding the Tantric sexual practices is quite different, but then, as Christoph von Fürer-Haimendorf pointed out many years ago, Tibetan attitudes to sexuality are in any case very much more open and relaxed than those of Hindu caste society. Not very many Tibetans do these practices, but there is none of the mixture of violent disapproval accompanied by prurient interest that one finds with Indian attitudes to Hindu left-hand practices. Tibetans do not perform the practices because they are difficult and 'advanced' practices. The control over prāṇa needed to carry them out properly is believed to take many years to acquire. Also, many Tibetan practitioners are monks (Sanskrit bhikṣu) or novices (śramanera) and have taken vows of celibacy, so performing the practices would involve a breach of their vows. On the whole these practices seem to be confined to hereditary lamas or to other non-celibate yogic practitioners. There is no suggestion of the explicitly antinomian and even orgiastic aspect of some modern Indian Tantric circles.

SOME CONCLUSIONS

What I have tried to suggest through these examples is that the kind of body practices—better, body—mind practices—involved in the Buddhist and Hindu Tantras do indeed have consequences for society and individual, through the structuring of self, personality, emotion and motivation involved in their continued practice. However the consequences of these spiritual practices cannot simply be 'read off' without knowing something about the cultural context within which their practitioners operate. The practices do not take place in a vacuum, but among human beings who are already very much part of a specific social milieu, and the influences between practitioner and society go in both directions. In fact, the dichotomy between individual and society, like the dichotomy between mind and body, is ultimately not viable. The practitioner and the social group are part of a single system.

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This, I think, has implications for those who wish to employ these practices in a western context. I believe that the Tantric traditions can be a valuable recource in the transformation which western spirituality is currently undergoing. However it is important to realize that these traditions do not simply provide a set of techniques that can be applied in a mechanical manner. The practices of the Tantras are embedded in a rich and significant cultural context. The elaborate preliminary training and the complex ritual environment of Tibetan Tantric practice, in particular, are not simply arbitrary accretions. These elements are an essential part of how the practices operate, as for that matter is the entire Tibetan social and cultural environment. I think that we need to tread quite carefully if we want to draw upon these practices as resources to use for our own purposes within our own very different social environment.

At the same time there is much in the Tantric lineages that is both fascinating and valuable. The use of direct operations with the body to bypass the conscious mind in order to reshape the human self in its emotional and rational aspects is not confined to the Tantras, but it is here that we have much the fullest elaboration within the world's major religious traditions of such an approach. The only really comparable tradition is that of Taoism, which was possibly historically connected with the Tantras. Within the Jewish, Islamic and Christian religions the general suspicion and rejection of 'mystical' procedures has been such as to keep analogous practices in a much more marginal and fragmented situation.

One can certainly find similar techniques in preliterate societies, outside the so-called 'great religions', within the so-called 'shamanic' traditions. I have argued elsewhere that Buddhism in Tibet functions in many respects as a 'shamanic' system.³¹ However, the Tibetan Tantric tradition, the Vajrayana, has had over a thousand years of evolution in the context of a literate, technologically relatively advanced society, as in a different way has its Hindu equivalent. If we want to know what is involved in operating with bodily techniques, alternate states of consciousness and the like in a complex literate culture, the Tantric lineages of India and Tibet are obvious places to look. The practitioners of these traditions have been engaged in balancing rational knowledge and intuitive insight, intellect and feeling, for many centuries, in the course of their search for a unity beyond the dichotomics. As the West wakes from 'single vision' and 'Newton's sleep', ³² we may find their experiences worth bearing in mind.

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ASPECTS OF THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF DIVINE AND HUMAN BODIES IN HINDUISM

David Smith

This paper shows the wide significance of the body within Hinduism. The divine in Hinduism is pre-eminently viewed in bodily terms and in bodies that vary greatly. Viṣṇu, Śiva, and the Goddess are viewed in detail. By way of conclusion, a striking instance of the corporeal nature of temple images, the wooden images of the Jagannāth temple at Puri, is considered.

The human body is, from the Hindu point of view, merely one of a series of bodies ranging from the lowest life form to high or highest divinity.

It is true that there is a standpoint within Hinduism from which this embodiment is unimportant. That art thou, the upanishadic tradition, as developed by Śańkara declares that the individual self is really no different from the formless, bodiless, neuter absolute, and that all else is ultimately unreal. This view has long been influential; but it would be wrong to take it, as many non-Hindus do, as the essence of Hinduism. The view that the divine is embodied is infinitely more widely held; and in theological terms the usual case is for the two views to be combined in one way or another. Thus in the Bhagavadgītā Kṛṣṇa tells Arjuna that the body is merely clothing for the immortal soul but later reveals his true form, brighter than a thousand suns, with yawning mouths swallowing the worlds. These two views, that the divine is formless, and that it has form, happily co-exist.

It is vital for the non-Hindu to appreciate the strength and the multiplicity of the embodiment of the divine in India. The divine is eminently visible. Images of the gods abound, whether as statues or pictures, not only in the temple, but in the home and in the street. In the cinema the gods' forms move, as they do in dream and in vision; and as they are often reported to in the temple. The gods manifest themselves in possessed people, and incarnate frequently in human avataras, gurus here and now.

The human body, then, is not alone. It is surrounded by crowds of other forms, living refractions of itself. Amid this imagined plethora, however, the human body necessarily remains the true measure. And indeed we find that the cosmos is mapped on the body. The Purusa, hymn in the tenth book of the

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Rgveda tells how Purusa, 'Man', the cosmic giant, the form of the cosmos, was the first sacrifice (that greatest of sacrifices, the human sacrifice). Sacrifice the event that generated the cosmos, and the human form of that victin underlies the pattern of the cosmos. The social order has its foundation in that shape: the brahmins from his mouth, the warriors from his arms, the skilled cultivators from his thighs, serfs from his feet. The human body thus locates itself on maps drawn from its own outline. The shape of the body shapes the world.

Mention must also be made here of a reminiscence of Purusa, the Vasin figure who, his body exactly filling a square space, is considered to be lying face downwards in the earth as the substratum on which all temples are built Again, the layout of temples can be held to mirror the cakras, the subtle interior levels, of a yogi's body. There are other correlations between the body and the temple. The Vāstu Purusa is also seen as lying on his back, with the gatewar over his feet, and the shrine chamber over the centre of his brow; and again as standing up.3

These are more or less esoteric considerations. Turning now briefly to the human body itself, we must note that here the common Western belief in a stable entity, in an impermeable, autonomous person, conflicts with Hindu notions. In the terms of the Chicago anthropologist, Marriott, the Hindu person rather than being an individual, is a dividual (composed of mobile elements), a fluid, loosely bounded entity. 'What goes on between actors are the same connected processes of mixing and separation that go on within actors." The moral order is not separable from the natural order. Action is not separable from actor, codes are not separable from substances. Purity and impurity pass like fluids from one person to another, as does a person's karms from one life to another.

It may well be that this fluidity between human bodies not only corresponds to the fluidity of shifting levels of corporeality discerned by Hinduism through out the cosmos, but also inspired and created it; at the least, a mutual influence seems inevitable. The primacy of fluidity between bodies is seen in another way by the psychologist Kakar, who suggests it produces what amounts 10 3 counter-ideology: 'Hindu stress on the vision of an unchanging human core the ātman—may be . . . a cultural defense against the fundamental anxiety aroused by an image of the body in unflagging transformation'. But, as has already been mentioned, the ātman finds itself amid a continuum of bodies and, ultimately, in most Hindu theologies, is confronted by the splendours of the divine body, as in the eleventh chapter of the Bhagavadgītā.

These preliminary considerations might give rise to alarm at a gulf between Western and Hindu views of the body. But the differences are rather between the somewhat narrow, however varied, and (from the Hindu viewpoint) highly authoritarian views of Christian theologians, and the pan-Hindu synthesis I am attempting here of anthropology, theology, poetry, art and ritual. Of course, a synthetic presentation of the Hindu view of the body is the far more easily made: the subcontinent is relatively homogeneous, and the relevant literatures less in extent.

Let us turn to a consideration of some features of the embodiment of the divine. That the gods have bodies is an important factor in the overall complexity of the body in Hindu culture, but the complexity can be said to be offset by the fixed vividity of divine forms. Despite almost infinite regional variation, the bodies of gods and goddesses are each sharply defined. And the nature of each divine body, not merely the shape, is clearly differentiated. The bodies of Viṣṇu, Śiva, and the Goddess, the three principal deities of Hinduism, will now be examined.

Perhaps the least problematic of bodies is the regal figure of Viṣṇu, particularly congenial to Christian Indologists. Rāmānuja's descriptions of Viṣṇu who is Brahman lord of all is well known:

He attracts eye and thought alike of all by the measureless and boundless beauty that is His. He overflows the entire creation of animate and inanimate beings with the nectar of His comeliness.... He looks upon the host of His devotees with loving eyes, filled with compassion and affection. His sport is to evolve, sustain and dissolve all the worlds.... He is the treasury of all beautiful qualities ⁵

Unlike the monist and quality-less Brahman of Śańkara's Non-dualism, Rāmānuja's Brahman has qualities, that is to say, all good qualities; 'he is the treasury of all beautiful qualities.' How could this visualization of God be improved upon? But there are more specific elements as well, provided by the Upanishads and the Epics:

His long eyes are spotless like the petals of a lotus that sprouting forth from deep water on a soft stalk, blossoms in the rays of the sun. His eyes and His forehead and His nose are beautiful, His coral-like lips smile graciously, and His soft cheeks are beaming. His neck is as delicately shaped as a conch-shell and His bud-like divine ears, beautifully formed, hang down on his stalwart shoulders. His arms are thick, round and long and He is adorned with fingers that are reddened by nails of a most becoming reddish tinge. His body, with its slender waist and broad chest is well-proportioned in all parts, and His shape is of an unutterably divine form. His color is pleasing. His feet are as beautiful as budding lotuses. . . . He is adorned with immeasurable, marvelous, endless and divine ornaments—a spotless diadem, earrings, necklaces, the Kaustubha gem, bracelets, anklets, belt, etc.—and with the Conch, Disc, Club and Sword, the Bow Śārnga, the curl Śrīvatsa and the garland Vanamālā. 6

The difficulty for the Christian of properly appreciating the Hindu view may be illustrated by considering a recent interpretation of this passage by the

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'If we subject Rāmānuja's description to scrutiny', says Lipner 'we shall see that the supernal form, in being deliberately and sensitively made to conform to the Hindu aesthetic ideal of man, tends towards androgyny. In other words it tends to harmonise male and female characteristics. On the one hand it is described as "having muscular, rounded and long arms" etc. . .; on the other it is said to have "large eyes, spotless as the petals of a lotus", to be "lovely browed", "with cheeks radiant and tender" and "delicate as the smile of a flower". Again, though are with conch, disc, club and sword, the celestial form is also adorned with ornaments which include earrings, necklaces, bracelets and anklets'. But it is quite wrong to see here any tendency to androgyny, and Lipner shows a strange blindness to Indian art and culture. In particular, Lipner overlooks the Kṛṣṇa aspect of Viṣṇu, the combination of fineness of skin and high sexual potency Krsna enjoys in his everlasting early adolescence.

Lipner's view is further refuted by pointing to the many similar images of kingly gods which more usually have their consorts seated beside them: the gender differences are perfectly clear. Rāmānuja was the leader of the Śri-Vaisnavas, devotees of Visnu and his divine consort Śrī.

A word or two further on ornamentation will assist understanding beautyin the Indian context. It has to be understood that ornamentation, of things and buildings as well as people, was basic to Indian civilization. In the words of Heinrich Zimmer, 'The Indian view is that only things covered with ornaments are beautiful'.8 The word for ornament, alamkāra, means literally: 'making suitable, equal to, a match for, fitting a thing out in such a way that it answers its purpose, etc.' And alamkāra often denotes magical objects that are 10 strengthen a person or thing-amulets and the like. Auboyer claims that ornaments in India all had a symbolic significance and even a magical function, protecting from evil spirits and the harmful influence of certain planets,9 but of course these considerations are not relevant in the case of the Supreme Lord (though they can be in the case of lesser gods). Viṣṇu is adorned in Rāmānuja's description with earrings and necklaces, bracelets and anklets in the same way as he is adorned with his distinctive emblems, the Conch, Disc and Club. They all contribute to manifest his fitness, his supreme ultimate fitness. They assist him in attracting 'the eye and thought of all'.

Visnu here constitutes perfectly embodied power; his power as such doos not need to be stated. His beauty is his power, manifested in the attracting of 'the eye and thought of all'. It is Viṣṇu's sport ($l\bar{\imath}l\bar{a}$) 'to evolve, sustain and dissolve all the worlds'. His beauty rests immaculate above all activity, but when he does choose the control of the control o when he does choose to play the cosmos undergoes change. His play is power, but being play, power is no longer a serious matter. It is a mere aspect

Visnu's total beauty.

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Obviously Viṣṇu is modelled on the Hindu king. It is the monarch that the Vedānta philosophers take as the model of līlā: when the kingdom is secure, and ruled by the Brahmin ministers, there is nothing the king has to do. He is dressed up, and plays. But note that the human king is in himself virtually divine, and is symbolically married to the earth.

One other aspect of Viṣṇu's beauty remains to be mentioned—his eyes are like lotuses, so too his feet. The fragile lotus signifies purity, a purity superior to the coarseness of ordinary life. It is delicate rather than weak; never to be vulnerable, it separates the divine from the non-divine. (It is also vegetative force, uncoiling and filling empty space on sacred walls; and, in literature, it represents what comes near to divinity—youth and beauty.)

Lipner's difficulty with Visnu's eyes was shared by the Monists, though they took a different line. The question first arises in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*. This Upaniṣad begins with a glorification of the chanting of the Sāmaveda. The Sāman hymn is the sun and the person in the sun is Brahman: 'That golden Person who is seen within the Sun has a golden beard and golden hair. He is exceedingly brilliant, all even to the fingernail tips. His eyes are just like a lotus. . . ' and the word lotus is qualified by a mysterious phrase, *kapyāsa*, which on the face of it refers to a monkey, *kapi*, and posterior, *āsa*. The Monist has no interest in fostering this anthropomorphism, this attribution of qualities to what for him has no qualities, and he is ready to reduce its imagined form to nonsense. The conflict of views is dramatically expressed as an incident in the life of Rāmānuja.

Rāmānuja is, the story goes, massaging with oil the body of his monist teacher Yādava while Yādava expounds the *Chāndogra Upaniṣad*. 'Now', says the Upaniṣad, 'that golden Person who is seen within the Sun has a golden beard and golden hair. He is exceedingly brilliant, all even to the fingernail tips. His eyes are just like a *kapyāsa*'. Yādava, following Śańkara's commentary on the Upaniṣad, declares that Brahman has eyes like a monkey's posterior. The young Rāmānuja was so upset by this interpretation that he shed a tear and the tear rolled down his cheek, dropped and burnt into the thigh of his teacher. Asked to explain himself, the pupil replied, 'I am so grieved that beautiful Vedic lines are so awkwardly construed'.

Yādava angrily demands Rāmānuja's explanation. 'God in the sun is he whose eyes are like the 'lotus which blooms under the balmy beams of the sun' or 'lotus which rests on its stalk below', replies the pupil'. The modern biographer glosses: 'It is to repudiate God to deny Him person; and when the Vedas postulate such a Personality, it is doubly to repudiate Him by reading blasphemous similes into the Vedas, where reverential gravity and grandeur are intended. Such constructions betoken nothing short of heresy'. In the contraction of the co

In the Upanisad we may note that the perfect balance of beauty and power in the sun and its person are gravely disturbed by the intrusion of the monkey.

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Of course, it is not in the Monist's interest for the saguna Brahman, Brahman with qualities, to be presented satisfactorily.

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The presence of an extraneous element in the Upaniṣad passage is followed by the presence of further extraneous details in the biographical incident Rāmānuja is rubbing oil into his teacher's body; this bodily note becomes untoward when Rāmānuja's hot tear scalds his teacher. That the part of the guru affected is the thigh comes close to being a reminiscence of the monkey's anatomical part. Doubtless the fabricator of the incident—it surely is fabricated—consciously or unconsciously mirrored the textual conundrum.

The incident and the textual problem bring out several important aspects, the deep emotional appeal of the bodily nature of the divine, and at the same time the danger of the corporeal descending into absurdity.

Let us now consider Siva. In certain respects Siva is Viṣṇu's opposite. Whereas Viṣṇu wears ornaments, Siva is smeared with ash from the cemeter, and garlanded with skulls; poisonous snakes, not golden bands, are twined about his arms. Whereas Viṣṇu is king, all-powerful, Siva is the Lord of Yogis, the seekers of power, spiritual athletes, as Zaehner Englished yogi. He is the divine exemplar of religious specialists who similarly treat their own bodies. In Siva we have literally naked power: his body clothed only in ashes is frightening and ugly. Although there is in the last analysis no doubt about Siva's power, at first sight his might is often not evident. This is the more common condition of his human prototypes, whose quest for power is mainly achieved in a horrible aspect.

Like Viṣṇu, his body is added to, complemented, by additional factors. In his case they relate more directly to power. Siva's body is goal-directed in a way that Viṣṇu's is not. But both Śiva's ascetic quest for power, and Viṣṇu's regal disposition are signalled by their bodies, and lest their bodies do not sufficiently signal the required meaning, their surface is added to, with ornaments and with ash and filth. Both cases illustrate what has been seen as Hindu bodily narcissism. As Kakar, and many others have noticed, Hindus make a very high emotional investment in the body. 'To a Westerner, the attention that the texts expect a person to devote to his body appears more appropriate to a doting mother's care of her newborn infant than to an adult's relationship with his body. 12 This emotional investment is by ascetics as well as non-ascetics. The Aghori ascetics, who smear their body with ash and bodily emissions, are in some sense not rejecting the body, but adding to it, building upon it. The body is seldom altogether rejected as it has been at time in the West. Kakar remarks that in India 'fascination and revulsion' with regard to dirt 'are neither disguised nor displaced to the extent they are in the West.

Siva, however, is profoundly complex. Smeared with ashes, as often he is but as supreme god, Siva readily acquires beauty: his snakes turn to gold ornaments, all can become benign and radiant. He too can sit in state like

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en he is to gold Viṣṇu, no less himself a king. But perhaps his best-known form, certainly in the West, is that of Naṭarāja, King of Dancers. His dance is twofold: on the one hand, it is the sport of the sovereign who has nothing he has to do, but merely plays. On the other hand, it is strongly analogous to the dance of a shaman, seeking power, becoming god-possessed.

The well-known representations in bronze of dancing Siva often show him dancing on a prostrate figure, who can well represent the human devotee, himself in trance, looking up at his lord's face. Just as Siva in his lotus position is the divine embodiment of one form of religious experience, that of the human yogin, as dancer he embodies another form of religious experience, for he represents not just the dancer of high court art but also the possessed dancer who, in South India, is such an important feature of popular religion.

No less vivid, no less distinctive, but even more varied are the forms of the Goddess. Terrifying Kālī, heroic Durgā, wifely Pārvatī are only three of many versions of the divine feminine, their unity underlined by their ability to transform themselves into each other. Viṣṇu and Śiva (when not building up ascetic power) are the rulers of the world, rejoicing in total lordship, but they are often felt to be too remote from daily life. The Goddess is usually a more immediate force. One constantly hears it said of Goddess temples that they contain power. Power is especially communicable between those who lack lordship. The ugly and wild forms of goddess dispose of great power just because they have needs to be fulfilled: they thirst for blood, or need to be otherwise cooled. In return for what they are seen to want they are seen to have much to give. Regal gods, in need of nothing themselves, dispense only the grace of their gaze—fortunately this is all that their true devotee requires.

The most striking form of the Goddess is Kālī, the Black Lady. Naked, with unbound hair, she wears a girdle of sliced-off arms. Several of her features are borrowed from Siva—the crescent moon on her head, the garland of skulls, the third eye on the forehead. But Kālī outdoes Siva: she is wilder than him, yet more lurid. She wears no ash: her skin needs no additional strengthening beyond its shining blackness. In the words of the Bengal poet Rām Prasād Sen, 'the hue of her skin is a dark that lights the world'.

Like Śiva, Kālī and other forms of the Goddess are closely connected with possession. That the power of possession is embodied by Kālī is clearly shown when she straddles the inert form of Śiva, inverting his relationship with Apasmāra, the dwarf or devotee beneath his feet when he dances. She also, I suggest, stands on Śiva in the sense that she is a transformation of him, that she is built upon him, is modelled upon Śiva who is modelled on the yogin and the dancer.

Turning to Durgā, beautiful warrior who saves the world from the buffalo demon, it is interesting to note that she is formed by the gods: unable themselves to defeat the demon who has gained control of the world, their

anger coalesces to create a mountain of energy that resolves itself into the Goddess. There are human analogues here of a quite different sort from those so far considered. The inadvertent collaborative action of the frustrated godd can be seen to parallel the ritual construction of a deity's body as a prelude to worship of the deity.

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In brief, one prepares a seat, a throne, for the deity. One constructs a 'body' with appropriate mantras. One places this 'body' on the throne, and into this 'body' one invokes the deity. One then gives to the deity the organs and instruments that are always associated with him (or her), and which symbolize his powers, and that one calls his 'limbs'. The divine form is now complete, and visible, at least in the eyes of the imagination. It is then supposed to be rubbed with oil and washed, dressed and further venerated.

In the case of Durgā, the gods themselves have no need for ritual: their desire coupled with their need is sufficient to magically produce the saviour Goddess; but I would suggest that the myth here refers back to established ritual engendering of the divine. What is in common between the creation of Durgā and the human procedures for summoning a deity is this factor of creation, of factitiousness.

When installing an image in a temple, it is necessary to bring down the deity into the image or seat prepared for it, and a variety of procedures are adopted. Often the parts of the image's body are identified with particular deities, and reference is made to the original dividing up of Purusa to form the cosmos, thus making the formation of the image a re-integration of what was formerly divided. The image is finally brought to life by breath being imparted to it by means of a mantra, the mantra itself an aspect of *prāṇa*, of breath. In the case of a physical image, its eyes are opened. They have been sealed with a thick coat of honey and ghee, and this coating is now removed.

Some of the bodily forms of the principal Hindu deities have been discussed, and some aspects of their relationship to the human body have been mentioned. By way of conclusion, a striking instance of the corporeal nature of temple images may be referred to. Permanent temple images frequently need strength ening. At the other extreme are the clay images fashioned for specific festivals and then abandoned: the divinity ritually enters, but makes no formal exil. Perhaps the most remarkable case is that of the wooden images of the Jagannāth temple at Puri, which have to be replaced every 12–19 years in a highly secret ritual. These four images—Jagannātha, Subhadrā, Sudarśana and Bālabhadra—most unusually in a great temple, instances of folk art, art more interesting still in that they contain a secret and mysterious substance'. When the images show signs of decay, the 'life-substance' is taked out and the images are considered to be dead. They are then buried in a pillined with red velvet in the temple compound, alongside their predecessors. When the new icons have been carved and the secret 'life-substance' transferred.

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decessors. ansferred they are still only living skeletons: the wood is only bones, and flesh and blood have to be added. Strips of coloured cloth wound over the images represent blood and blood vessels; a thick paste applied over the cloth represents flesh, and is covered by more cloth as skin. An application of starch to strengthen the cloth is said to be body hair, or perhaps semen. The 'skeleton', the wooden form of the image prior to this process, is never to be the object of public gaze. 14

With these concrete particulars I draw to a close. Manifestations of the divine in Hinduism can clearly be seen to be modelled upon the human body; but the human body for Hinduism is one among many. All this is in many ways problematic, as most graphically instanced by the intrusion of the monkey's posterior, the animal and the barely mentionable; but there can be no doubt that Hindu conceptions of the divine are firmly and deeply rooted in the body.

NOTES

1 See S. Kramrisch, The Hindu Temple, Calcutta 1946, vol.1, pp.73-76.

2 See Brenda E. F. Beck, 'The symbolic merger of body, space and cosmos in Hindu Tamil Nadu', Contributions to Indian Sociology (N.S.), vol.10 No.2 1976, p.240.

3 Cf. S. K. Ramacandra Rao, The Indian Temple: Its Meaning, Bangalore 1979, p. 97f.

4 McKim Marriott, 'Hindu Transactions: Diversity without Dualism' in B. Kapferer (ed.), Transaction and Meaning: Directions in the Anthropology of Exchange and Symbolic Order, Philadelphia 1976, p. 109.

6 Vedārthasamgraha, translated by J. A. B. van Buitenen, Poona 1956, p.290.

7 Op.cit., p. 289.

8 Julius J. Lipner, The Face of Truth, London 1986, p.98.

9 H. Zimmer, The Art of Indian Asia, Princeton 1968, vol.1, p.236. See also, David Smith, Ratnākara's Haravijaya: an Introduction to the Sanskrit Court Epic. New Delhi 1985, p. 213ff.

10 J. Auboyer, La vie quotidienne dans l'Inde, Paris 1961, p. 340.

11 A. Govindacharya, The Life of Rāmānujāchārya, Madras 1906, p. 32.

12 Sudhir Kakar, Shamans, Mystics and Doctors, London 1982, p. 236.

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4 See G. C. Tripathi, 'Navakalevara: The Unique Ceremony of the "birth" and the "death" of the "Lord of the World", in A. Eschmann, H. Kulke and G. C. Tripathi (eds), The Cult of Jagannath and the Regional Tradition of Orissa, New Delhi 1978; and James J. Preston, 'Creation of the Sacred Image: Apotheosis and Destruction in Hinduism', in J. P. Waghorne and N. Cutler (eds), Gods of Flesh and Gods of Stone, Chambersburg 1985.

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OFFERING THE BODY: THE PRACTICE OF GCOD IN TIBETAN BUDDHISM

David Stott

The use of the body as a vehicle for spiritual transformation as exemplified in the Tibetan Buddhist meditation practice known as gCod ('cutting') is discussed. The principal feature of this form of meditation is its stress on the contemplative offering of the body as a technique for generating the compassion and wisdom crucial to the attainment of buddhahood according to Mahāyāna Buddhism. In the first part of this paper a brief definition of the principal features of gCod is given, and then the practice is situated in its historical setting by relating its development as a distinct practice in the eleventh century and briefly surveying its subsequent transmission. This introductory material will be followed by a discussion of the theoretical underpinning of gCod, as located primarily in the confluence of the Prajñāparamitā doctrines and the techniques of the Vajrayāna. The third and final part of the paper focuses on one particular example of a gCod meditation-text, outlining the fundamental structure of the practice, and at the same time endeavours to show how it is designed to provide existential realisation of the various doctrinal affirmations of Mahāyāna Buddhism.

THE TRADITION OF GCOD

As is well known, the Buddhism of Tibet and the surrounding 'Tibetanised' cultural area is a form of Buddhism in which the Vajrayāna or tantric complex of doctrine and practice enjoys a high profile. It would, however, be true to say that Tibetan Buddhism possesses features from each of the so-called 'three vehicles' of Buddhism: Hīnayāna, Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna, which, in historical terms at least, unfolded in the first millenia and half of Buddhism's existence prior to its transmission to Tibet from India. It is also noteworthy that Tibetan religion possesses elements of spiritual practice that may, in certain respects, be described as shamanic.

In Tibetan Buddhism the body has been the focus of a number of ideas stressing variously its problematic and pivotal roles in spirituality. Amongst the numerous techniques of meditation in Tibetan Buddhism, the practice known as gCod ('cutting') is of considerable interest for the unusual manner in which it negates the body and yet simultaneously transforms it into an aid to spiritual realisation. At the heart of the practice of gCod is a series of contemplative enactments or visualisations of the sacrifice of the meditator's

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own physical form to all sentient beings, particularly those of a demonitorial continuous nature. In this fashion it is claimed that attachment to all phenomena, but most crucially the body, source of 'entrapment' in $sams \bar{s}ara$ is severed. Although the technique of gCod is somewhat distinctive it may be argued that it is in essence consistent with the teachings of the 'three vehicles'. Indeed, as we shall have occasion to reiterate below, gCod is particularly noteworthy for its apparent blending of the doctrines of the $Praj \bar{n} \bar{a} p \bar{a} r a m \bar{t} t a - s \bar{u} t r a s$ with meditative techniques that are certainly tantric and may even be termed 'shamanic'. On this last point it is worth noting that Mircea Eliade referred to gCod as 'clearly shamanic in structure'. ¹

Whilst there thus appear to be Indian antecedents for gCod, it is most likely to have received its formulation as a meditation practice in Tibet. The two ker figures in its development and dissemination were the Indian yogin Dam-na Sangs-rgyas (also known as Kamalaśrī; died 1118)² and his Tibetan follower. the remarkable woman saint Ma-gcig Labs-sgron (1055-1149).3 Dam-pa hailed from south India and is reputed to have studied with numerous gurus. most importantly the siddha Sabara-pa. 4 He visited Tibet some five times in all, but tradition associates him most closely with the Din-gri area in the southwest of the country. The two principal recipients of Dam-pa's gCod teachings were sKyo bSod-nams bLa-ma and Ma-gcig. It was, however, the latter's transmission of gCod that was to prove the most influential. The meditation facilities she established at Zangs-ri mKhar-dmar remained a centre for gCod practice until the recent destruction of Tibetan independence. Although Magcig's tradition never became a fully institutionalised sect in the manner of the major schools of Buddhism in Tibet, it did in fact find exponents in each of these schools though perhaps most significantly in the various bKa'-brgyud lineages.

SPIRITUAL SOURCES OF GCOD

As we have mentioned above gCod appears to be a synthesis of $Mah\bar{a}y\bar{a}na$, particularly $Praj\bar{n}\bar{a}p\bar{a}ramit\bar{a}$, theory with $Vajray\bar{a}na$ technique. The connection of gCod with $Praj\bar{n}\bar{a}p\bar{a}ramit\bar{a}$ is quite explicit in Tibetan works. Thus the 15th-century historian 'gos Lotsā-va refers to gCod as 'the $Praj\bar{n}\bar{a}p\bar{a}ramit\bar{a}$ cutting the demons'.

Furthermore it is highly significant that gCod meditators employ a series of precepts from the Prajñāpāramitāratnaguna-samcayagatha as 'slogans' in their practice, viz 'A bodhisattva, who is endowed with power and learning, is unconquerable by the four māras, due to four causes; which are that he rests in emptiness (śūnyatā/stong-pa-nyid), that he does not abandon sentient beings, that he acts according to his word and that he possesses the blessings of the sugatas'.6

As regards the offering of the body in gCod practice, references in Mahāyāna

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series of in their ning, is e rests in t beings, gs of the ahāyāna scriptures to the perfection of giving (dāna pāramitā) would seem to supply the doctrinal inspiration. In the Sagaramati-sūtra Buddha declares: 'The rejection and surrender of the body, the indifference to the body, that for him is the perfection of giving'. Turning to the Sāstra literature we find the notion of offering the body further elaborated by Śāntideva in his enormously influential Bodhisattvacāryavatāra, where he says inter alia,

'Eternally shall I offer All my bodies to the Conquerors and their Sons'.

and

Initially the Guide of the World encourages The giving of such things as food. Later when accustomed to this One may progressively start to give away even one's own flesh At such a time when my mind is developed To the point of regarding my body as food, What hardship would it be When it came to giving away my flesh?8

However, whilst Mahāyāna theory would seem to provide a doctrinal substructure for gCod, as we shall see the methods for producing existential realisation of the doctrine consist of techniques such as visualisation commonly associated with Vajrayāna.

THE STRUCTURE OF GCOD

Having surveyed briefly the historical and theoretical under-pinnings of gCod it seems appropriate to present some gCod material by an examination of the principal section of one particular meditation text, 'The Method of Practising the Essence of the Ocean of gCod in One Session' composed by 'jam-mgon Kong-sprul bLo-gros mTha'-yas.9 Kong-sprul's text, which is divided into preliminary, main and concluding sections, is a mixture of liturgy and meditation-instruction. The meditator chants the liturgy evoking the sequence of visualisations whilst accompanying himself/herself with bell and drum and, at points, a thigh-bone trumpet.

The Preliminaries (sngon-'gro)

The liturgy commences with the normative Mahāyāna ritual acts of taking refuge' in the three jewels and three roots, 10 generating 'the thought of enlightenment', 11 making visualised offerings, and supplicating the guru, here homologised with Ma-gcig Labs-sgron.

The main part (dngos-gzhi)

This section is further divided into three sub-sections, termed here 'the three samādhis'.

- (a) The vajra-like samādhi. In this phase of the practice the meditator achieves the 'blending' of his/her awareness (rig-pa) with ultimate reality (dbyings) by means of visualisation and manipulation of the energies of the 'subtle body'. Thus the meditator transfers his/her consciousness into the visualised form of Ma-gcig, who, in her role as embodiment of Prajāi pāramitā, also 'embodies' emptiness, the nature of ultimate reality. This meditative technique known as 'opening the door of the sky' (nam-mkha'i sgo-byed) is not only so similar to the well-known Vajrayāna practice of transference ('pho-ba)¹² as to suggest in fact an identity between the two but also might be said to bear a striking resemblance to the 'soul journeys' of Siberian shamans. ¹³
- (b) The illusion-like samādhi. In the second phase the meditator effects the offering of his/her body to all sentient beings, firstly in the form of the 'white feast' (dkar-'gyed) and then in the form of the 'red feast' (dmar-'gyed).

(i) White feast

The meditator's body is visualised as a huge and luscious corpse from which emanates a beautiful *yoginī*. This goddess, equipped with a chopper (gri-gug), cuts the body into tiny pieces, which are then boiled in a cooking-pot until transformed into the white-coloured nectar of wisdom (*ye-shus bdud rtsi*). This nectar is then offered by various visualised goddesses to the three jewels and three roots, protecting deities, sentient beings in general and the so-called 'lords of retribution' with the prayer that they may all 'sever resentment and come to be endowed with the thought of enlightenment'. (ii) *Red feast*

Once again a yogini is visualised to issue forth, but this time black in colour and wrathful in mien. She dismembers the meditator and fills the universe with a mountain of flesh, an ocean of blood and a swamp of brain and fat. Then all demonic beings are requested to accept this offering of the meditator's own body, seen here as a source of misery: 'From beginningless time this body, grasped at as mine, has been the basis of suffering'. As a consequence of this offering all debts are ransomed and all beings including the demonic powers, are assured of attaining Buddhahood. The normative Mahāyāna aspiration for universal benefit is explicit in the 'white' and 'red' feasts, yet to 'read' them in this doctrinally orthodox manner is not to deny further possible parallels with shamanic techniques. Thus, as is well known, there are numerous accounts of shamanic initiatory visions consisting of the dismemberment of the body by gods and demons. 15

(iii) The heroic conduct samādhi

The function of this third phase is to provide a means of assessing the

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practitioner's progress in the two preceding samādhis. Thus the meditator is expected to be able to 'cut' all fears of demonic forces that may be encountered during the course of the meditation and to further refine this fearlessness by performing the practice in lonely and awe-inspiring places.

The conclusion

This final section of the practice consists of the recitation of a sequence of brief doctrinal affirmations from various sources such as the Prajñāpāramitā literature. This is followed by the contemplation of the dissolution of all visions evoked during the meditation into the primordial state of emptiness from which the meditator subsequently emerges (or one could say is 'resurrected') in the form of the bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara. Thus gCod meditation, which is concerned with cutting or severing attachment to body, ends with resurrection in a 'divine' body. This sequence of 'death' and 'rebirth', albeit rebirth in the form of a Buddha rather than an unenlightened being, would seem to represent the deep Buddhist structure of gCod practice.

The similarity in terms of the content of visionary experience between gCod and certain aspects of shamanism is, as we have seen, noteworthy. The use made of the body in both affords perhaps the most obvious resemblance. Yet while gCod itself and its employment of the body may to some extent represent the use of shamanic-type trance-material in a Buddhist setting, one cannot gainsay the 'logic' of gCod within normative Mahāyāna Buddhism. Thus one could tentatively describe gCod as visionary experience deconstructed by the emptiness of the Prajñāparamitā (surely the most radical deconstructing agent of all!) and ethicised by the 'thought of enlightenment'.

NOTES

1 Mircea Eliade, Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy, Bollingen Series

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On Sabara-pa see D. J. Stott, The History and Teachings of the Dwags-po bKa'brgyud Tradition, Ph.D. thesis, University of Manchester, 1985, pp. 103-112.

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Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, Dharamsala, 1979, p. 90. jam-mgon Kong-sprul (1811–1899), gCod-yul rGya-mtsho'i sNying-po sTan Thoggeig Tu Nyams-su-len-pa'i Tshul contained in 'jam-mgon Kong-sprul (ed.), The Treasury of Precious Instructions of Tibetan Buddhism, Delhi, 1981, vol. 14, pp. 353–360. I am indebted to Ven. Karma Thinley Rinpoche for his oral instructions on this text.

on this text.

The three jewels (dkon-mchog gSum): Buddha, dharma (chos) and sangha (dge. 'dun). The three roots (rtsa-ba gSum): guru (bla-ma), devatá (yi-dam) and ditini

(mkha'-'gro).

The thought of enlightenment (Skt. Bodhicitta/Tib. byang-chub kyi sems) denotes the ethical impulse to attain Buddhahood for the sake of all beings, which is at the heart of the Mahāyāna.

On the technique and significance of 'transference' see Karma Chags-med, b.D. chen Zhing-du 'Pho-ba'i gDams-pa rGyas-par bsGrigs-pa, Rumtek monastery, Sikkin

India, n.d.

13 See M. Eliade, op. cit., for numerous accounts of this phenomenon.

4 'Lords of retribution' (lan-chags bdag-po) denote demonic forces to whom one is karmically indebted. On the notion of karmic debt and its 'ransoming' see G. Tucci, *The Religions of Tibet*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1980, p. 181

One example from the many cited by Eliade will suffice here for illustrative purposes: 'According to another Yakut account the evil spirits carry the future shaman's soul to the underworld and there shut it up in a house for three years. Here the shaman undergoes his initiation. The spirits cut off his head, which they set aside (for the initiate must watch his dismemberment with his own eyes), and cut him into small pieces, which are distributed to the spirits of the various diseases. Only by undergoing such an ordeal will the future shaman gain the power to cure'. (M. Eliade, op. cit., pp. 36–37.) On this point concerning healing powers it is relevant to note that gCod practitioners appear to have been renowned in Tibet as healers and exorcists.

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THE BODY AND THE BOUNDARIES OF ZOROASTRIAN SPIRITUALITY

A. V. Williams

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In this paper I offer some introductory reflections on the body in the structure of Zoroastrian thought, based upon the evidence of Avestan and Middle Persian sources. In Zoroastrianism the forces of good and evil in the world are regarded as palpable and actual: the good, divine creation is spiritually conceived and *physically* embodied, and, without any sense of 'materialism', the physical elements are held as sacred; evil is, so to speak, the *anti-body*, since it has of itself no physical, only a parasitic, destructive presence in the world. The physical, ethical, social, environmental and spiritual domains of existence are strictly delineated, and a pattern seems to emerge from the texts. Sociological thinking has recently sought to explain such drawing of boundaries with regard to the body and society, and to this the very distinctive evidence of the old Iranian tradition should be added.

In the following discussion it is not possible to give a comprehensive account of Zoroastrian concepts of body, matter and spirituality since that requires a full examination of Zoroastrian anthropology and theology. The present writer is engaged in a longer study of Zoroastrianism with particular attention to its rules of purity; such rules control not merely bodily, but also environmental and cosmological purity. This paper is an overview of the notions of the individual body and the bounded systems of society and world as found in the 9th-century CE Zoroastrian books in Pahlavi. These books are taken as representative of a much more ancient oral tradition which reflects the revelations of the prophet Zarathushtra himself; thus they are not merely scholastic formulations, for they disclose a living religion of vigorous practice and cohesive theology.

Modern students of Zoroastrianism are from the first struck by the power of Zarathushtra's vision of his God, Ahura Mazda, and the created spiritual and material worlds. The student finds a form of religion in which matter and spirit are understood in a way wholly different from, on the one hand, the Indian originating religious philosophies or, on the other hand, the monotheisms of Iran's western neighbours. With its origins in the second millennium BCE, and with its far-reaching influence over other cultures when it was the state religion of Iran's three great imperial dynasties, Zoroastrianism demands of the student as much of a reorientation of epistemology as do the sanskritic, semitic and sino-japonic traditions. For the Zoroastrian, piety has always begun with

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care for the physical world and for the state of ritual purity of the righteony man. According to the Pahlavi texts the cosmos itself proceeded from the body of Ahura Mazda in 'Endless Light'; in some texts the living world then emerges from the macrocosmic body of a primal man, Gayōmard, 'Mortal Life'. The present world in which we experience bodily imperfection and suffering was divinely created in a perfect state but was afflicted by the alient evil forces of Ahriman, 'Hostile Spirit'. Zoroastrians strive to cultivate the physical world (gētīg) in order to strengthen resistance to the forces of evil which prey upon the world; the cultivation of spiritual power through goodness and wisdom is fertilised by regular enactment of elaborate rituals, pious devotional observances and by maintaining states of purity in every aspected life. There will be a time of resurrection of all mankind and, after a divine judgment, each human being will live in the 'Future Body', incorruptible, eternal and blissful. Meanwhile and until that time, Ahriman and his broods of demons are all too eager to attack and destroy Mazda's creation.

It is well known that Zoroastrians were traditionally fastidious in maintaining their comprehensive purity rules. These rules served to protect a strong group identity even amidst cruel oppression by Muslims in Iran. Moreover, in caste-conscious India the Parsi Zoroastrians have kept their social and religious identity by using rules of purity whereby outsiders are firmly, though inoffensively, excluded. Today still, on the streets of Bombay, the passer-by sees the notice outside firetemples: 'Parsis Only. No Admittance To Non-Parsis'. For some modern minds such religious exclusiveness, and indeed any purity rules that do not coincide exactly with 'scientific' notions of hygiene, are regarded as intolerance and extraneous accretion which have little to do with any 'essential Zoroastrianism' they may discover in modern translations of the Iranian prophet's ancient words.⁴

In her well-known study of concepts of pollution and taboo, Purity and Danger, Mary Douglas analysed the abominations of Leviticus, having made only the briefest of references to the purity rules of Zoroastrianism, in her chapter 'Ritual Uncleanness'. She had noticed the tendency writers on this subject had inherited from the 19th-century students of religion James Frazer and W. Robertson-Smith to classify religions as primitive or advanced: the supposed irrationality of laws of uncleanness was seen in the following way, as Douglas paraphrases Robertson-Smith:

'If primitive, then rules of unholiness and rules of uncleanness were indistinguishable; if advanced then rules of uncleanness disappeared from religion. They were relegated to the kitchen and bathroom and to municipal sanitation, nothing to with religion. The less uncleanness was concerned with physical conditions the more it signified a spiritual state of unworthiness so much more decisively could the religion in question be recognised as advanced.'5

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In such terms Zoroastrianism appears to be a conundrum, for it is considered by the west to be one of the so-called 'higher religions', yet, perhaps more than any other, it is 'concerned with physical conditions' (as it defines physical, i.e. gelig). Douglas notices the neo-Kantian Cassirer explaining that for Zoroastrianism 'the ethical meaning has replaced and superseded the magical meaning';6 yet she also observes the Iranist R. C. Zaehner's impatience with the most ancient of the Zoroastrian texts on purity, the Vīdēvdād, 'Law Against the Demons', when he referred to 'its dreary prescriptions concerning ritual purity and its listing of impossible punishments for ludicrous crimes'.7 Douglas's comment, which we would echo, was to query thus:8

'This is certainly how Robertson-Smith would consider such rules, but 70 years later can we be sure that this is all there is to be said about them?"

It is not the historian's task, nor indeed the anthropologist's, to consider what might have been 'if . . .', nor what Zoroastrianism is and means sub specie aetemitatis. What is painstaking practice for the Zoroastrian priest and layman may make dreary reading for the modern outsider; but the alternative is to dismiss the religion as having degenerated long ago to a spiritually benighted condition. The evidence of the texts and a robust tradition of ritual cohering with theology and ethics, combined with the living witness of the present and the recent past militate against our dismissing the religion as unworthy of close investigation. 9 The most basic terms of Zoroastrian religion must be understood as they are defined in the greater context of Iranian thought. Even the concept of something as palpable as the human body is in fact highly elusive to the outsider who has in mind, for example, western or Indian notions of matter and spirit. In Zoroastrianism, from God and his Immortals down to the soul of each person, spirit reaches deep into matter, so that the very purpose and eventual outcome of existence is that the spirit of Mazda is to be realised in perfect bodily form. A passage from an important Pahlavi text on purity rules serves to introduce certain fundamental doctrines and to demonstrate also the indissoluble link between spiritual and physical worlds. In the text Šāyist Nē-šāyist, 'What is allowed and not allowed', it is said that Zarathushtra sat before Ahura Mazda in the spiritual world 'learning His word by heart'. Ahura Mazda is visible with head, hands, feet etc., and clothes as men have', and the prophet asks if he might take hold of God's hand. He is told 'I am intangible spirit'. How, then, may he worship Ahura Mazda and the Immortals when he departs their company and returns to the Physical world? Ahura Mazda's reply is:

^{...} each one of us has given to the material world a foster-mother of his own, whereby he makes effective in the material world, through that body, that proper activity which he performs in the spiritual world'. 10

There are seven principal 'foster-mothers' $(d\bar{a}yag)$, also called 'bodies' (lan) and 'counterparts' $(hang\bar{o}\bar{s}\bar{s}dag)$, as follows, according to the text:

Pahlavi name of divinity
Ohrmazd 'Lord of Wisdom' (Pahl.
form of the name Ahura Mazda)
Wahman 'Good Thinking'
Ardwahišt 'Best Righteousness'
Šahrewar 'Desirable Rule'
Spandarmad 'Holy Piety'
Hordād 'Wholeness'
Amurdad 'Immortality'

Physical (gētīg) counterpart 'Righteous Man'

'Beneficent Cow'
'Fire of Ohrmazd'
'Molten Metal'

'Earth and the Good Woman'

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'Water'
'Plant'

The text continues:

'Whoever teaches care for all these seven (creations) does well and pleases (the Immortals); then his soul will never arrive at kinship with Ahriman and the demons. When he has cared for them (i.e. the creations), then the care of these seven Immortals is for him, and he must teach (this) to all mankind in the material world'. 11

For the righteous Zoroastrian care for these seven physical creations coalesces with the religious duty to please and worship the amahraspands 'Holy Immortals' of the divine presence. Man should not pollute any of these elements, for by doing so the amahraspands would be harmed. In some texts the body of manis said to be an illustration of the material world¹² and in general the human body is the focus of attention with regard to purity/pollution rules. In the encyclopaedic Pahlavi Dēnkard, 'Acts of the Religion', a gloss on the term 'perishable body' (tan ī sazōmand) succinctly expresses Zoroastrian concern for the physical body: 'the perishable body is a worldly state of righteousness.' Evil is seen always to come from outside the boundaries of the 'body', i.e. the bounded system, whether that 'body' is that of the realm of divine light, or that of the spiritual-material cosmos, or the social and individual body of the Zoroastrian. Mythologically, even at the beginning, 14 when the realm of Infinite Light stands apart from the realm of Infinite Darkness, separated by the Void 15 (tuhīgīh, wišādag) Ahriman wished to invade the boundary of the Light. Ohrmazd laid him low and fashioned the creation as a protection against the Lie of Ahriman. First he fashioned 'that Spirit whereby He can make good his own body', which is the 'essence of the gods' when he contemplated the contem contemplated the creation of His creatures. 16 Ohrmazd created the spiritual form of his creatures out of Himself, but knew that Ahriman would rise up from the unconscious and the specific state of the specifi from the unconsciousness rendered by Ohrmazd's chanting of a sacred prayer and would again and would again attempt to destroy the spiritual creation of Ohrmazd. Ahriman awakes and created his own 'essence of the demons'. The spirits of s' (tan)

good and evil were ranged against one another, but then Ohrmazd reproduced his spiritual creation in material form, i.e. the mēnog state was reproduced in the getig state. Henceforth, even the Holy Immortals, amahraspands, have a corresponding material reality in the Sky, Earth, Water, Plant, Beneficent Cow, Righteous Man, and Fire. Ohrmazd knew that Ahriman and his forces would attack the material creation, but knew also that He 'must remove injury from it at (the time of) the Future Body', i.e. at the end of time when the battle against Ahriman has been won. Ahriman did attack the prototype material creation, but Ohrmazd turned the result to good effect by creating the multiplicity of material forms of his good creation. Without describing the whole myth of creation we may note that in the present getig state of mixture of good and evil the cosmic struggle continues on a grand scale for the world and on a small scale for the bodies of individual creatures. For the Zoroastrian the body is one of the outer walls of defence against the enemy. The Denkard puts it in the following way, revealing a heroic mentality which pervades the whole religion:

'Being on one's watch is this, one who makes his body like a fortress, and who places watch over it, keeping the gods inside and not letting the demons enter'. 17

As a passage from the same text shows, 'one's body' (tan ī xwēš) is the gateway to one's moral and spiritual nature:

'... one ... does battle against the non-material demons (druz ī mēnōg) ... in particular does not let these five demons into one's body: Greed, Envy, Lust, Wrath and Shame', 18

The body is 'the shield of the soul': 19 wisdom is the protector of the body, as the texts say: 'the body is held (or 'saved') by wisdom; the soul is saved by the union of both'.20

'The wisdom which is best of all wisdoms is that, viz. one who can hold this body in such a way that no evil comes to it because of the soul, and who can hold the soul in such a manner that no evil comes to it because of the body'.21

Zoroastrian attitudes to the physical body and the material world in general were neither hedonistic and materialistic nor ascetic and puritanical. The body, like the rest of the divine creation, is vulnerable to the attacks of evil for the evil spirit Ahriman is without a body of his own²² and is parasitic upon all life (his very 'existence' is the denial of existence); again the Denkard explains:

'It is possible to put Ahriman out of the world in this manner, namely, every person, for his own part, chases him out of his body, for the dwelling of Ahriman in the world is in the body of men. When he will have no dwelling in the bodies of men, he will be annihilated from the whole world; for as long as there is in this world a dwelling even in a single person for a small demon, Ahriman is in the world'. 23

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The bodies of sorcerers, witches, murderers and whores, for example, are possessed by evil forces so much that these are thought of as being evil persons, but the body of the righteous person is not evil. Zoroastrians were at pains to point out the great distance between the Zoroastrian and Manichaean attitudes to the body: the writer of the third book of the *Dēnkard* explains:

"... against that which the (Zoroastrian) restorer of righteousness Ādurbād taught: to drive the demons from one's body, the demon-inspired Mānī said that the human body is a demon'. 24,25

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For the Manichaean particles of light were trapped in the prison of the flesh for the Zoroastrian it was a religious duty to make the gods an abode in the body:

'make the gods abide in your own body, and if you make them abide in your own body, then you will have made them abide in the whole world'.²⁶

In the Pahlavi books religion is sometimes referred to as the '(right) measure' (paymān) of things. The Dēnkard speaks of three factors in religion: 'union' (hamīh), paymān, and 'separation' (wizihīdagīh), and they are defined:

'this is union: one who is united with the gods and good men in all righteousness in thought, speech and action'; 27

'this is separation: a man who has turned out of his body every demon, and who does not let them back';28

'this is the right measure: one who is a protector of that union and separation. It will never perish'. 29

In many passages the $D\bar{e}nkard$ speaks of man's giving an 'abode' ($mehm\bar{a}n\bar{b}$, $g\bar{a}h$) in the physical body to the gods, and the condition of their abiding is state of purity ($ab\bar{e}zag\bar{i}h$, $p\bar{a}k\bar{i}h$) or health (drustih). High states of ritual purity must be attained by priests performing sacred ceremonies, but these belong to another discussion. Here we may generalise that for the Zoroastrian health and purity are defined as the $D\bar{e}nkard$ puts it:

'Health is this: a man who separates his body and soul from aliens $(an\bar{o}dag)^{an\bar{o}}$ those of different substance $(\bar{j}ud-g\bar{o}hr)$, and who associates with those of the same substance $(ham-g\bar{o}hr)$ as himself'. ³⁰

As we see here, health and purity are not matters of merely private, individual concern. The categories of adversary that attack through the body are eminently those which attack society, as in the third of three types of adversary listed by the *Dēnkard*:³¹

(1) those that attack through the spiritual world—the demons;

(2) those that attack through one's nature—moral evil, e.g. envy;

(3) those that attack through the body—world destroyers, demon worshippers, the wolf-species and species of noxious creatures.

Just as it is said to be necessary for all Zoroastrians to smite spiritually and morally the adversaries of the first two categories, so they must kill physically the adversaries that attack through the body. In the physical world Ahriman has caused there to be a species of noxious creatures (xrafstar) and the wolfspecies. Ohrmazd's creatures can be divided into two main categories insofar as one group may not be eaten by humans, as their dead bodies are considered to be carrion (nasā), and the other group, gōspand, may be killed for food. Thus far, the classification of creatures may be set out as in Figure 1.

Ahuric (i.e. created by Ohrmazd) Nasā — may not be eaten Man Dog Fox, etc. Ahuric (i.e. created by Chrmazd) Carnivorous	Demonic xrafstar — 'noxious creatures' Wolf species: lion wolf panther, etc. Herbivorous and carnivorous
Gospand — may be eaten Cow Sheep Goat, etc. Herbivorous	be a leading to an Herrise in such self.

Figure 1. Classification of creatures.

Gōspand are thus a case set apart. In several celebrated passages in Avestan and Pahlavi literature the gōspand appeal to Ahura Mazda or other divinities to plead for a protector and that they may not be killed and eaten in the physical world. As they are the embodiment of the Immortal Vohu Manah (Wahman) they are granted special conditions whereby they will be sinless in the world. Their bodies will be offered in sacrifice so that their spirits will be free. To complete the classification of beings and their adversaries we add man's spiritual nature, the divine beings and their demonic opposites.

In Figure 2 the four classifications of spiritual and material creatures may be conveniently labelled A (Ahuric), B (Bodily), C (Corrupting) and D (Demonic). Man exists in A and B: the body (tan) and vital soul $(gr\bar{a}n)$ exist in B during life, as does the soul $(ruw\bar{a}n)$. At death, after the separation of the vital soul from the body, the $ruw\bar{a}n$ passes through a judgment and, if it is righteous, enters heaven in A, or if it is wicked enters hell in D. According to a traditional account man has two other parts to his nature, a 'form' $(\bar{e}w\bar{e}nag)$ and a 'spirit' (frawahr), both of which never leave the $m\bar{e}n\bar{o}g$ state in which they were created in A. As the present discussion is concerned with the $g\bar{e}l\bar{t}g$ 'physical' body there

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ndividual body are adversary is no need to consider the various accounts of human spiritual nature in the different texts. The realm of 'unixed evil' is, like that of 'unmixed good', a spiritual state, and the demons are the root of all evil in C and as it invades B. The demons have no access, however, to the Ahuric realm of unmixed good in A.




Figure 2. The four classifications of spiritual and material creatures.

Although the theology of Zoroastrianism divides the universe into these four realms (two separately originated orders of existence, the good and the evil, and two states of existence, the spiritual and the physical) it is necessary to expand the scheme, as in Figure 3 below, to include the dangerous and anomalous area [('exuviae'). In Figure 3 it is shown graphically that contact between A and Dis impossible, and that between B and C there is an area that necessitates the elaborate precautions and purity rules of the religion. Ohrmazd first created His spiritual creation in A; then Ahriman 'miscreated' his broods of demons in D. Ohrmazd created B, knowing that material existence would be the best defenced the spiritual creation, and that in the material world evil could be defeated ultimately (whereas otherwise evil would remain a virtual power for all eternity) Ahriman responded by producing C (which act made his evil power double grievous to the good creation, but just as the good creation became a target of attack in bodily form, so evil creatures could hereafter be destroyed). B and the exist in the 'mixed exist.' exist in the 'mixed state' (gumēzišn) for only a limited period, i.e. as long as the battle between them lasts. E is truly the battle zone, where gains and losses are made. So long as Zoroscopic made. So long as Zoroastrians attend to the lines of defence on this front, the limit the damage which the facts of temporal, organic, physical existence important to the lines of defence on this flow on the bodily realm. Necling a strength of the lines of defence on this flow on the bodily realm. on the bodily realm. Negligence in this area, however, is catastrophic, as material re in the good', a vades B.




Figure 3. Expansion of the scheme to include the dangerous and anomalous area E ('exuviae').

corruption is always followed hard on its heels by the devastating onslaught of demonic forces.

We may posit that the 'body' of sacred texts, the Avesta, exists in A insofar as its continuing holy status, of divine origin, was preserved primarily by oral transmission and was therefore truly not a material entity. Also, and importantly, it was supremely normative over the actual physical and social body of Zoroastrians. It is significant that the principal Zoroastrian icon of the transcendant truth of divine revelation has for thousands of years been the ever-burning sacred fire. This central focus of Zoroastrian worship must be sustained by pure fuel and tended so that it remains 'alive', for, as one scholar has put it:

'... fire is not only a beautiful thing, but with its movement and changes of state seems to be alive, and can readily be apprehended as sentient and aware of the services of its worshippers, whose attention it constantly demands.'33

Just as the painted images of the Pantocrator or Theotokos most fully represent the truth of the incarnation of the divine in Orthodox Christianity, so the 'icons' of fire and sacred words of the Avesta manifest in the visible

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world the living form of the divine Immortals. Unlike painted icons these forms must be repeatedly rekindled, recited and rehearsed in services wherein rules and standards of ritual purity are a sine qua non. The purity rules of the sacred liturgy (yasna) are an intensive form of more general purity rules in Zoroastrian society which are comprehensive and regulate physical, moral social and even economic life.

The Zoroastrian understanding of the individual living body is not comparable to modern scientific or western secular notions of the body as a merch material thing. It is understood strictly in the terms of the purity rules which govern and, indeed, define the Zoroastrian's body. Thus the frontier F. between man's spiritual and physical nature is an open one, regularly crossed in both directions as the purity rules regulate man's communication with the divine world. Within the physical and social body of B, processes of transformation are necessary for life to continue; for example, eating and defecation are necessary for perpetuation of the individual body; sexual behaviour and childbirth are necessary for perpetuation of the social body: all four processes necessitate breaches in the boundaries of the system and are thus hedged around with strict rules. The boundary—or frontier—F2 is crossed when, as2 result of functions listed in B, matter leaves B and enters E, for such matter is instantly prey to the corrupting forces that lurk in C. Nail parings, extracted teeth, cut hair, blood, semen, and waste products of the physical body must be correctly disposed of in order that the pollution that they attract may be minimised. Ritual washing and prayer must be performed in order to re-establish the frontier F2 where it has been breached. Indeed, some pollutions are so potent that the person in contact with them, not just the polluted matter, must be excluded from B (the body of the community), either temporarily (in the case of the menstruating woman) or permanently (in the case of the corpse bearer).34 Moreover, deviance from the norms of Zoroastrian society, of any kind that threatens the boundaries of the community, is treated as tabout homosexuality, adultery, whoredom, sorcery, apostasy, and corruption in social and economic institutions were severely dealt with according to the religious texts.

To complete the binary coding of Figure 3 it can be seen that F_3 and F_4 are mirror images of F_2 and F_1 . It is to be understood that if they were not stopped at F_2 by the religious faithful, the forces of corruption would overpower B, and presumably A also. 'Bodily' matter leaving the system in B is a paradigm for the danger of processes that threaten the body of the community at the collective level. For Zoroastrianism the body is indeed a symbol of Zoroastrian society. Mary Douglas' theory that 'the powers and dangers credited to social structure (are) reproduced in small on the human body' would not necessarily seem reductionist to the 9th-century writers of the Pahlavi books. To affirm that there is a correspondence between society and religious rules and dogmas

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seems to us also an acceptable preliminary stage of analysis, and it is suggested that it is one that orientalists can no longer dismiss as fanciful. Whereas a hundred years ago the Iranist Darmesteter could plausibly explain that 'the origin of all these notions (of purity rules) is in certain physical instincts, in physiological psychology ..., 36 we can no longer be so sure, since we are wary of such medical materialism and reductionism. Douglas suggested that correct method in the analysis of purity rules is 'to argue back from the known dangers of society to the known selection of bodily themes and try to recognise what appositeness is there'.37 The late Prof. Sir Edmund Leach has said of the 'orchestral performance' of ritual sequence:

'... there is no separate audience of listeners. The performers and listeners are the same people. We engage in rituals in order to transmit collective messages to ourselves'.38

If students of Zoroastrianism should now attempt, as does the anthropologist, 'to decipher the coding'39 of the metaphoric/metonymic transformations of religion, they will doubtless tread carefully, knowing something of the difficulties that lie before them.40

NOTES

1 See further Mary Boyce, A History of Zoroastrianism, vol. I, Leiden, E. J. Brill 1975, ch. 12, 'The Laws of Purity'.

Greater Bundahišn, I.35; B. T. Anklesaria, Zand-Ākāsīh, Bombay 1956, p. 10 f.

On this primeval sacrifice see Alan Williams, 'A Strange Account of the World's Origin', Acta Iranica II. X. 25, Papers in Honour of Professor Mary Boyce, pp. 683-697.

See further Alan Williams, 'The Real Zoroastrian Dilemma', in Victor C. Hayes, Identity Issues and World Religions, S. Australia, AASR, 1985, pp. 93-103.

Op. cit., Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1966, p. 11.

An Essay on Man, Oxford 1944, p. 100, cited in Douglas, op. cit., p. 25.

Dawn and Twilight of Zoroastrianism, Weidenfeld and Nicholson 1961, p. 27, cited in Douglas, op. cit., p. 25; cf. James Darmesteter's sympathetic introduction to his translation of the Avestan Vidēvdād in Sacred Books of the East, OUP 1880, repr. Motilal Banarsidas 1969, lxxxiii-cii.

Ibid., loc. cit.

R. C. Zaehner, in op. cit., attributed the Vīdēvdād and its purity laws to the west Iranian Magi; for recent scholarship on religion in Achaemenian Iran see Mary Boyce, A History of Zoroastrianism, vol. 11, Leiden, E. J. Brill 1982.

Sārist Nē-šārist, ch. 15.4; text and translation (with slight modifications) F. M. P.

Kotwal, The Supplementary Texts to the Šāyest Nē-Šāyest, p. 56 f.

Op. cit., ch. 15.6.

Greater Bundahišn, ch. 28.2 ff, B. T. Anklesaria, op. cit., 243 ff.; cf. Denkard III.263, transl. by J. De Menasce, Le troisième livre du Denkart, Bibliothèque des oeuvres classiques Persanes, Paris 1973, 263 f., e.g. mardom pad *hangardigih i gehan ewenag, man is like a miniature of the world', Denkard, D. H. Madan (ed.), The Complete Text of the Pahlavi Dinkard (DkM.), 279.9-10.

- 13 DkM. 807.12., transl. by E. W. West, Sacred Books of the East, XXXVII 207-208.
- Greater Bundahišn, ch. I, B. T. Anklessaria, op. cit., 5 ff.; The Selections of 14 Zādspram I, transl. by R. C. Zaehner, Zurvan a Zoroastrian Dilemma, 341 ff.

Greater Bundahišn, I.5; Selections of Zadspram I.1. 15

Greater Bundahišn, I.35, B. T. Anklesaria, op. cit., p. 11. 16

- DkM. 583.5-7, transl. by S. Shaked, Wisdom of the Sasanian Sages Denkard Book 17 Six (WSS), Persian Heritage Series 34, Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press 1976 p. 203, § E 34a.
- 18 DkM. 477.18, WSS 11, § 23.
- DkM. 478.14, WSS 13, § 26. 19
- 20 DkM. 474.20-21, WSS 7, § 6.
- 21 DkM. 478.8-10, WSS 13 § 25.
- Dādestān ī Denīg 18.2, transl. by E. W. West, Sacred Books of the East, XVIII, d. 22 19.2. Ahriman is there said to possess no stī 'material existence'; Ohrmazd is said to be 'a spirit among spirits' and his form (kirb), is not completely visible except through wisdom. As in the text referred to in note 10 above, the Dadestan i Ding states that the hand of God is grasped only in the righteous action of religion. The body of the divine and the disembodied state of the demons are problematic both for the theologian and for the popular imagination since it is observable that Ohrmazd's body does not interfere in the affairs of this world, whereas the evil of the demons seems all too physical. In Denkard III it is said that humans who practise sorcery (i.e. who are possessed by Ahriman's demons), are all the more dangerous when they display their naked bodies:

'The sorcerer by his naked body exposed to sight has a much greater power of destroying than one who is in some way clothed. [As for] the naked man, all the nakedness of his body is ugliness and obscenity. Man's ugliness and obscenity give strength to the demons and devils; from that strength the

enemies of man become more successful' DkM. 331.21-332.4.

23 DkM. 530.20-531.3, WSS 103 § 264.

DkM. 218.6-8, see also De Menasce, op. cit., p. 210. 24

25 The most powerful demon of pollution is Nasuš; the driving out of such demonsis done by self-purification. Even so philosophical a text as Denkard VI is unequivocal on this subject, e.g.: 'to drive Nasus from one's body is this: to wash one's hands and face [with gomez and water] before sunrise' (DkM. 544.17-18). Gomes mentioned here in one ms., is the urine of the consecrated bull which is traditionally used as a primary liquid cleansing agent. Gomez is used as a barrier between the state of uncleanness and the pure element water: water may be used as a purifier only after the polluted area has already been cleaned with gomez.

DkM. 216.15–17; see also De Menasce, op. cit., p. 209. It is true that Pahlavi and Jan can mean 'one's self. 26 tan can mean 'one's self', i.e. one's personhood rather than just one's anatomical body: in Deplard VI. here. body; in Dēnkard VI, however, the physical body seems always to underlie the term xwēš tan, as in xwēš tan ud wastarag pākīzagīhā ēd dārēd 'let him keep his own

body and clothes in cleanliness' DkM. 499,22-23, WSS 51 § 125.

27 DkM. 480.21-22, WSS 17 § 43.

DkM. 545.18-19, WSS 129 § 320. 28

DkM. 481.1-2, WSS 17 § 43. 29

DkM. 497.13-15, WSS 47 § 113. This aphorism translates into ethical maximal fundamental axiom of Zaposatria. 30 fundamental axiom of Zoroastrian thought; the same principle is found in quasiphilosophical form in the following definitions in Denkard III:

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maxim ^a in quasi 'The definition of goodness is that which of itself develops while hindrance of its development comes from outside itself; just as life is in itself desirable and worthy of praise, and that which is undesirable and unworthy of praise comes from outside itself, such as illness, disease, old age, sin and wickedness' (*DkM*. 222.7–11, de Menasce *op. cit.*, 213 f.).

31 De Menasce, op. cit., ch. 48, p. 58 f. = DkM. 39.20-21.

See especially Yasna 29.1 ff. on Zarathushtra's Gāthās; Greater Bundahišn IV a2, B. T. Anklesaria, op. cit., 53, and The Pahlavi Rivāyat Accompanying the Dādestān ī Dēnīg, ed. and transl. by A. V. Williams (forthcoming), ch. 14.

M. Boyce, A Persian Stronghold of Zoroastrianism, Oxford, Clarendon Press 1977,

p. 69.

On nasā-kaša 'corpse carrier' and nasā sālār 'master of the corpse', see Mary Boyce, A History of Zoroastrianism, vol. I, pp. 304–306.

35 M. Douglas, op. cit., p. 115.

36 In the introduction to his translation of the Vendīdād (Vīdēvdād), Sacred Books of the East, IV, xcii.

27 M. Douglas, op. cit., p. 121.

38 Edmund Leach, Culture and Communication, Cambridge University Press 1976, p. 69.

39 Leach, op. cit., p. 39.

40 In the present paper, which was presented as a short communication at the conference 'The Body: A Colloquium on Comparative Spirituality', University of Lancaster July 8–11 1987, time did not allow for background historical material and fuller sociological analysis to be included.

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Religion (1989) 19, 241-253

BODILY AWARENESS IN THE WING CHUN SYSTEM

s. McFarlane

This paper was given in conjunction with a demonstration of Wing Chun Kung Fu at the conference, 'The Body and Comparative Spirituality', University of Lancaster, 1987. The paper examines the psycho-physical implications of a traditional Chinese martial art. It focuses on how the art and its training methods entail a non-dualistic understanding of body and mind, and emphasises the importance of bodily felt awareness. The roles of Taoism and Buddhism in association with traditional Chinese martial arts are considered as they contributed to this developing non-dualistic understanding. The paper briefly examines the notions of bodily awareness in the work of M. Merleau-Ponty and D. M. Levin and concludes with a brief consideration of the possible educational, ethical and social implications of the practice of traditional martial arts.

Wing Chun^a *is a southern Chinese 'soft' and 'hard' fighting system, traditionally said to have been developed in the 18th century by Ng Mui,^b a Shao Lin^c trained nun who taught the system to a girl named Yim Wing Chun.¹ Wing Chun used her skills in a fight against a local warlord to put an end to his unwelcome attentions, and she completely defeated him.

Wing Chun as a system is characterised by its simplicity, directness and subtle use of economy of motion and effort. It avoids the use of sheer muscular strength. And to counter strong, forceful attacks it uses subtle body shifting through footwork, along with deflecting and intercepting moves. Nearly all Wing Chun techniques involve the generation and focusing of power at the specific point and at the instant it is required, and then reverting immediately to a relaxed 'soft' state.

Wing Chun is particularly noted for its cultivation of reflex sensitivity through the practice of Chi Sau^d (sticking hands).² A high degree of sensitivity, concentration and awareness is important in Wing Chun because it is primarily a close-quarter short-range system, in which contact with an opponent is actually turned to one's own advantage by feeling directly his intentions and moves. At normal, realistic, i.e. close, fighting range, the possibility of seeing an opponent's attacks and moves are quite limited. And the faster and more skilled an opponent, the less value sight-based anticipation has. Hence the need for skills based on contact and sensitivity to 'feel' and anticipate attacks and counter attacks. What the Wing Chun trainee is developing in the Chi Sau

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^{*}See Appendix for Chinese names a-p.

exercise is non-discursive bodily awareness and sensitivity.

Five key essentials can be identified in the development of reflex sensitivity in Chi Sau and Wing Chun techniques.

(1) A relaxed state, free of tension, physically and mentally; even when the pressure of an attack and fear of injury would normally cause stress, and the instinctive reaction is to tense up and to resist by using muscular strength. The overcoming of fear, anger and aggression is an indispensible part of Wing Chun training.

(2) An attentive and concentrated state in which the exact position and condition of the body, especially the limbs, is known or rather felt by the Wing Chun practitioner, while at the same time attending to the moves of

one's partner or opponent.

(3) A controlled state, in which the movements and positions of the limbs and muscles is achieved effortlessly and instantaneously within very narrow margins of error. This control is achieved largely by the training in precise positioning and movement through the constant repetition of forms.³

(4) A flexible and fluid state in which the practitioner can move freely from one reaction and technique to another without relying on consciously remembered learnt responses. In a real physical attack or even sparring one cannot fight according to a pre-arranged plan, or with the predetermined intention of using certain moves or techniques. One's opponent's or partner's moves and attacks are unpredictable and one has to respond instantly and usually automatically to any form of attack.

One also needs the flexibility to let go of tension in the limbs as soon as they have been used in striking or deflecting, as well as the ability to let go of fixed attention to one's opponent's or one's own moves and techniques. Focusing too much on any one attack, punch or kick, will lead one 10 overcompensate in a defensive counter and expose oneself to another attack. The first kick or punch might have been a feint or distraction as traditional Kung Fue systems use many of these.

(5) Efficiency and economy of motion and effort, to which I shall return in

more detail.

All these essentials are so interrelated that it is impossible realistically to deal

with them as separate categories.

A great deal of training in Chi Sau and Wing Chun techniques is about the efficient use of energy. Conserving it, and using it only where and when it is needed. To keep the limbs in a tense state, and to use muscular strength constantly in executing blocks, punches and kicks will quickly exhaust even the fittest athlete. In combat against opponents trained in systems such as Wing Chun Ailide Trained in systems such as wheel Wing Chun, Aikidō, T'ai Chi Ch'uan or Ju Jitsu any rigidity, tension or sheef muscular strength will be exploited and used against one. A hand or arm that is tensed to strike or block or deflect, and then held too long in that tense state can be grabbed, pulled or even broken by an opponent skilled in the soft, internal arts or in Wing Chun. So as soon as tension is employed it must be released again. Wing Chun uses the minimum amount of force and the minimum degree of movement to do the job. Master Yip Chun said recently at a seminar I attended that in Wing Chun the less you do, the more effective you become.

To anyone who has read the Tao Te Ching^f many of these ideas will be familiar as general principles; here of course they are being applied specifically to the arts of combat. For example the conservation of energy and use of minimal effort are described in chapters 10 and 55, doing less to achieve more is described in chapter 22, and the specific combat effectiveness of using minimal force and turning the violence of others against them are described in the strategic chapters 68 and 69.

Can you keep the disturbed gross essence together and embrace the one without wavering. Can you when concentrating the ch'i make it soft like that of a baby. Can you clean and polish your insight until it is unstained.

Can you love the people and govern the country without deliberate action.

In opening and shutting the heavenly gates can you take the female role. Can your insight penetrate the four corners of the land without prying.

Give them life and nurture them.

Give them life but do not lay claim to them.

Lead them but do not dominate them.

Be chief among them but do not dictate them.

This is called the mysterious power (ch. 10).

One who possesses great power is like a baby.

Poisonous insects do not sting him.

Wild beasts do not attack him.

Birds of prey will not swoop on him.

His bones are soft, his sinews weak; but his grip is strong.

He has not yet known sexual union but is complete, and is full of vital force.

He can scream all day without getting hoarse, because he is in perfect harmony.

Knowing harmony is called the constant, Knowing the constant is called enlightenment.

Forcefully pursuing life is called ill-omened. Forcing ch'i is called violence.

Beings that are forcefully vigorous simply age.

This is called going against the tao.

To go against the tao is to be destroyed (ch. 55).

'Yield and you will become whole', Bend and you will become straight, Be hollow and you will become full, Be worn and you will become new, Have little and you will get more,

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Have much and you will be perplexed.
Therefore the sage embraces the one,
And is an example to all under Heaven.
He does not show himself, and so is clearly apparent.
He does not define himself, and so is distinct.
He does not boast, and so has merit.
He is not proud of his attainments, and so they endure.
It is because he does not contend that no one under heaven can contend with him.
Hence the ancient saying, 'Yield and you will Become whole', is not empty words,
True wholeness is achieved by returning (ch. 22).

A good warrior is not violent.
A good fighter is not angry.
A good winner is not competitive.
A good employer of men is humble before them.
This is called the virtue of non-contention,
Or employing the strength of others.
This is called conforming with the ultimate, heaven (ch. 68).

The strategists say,
'I do not take the offensive but the defensive.
I do not advance an inch but retreat a foot'.
This is called marching without marching,
Rolling up one's sleeve when there is no arm,
Attacking without an army,
Engaging without weapons.
There is no greater mistake than to take a military Engagement lightly.
To do so almost destroys my treasure.
So when two armies oppose each other,
The one with sympathy wins. (Own trans., ch. 69).4

In the other great Taoist classic, the Chuang Tzu, such notions are developed and used to demonstrate in more practical detail the Way of mastering life. Frequently in the Chuang Tzu, mundane arts and occupations such as wood carving, cooking, archery or animal training are described as being perfected to such a level of non-discursive, non-volitional skill, that they become vehicles for transformation, mastering life, or following the Way (Tao). Chapters 3 and 19 contain many examples of these skills. The story of the fighting cocks (ch. 19) is particularly relevant to the martial arts.

Chi Hsing Tzu was training a fighting cock for King Hsuan. After ten days the King asked if it was ready. 'Not yet, he is vain and fiery'. Ten days later he asked again. 'Not yet, he starts at shadows and echoes'. Ten days later he asked again. 'Not yet, he glowers fiercely and swells with rage'. Ten days later he asked again.

'Near enough. If another cock crows there is no change in him. From a distance he looks as if he is made of wood.

His power is complete. Other cocks would turn and run rather than face him'. (Own trans.)⁵

It is of course Ch'an (Zen)ⁱ, Buddhism that historically is most closely identified with the Kung Fu systems, including Wing Chun. As we shall see the Ch'an understanding of the body and of the nature of effective action is clearly apparent in the theory and practice of Wing Chun. This in no way denies or invalidates the importance of Taoism. The theoretical and practical similarities between the above Taoist classics and Ch'an are very clear. The extensive interactions between Buddhism and the various forms of Taoism are well documented in Chinese history and in the Buddhist and Taoist Canons.

Returning to some of the practical and psycho-physical implications of Wing Chun, the system does not use hard exaggerated blocks in defending, but rather uses deflecting moves which disperse the energy of an attack rather than trying to stop its force with a great opposing force. The deflecting move in Wing Chun, in combination with the footwork, will often seem to go with the momentum of the strike and then subtly redirect it, exploiting the attacker's energy in the process. Such moves tend to be less obvious and more efficient than heavy blocks, but they have to be precise as there is a very narrow margin for error. The difference between successfully deflecting a punch and being hit is a very fine one in close-quarter combat. Hence the emphasis on precise positioning, balance and footwork, as well as the precise degree of tension to use. This precison and control is achieved through the repetition of the Wing Chun forms, so that eventually the correct positioning and conditioning of the limbs under pressure becomes automatic.

As I said earlier, Wing Chun is usually employed at such short range that one is in contact with the opponent. Despite this proximity, one has to remain mentally and physically relaxed. Fear and stress will quickly result in bodily tension and hence the loss of control and sensitivity; such emotional states must be overcome. Training in Chi Sau facilitates a state of relaxed, controlled, focused sensitivity. In that state, in the fraction of a second that it takes an opponent to initiate an attack, the Wing Chun practitioner is feeling the opponent's energy, tension and intended movements through his points of contact, and is so able to react before the attack gets through. Some observers. on seeing reflex sensitivity demonstrated at an advanced level by highly trained Wing Chun practitioners, have interpreted such skills as 'reading the opponent's mind'. This is particularly impressive when one partner is blindfolded. folded and is still effectively countering his sighted partner's attack. The anticipation and reflexes and ability to counter all atacks are such that he seems to possess 'telepathic powers'. But such skill is not a case of reading the mind - it is much more a case of reading the body, through control sensitivity

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and reflex training. And at this advanced level, the Wing Chun practitioner is reacting to his opponent's moves and stealing his energy and power and using it against him.

On this notion of anticipation as a psycho-physical accomplishment, closely associated with *concentration*, I came across the following passage in Sōtō Zen

Master Dōgen's Shōbōgenzōk, written in the 13th century.

'Samādhi (absorptive concentration) is similar to anticipating things before they occur; that is intuition. Use you own senses, not others', completely control your own veins. Then we will be like the water Buffalo on Mt. Issan.⁶

The kind of 'bodily awareness' involved in Wing Chun training is not so much an awareness of the body, an expression which suggests that 'mind' and 'body' are separate 'entities', which somehow have to be co-ordinated and harmonised in order to function effectively. Wing Chun training involves much more a state of awareness with the body, the expression of which assumes that physicality and mentality are functionally integrated processes; and that any separation of them is arbitrary on an abstract or theoretical level, and unworkable on a practical and experiential level. On this question of the dualism implicit in 'awareness of the body', as opposed to the holism implicit in 'awareness with the body', another passage from the same chapter of Dōgen's Shōbōgenzō is relevant.

'Mindfulness of the body (kan shin)¹ is the body's mindfulness (shin kan)^m butno others'. While the body's mindfulness is realized the mind's mindfulness cannot grasp anything, and though groping for it, cannot be realized.'⁷

I would argue that in Wing Chun, clarity, concentration, awareness and fluidity are skills acquired more through the embodied direct felt awareness of physical discipline and technique, than through supposedly mental, interior meditational disciplines. And it is significant that this sophisticated martial arts system *practically* applies an understanding of the functional interdependence of mental and physical processes, which is expressed experientially and theoretically in Ch'an/Zen, and is articulated very clearly in the teachings of Dōgen and the practices of the Sōtō tradition. As space is limited I shall quote just three more passages from Dōgen's *Shōbōgenzō* which clearly reflect his non-dualism and his emphasis on the role of direct embodied felt experience in Buddhist practice.

'Through the body and mind we comprehend the sound and form of things, they work together as one. However, it is not like the reflection of a shadow in a mirror, or the moon reflected on the water. If you look only at one side the other side is dark.'

'Buddhism teaches that body and mind are one, substance (ji/shih)" and form (n)

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li) are not two different things. Be certain that this was taught both in India and China. Furthermore, in Buddhism both imperishability or perishability are not to be separated as body and mind, or substance and form. Where does the body perish and the mind abide? In Buddhism there is no Nirvāṇa apart from the cycle of life and death. Moreover, if you mistakenly think that mind is eternal and consider it to be true Buddhist Wisdom that is beyond life and death, you should recognize that the very mind you are using is bound to the cycle of life and death; this is very futile. 9

'Shakyamuni Buddha once instructed a large assembly of monks saying, ''If you sit in the lotus position, you realize samādhi in body and mind (shin jin)'. P... we can actualize the king of all samādhis through the full lotus posture in this very body, in our skin, flesh, bones and marrow.' ¹⁰

In modern western thought the phenomenological movement has contributed to the rejection of naive mind-body dualism and has recovered a sense of the significance of human embodiment and the importance of direct bodily experience, which had been so long neglected in the European intellectual and philosophical traditions. A systematic comparison between modern phenomenology and the theoretical implications of Zen and Wing Chun practice is beyond the scope of this account, but I would draw attention to a passage in M. Merleau-Ponty's *Phenomenology of Perception* which suggests the direction which such a comparison might take.

'To understand is to experience the harmony between what we aim at and what is given, between the intention and the performance—and the body is our anchorage in a world. When I put my hand to my knee, I experience at every stage of the movement the fulfilment of an intention which was not directed at my knee as an idea or even as an object, but as a present and real part of my living body, that is, finally as a stage in my perpetual movement towards a world. When the typist performs the necessary movements on the typewriter, these movements are governed by an intention, but the intention does not posit the keys as objective locations. It is literally true that the subject who learns to type incorporates the key-bank space into his bodily space. 11

Merleau-Ponty proceeds to grapple at some length with the example of a trained organist who has to play an unfamiliar instrument with little time for preparation. There is some similarity here with the problems and demands facing a Wing Chun practitioner when she/he is applying movements, techniques and sensitivity learned in forms training to real combat or sparring. Merleau-Ponty rightly points out that the organist is not acquiring a new set of conditioned reflexes which he then applies to the unfamiliar instrument, nor is he memorising the new positions of stops and pedals and applying this new information in his/her performance. Unfortunately Merleau-Ponty's analysis of what the musician is doing is not as adequate as his diagnosis of the problem. Clearly the Wing Chun practitioner and the musician are not consciously and mechanically executing memorised movements, because the tempo of musical

performance or combat/sparring does not allow time to do so. But they are combining reflex movements or responses learned through drilling and repetition so as to be automatic, to unfamiliar and changing positions and demands. The key to success in both cases is flexibility and attention.

More generally, there are a number of interesting discussions of Dōgen in the light of modern phenomenological analysis. ¹² Although this kind of comparative analysis is still in its experimental stages, many of the emerging ideas and perspectives are compelling and suggestive. The wide ranging work of Levin draws on phenomenological analysis, psychology and psychotherapeutic methods, and also reflects an awareness of Buddhist, Kabbalistic and Christian sources. He attempts an integrated understanding of the nature of embodiment and the value of bodily felt awareness. ¹³ Again there is insufficient space here to adequately discuss the important themes and questions raised by Levin. A valuable part of his work is the attempt to apply his theoretical understanding of the nature of embodiment to practical policies and procedures for moral education to achieve personal and social change (chapters 3 and 4). He discusses Merleau-Ponty's account of the possible correlations between psychological and postural rigidity, and goes on to ask,

'If, now, we extend our conceptualization of the perceptual correlation, so that, in keeping with the specific focal concern of this chapter, we contemplate the nature of the correlation between psychological rigidity and the 'standpoint' of postural rigidity, which expresses and concerns the body as a whole, the question which must suggest itself, sooner or later, is surely this: If we take this correlation as our starting point, does it not make sense to search for ways of diminishing the rigidity of the psychological ego by working with the rigidity of its ego-logical body, and with the ego-body's self-image? This question, of course, invites us to attend more closely to the natural movements, the posture and stance, of the rigid, inflexible personality. What kinds of movements, what kinds of posture and stance, seem to be invariant, or anyway, characteristic? And how does the rigid moral standpoint 'schematize' or manifest itself in the disposition and comportment of the body'.

These questions eventually point, I think, towards the possibility of using procedures of relaxation and the teaching of free-style, self-expressive dancing as valuable ways of working therapeutically with personality-types suffering from a psychological rigidity which seriously impairs their capacity to participate fully and with maturity in the moral dimension of life. Furthermore, they suggest the possibility—something it is surely worth exploring—of teaching our young children some of the moral postures, attitudes, and positions which constitute the underlying somatic basis of a moral "consciousness", by working directly with their (relatively more compliant) bodies, their images of the body, and their contactful bodily awareness, their bodily felt sense."

Following on from Levin's suggestion in terms of practical programmes and methods of learning, my own view is that some of the existing systems of traditional martial arts such as Wing Chun, Aikidō, T'ai Chi Ch'uan also provide much of what Levin seeks to achieve through experimenting with

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forms of dance. In chapter 4 Levin expresses his understanding of the possibilities of dance in moral and social education in terms of Ancient Greek ideals.

'As a discipline of embodiment dance teaches civic ideals and values in the most direct and unforgettable way, realizing them in the living body of their tradition. The ancient Greeks, it seems understood the need for a healthy athletic body (athletic in a sense very different from our modern one), and for a wholesome, non-dualistic attitude toward the bodily nature of human being; an attitude of acceptance, and yet free of hedonism, or self-indulgence. In the well-being of the body—in its harmonious gestures, gracefully humbled bearing, well-grounded stance and agile movement, the soul, which is feeling at home, can rest: correspondingly graced with the political virtues of equanimity, balanced judgement, and a sense of just proportion. By directly embodying the classical ideals—those of justice and noble humility, for example—dancing makes political culture into second nature, ensuring a binding devotion that maintains, and celebrates, the harmonious order (nomos) of nature and culture. ¹⁵

With correct teaching and application in the traditional martial arts the practitioner acquires self discipline and a personal sense of achievement in his/ her high degree of skill. As we have seen she/he achieves bodily awareness and sensitivity, concentration, mental and physical flexibility and composure. In specifically social terms the martial arts practitioner is or should be learning respect for her/his teacher and consideration for fellow students without whom practice and progress would be impossible. Learning martial arts skill is clearly a collaborative and cooperative practice. It is of course not surprising that correct training in dance and martial arts can offer the same possibilities. Historically, as well as structurally and mentally, the relationship between dance and the traditional martial arts in the east is very close. For example some Taoist rituals of exorcism incorporate dance and martial arts movements in their highly dramatic performances. 16 Also the Chinese Lion dance is traditionally performed by Kung Fu societies and uses basic Kung Fu stances in the performance. 17 The south Indian martial art of Kalaripayit is closely associated with the classical dance forms of that region, 18 and the same is true of the martial arts and dance traditions of Okinawa and the Philippines.

Finally, since we are discussing questions of ethics, social responsibility and moral education, the obvious question which arises is what place does the Practice of martial arts, with its potentially dangerous techniques, have in the context of such concerns? Further, does the suggestion of training children in traditional martial arts amount to the promotion of aggressive attitudes and the facilitating of violence and conflict? I shall argue that it does not. In Japan, over five million people practise the martial arts of Judō and Kendō. In addition, millions of high-school children have received some training in these arts as part of their physical education curriculum; yet Japan's crime statistics

repeatedly reflect very low levels of interpersonal violence compared to those of other developed nations. ¹⁹ All responsible martial arts instructors and associations observe rules that dangerous techniques are not to be used in combat except in case of extreme emergency when other means of prevention and escape have failed or are not possible.

On a technical level it should be pointed out that in Wing Chun and other martial arts almost all the techniques are defensive in nature and presuppose that an attacker is making an offensive move which is then countered Furthermore, the cultivation of the five skills and qualities described above, as well as the social skills and attitudes of confidence, responsibility, respect cooperation and equilibrium, actually reduce the possibility of serious interpersonal conflict and violence arising. As we have seen, an essential elemental Wing Chun training is the overcoming of stress, fear and anger; so the Wine Chun practitioner is less likely to over-react violently to provocation than many people. As an integral part of their training, serious practitioners of any martial arts should have overcome any pathological desire to prove themselves through violence. 20 By exercising his/her awareness and sensitivity, the Wing Chun practitioner and any serious martial artist should be attuned to any danger-points where violence may threaten to erupt, and by exercising her/his control, equilibrium and confidence, can often prevent the conflict or violence from occurring. Many martial artists are familiar with such instances where calmness and quick-thinking have defused situations that could have led to violence.21

If self defence does become necessary, as a last resort, then the trained martial artist has the ability and control to know how much or how little force to use, and how much or how little damage he/she is likely to cause. With correct training in Wing Chun and other systems it is possible to immobilise, control and even disarm opponents without causing them serious damage. It could be argued that such a course of action is preferable to 'turning the other cheek' and allowing a violent attacker to harm oneself, others and possibly himself. English law does, of course, allow for reasonable force to be used in defence of oneself or others, as a last resort. It should be pointed out however, that the majority of martial artists are not going to be confronted with interpersonal violence, and are free to regard their training as a mental physical and spiritual discipline, which has immense value in itself.

NOTES

Wing Chun means 'harmonious springtime'. For the Chinese text of the late Grand Master Yip Man's account of the system see Leung Ting, Wing Tsun Kun. Hong Kong, International Wing Tsun Martial Art Association, 1978, p. 312. For modern attempts to locate the system in an historical context see: ibid. pp. 32-46. also: K. T. Chao and J. E. Weakland, Secret Techniques of Wing Chun Kung Fa.

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U.S.A., Paladin 1983, pp. 5–13. Most of the details and dates in the traditional accounts of the Wing Chun system cannot be reliably authenticated; even the existence of Yim Wing Chun has never been independently documented. The details of these accounts must therefore be treated as part of tradition rather than as historical certainties.

Wing Chun technical terminology is normally pronounced in Cantonese. Here, terms specific to the Wing Chun system are transliterated from their Cantonese pronunciation. Other Chinese terms are transliterated according to the Wade-Giles system from their standard Mandarin pronunciation. Japanese readings of

characters will also be given where appropriate.

3 Forms are pre-determined sequences of the stances, footwork, strikes, deflecting moves and kicks used in a Kung Fu system. There are three empty-handed forms in Wing Chun, and a form performed on a wooden dummy, which takes the place of a training partner. For further details, with illustrations, see Leung Ting, Wing Tsun Kuen, Hong Kong, International Wing Tsun Martial Art Association 1978; Master Yip Chun and Leung Ting, 116 Wing Tsun Dummy Techniques, Hong Kong, Leung Ting Publications 1981; Samuel Kwok, The Path to Wing Chun, London, Paul Crompton 1984.

4 For complete translations of the Tao Te Ching see D. C. Lau (trans.) Lao Tzu, Tao Te Ching, Penguin 1963; A. Waley, The Way and Its Power, London, Allen &

Unwin 1934, 1977.

5 For complete translations of the text see Burton Watson (trans.), The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, New York, Columbia University Press 1968; A. C. Graham (trans.), Chuang-tzu, London, Allen & Unwin 1981.

6 Dögen Zenji, Shöbögenzö, trans. by K. Nishiyama and J. Stevens, Tokyo, Nakayama Shobo 1975, vol. 1, p. 79. The buffalo occurs in an earlier chapter representing

immovable concentration.

7 H. J. Kim, *Dōgen Kigen-Mystical Realist*, University of Arizona 1975, p. 128; see also K. Nishiyama and J. Stevens (trans.) *Shōbōgenzō*, vol. II, p. 72.

8 Ibid., vol. I, p. 1.

9 Ibid., vol. I, p. 156.10 Ibid., vol. I, p. 125.

M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. by C. Smith, London,

Routledge & Kegan Paul 1962, pp. 144-145.

See David E. Shaner, 'The body mind experience in Dogen's Shobogenzo: a phenomenological perspective', *Philosophy East and West* 35: 1 (January 1985), pp. 17-35; and a full-length study by Steven Heine, *Existential and Ontological Dimensions of Time in Heidegger and Dogen*, State University of New York Press 1985. There is a fascinating account of Dogen's use of acoustic language and immediate hearing and their implications for his non-dualism by David Appelbaum, 'On turning a Zen ear', *Philosophy East and West* 33: 2 (April 1983), pp. 115-129

David Michael Levin, The Body's Recollection of Being, London, Routledge, Kegan

Paul 1985.

14 Ibid., pp. 234–235.

Ibid., pp. 252-253.

John Lagerwey, Taoist Ritual in Chinese Society and History, Macmillan 1987, ch.

Howard Reid and Michael Croucher, The Way of the Warrior, London, Century Publications 1983, p. 75.

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18 Ibid., p. 37.

Ibid., p. 193, 199. For comparative tables of crime and educational statistics see 19 Keizai Koho Center, Japan 1985, Tokyo, Japan Institute for Social and Economic Affairs 1985, pp. 90-93; Facts and Figures on Japan (1985 edn), Tokyo, Foreign Press Center 1985.

For an impressive account of the transforming effect of Kendo training see H. Reid 20

and M. Courcher, The Way of the Warrior, pp. 202-203.

For two examples see D. T. Suzuki, Zen and Japanese Culture, Princeton, 21 Princeton University Press 1959, pp. 74-75; Joe Hyams, Zen in the Martial An.

New York, Bantam Books 1982, p. 132.

For discussion of these and similar ethical dilemmas confronting Buddhism and 22 reference to some traditional Buddhist responses see S. McFarlane, 'Buddhism' in Linus Pauling (ed.), World Encyclopaedia of Peace, Oxford, Pergamon 1986, vol. 1, pp. 97-103. See also Allan Back and Daeshik Kim, 'Pacifism and the Eastern martial arts', Philosophy East and West 32: 2 (April 1982), pp. 177-186.

Peter Seago, Criminal Law, London, Sweet & Maxwell 1985, pp. 166-169.

APPENDIX

a	詠春	Wing Chun (C)
b	五 太女	Ng Mui (C)
С	少林	Shao Lin (M)/Siu Lam (C)
d	鶆 手	chi sau (C)
e	功夫	Kung fu (M/C)
ſ	道德經	Tao Te Ching (M)
g	莊子	Chuang tzu (M)
h	道	Tao (M)

i 禅
Ch'an (M)/Zen (J)

道元
Dōgen (J)

k 正法眼蔵 Shōbōgenzō (J)

n 身觀
shin kan (J)

n 事
ji (J)/shih (M)

ri (J)/li (M)

p 身に)
shin jin (J)/shen hsin (M)

M = Mandarin pronunciation

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C = Cantonese pronunciation

J = Japanese pronunciation

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THE BODY: THE GURŪS' TEACHING AND CONTEMPORARY SIKH PRACTICE*

Eleanor Nesbitt

Gurū Nānak and successive Sikh Gurūs proclaimed the need for inner devotion rather than the external physical requirements of Hinduism and Islam. Nonetheless, Sikh worship involves particular postures and symbolic acts. Some tendencies in popular Sikh practice echo the ritualism and asceticism of Hindu tradition. Arguably, the stronger a Sikh's faith is in the scriptures as the Gurū's embodiment, the more striking these tendencies may appear to be.

When a Sikh is admitted through the *amrit*¹ ceremony into the *Khālsā*, the pure Sikh community, the *amrit* (sweetened water) is administered by *Pañj Pyāre* (lit. five beloved ones). Not only must these individuals be equipped with the *pañj kakke*, the five outward signs of Sikh commitment, and known to live strictly in accordance with the Sikh code of discipline, but they must also be physically whole.

The ideal of physical as well as spiritual wholeness can be traced back to the period of the ten Gurūs (Gurū Nānak was born in 1469 ce, Gurū Gobind Singh died in 1708 ce). Sikhs increasingly needed to defend both themselves and the religious freedom of other non-Muslims from aggressors. From the time of the sixth Guru, Hargobind, they were required to be competent warriors. Gurū Gobind Singh in 1699 institutionalised the sant-sipāhī (saint-soldier) model. The baptisand, receiving the amrit (nectar) of initiation, still crouches in a posture of military preparedness—bīr āsan—with left knee raised.

Wholeness, in Sikh terms, is particularly expressed in the uncut hair (kesh) for both sexes. This is not restricted to head and facial hair. For the Sikh prohibition of haircutting many mutually supportive arguments are advanced. If hair is removed or cut of one's own volition (as opposed to during surgery for example) repentance and another amrit ceremony are required according to strict orthodoxy. In fact the term used to describe an orthodox or committed Sikh is 'keshdhārī', i.e. one who has kesh (uncut hair). Dyeing the hair and

^{*}Paper prepared for 'The Body: a Colloquium on Comparative Spirituality', University of Lancaster 1987.

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beard and piercing the nose and ears for jewellery are also contrary to the Sikh ideal of maintaining one's body intact.

In the Sikh amrit ceremony another of the Gurus' emphases is given physical expression. Before God and Gurū all are one, regardless of caste. Not only do all the candidates kneel together whatever their status, but the ceremony concludes with them drinking the amrit direct from the $b\bar{a}t\bar{a}$ (iron bowl) and then finishing it in reverse order. There should be no question of priority based on social rank. This is also the significance of the insistence that all partakeof the karāh prasād (a sweet wheat pudding shared by worshippers at the close of worship) and langar (corporate meal) seated on the same level and with no question of the seating reflecting caste-based distance. Lip service to such egalitarianism is no use. The Gurus insisted on bodily demonstration of the ideal—even by kings, as Gurū Amar Dās' words to the Emperor Akbar show:

pahile pangat piche sangat First sit in line, then join the congregation.

According to Sikh belief the Gurus, though ten in their earthly bodies, were one in spirit. Indeed the six Gurūs' hymns included in the scriptures are not attributed to them by name but to M1, M2, M3, etc. (M or Mahālā probably means ward, area.) Gurū Nānak's light shone in them all. Thus the emphasis of one is true to the spirit of all. The stress on healthy physique, martial readiness and equality is accepted as totally consistent with Gurū Nānak's message and the second Gurū, Gurū Angad Dev, had encouraged his followers in wrestling and physical fitness, for only the fit can adequately perform seri (community service).

Gurū Nānak's words are preserved in the scriptures, the Gurū Granth Sāhib. The many popular tales of his life (janamsākhī) are used in contemporary preaching of Gurū Nānak's teaching. (See McLeod 1980 for discussion of their place in history). Gurū Nānak's exhortations apply to life in its totality—dhan tan man (wealth, body, mind) in the context of a Punjabi society that was essentially Hindu but subjected to Muslim rulers and affected by religion in many guises. These included the obscure, detailed rituals of Brahminism, the unwashed, unkempt ascetiscism of reclusive yogis and the sequence of words and postures comprising the Muslims' daily namāz. In each case the degree of hygiene, the physical attire, movement and orientation of the devotee were deliberate and carried meaning.

Using these bodily manifestations as imagery in his hymns Gurū Nānak pointed to a personal religion beyond religions, to constant remembrance of God's reality (nām). The aim was union with the divine. Physical penance, pilgrimage, food taboos, insistence on a particular orientation in worship were

of no avail, Gurū Nānak declared:

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Nānak ance of enance, tip were The body decays through self-mortification
The mind is not inclined Godward by fasting and austerities
Nothing equals devotion to the divine nām.
(AG 905 M1)*

Yoga does not lie in the begging pouch or staff, Nor in smearing the body with ashes To live pure amid the world's impurities is the true way to attain yoga. (AG 730 M1)

Guru Amar Das continues this theme:

Yogi, wear the earring of modesty, carry the pouch of compassion. Smear your body with the ashes of realising your mortality. Then you will conquer the three worlds. (AG 908 M3)

Gurū Nānak maintained that:

The true pool for spiritual bathing is the divine nam. (AG 687 and 789 M1) $\,$

One reaches not truth by remaining motionless like trees and stones, nor by being sawn up alive. (AG 952 M1)

The point that since God is omnipresent no special orientation is necessary in worship is made vividly—if apocryphally—by the *janamsākhī* account of Gurū Nānak's behaviour at Mecca, where he fell asleep in the mosque with his feet pointing towards the *miharāb* (the niche indicating the direction for praying). To the indignant $q\bar{a}z\bar{\imath}$ (judge) who rebuked him he 'suggested that the *qazi* should drag his feet around and leave them pointing in a direction where God and the Kabah were not'. (McLeod 1968)

This does not mean that in subsequent Sikh worship the congregation are free to assume any pose they wish. Respect is shown to the scriptures as living Gurū in traditional Indian style. All sit at a lower level than the Gurū Granth Sāhib. On entering the prayer hall where it is installed footwear is removed, and heads (if not already turbanned) are covered. One touches the floor in front of the scriptures with one's forehead (an action called matthā teknā) and sits facing the scriptures. If not cross-legged on the floor (the preferred position) one must at least sit in such a way that one's feet do not point towards the scriptures.

Another aspect of bodily behaviour is sexual morality. After briefly indicating the Gurūs' teaching I will look at one strand within contemporary

^{*(}AG \equiv \bar{A} di Granth (the Gurū Granth Sāhib). As the pagination of all volumes is identical the page number is a sufficient reference. There is no standard way of referring to hymns in English translation.)

Sikhism in which the intensity of devotion towards the Gurū Granth Sāhih arguably results in distinctive emphases in respect to physical and sexual behaviour.

Gurū Nānak and succeeding Gurūs stressed and exemplified grihasth. In other words, whereas for the Hindu life is ideally divided into āshramas or successive stages of which family responsibility is only one (prior to with drawal from worldly ties), for Sikhs the ideal is married life. Sikhs were not to give in to lust and adulterous relationships, nor were they to eschew marriage and parenthood. This was to be the way of life for all—there was no place for celibate ascetics. This point was given firm expression when Gurū Nānak appointed as successor not his ascetic, unmarried elder son, Srī Chand, but a dedicated follower, Bhāī Lehṇā, whom he renamed 'Aṅgad', i.e. "a limb or part of one's own body".

One approach to the study of Sikhism is to view its beliefs and practices ina Hindu matrix, seeing everything as a reaction against, a modification or reassertion of some aspect of India's more ancient and pervasive religious traditions. Within Hinduism there is a recognised place for rules of purity and pollution and for the path of absolute chastity. However, the tendencies of some devout Sikhs, which strike Sikh critics or students of Indian religion as a revival of Hindu attitudes, may well be simply the most authentic way in North Indian cultural terms of paying homage to the Gurū as far as those devotees are concerned. The line between the most dedicated practice of Sikh teaching and arguably Hinduising developments will be drawn differently according to the individual viewpoint. In this sensitive area attitudes to the body are an integral element.

For the purposes of this paper I will focus briefly on a style of devotion to be found in gurdwārās whose congregations are strongly influenced by a sant (person of recognised spirituality) whose name was Bābā Nand Singh (for further details see Doabia 1981 and Nesbitt 1985). The gurdwara in Punjab now standing on the site where he meditated for many years between 1912 and 1943 is called Nānaksar. So too are two British gurdwārās, one in Smethwick the other in Coventry, where Bābā Nand Singh and his successors are highly respected. Bābā Nand Singh believed so intensely that the Gurū Granth Sāhib was indeed the body of the Gurū, and meditated on it with such devotion, that Guru Nānak manifested himself before him. This belief in the scriptures as 'pragat gurān kī deh' (the manifested body of the Gurūs) is an orthodox Sikh belief. These words are daily intoned in the verse following Ardas. It was the totality of Bābā Nand Singh's conviction which was remarkable and which influences his followers' devotion. Thus the scriptures are covered with rumālās (cloths) the size of bedspreads, as befits the living Gurū, and food is offered three times daily.

In Nānaksar gurdwārās, readers of the Gurū Granth Sāhib must have their

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ion to be by a sant ingh (for n Punjab 1912 and ethwick, re highly th Sāhib ion, that otures as dox Sikh t was the nd which mouths covered with a white cloth to prevent saliva dishonouring the Guru. Not only are the scriptures ceremonially laid to rest each night in an upper room—as happens in many gurdwārās—but in Nānaksar gurdwārās in India the floor on which the Gurū is installed varies with the season to ensure that the Guru is enjoying the pleasantest temperature. Such detailed reverence for the Guru Granth Sāhib is continuous with widespread, though not universal, Sikh practice. Singh, for instance, mentions how more covers are spread over the scriptures in winter than in summer (1961).

Through their striking emphasis on the scriptures as the living embodiment of the Gurū these Nānaksar-style devotional practices present a paradox. The observer is tempted to ask whether, along with this degree of emphasis on the central Sikh tenet that the scriptures are Gurū and the purity required of attendants, there is a tension with the Guru's teaching on grihasth. Baba Nand Singh was unmarried and male celibacy continues to be respected in the Nānaksar tradition. The resident attendants on the Gurū Granth Sāhib are called 'bahingam', from a Sanskrit word for a bird, denoting detachment from the earth. From a nucleus of male devotees total sexual abstinence is required.

I have used the Nānaksar phenomenon to point up a dynamic tension within Sikhism. One could look instead at distinct, established groups such as the Nāmdhārīs. One can describe the emergence of Sikh and Sikh-related groups in terms of the pull between Hindu norms and the Gurus' transformation of these; one can focus on the relationship between Gurū and Sant in popular devotion. Whatever one's analytical frame one has to take note of attitudes to the body and the physical demonstration of faith through corporate worship.

NOTE

Glossary of Punjabi terms

amrit

lit. undying. Nectar, the water, sweetened with sugar sweets, administered when one is formally admitted to the Khālsā. This form of initiation is often called the amrit ceremony.

ardās

Prayer—in particular the prayer that concludes a Sikh act of worship. It reminds Sikhs of their history and ends in supplication.

bātā bīr āsan

Iron bowl in which the amrit is stirred during the amrit ceremony. lit. warrior, brave (bīr or vīr) position (āsan). By kneeling with one

knee on the ground and the other raised the initiates and panj pyare are in a posture of readiness for action.

A ceremonial whisk, usually consisting of a metal handle and white tail hair from a yak or other animal. Like a fan of peacock feathers the chaurī is a sign of respect, waved above princes and spiritual masters. Since the Sikh scriptures are regarded as the living Guru it is appro-

grihasth

chaurī

priate to wave a chauri over them. The state of being a householder, i.e. having spouse and children as opposed to the unmarried or widowed state. For Sikhs this is not

merely a stage of life for some but the recognised ideal.

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Gurū	Teacher, particularly a spiritual teacher. For Sikhs in the main	
	stream this title can only be accorded to the ten human Guris from Gurū Nānak to Gurū Gobind Singh and to the scripture.	
	the Guru Granth Sāhib.	

See above, the volume consists of 1430 pages of hymns composed Gurū Granth by six of the Gurus and by other religious poets whose theme was Sāhib inner remembrance of the divine reality.

Sweet, doughy mixture of equal quantities of wheatflour, sugar karāh parshād and clarified butter plus water. This is distributed to everyone present at the end of congregational worship.

Uncut hair, one of the requirements of a committed Sikh, malege kesh female.

A committed Sikh, one whose hair (and beard) are uncut. keshdhārī lit. pure, a word also used historically for those whose allegiance khālsā was to the emperor (and so subsequently to the Gurū) rather than to intermediaries. The name for a Sikh or for the body of Sikh who observe the rules laid down by Gurū Gobind Singh.

Free, corporate meal prepared in the gurdwara kitchen and langar served to all present.

To show respect by touching the ground with one's forehead as matthā tekņā

before the Gurū Granth Sāhib.

lit. name. A term used constantly in the Gurus' hymns for the nām name of God, the living reality of God. The Sikh is exhorted to

repeat the nām, be mindful of God at all times.

lit. adopter of the name. Nāmdhārīs, also known as Kūkās, are Nāmdhārī followers of Ram Singh, a 19th-century Sikh reformer. Among other distinctive features they believe in the need for a living human Guru. In diet they are strictly vegetarian.

Five K's, the five marks of an orthodox Sikh. These include the pañi kakke

kesh and all begin in Punjabi with the letter 'kakkā'. Sikhs offer squares of cloth, often brightly coloured and shim with trimming stitched around the edge. With these the Guri

Granth Sāhib is covered when not being read.

A religious leader. In some cases their leadership is political 3 sant well.

Service, i.e. voluntary community service. Within the gurdward this may consist of preparing langar, wiping shoes, keeping he premises clean.

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THE BODY IN THE SPIRITUAL EXERCISES OF IGNATIUS OF LOYOLA

Michael Barnes

The return to the original sources of spiritual traditions advocated by the Second Vatican Council has resulted in a radical reappraisal of the aims and methods of Ignatius of Loyola's manual of ascetical training, the Spiritual Exercises. This article summarises and comments on references to the body in the text of the Exercises and, using the tradition of interpretation given by the original Directories, focuses on the last exercises in the book — the three methods of prayer.

Christian asceticism has never felt entirely at home with the body, to which it has reacted with, at best, ambivalence and, at worst, a positively destructive dualism. Still less have Christians — at least in the West — been happy with techniques of prayer which have emphasised the physical. Contact with other faiths and particularly with the techniques of meditation and prayer associated with Hinduism and Buddhism has changed much of that. Hence a plethora of books and articles on relaxation methods, Christian Yoga, Christian TM and Christian Zen. Yet, not a great deal of attention has been given to the attitude to the body in traditional forms of Christian spirituality. The aim of this article is to rectify this by examining the place of the body in the Spiritual Exercises of Ignatius of Loyola. It seems to me that this somewhat neglected aspect of the Ignatian tradition is highlighted by the contemporary interest in eastern spirituality. These reflections will centre on what the text of the Exercises and the early Directories have to say about the body. (1)

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CONTEMPORARY INTERPRETATION OF THE EXERCISES

Ignatius intended his little handbook to be used with great freedom for particular needs and circumstances. He wrote Constitutions for his Society, left a brief autobiography, sent innumerable letters to Jesuits, friends and acquaintances all over the world, but he never wrote a spiritual treatise, The Exercises were never intended as a course in ascetical theology which they so easily became. They were born not out of any particular theory about the spiritual life but from the conversion experience of Ignatius himself who passed them on to others by way of personal contact. Ideally the Exercises need a minimum of direction and a maximum of sensitivity and adaptation. But — perhaps inevitably — patterns of interpretation have developed, not all of them sensitive to the original spirit The form taken by the text is that of an aide-memoire, a simple guide to practice, but in the years immediately following Ignatius' death in 1556 an enormous amount of actual experience found written form in a number of Directories, notably in the Official Directory issued by Father General Acquaviva in 1599. Such a distillation of practical wisdom had the unfortunate side-effect of stifling development. The secondary directories tended to supersede the advice given in the Exercises themselves. Moreover, with the suppression of the Society for forty years, between 1773 and 1814, the old tradition was interrupted, if not lost, to be replaced by a much more rationalistic interpretation of the Exercises based on the latin version of Father General Roothaan. (2)

Until fairly recently the Exercises were preached. The success of the retreat-giver was more often measured by his ability to tell anecdotes which would dispel the monotony of the time-honoured procession of familiar meditations than by any skill as a spiritual director. With a return to the sources we find a new engagement with the text as a process of growth and personal conversion. In short, an ascetical interpretation, which stressed the conforming of the will to the Divine Plan, has given way to a more contemplative spirituality which suggests that the exercitant has to spend time discerning his or her place in that Plan before acting in accordance with it. If the former is a school of asceticism that aims at the control of desire, the latter is a school of prayer that seeks to build up a contemplative mood from which purified desires naturally arise. (3)

THE TEXT AND THE BODY

The text contains two types of material: a number of exercises in prayer and various sets of practical instructions for exercitant and director, about how and when to pray. There is only one explicit reference to the body in the former; it occurs in the material for the first week, devoted to sin. In the first prelude to the first exercise Ignatius asks his exercitant to 'see in

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imagination my soul as a prisoner in this corruptible body, and to consider my whole composite being as an exile here on earth, cast out to live among brute beasts. I said my whole composite being, body and soul'. (4) The imagery used here is scriptural (5) but should be interpreted according to the use to which Ignatius puts it. His theology is not original. He accepted the traditional scholastic interpretation of the day and it would be surprising if he was not influenced by a dualistic anthropology. However, he was not primarily a theologian but a spiritual director. His object was to bring home to the exercitant a certain truth: that the human person is subject to the power of sin. The repetition of the word 'composito' in the text emphasises the aim of the prelude: to see oneself as essentially one composite being who is one with surrounding reality, a world of sin. To complain that Ignatius's imagery here betrays an almost manichaean dualism rather misses the point. Ignatius never asks his exercitant to 'prove' a truth to himself. Rather, at a time when access to scripture itself was still limited, Ignatius's glosses served the purpose of stimulating devotion rather than giving carefully calculated theological points. In an age of faith the truth about the fallen nature of mankind given in the summaries of the first week could be taken for granted; the personal experience could not.

Similarly the brief but lurid description of hell - full of sulphurous smoke and putrid smells — is not a catechesis but a simple statement of fact: the exercitant must accept the eternal loss of God as a possibility. (6) Thus what is emphasised is the nearness of hell, not its unpleasantness (although in a less imaginative age it has given plenty of Jesuit retreatgivers ample scope to develop blood-curdling variations on the theme). My point is that there is no reference to thinking about the reality of hell meditating, in the traditional sense. The instruction is to use the imagination and the senses to experience a deeply held truth. In all the exercises there is the constant demand that the exercitant uses all the faculties and all the senses to make present fundamental truths which have to be fully lived out and experienced, not just taken on trust as if handed down from a wise teacher. Thus the typical pattern for a day's prayer consists of a gradual simplification of the subject until an originally discursive meditation gives way to a much more affective application of the senses. It is worth noting, in fact, that there are only five exercises in the whole book called meditations. (7) The typical Ignatian prayer is imaginative 'contem-Plation' in which the exercitant enters into the mysteries of the life of Christ. It is thus the whole person who experiences through the senses and the whole person who perceives the truth. (8)

This point comes out more clearly when we look at the notes and rules. Here we find only a few references to the place of the body in prayer. Yet so much is simply assumed — notably the wholeness and psycho-physical

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integrity of the human subject. A cursory examination is instructive. At the end of the exercises for the first week Ignatius gives us ten 'additional directions' about how 'to go through the exercises better'. (9) Numbers six to ten are concerned with the external circumstances in which prayer takes place. Since the aim of the early exercises is to dwell on penance and sorrow care should be taken to ensure a somewhat sombre mood, perhaps closing curtains or sitting in darkened corners. By the same token, in the fourth week, given to the Resurrection, the mood is gladness and joy and the external circumstances must change accordingly. (10) Additions one to five give advice rather than exact instructions for prayer, among them the fourth which suggests a variety of postures — kneeling, prostration, sitting standing — to be chosen as appropriate for what one wants. Ignatius insists on two points: 'If I find what I desire while kneeling, I will not seek to change my position: if prostrate, I will observe the same direction etc. I will remain quietly meditating upon the point in which I have found what! desire, without any eagerness to go on till I have been satisfied'. (11) Posture is not to be confused with penance or other externals, which develop and maintain a mood. It is simply a matter of personal choice. What is important is to stay with that choice and not feel the need to change or hurry from one contemplation to another. Posture is one of many means to an end.

A BALANCED ASCETICISM

To develop a contemplative interpretation of the Exercises is not, of course, to deny that considerable asceticism is demanded of the exercitant. The very title in the text speaks of the aim as 'the conquest of self and the regulation of one's life in such a way that no decision is made under the influence of any inordinate attachment'. (12) The first objective is to bring order out of disorder, to put together what is experienced as torn apart. Self-discipline is essential. Hence the attention to suitability of place and length of time: if prayer becomes a struggle the exercitant is told to carry on a little over the hour. Much could be said on the subject of physical penance. Here Ignatius displays a sensitivity to zealous excess which seems to arise from his own experience — and mistakes. In the tenth additional note he makes the point that exterior penance must flow from an interior attitude of sorrow for sin. Physical penance is not a means to an end but a response to the love of God. Love, as he says, will always express itself in action rather than words; (13) he therefore presumes that the exercitant will want to show the love he or she feels for God. This is the correct motivation for penance but it can, of course, become mere self-indulgence. Illness of injury can easily result from ill-considered fasting or austerities.

So concerned is Ignatius to get ascetical practice right that he produces a whole series of rules for eating — which strike the reader, on first reading

as the ultimate expression of obsessive pedantry. (14) Yet here again Ignatius manifests his concern for the whole person. A mean is to be established between excess and necessity, always bearing in mind that the aim is to overcome all disordered affection. Ignatius also speaks positively of the attitude to be followed while eating. Exercitants are instructed to keep their minds on Christ at table with the disciples: eating is an extension of the contemplative attitude developed throughout the four weeks. (15) But it should never become a preoccupation. It is good discipline to plan ahead for the next meal, to decide well in advance what one is to have, so that one is not ruled by immediate impulse. And Ignatius is quite clear that the exercitant must be given whatever is felt to be necessary; what is desired must always be given to him 'whether he requests a chicken or a trifle, as his devotion move him'. (16) Ignatius's attitude to asceticism is summed up neatly in some remarks dictated to Fr Victoria. In applying the rules the director is told to consider the particular character of his exercitant so as not to press him too far. 'With certain ones,' says Ignatius, 'I have used liberality in them and it has helped them; and with others, no small austerity, but with all the gentleness of which I was capable'. (17)

METHODS OF PRAYER

Nowhere does Ignatius speak of the final exercise. The famous Contemplation for Attaining Love is always taken to be such, but it is followed by three methods of prayer. These are often regarded as a sort of appendix, a supplement to the forms of prayer recommended in the four weeks. Hence precious little is available by way of commentary. This is unfortunate as investigation shows that they are instructive both about Ignatius's attitude to the body and to his understanding of the Exercises as a whole. In a sense the three methods are the end of the retreat, but they are more than that. It is no part of Ignatius's intention to remove the exercitant from the world but to return him or her to that world strengthened by an experience of prayer which is now to be maintained in the midst of ordinary occupations; over the course of the four weeks Ignatius wants a contemplative awareness of the love of God to become a fully human activity — in fact, the most human of all activities. (19)

It is easy to overlook the first method — devoted to the Ten Commandments, the Seven Deadly Sins, the Three Powers of the Soul and the Five Bodily Senses. But Ignatius makes it clear that here his concern is less with content than with structure and method. Thus he speaks of letting the spirit rest a little: 'before entering on the prayer I recollect myself for a while, and either seated or walking up and down, as may seem better, I will consider where I am going and for what purpose'. (20) The emphasis is clearly on relaxation and recollection, after which the individual must find his or her

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This third method of prayer is something of a mystery. Not only is it not known where Ignatius got it from; but it is also unclear how it should be taken or even who it is aimed at. The Directorium Granatense speaks of it as 'màs facil' and 'màs para los simples que los otros modos'. (23) The Directory of Davila, on the other hand, speaks of it as 'very useful to those who are bound to the recitation of the canonical hours or other vocal prayers'. (24) The two statements need not be contradictory, of course, and the Official Directory of 1599 incorporates both of the earlier statements. (25) Taken together they may simply emphasise how much the prayer of the unlettered is similar to that of the contemplative. Ignatius is, after all, concerned to lead his exercitant into the realms of contemplative awareness. The prayer of the sophisticated is not necessarily the most advanced. In fact, all the indications are — as I have pointed out — that it must go beyond discursive meditation into stillness and, possibly, silence. Be that as it may, it is likely that, by incorporating both points, the Official Directory has only succeeded in sealing an earlier confusion. The assumption seems to be that the Three Methods are really one 'triple method' — to be run together. But, however similar in form the three methods may be, there is no good reason to interpret them all as if intended solely for 'los simples'. (26)

For whom, then, is this third method appropriate? Here the early direct ories are quite instructive. Polanco, Ignatius's secretary, who is to be taken as a reliable guide to the oldest tradition, distinguishes between two forms of this mode of prayer. The first sets it 'mid-way between vocal and mental

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prayer' and suggests that the rhythm of breathing allows the one praying better 'with the intellect to penetrate the truth of those things which are signified by words and phrases and with the feelings to be moved towards those things which have been understood'. (27) The second suggests that one should not be so strict with the length of each breath. Where appropriate, it is quite acceptable to dwell on a particular word for a longer period than the time it takes to breathe in and out. This sort of flexibility is typical of Ignatius. There is nothing sacred about his methods. Thus, in Polanco's Directory, the director is told to be concerned only for what is useful to the exercitant and what brings him or her greater devotion. We should note, however, that Polanco admits that if the exercitant does decide to accommodate the method of prayer in this way then, strictly speaking, the prayer is according to the second rather than the third way. (28) This point is also made in the slightly later Directory of Miro. This text, which seems in many ways to be a shortened and simpler version of Polanco's, is also thoroughly impersonal. Whereas Polanco talked about the 'one who prays' penetrating the truth 'with the intellect' and being moved 'by the feelings', Miro makes the intellect and the feelings the subject of the sentence. (29) They thereby become thoroughly disembodied. The meaning remains much the same but the change is perhaps significant. By the time of the Official Directory, some twenty or more years later, we find that the emphasis is very much on correct understanding of the word or phrase. There is no reference to the rhythm of breathing; it is merely a timing device. Polanco's point is taken up, that, if anyone wants to dwell on the word longer then he or she may do so: 'only in that case it will become rather an exercise of the second method than of the third'. There is now no reference to affect. Any idea of a balance to be achieved between intellect and affect has been superseded by something more prosaic: the object is to build up 'a habit of saying our vocal prayers with attention and due devotion'. (30)

INTERPRETING THE METHODS OF PRAYER

What are we to make of this third method? Does it represent a significant, if neglected, aspect of Ignatius's teaching on prayer? First, on a reading of the Directories, it appears that it has been more or less reduced to the second. Perhaps this was inevitable once the aim of the Exercises was taken to be a strengthening of the will; hence an emphasis, which has continued until fairly recently, on the work of the intellect which has to penetrate the meaning of the word or phrase. The earlier Directories, however, allow for a certain balance of intellect and affect which makes it clear that the former is not to be understood narrowly in the sense of reasoning. The Official Directory has omitted this and, as a result, any independent value that the third method may have had has been lost. Second, Ignatius's text does not

stress attention to the meaning of the words. The exercitant should also be concerned, he says, for the person addressed, his or her own baseness or the difference in standing between the two. (31) We note also that the word used here is Mirar, 'to gaze at', one of those key terms, frequently employed by Ignatius with the connotation of 'exploring' or 'having a good look at' Third, why are the three methods of prayer there at all? According to the fourth annotation they are an integral part of the Exercises. (33) All the indications in the text are that they are practical guidelines for the exercitant returning to everyday life on how to continue praying — a Christian equivalent, perhaps, of the Zen return to the market place. The problem of the return is not how to understand the truth, which the words represent but how to experience and appreciate that meaning fully. Slow recitation of a few words may help but this in itself is not enough. Neither are the largely artificial structures of posture, reflection, repetition, etc. — as Ignatius in his wisdom realised. Ignatius — if he himself is responsible for this simplest of all forms of prayer — saw a way to unite intellect and affect. Exercitants must learn to take themselves as they are, persons who live and breathe, and turn that most basic of all human actions into a form of prayer. The instruction is not to concentrate on breathing and then on a particular word. The word is already present: it is simply held for a period of time in rhythm with the breathing. Prayer becomes itself one of the most natural of all human acts.

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It is true that while the Exercises are a retreat with a particular dynamic of their own, they are also, at a more basic level, a collection of methods of prayer. However, it makes no sense to see the three methods as a sort of short-hand for the best things in the text. Rather the Exercises as a whole introduce people to a state of simple awareness of the Divine. If so, then the three methods are not so much a summary as the next stage of the retreat, to be used when one is surrounded in the market-place of the world by the distractions and the dullness of routine. The three are separate, although clearly connected, methods of prayer to be chosen and used as appropriate in particular circumstances and needs. The question of where Ignatius picked up a method of prayer that harmonises the recitation of a word with the physical process of breathing is intriguing but secondary. (34) My point is simply that it fits perfectly with the attitude to the body implicit in the Exercises. For Ignatius, prayer is an activity of the whole person coming to terms with a God who reveals himself in this world, a world which the exercitant must learn to 'gaze at'.

Such an account, focussing on the body, does full justice to the early texts which have, until relatively recently, either been ignored or subjected to a narrowly ascetical interpretation. Contemporary Ignatian scholarship has moved away from the earlier rationalism with its emphasis on an ascet-

icism of the spirit — let alone the body — to a more contemplative interpretation, as a school of prayer. Once understood in these terms, the dynamic of the Exercises, so far from being limited to a complex series of elaborate meditations, which use the three powers of the soul, is seen to lead to a thoroughly apophatic openness to the Divine which reflects something of the inner stillness and clarity of Zen.

NOTES

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- The influence of the Spiritual Exercises on Christian spirituality does not need to be stressed. Today's resurgence of interest has been greatly stimulated by a number of Jesuit spiritual writers involved in the Buddhist-Christian dialogue. Works available in English include: H. Enomiya Lasalle, Zen, Way to Enlightenment, New York, Taplinger 1968; Zen Meditation for Christians, La Salle, New York, Open Court 1974. K. Kadowaki, Zen and the Bible, London, Routledge, Kegan Paul 1980. H. Dumoulin, A History of Zen Buddhism, Boston, Beacon 1969. W. Johnston, Christian Zen Dublin, Gill and Macmillan 1979, 2nd edn; The Still Point, New York, Harper and Row 1970; Silent Music, London, Collins 1974; The Inner Eye of Love, London, Collins 1978. On the particular subject of Zen and Ignatian spirituality, perhaps the most comprehensive comparative survey is that of Daniel O'Hanlon, 'Zen and the Spiritual Exercises: A Dialogue between Faiths'; Theological Studies 39 (1978) pp. 737–768.
- ² The different versions of the text of the Exercises have been collected and edited in Monumenta Historica Societatis Jesu (MHSI), vol. 100, New edn, Rome 1969). The texts of various directories are contained in an earlier edition: Monumenta Ignatiana (MI), Exercitia Spiritualia Sancti Ignatii de Loyola et Eorum Directoria, Rome 1919. The translation of the Exercises that I have followed is that of Louis J. Puhl, S.J., Chicago, Loyola University Press 1951.

The fullest account of the history of the interpretation of the Exercises is J. de Guibert, *The Jesuits: Their Spiritual Doctrine and Practice*, Chicago, Institute of Jesuit Sources 1965. An excellent summary article, underlining very clearly more recent developments, is J. Veale, 'Ignatian Prayer and Jesuit Spirituality',

Way Supplement 27 (Spring 1976).

4 Exx 47.

6 e.g. Wisdom 9.15, Hebrews 11.13, Mark 1.13.

0 Exx 65-71

As a comprehensive term Ignatius uses the word 'exercise' to cover different forms of prayer. The use of the words meditation and contemplation is more a matter of emphasis than exactness. The term meditation is used for three exercises of the first week — 'on the first, second and third sin employing the powers of the soul', (45) 'on our sins', (55) and on hell — and two exercises in the second week: that 'on Two Standards' (136) and that on 'Three Classes of Men', (149) All the others either have no title at all or are referred to as contemplations: imaginative considerations of the mysteries of the life of Christ.

The difference between Ignatius's use of the terms meditation and contemplation should be seen in the context of the overall dynamic of the Exx. He expects the exercitant to move from a relatively discursive approach to something more affective through a series of repetitions of the exercise in question.

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The words used are indicative of certain 'levels'. Thus the first stage is trace hables, while a third is mineral. historia, a second is discurrir, pausar, hablar, while a third is mirar, advertir, contemplar. At the end of the meditation on the Three Classes of Men, for instance, (156) he calls the repetition a contemplation since by this stage the exercitant may be expected to have interiorised a hitherto purely intellectual truth.

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- 9 Exx 73-90.
- 10 Exx 229.
- Exx 76. 11
- Exx 21. 12
- 13 Exx 230.
- Exx 210-217. 14 Cf. David Townsend, 'Digesting the Rules for Eating', Way Supplement, 38 15 (1987), pp. 86-103.
- 16 MI, vol. cit., p. 782.
- MI, vol. cit., p. 794. 17
- Exx. 230-260. 18
- Cf. William Peters, The Spiritual Exercises of St Ignatius: Exposition and Interpretation, Jersey City, Program to Adapt the Spiritual Exercises 1968, pp. 170-179. The author's primary concern is with an exact exegesis of the text, careful study of which he takes to be essential to a correct understanding of the Exercises as a school of prayer. The three methods of prayer are an integral part of the Exercises, a point also made by Ignacio Iparraguirre, Vocabulario à Ejercicios Espirituales, Rome, Centrum Ignatianum Spiritualitatis 1972, pp 151-152.
- 20 Exx. 239.
- 21 Exx. 252.
- 22 Exx. 258.
- Cf. MI, vol. cit. p. 971. The footnote to the text reminds us that in Annotation 18, about adapting the Exercises to people of very different backgrounds, talent and education, Ignatius recommends the first method 'ad usum rudiorum hominum'. But there is no reference in the Annotation to the third method of prayer. Peters comments that the misinterpretation results from 'an overstressing of "por compás" and a misunderstanding of the correct meaning of "orar" ' (op. cit. p. 179).
- Cf. MI, pp. 933-935. After a reference to Annotation 18 and the usefulness of 24 the first method of prayer, Davila continues: 'Los otros dos modos sinca mucho para que la oracion vocal sea con atención y devoción, y se cumpla del apostoli orabo minima. del apostol: orabo spiritu, orabo et mente. Y esta doctrina es muy útil a los que tienen obligación tienen obligación a oras canónicas y otras oraciones vocales'.
- MI, pp. 1116-1178. The commentary on the Three Methods of Prayer makes them supplementary too-bithem 'supplementary teaching, for the benefit of less educated and less capable folk, that is to say for such folk, that is to say, for such as are unequal to continuous reasoning in prayor, which involves dwelling and which involves dwelling rather long on one point. Hence in the Constitutions it is stated that the whole of the P it is stated that the whole of the Exercises are to be given only to few; where the First Week with the Trial Property of the Exercises are to be given only to few; where the First Week with the Trial Property of the Exercises are to be given only to few; where the Exercises are to be given only to few; where the Exercises are to be given only to few; where the Exercises are to be given only to few; where the Exercises are to be given only to few; where the Exercises are to be given only to few; where the Exercises are to be given only to few; where the Exercises are to be given only to few; where the Exercises are to be given only to few; where the Exercises are to be given only to few; where the Exercise are to be given only to few; where the Exercise are to be given only to few; where the Exercise are to be given only to few; where the Exercise are to be given only to few; where the Exercise are to be given only to few; where the Exercise are to be given only to few; where the Exercise are to be given only to few; where the Exercise are the the First Week with the Triple Method of Prayer, may be given to many 172). Later it is said that the Triple Method of Prayer, may be given to many 172. 172). Later it is said that the Third Method 'is very useful to those who are under obligation of recital of the same that the Third Method is very useful to those who are under obligation of recital of the same that the same under obligation of recital of the canonical hours, or of other vocal prayers 174). [It may not be insignificant that the Inird Method 'is very useful to those under the insignificant that the initial method is very useful to those under the initial method is very useful to those under the initial method is very useful to those under the initial method is very useful to those under the initial method is very useful to those under the initial method is very useful to those under the initial method is very useful to those under the initial method is very useful to those under the initial method is very useful to those under the initial method is very useful to those under the initial method is very useful to those under the initial method is very useful to those under the initial method is very useful to the initial 174). [It may not be insignificant that the English version prepared by the English Province of the Society of I English Province of the Society of Jesus (Manresa Press, Roehampton,

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ss capable in prayer. astitutions ; whereas many' (p. e who are rayers' (P. ed by the ton, 1925) translates De tribus Modis orandi as 'The Triple Method of Prayer'.]

26 It should be noted, for instance, that the Jesuit Constitutions, in the text mentioned above (part.7.cap.4.1.F) [Cf. note 25], refer specifically only to the first method of prayer as suitable for 'large numbers'. No reference is made to the third method (Cf. The Constitutions of the Society of Jesus, translated with introduction and commentary by George, E. Ganss, S. J., St Louis, Institute of Jesuit Sources 1970, p. 283).

27 Cf. MI p. 827. In tertio modo orandi, duo tantum notanda videntur; alterum est quod haec oratio etiam est inter vocalem et mentalem, et quod illud interstitium respirationum dat tempus oranti, quo intellectu magis penetret veritatem eorum, quae per voces vel sententias significantur, et affectu magis

ad intellecta moveatur; ...

Ibid., pp. 827-828. 28 MI p. 877. In 3. modo orandi duo notanda videntur: alterum est, quod illud interstitium respiratonium dat tempus oranti, quo intellectus magis penetret veritatem eorum, quae per voces vel sententias signficantur, ut affectus ad intellecta magis moveatur: ...

30 MI pp. 1173-1174.

31 Exx 258.

32 Cf. Peters, op. cit., p. 32, 40, etc. At Exx 258 the object of the verb 'mirar' is the meaning of each word, but at once it is extended to embrace the person to whom the prayer is addressed, the exercitant's own lowliness, etc. 'Clearly, the meaning of each word is of relatively slight importance. The exercitant in reciting these prayers is occupied with the person to whom he prays, with himself as praying, and the great discrepancy between this person and himself (p. 176).

33 Exx 4.

34 Connections with hesychasm through John Climacus cannot be discounted. Nor is it impossible that Ignatius had some contact with the moorish culture of southern Spain and therefore with Sufism. But, since we find nothing comparable in western spirituality at this time, it seems much more likely that the prime responsibility for harnessing so simple — and obvious — a technique must lie with the saint himself.

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DISCUSSION:

CRITIQUE OF WILLIAM SHEPARD "FUNDAMENTALISM" CHRISTIAN AND ISLAMIC' (Religion 1987, 17)

Bruce Lawrence

Shepard's article is a pre-Wittgensteinian effort to claim that each word has but one pure, objective and therefore defensible meaning. That meaning is to be located in the original context from which the word arose. Apart from that context other derivative or associative meanings besmirch. They besmirch not only the group to which they are applied but also the interpreter who would apply them. While Shepard unwittingly advocates a version of cultural atomism, he does not go so far as to claim that each local manifestation of particular traits clusters in such a novel configuration that it resists comparison with either geographical or ideational neighbours. The title of his essay "Fundamentalism" Christian and Islamic' suggests that he wishes to rescue comparison as an intellectual endeavour. Yet he fails to note Jonathan Z. Smith's salutary warning that every comparison runs a two-fold risk: (1) the illicit division between us and them, with 'the perceived positive pole (being) identified with "us" and the negative with "them" (Smith 1982:6); and (2) the taxonomic identification of particular religious traditions with 'a single trait which is held to reveal the "essence" of that tradition' (Smith 1982:7).

There is a Christian tone throughout Shepard's argument: the fixation with scriptural categories, the close definitional readings of technical terms, and the favourable citation of Christian exceptions to the common notion that fundamentalists are close-minded, unyielding, intolerant. The endnotes often provide the gist of what he is trying to say in the body of his essay, and it is in Endnote 35 that we find him comparing Christian and Muslim fundamentalists as follows: 'Christian fundamentalists are willing to recognize other forms of Christianity at least to the extent of accepting a distinctive label ... (but) I think this willingness is less widespread among Muslim

"fundamentalists" than Christian fundamentalists'. (p. 375).

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The preceding quotation not only demotes Muslims by making them quasi-fundamentalists, 'fundamentalists' who must always be framed by quotation marks calling into question the adequacy of that label when applied to them, but it also ranks Islamic fundamentalists as lower than their Christian counterparts because they are allegedly less tolerant of other forms of Muslim belief than Christian fundamentalists are of other forms of Christian belief. The 'we' who are Christian, even in extremist representation, are better than the 'they' who are Muslim and also extremist.

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Such implicit bias toward the subject matter unfolds into a spate of misrepresentations of both Christians and Muslims, especially since Shepard also falls into the other trap that Smith delineated: essentialism. Shepard advocates a variant of reified essentialism in assessing both Christian and Islamic fundamentalists. In his view, all Muslims think, feel, act and believe in ways that link them to one another while separating them from all others, in this case, all Christian others. Hence Christian fundamentalists are said to resemble the majority of Protestant American Christians because they attach primacy to scripture and doctrine, while Islamic fundamentalists, both Shi'i and Sunni, resemble their co-religionists because they emphasize not only the convergence of religion and politics but also the holistic application of religious prescriptions to every sphere of human activity (pp. 359, 362).

The comparisons do not work in either case. The technical topos of American Protestant fundamentalists may be 'scriptural inerrancy', but one must look beyond that shibboleth to grasp the basis for their ideological formation. What makes the American variety of Christian fundamentalists exceptional is not 'scriptural inerrancy' but their strong identification with a peculiarly American notion of progress and patriotism. Henry May has convincingly demonstrated that the national (as distinct from the ecclesiastical religion of America is Progressive Protestant Patriotism (May 1983:17] 183). American fundamentalists so closely resemble the outlook of their compatriots that they may be aptly labelled Progressive Patriotic Protestants Whether progress is charted as premillenial or postmillenial, and whether scripture is honestly investigated or merely invoked, is less important that identification with ideals of divine providence and manifest destiny that converge in a unique manner for Bible-belted Protestants of urban America In quoting Bob Jones, Jr, Bob Jones III and Jerry Falwell, Shepard seldon does more than a seldon and seldon does more than a does more than repeat their words; he fails to interpret what they say much less explain who they are.

The task of understanding Muslim fundamentalists is even more complex than coming to terms with their Christian counterparts. Surface aspects identity become compelling only when tacit motivations have been sought found, and related to the short-hand nomenclatures that abound in public

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discourse. The word 'ulamā is often used when speaking of both Sunni and Shi'i religious functionaries. Sunni and Shi'i Muslims do not, however, share a similar view of the state. For most Sunnis, the modern post-colonial nation-state is a vehicle imbued with hope. On its leaders, its symbols, its policies they have pinned their own spiritual and material aspirations. For Shi'i Muslims of Iran the opposite is the case. It was European-style nationalism that produced the latest line of despotic Shahs. Through modern education the Shahs and their supporters attempted to close the traditional maktabs at the same time that they denied to Shi'i mullahs the independent source of revenue (khoms) without which their own institutions could not survive (see Mottahedeh 1984). The name 'ulamā only loosely applies to the same religious juridical elite in Shi'i and Sunni regions of the Muslim world. It is not enough to consign to still another endnote the truism that 'the authority of the 'ulamā plays a prominent role in Shi'i fundamentalism' (Endnote 55; p. 378). The distinction between Shi'i jurisconsults and Sunni laymen reverberates throughout the contemporary history of the two major showcases of Islamic fundamentalism: Egypt and Iran. By finessing any attention to socio-economic variables, Shepard attempts to claim that the differences between Sunni and Shi'i 'fundamentalists' are really not that significant: 'The difference is one of degree rather than kind, and the range of attitudes is probably comparable to the range of attitudes toward the ongoing tradition among Christian fundamentalists. In any case, there are significant similarities between Sunni and Shi'i "fundamentalism", and these are or primary interest here.' (Endnote 15, p. 371). By locating this major qualification of his entire argument in an endnote, Shepard cannot duck the enormous interpretive problem it raises. Even if one qualifies the term 'fundamentalism' by constantly placing it in quotation marks, in what sense can one speak of Muslim, as distinct from Christian, fundamentalism? The difference in contexts within the Islamic community is so radical that the only plausible strategy is to admit a variant of Karl Mannheim's two-wing approach to ideology, as I have done elsewhere (Lawrence, in preparation). Lumping Shi'i and Sunni Muslim 'fundamentalists' into a single catchall category voids what little explanatory force Shepard's simplistic trait typology may have yielded.

Shepard's major problem, however, resides in his inability to relate Muslims to Christians except as lesser to more, lower to higher, third world to first world. The gradient distinction becomes clear in his recurrent emphasis on the surface meaning of terms. Preoccupation with definitional certitude leads him to talk at length about the monocultural character of the word 'fundamentalism'. He asserts: 'I know of no suitable and generally recognized word for "fundamentalism" in Arabic, or in any other Islamic language' (p. 359). Such an etymological literalism renders Shepard's

attempted comparison of Christian and Muslim cases intellectually otioned. He denies that Muslims, like Christians, have been influenced by the momentous changes that characterize all civilized societies in the Technical Age. As I have written elsewhere, 'in the same manner that Muslim countries have become integral to a larger global culture, many "isms" exist in the Islamic world that do not originate from the Qur'an, the Sunni, or any premodern category of Islamic history. What they represent must be admitted and discussed. Just as Arab nationalism is a reality crisscrossed with Islamic loyalty in over twenty nations of the Middle East and North Africa, so fundamentalism is a religious force no less real but decidedly more mysterious in its origins and its continuous manifestation' (Lawrence 1987:20).

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Fixated on his quest for 'pure' fundamentalism, Shepard neglects to note the absence of equivalent 'purity' in either Arab nationalism or Islamic modernism. Both are 'polluted' ideological constructs. They are 'polluted', as are all the structural and cognitive features of our world, by the process of modernization. Yet, to avoid blatant self-contradiction, Shepard glosses over the etymological problems attendant on the use of both nationalism and modernism in the Arabic language. Egyptians, for instance, have known and discussed nationalism for more than a century, as Albert Hourani made clear in analysing the writings of the 19th-century liberal 'adib, Rifa'a al-Tahtawi (Hourani 1962:69-83), yet the terms used to discuss and debate nationalism — gawmiya and wataniya — are both neologisms. Modernism poses problems of such magnitude for Shepard that he cannot avoid at least reference to the quandary he faces. Once again in an endnote, he tries to define 'modernism' in Arabic. He reverts to two terms: islah (reform) and tajdid (renewal), 'both of which [he goes on to say] could be applied to 'fundamentalists'(!)' (Endnote 22, p. 373). In effect, he admits that there is no indigenous Islamic vocabulary — neither in Arabic nor in Persian nor in Urdu — with which he can speak about the distinction which forms the crux of his argument, the cognitive incommensurability and ideological hostility between fundamentalism and modernism.

What Shepard has not grasped is the encompassing force of that transformation in world history that Marshall Hodgson aptly labelled The Great Western Transmutation (Hodgson 1979:vol. 3). The modern world is irrevocably set on a course that claims perilous, often inchoate relationship to the the pre-modern world. One has to try to make sense of the shifts technological as well as political, communicative as much as ideological that produced the Technical Age before one can address the matter of religious reactions, whether they be modernist and secular or fundamentalist and scriptural.

Especially the preemptive and coercive force of the modernday nationstate, in the Arab world but also in America, must be discussed if one hopes to make sense of either Christian or Islamic fundamentalists. All too often Shepard wastes the opportunity to build a serious argument by relegating evidence to an endnote. He observes that the author of The Hidden Imperafive (which was the proper title of his book, not Al-Jihad, as Shepard's English translation suggested), opposed 'the concept of the nation-states' (Endnote 25, p. 374). One might have expected the chief ideologue of the group that killed Sadat in October 1981 to oppose the government of Egypt, but does 'Abdussalam Faraj's rhetorical posture suffice? Must one not also explain why he and his co-conspirators had to cooperate with agents of this same hated state? There is, in fact, a complex relationship between dissidents and defenders of the Sadat regime, as Gilles Kepel has partially indicated (Kepel 1986:129-30, 210-213). Every opposition group in post-1953 Egypt had to engage in a kind of macabre dialectical dance with Egyptian security forces. Fouad Ajami has claimed that the state often emerges the victor because the acts of violence, including political assassination, to which religious fundamentalists resort, have the curious effect of reinforcing the necessity of the state.

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What begins as a challenge to the state ends up confirming its rationality, its monopoly on steering a reasonable course in a world that either is mad or is capable of becoming so at any moment. The state is said to be (by its custodians, by its many, many spokesmen) the only dike against great upheaval and disorder. This is a game that all states play; this also happens to be a game at which the Egyptian state is particularly skilled. (Ajami 1983:34)

In criticizing its content, one must still underline the fact that Shepard's article is commendable for what it sets out to do: to locate a discursive tealm which permits dispassionate enquiry into the quandary of 'absolutist idealism' (A. James Reichley's term (1985:28) for fundamentalism) in the modern world. However, by resting his case on a variant of Weber's ideal types, he engages in a nominalist quest that reduces all Protestant Christian fundamentalism to scriptural inerrancy and all Islamic fundamentalists to Political dissidents. The real issue, the reaction of fundamentalists to the relativizing and anti-ecclesiastical force of modernization, particularly as manifest in the ersatz religiosity of the nation-state, is lost. Instead, after 13 papers of text and 10 pages of endnotes, we are left with nothing more than a strategy for semantic purification. In lieu of Muslim 'fundamentalism', we are asked to speak of 'Islamic radicalism', and when we choose to compare Christian Christian fundamentalists with Muslim radicals, we are instructed to array them both under the rubric 'radical neotraditionalism'. It is an endeavour designed to satisfy none. It makes nonsense of the anti-modernist protest at 280 B. Lawrence

the heart of all fundamentalist activity. It also confuses modernists about the true causes of their own failure to diminish or forestall the assertion of fundamentalist values.

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BEYOND FUNDAMENTALISM;

A critique of William Shepard '"Fundamentalism" Christian and Islamic' (*Religion* 1987, 17)

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Academics, in recent times, have been trying to catch up with and understand what has been generally referred to as an emerging fundamentalist trend among adherents of several of the world's religions. This trend is marked by its perceived vocal and conspicuous intrusion into the public realm, offsetting existing patterns and relationships between religion and public life. The situation poses a particular problem because the term 'fundamentalism', which arose in a specific 20th-century context — American Protestantism—embodying specifically stated cognitive elements, has come to be applied to all supposedly comparable responses and reactions in other parts of the world. If, in fact, each of these 'fundamentalisms' possesses common characteristics, then a coherent, comparative method would seem to offer the most effective way of making them intelligible.

Thus, William Shepard reminds us early on, that his article is an attempt to compare and contrast Christian and Islamic 'Fundamentalism' at three levels:

An obvious level of similarities a somewhat more profound level of very important differences and a still deeper level of mixed and often subtle similarities and differences.

It is, however, never made clear what this means nor what the choice of comparative categories implies, in terms of enhancing an understanding of what are culturally, geographically and historically, distinct phenomena. Since Bruce Lawrence has already circumscribed in his critique the problem of words and their meaning as they occur and are used in the article, my focus will be on the way in which a weak, conceptual framework and too ready an acceptance of apparently superficial affiliations, further compound difficulties in appreciating and locating developments as they relate to the Islamic context.

Fundamentalism, as other expressions of religious belief, has a history. Those presumed to be expressing it are among many groups in Islam and

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the Muslim world, responding to the question of how to relate their present situation to a perceived historical past and stance. This is in part an expression of self-consciousness about history and in part an attempt to recover the sense and meaning of tradition in contemporary life. Among them are those who espouse a world of set rules and absolute ideas and who reject pluralism or diversity, seeking in turn a oneness of belief and practice. Since in the context of Islamic history and tradition, this form of response, like others, encompasses issues that are simultaneously religious, ethical legal, political, cultural and economic, the study of Muslim 'fundamentalism' or resurgence has brought into question established usages of concepts such as 'religion', 'politics', 'community', 'culture', etc. It is this wider context that Shepard's article misses altogether. As Marilyn Waldman has pointed out, when we seek to isolate a particular strand within the spectrum of modern Muslim formulations of Islam, 'We particularize and defamiliarize what are in fact two quite general and familiar twentieth century developments: the crisis of meaning associated with accelerated secularization and the dramatic shifts in traditional pre-modern loyalty patterns occasioned by nationalism' (Waldman 1983:98).

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A good contemporary example of how such a wide debate, brings into relief the relationship of the various strands in a specific political and legal context, is the public trial being conducted in Egypt (since the Spring of 1988), of several individuals on charges of attempting to assassinate ministers and a magazine editor in the hope of fomenting an 'Islamic' revolution. It is worth noting that the *Ikhwān* al *Muslimūn*, cited in the article as one of the original fundamentalist movements, participated in the last Egyptian elections by building a coalition, suggesting a less 'radical' approach to participation in public life than what is implied by the article. This is of course also true in part of the *Jamā'at's* participation in Pakistani politics.

What Shepard's article fails to do with regards to the whole spectrum of responses in Islam, is to create an appreciation of the distinction that needs to be made in the cases that he has identified, which result from specific 20th-century forces and are thus relatively recent, and those that emphasize long-term continuities. The attempt to apply a narrower notion of 'fundamentalism', derived from an admittedly limited geographical and political part of the western world, and produced by a specific encounter between secular and religious definitions in one Christian group, runs aground when applied to diverse and widely spaced religious groups such as the Muslims operating under equally diverse political arrangements, cultural and linguistic backgrounds. The attempt obscures the particular histories of Muslims in each of these areas and also undermines the divergence of approaches that are subsumed by the label 'fundamentalist'. It also leads Professor Shepard to make generalizations that are very hard to sustain; as for instance

in forcing distinctions and categories such as 'laymen' and ''ulama', among both Sunni and Shia (page 358). Such distinctions ignore obvious historical antecedents such as the role of Muhammad Ibn al Wahhāb (d. 1765), who was certainly not a 'layman' and would be hard to pin on Ali Shariati (d. 1977) who would not have wished to be considered as a traditional 'alim and who has been considered one of the intellectual leaders of the Islamic revolution in Iran.

Equally problematic is the vague use of the terms 'modernist' and 'traditional' when applied to Muslim groups, particularly when it is suggested that in the Muslim case, 'modernism' has come entirely from outside the culture. Whereas one might accept, that in the case of some Muslims, components of alien culture might be viewed as intrusions or negations of Islamic identity, it is much more difficult to support the assumption that all expressions of 'modernism' within Islam, have an alien derivation or that the debate between 'fundamentalists' and 'modernists' is over the relative merits of 'westernization'. All these groups are indeed committed to reform and change, a major area of distinction lies in their choice of symbols and rhetoric and to the particular vehicles that can act as agents of change - in fact, both avow differing views of 'radical' transformation. In the context of past Pakistani politics, surely the changes envisaged in social and economic life in the election rhetoric of the party led by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto can be construed to be as 'radical' as those of the Jamā'at, as was the common usage of the language of 'radical third world opposition to western imperialism' (p. 360). Given this, it is difficult to see why in both Muslim and Christian cases specific claims by fundamentalists to represent a more authentic expression of their respective tradition should be regarded as having 'considerable historical justification' (p. 361), any more than other groups.

Surely the central issue in all this is the way in which different groups create, through a specific reading of past symbols and patterns, a new vocabulary and plan of action to relate to 'modernity'. Such 'fundamentalist' expressions may best be understood not as 'radical' ways of rethinking and restating Islam, but in terms of what they wish to include, exclude and encode in their specific representations of Islam. Since such representations are meant to establish stances to public as well as private life, such responses are inevitably political and social, regardless of whether they are Christian, Muslim, Jewish or Sikh. It is such as intertwining that makes for greater commonality than difference, as suggested in the article. Thus it makes very little sense to distinguish strands by reference to whether doctrine or political stances are more at stake, since the ultimate goal of such movements is to

create a total and not partial discourse. In a novel and what some might regard as an altogether quaint reading of Islamic Fundamentalism', Ernest Gellner (1988) has suggested that in its

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basis, it is closer in many ways to the ideals and requirements of modernity than those of any other movement. He argues that a strict unitarianism, a (theoretical) absence of any clergy, hence, in principle, equidistance of all beliefs from the deity, a strict scripturalism and a stress on orderly law observance, a sober religiosity avoiding ecstasy and the audiovisual aids of religion — all these features seem highly congruent with an urban bourgeois life style and with the commercialism of the day.

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Gellner's dismissive air about other less composed reactions to 'fundamentalism' might incline one not to take too seriously the less friendlier image of it, evoked by Professor Shepard, but both readings strive unsuccessfully to reveal submerged patterns in what is essentially, in both Christianity and Islam, a minority stance on how to assimilate the past to the present. One is grateful that they provoke argument and highlight a clear need to clarify approaches and to carry the discussion further, but with a difference.

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RESPONSE TO THE CRITIQUES OF "FUNDAMENTALISM" CHRISTIAN AND ISLAMIC' BY BRUCE LAWRENCE AND AZIM NANJI

William Shepard

Let me begin by thanking the editor for this opportunity to respond to the criticisms of my article presented by Bruce Lawrence and Azim Nanji.

Lawrence begins his critique by stating that my article is 'a pre-Wittgensteinian effort to claim that each world has but one pure, objective and therefore defensible meaning'. Elsewhere he refers to my 'preoccupation with definitional certitude' (p. 277) and 'a strategy for semantic purification (p. 279). I am undoubtedly interested in as much definitional certitude as is possible and I do think that a term like 'fundamentalism' could do with a good measure of 'semantic purification'. It is hard for me to believe that anyone would deny the value of these goals. It does not follow from this, however, that I claim or assume that each word has but one pure, objective meaning. Admittedly I do ask what traits the various groups or persons called 'fundamentalist' have or do not have in common, and this might be taken as aiming for a 'pure' definition in terms of a list of traits that all 'fundamentalists' and only 'fundamentalists' have. But it is also consistent with what Jonathan Z. Smith calls a 'polythetic' classification in which the important properties are 'possessed by a large number of individuals in (a) class, but no single property (is) possessed by every member of the class' (Smith, 1982, 4). In fact, I think that Islamic 'fundamentalism', at least, is such a class. It is still, however, relevant to ask what similarities and differences characterize the members of a class such that they are included within that class. It is particularly important to be clear on this when the label attached to the class is as highly emotive and value laden as is the term 'fundamentalism'. So far as I can tell, the term 'fundamentalism' has been applied to certain Muslims by a presumed analogy with certain Christians who already have that label. The tendency, I believe, in such a situation is for people who know (or think they know) about Christian

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fundamentalists to ascribe most or all of the traits of Christian fundamentalists to those Muslims called 'fundamentalists'. But, of course, the Muslims in question may not exhibit those traits, and to the extent that they do not, the label will lead to confusion. The differing attitudes of the two groups toward a nationalism is a good example of this possibility. Hence, a close examination of the two groups in terms of traits is justified. Semantic purification as such does not concern me, but understanding does. And if an effort at semantic purification is necessary for understanding, we should undertake it.

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Lawrence also states that for me the meaning of the word 'fundamentalism' is to be located in the original context from which the word arose' (p. 275). In fact, I clearly indicate (in Endnote 6) that the earliest usage of the term is broader than the strictest definition of it that I adopt. Neverthelesss, it is of value to consider the history of the term, especially when it has been coined within living memory and virtually all of its historical usages can still be found.

Lawrence accuses my article of a 'Christian tone' because of 'the fixation with scriptural categories, the close definitional readings of technical terms, and the favourable citation of Christian exceptions . . .' (p. 275). I do not see that 'scriptural categories' and 'close definitional readings of technical terms' are more Christian than Islamic. As for my supposedly more favourable treatment of Christians, the only evidence cited is an endnote in which I suggest that Christian fundamentalists are slightly more tolerant than Muslim 'fundamentalists' (Endnote 35, Lawrence p. 275). I honestly do not think he could find another. In this case it is clearly a tentative and minor point and, in fact, includes an illustration favourable to Muslims which Lawrence has to exclude when he quotes me. That I 'demote' Muslims by always framing Muslim 'fundamentalists' in quotes strikes me as absurd. I give clear reasons for doing this and they have to do with understanding, not 'demoting' Muslims. If there were any favouritism involved, given the negative valence most commonly assigned to 'fundamentalism', the use of quotes for Muslims and not Christians could be seen as favouring Muslims.

Lawrence accuses me of a 'reified essentialism' because I speak of certain characteristics that particularly distinguish Christianity, Protestantism, and Islam (Shepard 1987a: 361–362; Lawrence, p. 276). I do not see that what I do is illegitimate, unless one claims that we cannot ever characterize a historical movement as a whole. To claim, for example, that Islam, as a historical movement, has been particularly characterized by a close relation between religion and politics is not to claim that all Muslims have made such a close connection, nor is it to speak of a reified or 'ideal' Islam. I believe that within the limits of what can be said in characterizing any large

Both critics appear to accuse me of insufficient attention to the sociopolitical contexts of 'fundamentalism' (in Lawrence's words, 'finessing attention to socio-economic variables', p. 277). Lawrence's efforts at this noint strike me as particularly inept. He wants to read American Christian fundamentalism in terms of 'progress and patriotism' (p. 276), matters I do not entirely ignore, and, referring to Henry May, labels them 'Progress Patriotic Protestants', even though May explicitly excludes fundamentalists from this category (May 1983, 182). Moreover, there are so many who could be called Progressive Patriotic Protestants but whom no one would label fundamentalists, that applying this label to fundamentalists would surely lead to more confusion than understanding. Elsewhere, he claims that 'for most Sunnis, the modern post-colonial nation-state is a vehicle inbued with hope', whereas for the Shi'is of Iran 'it was European-style nationalism which producd the latest line of despotic Shahs. Through modern education the Shahs and their supporters attempted to close the traditional maktabs at the same time that they denied to Shi'i mullahs the independent sources of revenue (khoms) without which their own institutions could not survive.' (Lawrence, p. 277). This contrast will hardly do. Both the rulers of Egypt (to which Lawrence refers as a Sunni example) and the Shahs of Iran in modern times have attempted to close, or to control and 'reform', the traditional schools and limit the independent power of the 'Ulama'. The main difference is that the rulers of Egypt have been far more successful than the Shah was. Today, in Egypt, it is not so much that the 'nation-state is a vehicle imbued with hope', as that the state justifies itself, in the words of Fouad Ajami, quoted later by Lawrence, as 'the only dike against great upheaval and disorder' (p. 277). Just such reasoning was often used to justify support of the Shah. In fact, there have been many Egyptians and many Iranians who have at one time or another seen the nation-state as a source of hope, and there have also been many in each country who have come to reject it as an ideological focus, and those generally labelled 'fundamentalists' are among the latter. On this score I find the similarities between Egypt and Iran more striking than the differences. Later on, Lawrence refers to the complex relation between the nation-state and its opponents and the fact that the opponents' actions may have the effect of strengthening it (p. 279). This is true; the nation-state is so strong and pervasive in today's world that even its opponents cannot escape it. But this does not make them any less its opponents. A particularly good example of this paradox is the situation of the present regime in Iran, ideologically opposed to nationalism but perforce governing in a nationstate. Does this mean it is not ideologically anti-nationalist? I think not. Undoubtedly the relationship of the various 'fundamentalisms' to their

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social and political contexts is a matter on which much more could be said

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made am. I large than I do. It would not only be of value to explore the relationship of American fundamentalism to Progressive Patriotic Protestantism, but also to consider whether there is anything analogous in other 'fundamentalisms' Likewise, the relationship between Islam and nationalism or ethnicity varies from place to place, and this is probably true of Islamic 'fundamentalism' too. Given that 'fundamentalism' is a polythetic category, the discovery of an Islamic 'fundamentalism' that is more favourable to nationalism than the ones I am most aware of would not necessarily vitiate the claim that, in general, Islamic 'fundamentalism' is anti-nationalist, but it would probable refine our understanding of the phenomenon. All of this, and much more was beyond the scope of my 13-page article, however. Given that my concern was, to a large degree, definitional, it seemed to me appropriate to focus on the overt ideological content of the movements since it seems to me that it is primarily in terms of this content that they should be defined. Perhaps this results in a particular attention to 'surface' (Lawrence, pp. 276, 277) matters, but I do think this is the place to begin and it is as a beginning, only, that the article was conceived. (For more on this, see my Endnote 4.)

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Another criticism is that I gloss over important distinctions among Muslims. Lawrence criticizes me for lumping Shi'i and Sunni 'fundamentalists' into a single category and locating a major qualification in an endnote (Lawrence, pp. 276, 277). That there are important differences between Sunni and Shi'i 'fundamentalism' I make clear both in the text and in the endnote. I have no desire to 'duck the enormous interpretive problem', but there is hardly space in this article to undertake it. I do undertake it somewhat more in the article, 'Islam and Ideology', to which the endnote refers the reader. I would stand by my position that for all the differences, there are real similarities between the two 'fundamentalisms', which I outline in the article, and that these are what are important for the purposes of this article. There is not space here to spell out the similarities and differences, but it is worth noting that Khomeini has had a real if ambiguous appeal in the Sunni world. One may also note that the main reason Sunni 'fundamentalists' have opposed the 'ulamā is that they have perceived them as cooperating with the unIslamic state; Khomeini, though an 'alim, was no less critical of such 'ulamā under the Shah. A criticism might more legitimately be made at another point. Given the prominence of 'ulamā authority in Shi'i 'fundamentalism', one might question whether it is properly labelled scripturalist. They are perhaps more like the ultraorthodox Jews, to whom I am hesitant to apply this label (Shepard 1987a) pp. 366, 368 and Endnotes 55 and 57).

Nanji notes that 'fundamentalists' have differing approaches to participation in public life (p. 3); some participate in elections and others carry out or attempt assassinations. This fact I note (p. 358 and Endnote 16) but

it hardly invalidates the label. These differences are more a matter of strategy than of basic ideological belief or goal. Marxists, for example, have varied comparably on strategy but one would restrict the label Marxist to those following a particular strategy.

He also complains that I apply a narrow notion taken from a limited part of the Western world to the diverse and widely spaced Muslims and that this 'obscures the particular histories of (these) Muslims' (p. 276). Of course it is not initially I who do this but a whole army of journalists and scholars before me whose action at this point my article undertakes to consider. It should be clear from the article that I think we would probably be better off if they had not done so. Admittedly I do continue to compare the rather narrowly based Christian 'fundamentalism' with a much more broadly based Muslim one; I also note this fact and make some brief suggestions about it (Shepard 1987a: 360, 367). I do grant that there is an asymmetry here that hears further investigation, but it is not impossible that a narrow segment of one religious tradition might be legitimately compared to a much broader segment of another. Nanji also seems to object to applying a single label to a very diverse group. If he were right, however, one could not use the label Sunni', for example, which is applied to a much larger and more diverse number of Muslims than 'fundamentalist'.

Nanji also misses the mark in his comments on 'laymen' and 'ulamā (p. 283). I agree that Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab is to be considered an 'alim, not a 'layman', but it is doubtful whether he is to be considered a 'fundamentalist' as the term is used in this article, since I consider 'fundamentalism' a distinctively modern phenomenon, one beginning in the Muslim world well after his death (Shepard 1987a: 366). Admittedly some would call him a 'fundamentalist'; if he is this would tend to vitiate Lawrence's stress on 'the distinction between Shi'i jurisconsults and Sunni laymen' (p. 4) since he was unquestionably a Sunni. As for Ali Shariati, I would not call him a 'fundamentalist' (see Shepard 1987b: 313). At this point my critics seem to be at cross purposes, Lawrence accusing me of not taking the differences between Shi'i and Sunni 'fundamentalists' seriously enough, and Nanji of taking them too seriously.

Both critics seem to think that, as Lawrence puts it, I have 'not grasped ... the encompassing force of that transformation in world history that Marshal Hodgson aptly labelled The Great Western Transmutation' (p. 278). I simply reject this. Moreover, I think I make it clear, as I have just mentioned, that I consider both 'fundamentalisms' to be distinctively modern and responses to distinctively modern circumstances (Shepard 1987a, especially pp. 364–365). This is a point that I consider quite important and one objection that I have to the term 'fundamentalism' is that the 'reactionary' image it calls up in many people's minds tends to obscure this

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fact. Probably one should, ideally, as Lawrence says, 'try to make sense of the shifts . . . that produced the Technical Age before one . . . address(es) the matter of religious reactions' (p. 278). How much space one can devote to itin a 13-page article of the sort I wrote is another matter. I believe I say enough under the circumstances. Likewise, on the tendentious issue of the use of the word 'modern', I think I sufficiently indicate my position in Endnote 46.

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Related to the question of modernity, apparently, are Lawrence's comments on my observation that there is no equivalent for 'fundamentalism' in any Islamic language (at least this appears to be the target of his comments on pp. 277-278). He seems to think I am seeking a 'pure' term and argues that other terms, such as 'nationalism' and 'modernism' are 'polluted', by which he appears to mean that they are not indigenous but are neologisms. I hardly see the relevance of this. In my view, when describing another culture one ought, if possible, to do so with categories for which that culture has terms, since otherwise one risks imposing inappropriate categories, something that has happened all too often in Western studies of the non-Western world. Often it is appropriate to use the indigenous term (as, for example, Sunni or Shi'i, or 'ulamā), and certainly it is appropriate to inquire whether there is an indigenous term and what its connotations and history may be. That a word is a neologism does not make it any less indigenous in this sense. I am happy to accept the Arabic words for 'nationalism' as indigenous, and also the Arabic word for 'secularism' ('ilmaniyyah), also a neologism. The problem is that sometimes there are no indigenous terms adequate to the distinctions we wish to make, and this is the case with both 'Islamic radicalism' (i.e. Islamic 'fundamentalism') and 'modernist' in the sense in which I use them on p. 358. In this situation we have to develop both the categories and the labels we find necessary; my only plea is that we recognize what we are doing and why, and that we are perforce taking a certain risk of misconstruing the phenomena we are studying. An important reason, I believe, why indigenous terms have not (yet) developed for some important categories is that so much of the modern transformation is a response to forces originating from outside the Islamic world. This has generated phenomena for which the traditional vocabulary was not adequate and it has not, in all cases, generated an adequate vocabulary. This I consider an important point and it is in this context that I mention the question of indigenous vocabulary. Both Muslim and Christian 'fundamentalists' are reacting to something that can be labelled 'modern' ism', but it is culturally alien to the Muslims in a way that it is not to the Christians. This I had: Christians. This I believe is crucial for a number of differences between them, not least their differing attitudes toward nationalism. Lawrence ignores the difference between modern and culturally alien.

Nanji does see this issue and criticizes my statement that 'in the Muslim

case the "modernism" has come from outside the culture' (Shepard 1987a; p. 360, Nanji, p. 283, but Nanji adds the word 'entirely', which I do not use). I agree that Islamic modernism is not entirely alien derivation; it has significant roots in Islamic culture. I likewise agree, indeed insist, that Islamic 'fundamentalism' involves significant, though often unacknowledged, borrowings from the West. Perhaps I am at fault for failing to make this clear, particularly since I use the term 'modernism' on p. 360 in a slightly different sense from its use on p. 358, but this fact may be apparent only on reading Endnote 22. If so, I stand corrected. Nevertheless, Islamic 'fundamentalists' and modernists do differ on the merits of 'Westernization', particularly but not only at the conscious level. In any case, the point of the passage in question is to contrast Islamic 'fundamentalists' not with Islamic modernists but with Christian fundamentalists and the point that 'modernism' in the broader sense I have used on p. 360 is more culturally alien to Islamic than Christian 'fundamentalists' remains in my view.

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I would agree with Nanji that a major area of distinction between Islamic 'fundamentalists' and modernists 'lies in their choice of symbols and rhetoric' and that both may be interested in radical social transformation. I do not see, however, why this should tell against my statement that there is justification for 'fundamentalist' claims to be more authentic expressions of their traditions. It is to no small degree precisely in the area of 'symbols and rhetoric' that this authenticity lies. The call to apply the Shari'ah to all areas of life may be seen as a call to use thoroughly Islamic symbols and rhetoric in all areas. It is not just a matter of rhetoric, though. For example, those in Pakistan who wish a woman's testimony to be worth half that of a man, are insisting on the traditional figh view of the matter (whatever the actual practice may have been) and to this extent may claim an authenticity in relation to the tradition which cannot be claimed by the modernist who must claim that the traditional figh has misconstrued the intent of the Qur'an or that its interpretation is not appropriate for today's world (see, e.g. Rahman 1983: 41-42; for a further discussion of the general issue, see Shepard 1987b: 324-326). Of course, 'authentic' here is not the same as 'right' even 'Islamically right'. The modernist may well be right, but he or she is still less traditional. At any rate, I do not claim in this section an absolute authenticity for 'fundamentalism', only 'considerable . . . justification, for the claim, and I am at least as interested in the ways in which the 'fundamentalisms' skew their traditions, and in the fact—which I think is Probably of real significance and worth exploring further—that both tend to stress what is distinctive in their traditions.

The force of Nanji's statement that 'such "fundamentalist" expressions may best be understood not as "radical" ways of rethinking and restating Islam, but in terms of what they wish to include, exclude and encode in

their specific representations of Islam' (p. 283) is not totally clear to me, since he does not indicate what sort of things are being included, excluded and encoded. If he is referring to the concrete, or intended to be concrete, impact a given ideology will have on its society, this is of course important, and I do not totally ignore it. It is not the only question one may ask of an ideology, however. For certain purposes it may be legitimate to look at the content of an ideology on its own terms. Once again I plead that I could not, in 13 pages, do everything that might be desirable. I might note in passing that Islamic 'fundamentalism' is not, in intention at least, so much a radical rethinking and restating Islam as a desire to apply Islam to society in a radical way.

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To the extent that my critics have given me occasion to clarify some of the points and concerns in my article, I thank them. I must, however, confess considerable disappointment in both criticisms. There is much in my article that could be criticized and that calls for further elaboration and discussion, but on the whole they have not focused on these things and I have found relatively little in their comments that I could accept or relate constructively to. I would have hoped for a more productive discussion. I do, though, look forward to reading Lawrence's Anti-Modernism: The Fundamentalist Challenge in Judaism, Christianity and Islam when it becomes available.

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Religion (1989) 19, 293-301

BOOK REVIEWS

Robert A. Segal, Joseph Campbell: An Introduction. New York and London, Garland Publishing, 1987, \$22.00.

When octogenarian Joseph Campbell died in 1987, he left behind a legacy of myth interpretation spanning more than four decades. A popular American theorist of myth, Campbell was a prolific and ambitious writer who attempted nothing less than a comprehensive interpretation of the themes and structures of world mythology. In his best known book, Hero with a Thousand Faces (1949), Campbell outlined the fundamental structures of the mythic narrative of heroic quest. His massive four-volume work, The Masks of God (1959–1968), described universal themes and symbols in the mythological traditions of the world. Here he incorporated ancient and primitive mythologies, Eastern and Western mythologies, and the 'creative mythology' embodied in artistic and literary productions of the 20th century. His many other books and articles expanded and illustrated the structural and thematic

arguments presented in Hero and Masks.

Although Campbell's theory is widely known, a thorough scholarly evaluation of his ideas has not been heretofore attempted. In Joseph Campbell: An Introduction, Robert Segal of Lousiana State University initiates such a project, offering a bookby-book description of Campbell's work and a critical assessment of the theory. This book has much to commend it, for Segal makes three major contributions to scholarship on Campbell. First, he offers a careful analysis of the hermeneutical underpinnings of Campbell's thought, analysing the changing understanding of the meaning, origin, and function of myth in each of Campbell's major texts. Second, he situates Campbell's work within the broad tradition of the comparative study of myth, by means of excellent discussions of the relation of Campbell's theories to those of other interpreters. Third, Segal offers an important critique of Campbell's work, demonstrating major problems both in the theoretical structure and in its application to specific myths. This third contribution, however, leads to the major disappointment of Segal's work—his polemical attack on Campbell's œuvre. Segal ultimately dismisses Campbell's work on the basis of its theoretical inconsistencies, without considering the legitimacy of shifts in theory during a lengthy writing career.

At pains to show that Campbell's argument regarding the meaning, origin and function of myth is not static, Segal offers a comprehensive and sequential survey of Campbell's ideas. He characterizes Campbell as a comparativist or universalist rather than a particularist, and a seeker of the psychological rather than the historical or sociological origins of myth. Segal describes how Campbell posited an independent invention' theory of the origins of myth, explaining common mythic themes as products of the human unconscious or the 'psychic unity of mankind'. He shows that Campbell's focus on the psychological meaning of myth in Hero with a Thousand Faces eventually gave way to a focus on the four-fold function of myth (mystical, scientific, sociological, and psychological/metaphysical) in The Masks of God, Segal demonstrates, however, that throughout these shifts Campbell's primary

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intent remained the same: to show that the central meaning and function of myth is to reveal the existence of a deeper part of the human self, the unconscious, and a deeper aspect of the cosmos, the ultimate unity of all things (pp. 111, 119). In other instances, as well, Segal offers much needed clarification of key assumptions in Campbell's thought, revealing the shifting paradigms underlying such concepts

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as matriarchy, symbolism, literalism, historicism and mysticism.

In situating Campbell within the tradition of scholarship on myth, Segal's concern is not to trace Campbell's intellectual heritage, but rather to outline similarities and differences in the internal structure and logic of the theories. Malinowski Bachofen, Tylor, Raglan, Frazer, Rank, Freud, Jung, and others, come under Segal's gaze. In an entire chapter (chapter 11) devoted to the question of Campbell's relation to Jungian theory, Segal convincingly argues that Campbell cannot be considered Jungian despite the face that he adopted a number of Jungian assumptions, concepts, and methods. For example, like Jung, Campbell located the origins of myth in the 'archetypes' of the unconscious, and dismissed historical or cultural diffusion as a primary explanation of common mythic patterns. Nevertheless, Campbell differed significantly from Jung in asserting that myths and archetypes are acquired through experience, rather than through an innate inheritance. In his analysis of these issues, Segal penetrates to the underlying logic of Campbell's arguments to show crucial intellectual differences.

Segal's critique demonstrates serious problems in the theoretical superstructure and in the application of the theory to specific myths. For example, Segal reveals Campbell's tendency to sever myths from their social context. While he does not object to Campbell's argument that the origins of myth are psychological, he does object to the frequent insistence that sociological factors are insignificant. Moreover, Segal demonstrates that when Campbell ostensibly attended to social and economic factors, he, in fact, ignored them. In The Masks of God: Occidental Mythologies, for example, Campbell ascribed differences between two groups of myths to economic (hunting and planting economies) and gender-based social arrangements (matriarchy and partiarchy), but 'he never utiliz(ed) any information about either economics or gender to understand these myths. Rather he inferr(ed) economic and sexual conclusions from the myths themselves' (p. 138). Similarly, Segal argues convincingly that Campbell stretched myths to fit his theory. A striking example of this is Campbell's reading of Genesis 2-3. According to Campbell, all Western myths represent a projection into the realm of the gods of a social and political struggle between matriarchy and patriarchy. Thus, Campbell interpreted the name time of creation and Cili tive of creation and fall as a conflict between male and female deities, i.e. Yahweh and Eve. Campbell argued that Eve's transgression represented a rebellious attempt by a defeated goddess to regain her lost rule; that 'the earth, to which Adam and Eve will he returning at all the lost rule; that 'the earth, to which Adam and the returning at all the returning at Eve will . . . be returning at death, symbolizes the mother goddess' (p. 44); and that the entire enisode expressed by the control of the con the entire episode expresses the rebellion and victory of the forces of matriarchy. Segal attacks Campbell's ferrois resulting of Segal attacks Campbell's 'strained . . . interpretation' (p. 44), his understanding of earth and Eye as gooddesses and . . . interpretation' (p. 44), his understanding of earth and Eve as goddesses, and his apparent belief in an historical period of matriarchy (pp. 39-51). In addition, apparent belief in an historical period of matriarchy (pp. 39-51). In addition, he challenges Campbell's tendency to treat isolated mythic themes rather than the challenges Campbell's tendency to the structure. isolated mythic themes rather than whole myths, separating myth from plot struc-ture and narrative context (p. 128). The myths apparating myth from plot structure and narrative context (p. 138). Here and elsewhere, Segal justly objects to Campbell's exegetical violence to the Campbell's exegetical violence to the text.

In spite of its strengths, Segal's book has some serious limitations. Far from being a non-partisan review of Campbell's work, the book is a hostile polemic against Campbell. This perspective against Campbell. This perspective is not initially stated; rather, it emerges gradually throughout the first few chapters with occasional references to Campbell's 'obsessions', and 'stretched analyses', and culminates in a vituperative catalogue of Campbell's faults (pp. 136–140). Ultimately, however, Segal's major reason for rejecting Campbell is that there are contradictions in the body of the work. Surely, theoretical inconsistencies are to be expected in a four-decade career. Segal allows for no development or change in Campbell's ideas. While Segal attacks Campbell for the ahistorical or anti-historical nature of his theory, he is guilty of a profoundly ahistorical interpretation of Campbell. Jung dealt with changes in his theoretical perspectives by literally revising his earlier books; Freud reconstituted his argument with each new development. Indeed, like the river of Heraclitus, Campbell's theory is never quite the same in any two encounters. One might investigate intellectual or personal causes for theoretical shifts in a lengthy career, but such shifts are hardly justification for dismissal.

If Bultmann pointed toward an existentialist demythologization of mythic narrative, Campbell's call for a 'myth to live by' revealed the richness of the realm of myth and its relevance to the contemporary world. In the year of Campbell's death, an assessment of his work and influence is timely and appropriate, but the bold mythographer deserves better treatment than Segal proffers. Segal's book is an important step toward an adequate assessment of Campbell's œuvre: his precise reading of Campbell's texts and his careful analysis of the theoretical superstructure will be indispensable to future studies, but his polemical dismissal of Campbell limits the usefulness of his book.

In concluding his attack, Segal deals what he sees as the final blow: Campbell repeatedly contradicts himself on the central issues: why myths are the same, whether myths are the same, and what their message is. But these criticisms pale beside the prime one: that Campbell spends too much time reveling in myth and not enough time analyzing it' (p. 140, my emphasis). Indeed, Campbell may be guilty of this, but Segal's problem is the reverse: he spends too much time analysing his subject, and not enough time revelling in it.

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Lawrence A. Hoffman, Beyond the Text: A Holistic Approach to Liturgy. Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 1987, 213 pp.

Lawrence Hoffman's Beyond the Text breaks new ground in the study of Jewish liturgy and raises important questions for the study of worship practices in general. Moving beyond the traditions of philological and form critical scholarship that have dominated the study of Jewish liturgy, Hoffman builds bridges between the field of litugical studies and the discipline of anthropology. The turn to anthropology, Hoffman argues, will overcome the literary and textual bias that has operated in earlier approaches to Jewish liturgy, a prejudice that has predisposed earlier interpreters (Zunz, Elbogen, Heinemann) to miss the way that liturgy actually works in communities. To correct for that bias, Hoffman examines the social dimensions of liturgy: its power to shape communal identity, to articulate shared conceptions freality, to create and express social differentiation between and within social groups, and to capture a sense of the numinous.

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What makes this work so suggestive is the author's ability to move from problems that are indigenous to the scholarly traditions that interpret Jewish liturgy to more general disciplinary reflections on the nature of myth, evocative language, riual and religious communities. Methodologically, Hoffman draws on the structural and social anthropology of Lévi-Strauss, Douglas, and Turner, and to a lesser extent on the interpretive approach of Geertz. He brings these perspectives to bear on a range of liturgical practices within the Jewish tradition from biblical to modern times, with particular emphasis on the worship ritual of Reform Jews.

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Hoffman's structuralist assumptions are most visible in his analysis of the havdalah ceremony which is a 'ritual of categorization' that establishes the basic categories (holy/profane) that govern Jewish experience. This ritual takes place at the conclusion of the Sabbath (sundown), a liminal moment, when sacred time ends and profane time begins, and when Jews leave their own self-enclosed social worlds to mix with other people. The havdalah ritual reasserts the basic Jewish categories of experience at precisely a moment when the category system is

threatened.

Hoffman, however, is not content with a purely structuralist interpretation of liturgy but tries to locate worship practices in specific communities with identifiable social problems and interests. He argues, for example, that liturgical traditions should be viewed, not in geographical categories (Ashkenazic, Sephardic) as early interpreters suggested, but as a code that defines social distance and proximity Through both its selection and rejection of previous liturgical forms, a community identifies with or dissociates itself from other Jewish groups, living prior to and contemporaraneous with itself. Liturgical traditions therefore reveal a community's self-understanding and locate a community in a social map with respect to others. On the basis of this understanding, Hoffman interprets the development of modern worship practices in Reform, and to a lesser extent, Conservative, Reconstructionist, and Orthodox liturgies, as expressions of the unfolding self-identity of these social groups. He explores the impact on these self-understandings of various events, including the changing composition of Jewish communities produced by European immigration, and more recent events, such as the Holocaust and the founding of the state of Israel.

Hoffman's analysis of modern Jewish liturgical practice is masterful, particularly his account of the development of liturgy in the Reform movement. His treatment of practices from earlier periods, however, is more problematic. He has not, for example, sufficiently confronted the problems of attempting to date particular practices, and thus relies to some extent on attributed sayings (so and so says such which are themselves part of the unfolding myth of Rabbinic Judaism. Moreover, Hoffman moves too quickly from interesting analyses of specific practices to generalizations about rabbinic Judaism as a whole. The havdalah ceremony, for example, functions 'as a presentation of the Jewish category system'. A consideration of other liturgical and non-liturgical practices of rabbinic Judaism, however, would show that there are competing and alternative categorizations of reality. Consequently, Hoffman fails to address the question of how a liturgical presentation of reality relates to presentations in other contexts.

There are also a number of broader theoretical issues that Hoffman's work raises that require further reflection. Hoffman describes his approach to liturgy as a move beyond the text and thus a break with previous approaches. But in several important ways this is a misleading characterization of his own contribution. As Hoffman himself notes, earlier interpreters such as form critics also appealed to social

contexts (such as the destruction of the Temple) to explain the origin and function of a practice. It is not the appeal to worshipping communities, therefore, that makes Hoffman's approach different but the way in which he contextualizes a liturgical practice. Unlike his predecessors, he invokes categories that are applicable to ritual forms in other traditions (social distance and proximity, liminality, etc.). Earlier interpreters, by contrast, explained rites in terms of historically specific circumstances that could not be generalized to other traditions. Part of the difference, therefore, between the two approaches is the difference between history and the social sciences generally.

Second, and somewhat ironically, Hoffman's work is actually more bound to textual categories than was that of his predecessors. The theoretical perspectives from which he draws (the structuralism of Lévi-Strauss, the interpretive approach of Geertz, and the work of the ordinary language philosophers such as Austin and Searle) owe a tremendous debt to linguistics and literary theory. These theoretical discourses represent an attempt to understand social pratice through textual categories. Paradoxically, therefore, Hoffman's work actually departs from his predecessors precisely in seeing the value of using literary categories to think about communities and social practices. In this sense, his work does not go beyond the text, but textualizes liturgical practice; and this is one of the reasons that Hoffman's work is so interesting.

Third, Hoffman fails to deal with a variety of questions that necessarily arise in an attempt to move beyond the text. To show that liturgy creates reality and shapes identity, it would be necessary to consider the various ways in which liturgical texts are used. It is by no means obvious, especially in the modern period but also in antiquity as well, that individuals care about the words of their liturgies. Texts can be used in communities and by individuals in a variety of ways. A move beyond the text necessitates considering what people do with and how they think about

their liturgical rites.

These criticisms point to the most important way that this work remains incomplete. Hoffman appropriates theories and categories from other disciplines without examining the assumptions on which they rest. Consequently, there are a number of theoretical problems that are side-stepped. Philosophers of the human sciences, for example, have argued that the structuralism of Lévi-Strauss is incompatible in a variety of ways with the interpretive understanding of Geertz. Even more problematic is the appeal to the concept of the numinous as a comparative category. To be sure, Hoffman argues that the numinous differs from social context to social context, but he fails to reflect on the history of this category and its emergence as an apologetic for religious practice in the light of social scientific critique of religion. It is not apparent, therefore, why Otto's concept of the numinous deserves attention, while completely unacknowledged is Durkheim's suggestion that the sacred is the vocabulary in which experience of community is articulated. This is so, despite the Durkheimian conclusion that 'whatever worshippers presume to say to God, they are at the same time directing a message to themselves'.

These queries should not diminish the overall importance of Hoffman's contribution. They point, rather, to the successful way in which this work redefines the study of liturgy and raises a whole new set of issues about the ways liturgies work in religious communities. Beyond the Text is an important text that students of liturgy should read and take seriously.

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Wesley A. Kort, Modern Fiction and Human Time: A Study in Narrative and Belief. Tampa, University of South Florida Press, 1985, pp. x + 227, \$20.00.

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Good criticism is not merely 'secondary' or derivative from the creative literature upon which it operates and from which it derives its inspiration. It is, in itself, a creative act with its own beauty and its own essential concerns. Wesley Kort's book reminds us of this. Not simply a study of six modern novelists (Hemingway, Lawrence, Mann, Faulkner, Woolf and Hesse), and three modern 'thinkers' (Eliade, Whitehead and Heidegger), it is a meditation upon the characteristics of fiction—and specifically of plot—and its determination of the notion of time as that which both illuminates and establishes categories of belief. By linking the preoccupations of fiction with central tendencies of 20th-century Western thought, Kort establishes the novel at the heart of artistic, intellectual and spiritual concern. At a time when the study of narrative and 'narrative theology' is so fashionable his work is distinctive and peculiarly intelligent.

The discussion centres around three great images of time, rhythmic, polyphonic and melodic, and involves close discussion of the novels of his chosen writers. Initially I found myself resistant to the underlying generalizing, not to say coercive tendency of such an approach to fiction. Was this Hemingway or Lawrence, or Kort doing exactly what he tells us we should not do—preferring the context to the text (p. 25), and imposing patterns on it? In fact, Kort's criticism is wise and subtle. He is perfectly well aware of the metaphorical nature of these images of time (p. 155) which are not, therefore, comprehensive formulae prescribing patterns which claim coercive authority, but essential aids to reflection. Metaphors of time evoking the metaphorical quality of the complex art of fiction, metaphor calls to

metaphor in a creative interplay of textuality.

That is why this is good criticism. As one reads the chapter on Virginia Woolf one is not struck by a sense that this would be the best way to introduce the uninitiated reader to a new writer providing a safe and unexceptional guide to her work. Kort's analysis of the novels, fluent and free of quotation or historical intrusion, seems to presuppose a knowledgeable reader who is prepared to resist appreciatively (in de Man's sense), Kort's own metaphors of interpretation in an active and sometimes anxious return to the primary experience of reading the novels. The strategy is highly effective (because Kort's images are genuinely living metaphors) in driving us back to the novels again with new sensitivity and excitement.

This stimulation to return to literature is augmented by the involvement of the three central modern thinkers in the metaphorical discussion. Key terms—process, being—take their place in the discourse freighted with the density of Whitehead and Heidegger. Kort adds to them his own key terms, words initially bland but which gather resonance and depth as they are passed from author to author. 'Trustworthiness'—the third characteristic of time as it is experienced in human life—I felt very uncertain about at the outset. It seemed inappropriate until the complexity of Kort's intertextual discussions invested it with the necessary responsibility of the question of belief. Religion becomes unavoidable as narrative time inexorably reveals the nature of human time.

The complexity of time, which the writers discussed by Kort unintentionally reveal (p. 175), prompts questions that are fundamental in the Western tradition of philosophy and religion. Kort persuades me afresh to restore modern fiction to

a central place in contemporary thought and belief without surrendering its distinctive artistic qualities as narrative in various modes. Never trapped into the jargon of literary theory or theology, this book raises serious questions on the basis of sound scholarship and even where it may be criticized, is always eminently worth arguing with.

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Bentley Layton (ed.), The Gnostic Scriptures. London, SCM Press, 1987, pp. xiii + 526, £25.

Nowadays it is usual to treat Gnosticism as one of various 'branches' or 'streams' of Christianity in the ancient world, another one being the 'orthodox' or 'proto-orthodox'. If the orthodox had their Bible, the gnostics presumably had one too, and it ought to be possible to make it available in English translation. Such, one may suppose, was the 'concept' of *The Gnostic Scriptures* which the editor says was suggested by his publisher. The editor rightly finds himself in tension with this 'concept' as early as the Preface. As he makes clear, the gnostics had no hard and fast ideas of authoritative scripture, and so he defines 'scriptures' to refer to gnostic writings of all kinds. But in that case, 'the' gnostic scriptures comprise a great number of texts, more than one volume could contain. A selection has had therefore to be made, and that is what we have here.

Perhaps out of allegiance to the 'concept', the editor does not give anything like an idea of how selective he has been in his collection. Even of the Coptic gnostic treatises from Nag Hammadi some important ones do not appear or even get a mention, e.g. the Sophia of Jesus Christ and the Gospel of Mary which have been prominent in scholarly discussion. Other well-known texts like the Pistis Sophia and the 'Naassene Hymn' are likewise passed over. Basilides is covered (though incompletely), but the equally important Bardaisan of Edessa is not, and the name of Marcion does not even appear in the index. The Mandaeans are dismissed with one misleading map reference, and other later-appearing movements like the Paulicians and Bogomils are ignored (all except, curiously, a very obscure sect called the Borborites).

The choice of texts for presentation here (which includes also reports about Gnosticism from the early heresiologists) is in fact intended to serve a particular hypothesis about the early history of Gnosticism. According to this (1) there was a 'classic' (or 'Sethian') Gnosticism, including a more or less coherent cosmological myth. This may or may not have been pre-Christian: the editor does not take a position on this question. (2) Valentinus, the greatest of the gnostic teachers of the 2nd century, revised this earlier type of Gnosticism, most importantly by introducing a mystical doctrine of individual salvation through gnosis.. (3) This doctrine may be traced to certain Christian writings from the 'school of St Thomas' in Mesopotamia

It is a hypothesis that is delicate, relying for support on numerous uncertain judgments about the provenance of various writings, and also on the subtle perception of ideas in common between different texts. This delicacy is most exposed perhaps in the section on the 'school of St Thomas'. That such a 'school' existed

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at all is a pure deduction from a family resemblance perceived among the Ads of Thomas, Gospel of Thomas, and Book of Thomas the Contender. They are supposed to share a theological view of 'twinship' with Jesus, and to presuppose the same particular myth of the salvation of the soul. There are, however, many difficulties with all this. The twinship, for example, is no doubt fundamental in the Book of Tho_{max} (138.7-15); but in the Acts Thomas's status as Jesus' twin is hardly more than a device in the plot of the romance (11, 31, 39, 45, 57). The 'Hymn of the Pearl', an independent text preserved embedded in the Acts, has only an obscure passage about a mirror-image (vv. 76-80). In the Gospel there is no more than the name 'Didymus Judas Thomas' in the prologue, which may not be as significant as the editor supposes. ('Thomas' may have been a proper name, as well as the Jewish Aramaic word for 'twin'. The New Testament does not say, or even to my mind suggest, that the apostle's real name was Judas. In any case, in Syriac 'Thomas', t'wm', is not interchangeable with 'twin', t'm'.) Likewise, when the myth supposed to be common to the 'Thomas scripture' is set out in a table (p. 368), the evidence for a concordance among the various books looks thin, and it does not come down to the kind of similarities in terminology which would be expected from the writings of a 'school'. A map (pp. 362-363) showing the purported 'transmission of the Thomas scripture' from Edessa to Egypt, gives an impression of definiteness about the whole construct which is not justified.

Apart from its historical thesis, The Gnostic Scriptures will have its value in making most of the principal early gnostic texts accessible in readable and attractive form. The editorial apparatus consists of both the usual scholarly devices (round and square brackets, line numbers for reference to Coptic manuscripts, etc.) and elaborate helps to the ordinary reader (e.g. lists of the dramatis personae at the beginning of each book, and lavish editorial headings and subheadings within the text). One may certainly quarrel with some of the editor's judgments-for example the irritating translation of gnosis by 'acquaintance'—but he does his best to convey the 'extraordinary kind of sense' which in his words the gnostic texts possess. The typography is the same as that which is now familiar from other works of reference published by Doubleday in the U.S.A. such as The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha, 10 which this volume is in some ways a companion. The page-layout presents the text and apparatus economically and clearly. Unfortunately, at least in the British edition the photographic reproduction of the typeset pages has been of the cheap and muddy kind which takes away much of the aesthetic appeal which the editor has aimed to infuse into his subject matter.

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H. H. the Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, The Kālachakra Tantra: Rite of Iniliation for the stage of Generation, a commentary; text edited, translated and introduced in Jeffrey Hopkins. London, Wisdom Publications, 1985, 511 pp. £11.95.

In recent years, Vajrayāna Buddhism, primarily that represented by the various Tibetan traditions, has been the focus of considerable attention in the West. This interest has taken the form of both scholarly investigation, exemplified in this country by the pioneering work of David Snellgrove, and also of study and practice

of the traditions by Westerners with varying degrees of spiritual commitment. The initiation for the Kālachakra tantra has itself (at least in an attenuated form) been given twice in the West by His Holiness the Dalai Lama in the past decade: once in the United States and once in Switzerland.

The present book has very definitely originated from the burgeoning Western spiritual interest in Vajrayāna. Indeed it is based on the teachings given by the present Dalai Lama on the occasion of his bestowing the initiation in Madison, U.S.A. in 1981. However it also bears the marks of the scholarly rigour associated with modern Buddhology, a rigour which is sadly often lacking in popular works on Buddhism. The scholarly qualities of the present volume are due in no small part to the endeavours of co-authors Jeffrey Hopkins, who is well known in his dual role of American Buddhologist and eloquent spokesman for the dGe-lugs-pa tradition of Tibetan Buddhism, and H. H. the Dalai Lama, exiled King of Tibet, and considered by many to be the leading representative of Buddhism in the modern world.

The volume falls into three major sections: an extensive introduction by Jeffrey Hopkins, the Dalai Lama's 'Commentary on the Kālachakra Initiation' and, thirdly, 'Rites for Daily Practice'. Hopkins's introduction is a fairly substantial piece of work in its own right. Drawing upon normative dGe-lugs-pa doctrine, he sketches the ethical and philosophical foundations thought necessary for the practice of such anultara-tantra teachings as those contained in the Kālachakra before going on to discuss the transmission of the lineage and the procedures of the initiation itself. Perhaps the greatest value of this section is to remind us of the context in which the dGe-lugs-pa school viewed and practised the teachings they had inherited from earlier Tibetan traditions.

The second section consists of the oral commentary, albeit one drawn from textual sources, given by the Dalai Lama during the course of the Kālachakra initiation. It is important to note here that the commentary, and indeed the public initiation itself, consists only of the sections authorising practice of the stage of generation (bskyed-rim). As is well known, the practice of anuttara-tantra, the highest of the four orders of tantra, delineated by 'the new tantra' schools of Tibet, consists of two stages, the above-mentioned stage of generation, concerned particularly with 'deity-yoga' and the stage of fulfilment (rdzogs-rim) which focuses primarily upon techniques of internal yoga. It is the sections of the initiation relating to this second stage that are omitted here. The Dalai Lama's commentary is clear, detailed, and throughout is a model of dGe-lugs-pa pedagogy.

The third and final section of the volume, excepting a brief appendix, consists of a collection of three brief texts each of which can be used on a daily basis by initiates of the Kālachakra as a method of maintaining the vows and pledges

received in the course of the initiation.

In sum, it can be said that *The Kālachakra Tantra* is a well-produced piece of work, which happily marries together the dual demands of scholarship and authentic representation of the Buddhist tradition from within. Such faults as it possesses are minor and confined in the main to Hopkins's presumed determination to reflect Tibetan thought patterns in his translation as faithfully as possible, a determination which, on occasion, leads him to subject the English language to systematic torture.

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Religion (1989) 19, 303-304

EXPLAINING RELIGION: A SYMPOSIUM

INTRODUCTION

E. Thomas Lawson

Explaining religion: Criticism and Theory from Bodin to Freud by J. Samuel Preus (Yale University Press, New Haven; 1987) is an important new work on the history of the study of religion which not only breaks new ground but changes our perspective on why that study has assumed its present shape. Explaining Religion provides an opportunity for students of religion to rediscover and re-evaluate their scholarly tradition and to reinterpret their allegiances.

Preus' study is particularly important at this time because of the muddled state of the contemporary study of religion, and the prevalent theoretical vacuum created because scholars of religion have failed to produce interesting new theoretical work.

Until the publication of this work, the story of the development of the study of religion has remained largely untold. While important clues are still missing, Preus' book gives us, nevertheless, an intriguing and largely convincing version of that story. His bottom line is that criticism of the Christian religion generated by its own intellectuals led to the establishment of a 'naturalistic' study of religion which conformed to the prevailing standards of the human sciences, which were themselves in the process of development.

As the consequence of such criticism, Explaining Religion chronicles the change from the self-interpretation of a set of religious phenomena approached from the theological perspectives available to critical thinkers within the context of a set of religious institutional forms (largely Christian in form) to the explanatory study of the religious subject matter approached from institutional forms that are increasingly independent. Quite simply stated, what has occurred since the time of Bodin, according to Preus' version, has been a change of institutional auspices for the study of religion along with a quiet revolution in both the style of inquiry and the conception of the object studied. While the primary focus of Explaining Religion is the telling of a narrative which marks the various changes in method and theory, the book also represents a subtle manifesto about the contemporary requirements for the theoretical study of religion. It seems to be Preus' view that, by and large,

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recent theological endeavours have eschewed explanation entirely or else have been parasitic on whatever explanations have been made available by the human sciences. So, for example, one can expect to find references to, and uses of, the works of Durkheim and Freud among contemporary theologians, but not alternatives to their theories.

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But for Preus theological approaches are inherently incapable of delivering the kinds of explanations they sometimes consider desirable. Despite the fact that it is supposed to be a mark of recent theological sophistication to be able to traffic with ideas taken from the human sciences, theology is doomed to confinement within the hermeneutic circle. Given a commitment to criticism of theological perspectives and to finding explanations in naturalistic terms, psychogenic and sociogenic accounts such as those found in Freud and Durkheim are crowning achievements to be expected. All that remains to be asked is whether contemporary theology, when it is not interpreting the meaning of its religious propositions, is capable of having theoretical objects at all.

In this symposium Donald Wiebe, Robert Segal and Ivan Strenski provide their critical responses to Explaining Religion, and Preus gets his chance to reply to their critique of his study. Wiebe provides us with an able summary of Preus' historical essay. He agrees with Preus about the major terms of his analysis, namely that the 'naturalistic' study of religion emerges from an emerging criticism of religion along with an increasing detachment of the scholar from religious presuppositions and commitments. Wiebe's only apparent worry is whether Preus recognizes how powerful the threat to academic inquiry in 'naturalistic' contexts contemporary theology really is.

Wiebe hopes that we will recognize that the scholarly study of religion has not only emerged out of a religio-theological context but that, for large numbers of scholars, the original impetus has not only continued to persist along with the changing perspectives but continues to influence the way in which religion is studied in the contemporary scene.

Segal reads the history with which Preus deals as a change from accounting religiously for religion to accounting non-religiously for religion. He agrees with Preus' account of the development of the scientific paradigm which developed out of earlier criticism; he disagrees that religiously motivated inquiry is committed to transcendentalist approaches to the study of religion

Strenski locates Preus' own work in its social context and sees Preus at outdoor the Company of providing 'the first coherent foundation myth' for the naturalistic study of religion. Strenski is concerned, however, to warn us about those aspects of the story not told, that 'non-naturalistic approaches to religion' are alive and well not only outside the area. not only outside the secular academy but inside departments of religion. Strenski thinks that such perspectives have far greater power and influence than scholars in general and B. than scholars in general and Preus in particular are willing to acknowledge.

Religion invites you to evaluate their critiques, and Preus' response.

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EXPLAINING RELIGION: THE INTELLECTUAL ETHOS

Donald Wiebe

The scholarly study of religion is now and has always been an essentially religio-theological undertaking for the majority of those involved in the enterprise. It is and has always been predominantly informed, that is, by theological assumptions and/or religious commitments. But that approach to the study of religion(s) has not been without rivals. There is, for example, a mode of inquiry which is concerned with finding explanations of all phenomena only from within a naturalistic framework. Such a naturalistic approach to the study of religion simply treats religion as an element of culture like any other and does so by rejecting the assumption that it is necessary 'to believe', in some sense or other, what the devotee believes in order to understand. And it is the history of the development of that naturalistic framework that Preus pursues in Explaining Religion: Criticism and Theory from Bodin to Freud.

Preus correctly points out that the new paradigm for studying religion emerged out of criticism of religion and that its later development rested on the Enlightenment critique of religion. But it is an historical investigation of early modern European theories of the origin of religion that, Preus maintains, will clearly reveal the development of a radically different research tradition. Over a period of three centuries, Preus, making heuristic use of Thomas Kuhn's notion of paradigm both as 'disciplinary matrix' and as 'exemplar', identifies a series of minor revolutions in thought about religion, the cumulative effects of which, he claims, constitutes the naturalistic paradigm. The history of those minor revolutions, according to Preus, can be divided into two periods—the earlier involving a progressively advancing criticism of religion and an increasing degree of detachment from religious presuppositions and commitments in the study of religion, and the later involving an increasing awareness of the social nature of religion that resolves the paradox of religion's intellectual obsolescence and social persistence, and therefore raises the study of religion to a new level. David Hume is the watershed between these two Periods, his work for the first time placing the study of religion within the Purview of a scientific study of humankind. In Preus' view, therefore, Hume completes the 'paradigm shift' started by Bodin, for there is in Hume a selfconscious substitution of a scientific for a theological paradigm for the study of

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religion. 'With him', writes Preus, 'a line of criticism definitely ends and construction of alternative theory begins . . .' (p. 84).

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With Jean Bodin we have, claims Preus, the first extended debate about religion as a problem created by the discovery of a vast religious world outside Christendom. Bodin remained a religious person and worked within a normative framework, but in seeing religion as problematic he made an intellectual break from Christianity. Though not rejecting revelation, he put reason above revelation which undermined the generally accepted biblical model for the organization of reality as a whole.

Herbert of Cherbury goes even further than Bodin in the rejection of revelation. Herbert adopted a global perspective, transcending confessional norms. Preus admits that Herbert has a theological agenda but claims that his concern to draw general conclusions about religion based on data from all the religions of the world involved a freedom from having to save the biblical framework.

Bernard Fontenelle's work leaves deistic theology behind and expands on Herbert's attempt to account for the rise and fall of religious/mythic belief without appeal to supernatural causes of any kind. Indeed, in looking for psychohistorical causes of religious belief we see in Fontenelle, claims Preus, the beginnings of a developmental paradigm for studying religion. We have here, that is, 'an evolutionary framework . . . [as] a clear alternative to traditional theology, both of revelation and of the innatist, deistic type' (p. 54). Giambattista Vico develops Fontenelle's approach. Though not rejecting a catholic worldview he nevertheless presented a thoroughly naturalistic account of all human institutions including religion. By exempting Christianity from his analyses, Vico was able to break free from its authority and to give critical-historical reason free reign.

Hume, as I have already pointed out, completes the development of this stream of critical thought. By rejecting 'religious explanations' of religion, that is, Hume placed the study of religion within the intellectual map of human studies; he made humankind the object of study by extending the experimental method to human motivation and behaviour. And his hypotheses in this regard had a direct documentable impact on later students of religion, claims Preus, in Britain, France, and Germany. No longer was the concern in this field focused on the problem of the legitimation of religion, but rather with sexplanation. Thus, writes Preus, 'Hume's thoroughgoing naturalism, his claim vision of religion as part of a science of humankind, and his development of alternatives to all the contemporary theological explanations of religion together warrant the paradigmatic role he is accorded here. He in effect closes an era of criticism and opens the paths of future research' (p. 100).

Though Hume, in disposing of the necessity of accounting for religion religious terms, brings to conclusion a paradigm-shift in the study of religion

begun by Bodin, he does not provide a wholly adequate framework for that study. As Preus points out, for example, there is an obvious absence of the social component of religion in Hume's reconstruction of its origin. Hume failed, that is, to consider the possible connections between human sociability and the origin of religion and the role of religion in the establishment and maintenance of a social order. In disposing of the last remaining religious explanations and legitimations of religion, however, he made the emergence of the concern with social dynamics of this kind possible.

Auguste Comte, Preus proceeds to argue, moves well beyond Hume's concern with critique in recognising that religion is an ideological complex that performs functions indispensable to society. Unlike Hume, therefore, Comte is able to handle the paradox of religion's persistence even though it has been shown to be intellectually obsolete. Comte, that is, appears able to explain religion without 'explaining it away'. In the light of the evolution of mind, Comte can relegate theology to oblivion while still recognizing that religion functions as a unitive element in society. Religion as explanation, that is, cannot hold its own in the modern world and therefore does not provide knowledge about the world as it once did (and in some cultures still does), but religion as function is still necessary to society.

Preus points out that there are two theories of religion implicit in Comte's work—one connected to his view of the evolution of the human mind involving a progressive mastery of humanity over its destiny and the other connected to anxieties created by social crises. And these theories, he maintains, anticipate the division between early British anthropological theories of religion and French sociological theories.

E. B. Tylor's evolutionary anthropology clearly follows the Hume-Comte line in eschewing all possibility of supernatural explanations of religion and in approaching the historical study of humankind as part and parcel of the history of nature in general. And, like Comte, Tylor sought an explanation of human behaviour, including religious behaviour, in terms of empirically based scientific generalizations and laws.

Whereas the line of approach to understanding religion that develops from Hume through Tylor is intellectualistic and developmental in that it sees the rise of religion in connection with the individual person's struggle to explain her/his experience of the world, another line of development, as Preus points out, is to be seen in the Vico-Comte tradition. In the latter, religion is explained by reference not to individuals but rather to social necessities and utilities. Though religion has been surpassed as knowledge, that is, its other functions still need to be carried out. Thus religion is 'true' not in the literal sense of making correct (acceptable) claims about the world—physical or metaphysical—but rather in the sense that it continues to be socially necessary. Durkheim and Freud, for example, though accepting the Enlightenment

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eligion in f religion critique of religion do not find that critique a sufficient basis to account for the persistence of religion. If religion were merely 'a fabric of errors', they main tain, there could be no accounting for its persistence. Both recognised that religion may well be illogical but also that it is independent of logic. And both therefore, like Comte, offered theories that account for the emergence of religion and for its persistence in the face of rational criticism. Their theories, that is, referred to forces 'deeper than those recognized consciously by the ancient actors themselves, and deeper than the mere curiosity attributed to them by the British anthropologists' (p. 197).

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Durkheim and Freud then, claims Preus, bring to completion the natural istic paradigm for the academic study of religion that finally emerged with Hume. That paradigm is complete, he says, 'because their allegation that psychosocial causes are at the root of religious experience was subject to testing through scientific methods of observation and correction—a process that continues still. Despite the fact that no final scientific 'proof' of their theses can be imagined [he continues] (a problem shared by the most comprehensive paradigms in the natural sciences as well), the theories were supported by argument and evidence of sufficient power and coherence to support a new generation of specialized studies' (p. 162).

Preus, as this summary of his argument indicates, clearly identifies the

emergence and development of a new and coherent intellectual tradition for the study of religion that breaks away from a religio-theological paradigm within which that study had been ensconced. Preus does not provide an account of the institutionalization of the academic study of religion in the curriculum of the modern western university but rather, and more importantly, accounts for the intellectual ethos in which an argument for such a development was capable of formulation. This is hardly a whiggish history of the development of 'Religious Studies', however, for Preus is well aware that even though the study of religion was included in the modern university curriculum it never really entered fully into the academic study of culture in that context. Indeed, even today, Preus quite correctly notes, the study of religion within the university context is still carried on quite comfortably in quasitheological or metaphysical mode in that most of it still presumes the origins or causes of religion to lie beyond scientific investigation. And his account here of the arrangement of the arrangemen account here of the emergence of a naturalistic framework for the study of religion functions—and is intended to function—as a critique of that dominant crypto-theological framework. As Preus puts it, his history 'challenges the popular notion that the contraction th popular notion that the only proper approach to religions is "from inside" and the implicit corollary that it the implicit corollary that the only proper comprehensive explanation of religions is that they are "rereligions is that they are "manifestations of the sacred" or responses to "transcendence": it arms of "transcendence"; it argues that a clear distinction between a naturalistic approach—with its own avalapproach—with its own explanatory apparatus—and religious approaches is

necessary to achieve a coherent conception of what the study of religion is about; and, negatively, that such a distinction is needed in order to clarify the difference between the study of religion in the framework of the humanities and human sciences and often hidden apologetic intentions that inform much contemporary writing and teaching about religion' (xxi). The 'insider' approach just does not figure into the general consensus concerning the study of cultural matters that exists in the academy, for it isolates the study of religion from the assumptions and presuppositions that characterize the social sciences concerned with human affairs.

Preus notes in the introduction to this study that the abundance of literature in recent years on how the study of religion ought to be conceived amounts to conclusive evidence of an identity crisis in the field. And he quite correctly, I think, concludes that the religious framework for that study is far less likely to provide the unifying paradigm the field seeks than is the naturalistic framework. Preus, consequently, concludes his study proposing the adoption of the latter:

The naturalistic approach is at once more modest and more ambitious than the religious one: more modest because it is content to investigate the causes, motivations, meanings, and impact of religious phenoma without pronouncing on their cosmic significance for human destiny; ambitious, in that the study of religion strives to explain religion and to integrate its understanding into the other elements of culture to which it is related. (p. 211)

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RELIGIONIST AND SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC STRATEGIES

Robert A. Segal

Just as Joseph Strayer argues in On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State that the modern state began in the Middle Ages, so J. Samuel Preus argues that modern 'criticism', or explanation, of religion began as early as the 16th century. It began with the attempt to account for all religions, not just for Judaism and Christianity. Preus ably traces the shifts in the criticism: from accounting religiously for all religions (Jean Bodin, Lord Herbert of Cherbury) to accounting non-religiously for all religions save Judaism and Christianity (Bernard Fontenelle, Giambattista Vico) to accounting nonreligiously for all religions (David Hume, Auguste Comte, Edward Tylor, Emile Durkheim, Sigmund Freud); from accounting for the 'origin', or initial time and place, of religion to accounting for the 'cause', or recurrent source, of religion (Hume on)1 to accounting for the persistence of religion (Durkheim, Freud). At the same time Preus argues that the prime issue has been that of cause (pp. xvii-xviii). Theologians, or more broadly 'religionists', account for religion supernaturally: through either revelation or innate religiosity. Social scientists account for religion naturalistically: psychologically, sociologically, or anthropologically.

Preus is doubtless right to say that what he considers a single social scientific 'paradigm' has provided an alternative to the religious one. But he is wrong to say that religionists have clung stalwartly to a supernatural account religion: 'The terms of the tension between a science and a theology of religion have changed in the century since Tylor, but the tension remains in the seemingly irreducible conflict between naturalistic and "transcendental" explanations of the second planations of religion' (p. 153). On the contrary, religionists have responded by proposing either a naturalistic cause of religion or none at all, in which case the question of cause he the question of cause becomes irrelevant and even improper. Moreover, the 'non-causal' response appropriates strategies from seculardom, as Preus 1006 in passing (p. 209). Contract D in passing (p. 209). Contrary to Preus (pp. xviii-xix, 210), religionists are and are much in touch with the rest. much in touch with the rest of academia as social scientists. Their ends are incontestably isolationists. incontestably isolationist, but their means are not. They deploy most sophisticated of social scientists. Their the means are not. most sophisticated of secular techniques. It is not the Bible but Ludwig Wittgenstein, W. V. O. Ovice. To Wittgenstein, W. V. O. Quine, Thomas Kuhn, Richard Rorty, and Jacquo Derrida that they invoke Altriance and Derrida that they are they a Derrida that they invoke. Alternatively, they cite various social scientist

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themselves: Clifford Geertz, Victor Turner, Mary Douglas, Peter Berger, Robert Bellah, and Erik Erikson. Only because secular thinkers either approve of religion or disapprove of its opponents dare religionists breathe easy. Religionists are far more other-directed than inner-directed.

FROM SUPERNATURAL TO NATURALISTIC CAUSE

The first religionist strategy overlooked by Preus is that of Mircea Eliade, whom Preus wrongly groups with Friedrich Schleiermacher and Rudolph Otto (pp. xviii–xix, 200, note 56). Eliade says that religion arises not, as for them, out of the experience of god or the sacred (p. 200)² but out of the opposite: a need for that experience. Not an uninitiated encounter with the sacred like Abraham's encounter but the absence of one prompts religion. Humans invent religion—myths and rituals—less to express than to secure access to the sacred. Religion does for Eliade what myth does for Lucien Lévy-Bruhl: it restores contact with a no longer immanent sacred. The fulfilment of the need for contact requires the existence of the sacred, but the need itself, the cause of religion, does not. Because religion for Eliade still arises to serve an irreducibly religious end, he is offering a religious yet naturalistic account, which therefore falls outside the supernatural paradigm Preus demarcates.

To be sure, under the rubric of supernatural cause Preus includes not only revelation (Bodin) but also an innate idea of god (Herbert) and even an innate instinct for god. Furthermore, Preus considers Hume's rejection of a religious instinct a quintessentially naturalistic response. But Preus is presumably assuming that innate religiosity is supernatural because it must come from god. Eliade, however, is not committed to a supernatural source of innate religiosity. Where it comes from, he never says. Hume himself rejects the hypothesis of an innate religious instinct not on the grounds that it is supernatural but, above all, on the grounds that religion is not, like an instinct, universal

FROM CAUSE TO MEANING

A second strategy often pursued by religionists is one that Preus discusses briefly near the end of his book: the appeal to the *secularist* shift of attention from explanation to interpretation, or from cause to meaning (pp. 198–199). In its simplest form, the form considered by Preus, an explanation alone says what accounts for, or causes, religion, and an interpretation says what the message, or meaning, of religion is. Human behaviour is often compared with a text. Just as many literary critics distinguish sharply between why an author wrote a work and what the meaning of the work is, so many 'interpretivists' distinguish between the cause and the meaning of behaviour.

Preus rightly notes the would-be consequence of this distinction: that interpretation is impervious to explanation. One can, as Preus puts it, give a

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Freudian interpretation of religion without committing oneself to a Freudian explanation (pp. 198–199). But few religionists use a Freudian interpretation sans Freudian explanation. They use an irreducibly religious interpretation sans Freudian explanation. Moreover, they think that they are thereby safe from a would-be Freudian interpretation as well. For they assume that an interpretation of religion is necessarily religious and an explanation necessarily secular. To interpret rather than explain religion is therefore not only to fend off a secular cause but also to guarantee a religious meaning. Religionists are not unaware of purported Freudian interpretations of religion. They simply argue that those interpretations are, by definition, of psychology rather than religion.

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Religionists are in fact doubly wrong: an interpretation of religion need not be religious, and an explanation of religion need not be secular. While an interpretation must match the object of interpretation-religion must be interpreted religiously-'religion' is only the putative, not necessarily the underlying, object of interpretation. A Freudian interpretation of religion does not miss the object of interpretation. Rather, it transforms that object from religion to psychology and thereby retains the parallel between interpretation and object.

The same symmetry holds between explanation and explanandum. But because the object of explanation, like that of interpretation, may really btreligious, a religious explanation of religion is hardly impossible. Indeed, both revelation and innate religiosity are irreducibly religious explanations of religion. While assuming a symmetry between an interpretation and what it interprets, religionists assume an asymmetry between explanation and whatit explains. For they invariably assume that an explanation requires a physical cause. Because religious causes, which religionists invoke, are mental, they thereby become meanings rather than causes. The would-be explanations of religionists thereby become interpretations rather than explanations. Religionists like Eliade, who opposes explanation as irremediably secular, thus claim to be interpreting rather than explaining religion.

In actuality, an explanation can postulate mental as well as physical causes, in which case there can be mentalistic, including religious, explanations of religion. Religionists are, then, wrong both to fear explanation and to embrace interpretation. But in so doing they again break out of the religious paradigm in which Preus places them: if, on the one hand, by giving a naturalistic religious explanation of the control religious explanation of religion, on the other hand, by giving what they claim

is an interpretation rather than an explanation of religion.

Preus assumes that explanation and interpretation are compatible because explanation alone accounts for a phenomenon (e.g. p. 179). But others assume that an interpretation as well that an interpretation as well as an explanation is an account, so that the approaches compete rather the approaches compete rather than run askew. Eliade's innate religiosity is an instance. For R. G. Collinson, J. Tillian askew. instance. For R. G. Collingwood, William Dray, Peter Winch, and, despite his use of the textual analogy. use of the textual analogy, even Geertz, an interpretation is therefore not merely 'unconstrained' by an explanation (p. 198), to which alone Preus objects, but outright incompatible with it. For this reason the textual analogy, at least as usually used, proves misleading. Indeed, Ricoeur, whom Preus praises (p. 198), blithely reconciles interpretation with explanation only by employing it: by saying that one can surely ask both what the meaning of a work is and why the author wrote it.

Ironically, Geertz uses the textual parallel for opposite ends: to pit interpretation against explanation. By the interpretation of a text he does not, to be sure, mean why the author wrote it. But he does mean why the characters in the text, for him necessarily a story, behave as they do. For Geertz, the difference between explanation and interpretation is that between the author's intent and that of the characters. For Ricoeur, the difference is at times seemingly that between the author's intent and the meaning, or message, of the work, but more often it is that between the means by which the message gets conveyed and the message itself. Those means are, above all, the Lévi-Straussian structure of a work. That the message necessarily involves intent on anyone's part it is not clear. Like this more typical Ricoeur, Geertz skirts the issue of what the author intended, but by concentrating on what the characters intend. For Geertz, an interpretation is, then, an account—just of the character's behaviour, not the author's.

Strictly, the difference for Geertz between explanation and interpretation is not even that between the author's intent and the characters'. Although Geertz concentrates on the characters rather than the author, he would say of both what Collingwood, Dray, and Winch, none of whom uses the textual simile, would say of the author alone. For all four, the difference between explanation and interpretation is the difference between one characterization of intent and another. In explanation, intent, as a cause, is separate from what it effects. In interpretation, intent, as a meaning, is inseparable, so that what it

effects cannot be its effect but rather is its expression.

This way of distinguishing interpretation from explanation seemingly offers religionists a sturdier bulwark against seculardom than the first way. Inter-Pretation now precludes explanation, not merely is distinct from explanation: one cannot simultaneously interpret and explain the same phenomenon. But in fact this way no more saves religion, or religionists, than the first. For an interpretation still need not be religious or an explanation secular. The fact that an interpretation here is of the believer's own intent does not mean that the intent must be religious or even conscious. Conversely, an explanation, which is or, more accurately, can be of intent, can be religious. A religious yearning can, then, be either a cause or a meaning. The embrace by religionists of interpretation vis-à-vis explanation is, then, at once futile and unnecessary. But again it breaks out of the mould Preus assumes.

Preus either overlooks or effaces still other ways of distinguishing inter-

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pretation from explanation. For example, Eliade, whose religionist desence fluctuates, most often follows the later Wilhelm Dilthey and other idealists, for whom an interpretation seeks the meaning of behaviour less to the actor than about the actor. Primarily, the meaning of religion says neither why the believer is religious nor even what religiosity means to the believer, but rather what religiosity reveals about the actor—or, even more, about religion itself. Preus cites Dilthey but simply lumps him with all others seeking meaning (p. 198)

Preus cites as well Melford Spiro's objection to 'the "false dichotomy" between interpretation and explanation' (p. 198), but he equates Spiro's objections with Ricoeur's. In fact, their views are opposed. Ricoeur reconciles interpretation with explanation by subordinating explanation to interpretation. An interpretation gives the meaning of religion. An explanation gives not the origin of that meaning but typically just the structuralist means by whichit gets conveyed.

Spiro reconciles interpretation with explanation by reducing interpretation either to explanation or to one step within explanation. Against the view of Ricoeur, insofar as Ricoeur considers intent, that an interpretation alone allows for mental states, Spiro, following Carl Hempel, argues that an explanation allows for mental as well as physical causes. A would-be mentalistic interpretation is therefore just a species of explanation. Against the view of Geertz that an interpretation is particularistic, Spiro, again following Hempel, argues that only a general law links the mental state to the behaviour. Here an interpretation provides merely the state itself and not the link, which only a law can provide.

FROM CAUSE TO FUNCTION

A third defensive strategy practised by some religionists is likewise taken from seculardom and is likewise a shift of attention—not, however, from cause to meaning, as in the second strategy, but from cause to function. For religionists who follow looser functionalists like Bronislaw Malinowski, the function is only the flip side of the cause: religion functions to fulfill a need, which also causes religion. But for religionists who follow stricter functions alists like A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, the function, or sheer effect, is as independent of the dent of the cause as the meaning is for interpretivists. The function accounts for not the emergence of religion but the present-day existence of religion; if religion served no function today, it would not exist. At the same time the function, no more than the meaning, need be religious. Indeed, many religionists oppose functionalism because they wrongly assume that the function must be secular. Like both the cause and the meaning, the function can really be anything. be anything.

Even in discussing social scientists concerned with accounting for religion, Preus must distinguish between origin and cause. He concedes that Tylor himself, the social scientist most interested in origin, considers only how, not when and where, religion began (pp. 140–142). Like Hume, Comte, Durkheim, and Freud, Tylor is primarily concerned with not the origin but the cause, or recurrent source, of religion.

FROM CAUSE TO SURVIVAL

Yet Preus, in turn, distinguishes Durkheim and Freud from Tylor for their further shift of attention from even the cause of religion to the survival of religion (p. 196). Admittedly, cause and survival are connected: religion presumably survives only because it continues to be useful. Since, however, Tylor himself, according to Preus, concentrates on cause yet assumes the virtual demise of religion, cause does not entail survival, which is, then, a distinct issue. Even function and survival are distinct issues: to say that religion functions is to say only that it exists today, not that it will exist tomorrow. Insofar as Durkheim and Freud, for Preus, concentrate on survival, it becomes even harder to see how the debate between religionists and social scientists is over origin and cause.

Preus's analyses of Tylor, Durkheim, and Freud, the figures I know best, are often insightful but somewhat skewed. On the one hand, Tylor sees modern religion as much less of a relic, or 'survival', than Preus assumes (pp. 138–139, 143–144). On the other hand, Durkheim and Freud see religion as much less of a survivor than Preus suggests (pp. 159–160, 176, 191–192, 196, 208–209). Preus correctly observes that modern religion for Tylor ceases altogether to be what primitive religion was wholly: an account of the physical world. But modern religion for Tylor is not, therefore, a relic. Rather, it becomes ethics, as Preus notes (pp. 147–148) but dismisses (pp. 144, 146). Because Tylor deems primitive religion entirely amoral, the ethical function replaces the explanatory one, not merely remains once the explanatory function is gone. In saying that the function of religion changes, Tylor is still accounting for the persistence of religion.

Durkheim does, in part, deem religion eternal: where there is society, there will naturally be religion. But Durkheim also, whether or not consistently, deems religion threatened by modernity: not where there is society but only where there is society based on mechanical solidarity will there naturally be religion. Where society is based instead on organic solidarity, as modern society is, religion must be forged. Hence Durkheim proposes the establishment, not merely the acknowledgment, of a cult of non-egoistic individualism. In seeking to revive religion, Durkheim is hardly seeking to account for its survival

Freud, even less than Durkheim, assumes the survival of religion and so, even less than Durkheim, seeks to account for it. Like Durkheim, he assumes ever increasing secularization. He does, like Durkheim, grant that Tylorean

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intellectualism cannot account for even the cause, much less the survival, of religion. He also grants that the true causes of religion, the needs to alleviate guilt (Totem and Taboo, Moses and Monotheism) and to accept a callous world (The Future of an Illusion), are hard to overcome. But in at least the optimistic Future he envisions the possibility of overcoming them, as Preus himself notes (p. 192). What Preus overlooks is that Freud predicts, not just proposes, the eventual end of religion. In seeking to account for the survival of religion till now, Freud is not assuming its permanent survival. Where for Durkheim religion may not last even though the need for it remains, for Freud religion will not last once the need for it wanes.

Preus's claim that Durkheim and Freud are preoccupied with the persistence of religion is most fitting. For the fourth and final strategy pursued by religionists is an appeal to that persistence itself: if, assert religionists, religion still exists, it must be serving an irreducibly religious function. Otherwise something else would surely by now have supplanted it. Where the third strategy says simply that religion serves *some* function *wherever* it exists, the fourth says that religion serves a distinctively *religious* function because it *still* exists. In accounting naturalistically for the persistence of religion, Durkheim and Freud are thus undermining the religionists' last line of defence.

NOTES

Preus says at the outset that "Origin" here will embrace the notions of cause and source (p. ix), but with some exceptions (e.g. p. xxi) he proceeds to distinguish between origin and cause.

More precisely, the experience for the later Schleiermacher is not of god but of

dependence on god.

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RELIGIOUS STUDIES, NATURALISM, AND THE PERSISTENCE OF ASTROLOGY

Ivan Strenski

Do we live in a crazy world? Sometimes it seems so. Women dress like men; men struggle to liberate the 'woman' inside them; palmistry shops sit alongside computer stores; American dailies feature astrology columns, but rarely an astronomy story. That, at any rate, is a line of thought Samuel Preus's Explaining Religion calls to mind. In this valuable and accessible study, Samuel Preus charts the rise of a paradigm of naturalistic study of religion; but, like the 'crazy' persistence of astrology in an age when astronomy is commonplace, non-naturalistic approaches to religion have not yielded gracefully before its march. And while Preus gives naturalists everywhere the first coherent foundation myth to rival those long taken for granted by theologically minded students of religion, the older myths still retain their magic. Worse yet, although Preus ably shows that today a naturalistic study of religion is logically emergent from theology and institutionalized in university departments of religious studies, speaking practically, theologizing is often rampant in those same institutions. None of this, however, does anything to diminish the great service Preus does in creating a coherent history of the 'research tradition' (p. ix) of this 'naturalistic' study of religion over four centuries. Nor does it reduce the drama of our having moved from looking at religion with the 'Superior Intelligence' peering over our shoulders to a quest for causes and origins (pp. xv-xix) where the theistic 'hypothesis' is no more necessary for us than it was for Laplace. The paradigm shift toward naturalism that Preus charts indeed leaves religiously committed approaches to religion on the wrong side of the gestalt switch—even if somehow the light has not dawned.

But, even though Preus trusts that non-naturalism rides the flight of time's arrow along a path of progress, one cannot but wonder how and why the world of the study of religion is a little crazy, why things have not quite worked out according to plan? For parallels, imagine Carl Sagan sorting out departmental teaching assignments with Jean Dixon. But to appreciate Sagan's deepest anguish, again imagine him lecturing before students in an astronomy course with greater emotional stakes in their Zodiacal signs than in understanding why stars twinkle. So also, one suspects, anguished religious studies natur-

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alists make few complaints about coexistence because daily they confront the not so 'crazy' reality of student populations hungrier for God or The Meaning of Life than for the phenomenology, comparative study and history of religion. This is not a progress the naturalist tradition had in mind, but it is a contemporary reality—crazy or not—with which it must deal.

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Perhaps because naturalism is in some distress, Preus' work takes on a special timeliness. Partly because of continuing theological dominance or undergraduate needs for existentially 'relevant' education, naturalists need now to shore up their legitimacy (p. ix). Nothing gives legitimacy like a little history—even if (like all good histories) we have self-consciously to create one. Naturalists represent an 'alternative tradition' (p. xx). Thus we have to struggle to establish our historical existence against the longue durée of the prevailing non-naturalistic powers in the study of religion. Struggle seems to me perfectly appropriate, with historical precedent enough of its own in the history of almost any 'new' academic discipline.

INTELLECTUAL HISTORIES AND THE RATIONALITY OF IRRATIONALITY

But this 'crazy' situation calls for naturalists to know more about the 'blood and guts' of their own history than Preus tells us. If non-naturalists want to succeed at being a durable 'alternative' tradition, they will have to understand why, for instance, the non-naturalist approaches to religion—theological, existential, therapeutic—prosper. Thus, although naturalists may be tempted to think so, the coexistence of non-naturalism with Preus' naturalism is not 'crazy' at all. Understanding why this is so, will help us to understand better the strengths and weaknesses of Preus' book. It will also, I hope, help a naturalist religious studies conceive an even livelier future than it has thus far had.

First, why is it rational that non-naturalistic approaches to religion should coexist with naturalism and persist in the naturalist age? And how does understanding the hidden rationality of this persistence of non-naturalistic approaches help us understand a crucial limitation in this otherwise fine book? The answer lies in perceiving how non-naturalistic approaches to religion collect certain adherents, and how doing so supplies them with a social basis of support—and thus a social sort of rationality. To the extent we perceive the social rationality of ideas we are implying a critique of Preus' exclusive commitment to what is called an 'internalist' and 'whiggish' style of 'interlectual history' (p. xii).

Preus' 'internalist' history focuses on texts rather than contexts, on their internal arguments and logic, on the unmediated passage of great ideas from one great thinker to another. At the same time, Preus' internalist history is also 'whiggish', which is to say not aware enough of the details of historical contexts and too ready to see the past at the service of the present. 'Whiggish' history

encourages us to see a kind of triumphant parade of progressive ideas from the origins to their culmination in the thought of the present day. On the other hand, intellectual history might be done in an 'externalist' and 'historicist' way. 'Externalism' takes seriously the way ideas are 'corporeal' or made possible by their social locations; 'historicism' focuses on the way ideas speak to a given age and reflect the intentional projects of their creators. From the combined 'externalist' and 'historicist' perspective, naturalism and nonnaturalism appear as forces competing for the interest of people in certain social contexts—competing for a 'social rationality'. Thus, a possible key to understanding the success or failure of modes of explanation would be in terms of how they addressed the issues valued by people in these contexts. If, for instance, we wanted to explain how Durkheim's explanation of religion emerged, we would want to understand at least (doubtless more) how it addressed certain key communities of interest. Part, at least, of the success of such a naturalistic programme of explanation would depend upon convincing certain audiences to accept what explanations were given. And, acceptance would in some sense be related to the interests of the group in question. Most of all, 'externalist' history means being attentive to questions of social causality in the realm of ideas, while 'historicism' looks for causes within the context of origin of ideas.

Now I admire Preus' having set himself the already ambitious task of simply trying to record the occurrences of the naturalistic explanations of religion across a span of several centuries. Perhaps this is all one book can do-and certainly on figures scattered so broadly across the historical landscape. Indeed, Preus does an extremely valuable job of identifying the key ancestors of naturalism in religious studies, and then in meticulously showing how their approach to religion joins the march to contemporary academic studies of religion. But showing is not the same as explaining. For instance, showing what the logic of Durkheim's explanation of religion was, is not to explain Durkheim's explanation of religion. Preus does not explain what enabled (caused) Durkheimian ideas to emerge at all, or once emergent, to become institutions. So although Preus has gone further than others to identify, expose and celebrate the ancestors of naturalism and their work, there is more to doespecially if we want to remedy why naturalism is only an 'alternative' rather than mainstream. I suggest that we can neither understand nor explain the emergence of Preus' naturalistic (causal-cum-genetic) explanations of religion unless we are equally causal and genetic about so doing.

ANOTHER LOOK AT DURKHEIM'S EXPLANATION OF RELIGION
Let me elaborate with respect to Preus' discussion of Durkheim to show how
seeing his explanation of religion in terms of society and history makes a
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A key feature of Preus' analysis of Durkheim's approach to religion is that for Durkheim to 'explain religion' meant to get 'beyond the letter' (p. 163). But what precisely did Durkheim mean by this? Was Durkheim a kind of anarchist in revolt against bureaucratic formalism?; a kind of cabalist mystic diving deeply for hidden reality?; Some sort of anti-fundamentalist critic of religious conservatism?; an anti-positivist repelled by the tyranny of facts?; or doing a strange sort of 'biblical hermeneutics' of the spirit over against the law, as Preus himself suggests (p. 163)? How are we to explain why Durkheim thought it would be widely acceptable to characterize explanation by reference to 'going beyond the letter'? If we are to explain what his explanation of religion amounted to, it is relevant for us to understand what Durkheim meant here.

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For the sake of contrast with an 'externalist' and 'historicist' history, it is worth looking at what Preus does in this chapter. In a nutshell, Preus shows us how Durkheim's method involved relativizing what people said about their own religion to what he thought underlay it. He thus sought to go beyond empathy alone to explanation (pp. 171, 173), as we all know, in terms of social forces. In this quest, Durkheim was in deep communion with great souls and great books of the 'alternative tradition', whether in the person of Hume, Comte, Tylor or Vico (pp. 158-161). The greats either 'anticipated' (p. 158) Durkheim or were addressed in debate by him; we understand Durkheim because he took them 'for granted'. These past masters made it possible for him to think his new explanation of religion (p. 159) as an advance upon what they thought. Durkheim's naturalism marks progress, indeed 'the completion of the naturalistic paradigm', (p. 161) because Durkheim opened his results 10 'testing' (p. 162), while not needing to pose religious believers as deluded (p. 162). That, at any rate, seems the simple logic of Durkheim's sociogenetic approach to religion as Preus sees it.

Now leave aside the facts that Durkheim was a philosophical rationalist and probably a kind of neo-hegelian who only once referred to Hume, that he was arguably more concerned to revise than revisit Comte, that he had Frazer, Albert Reville and Robertson Smith far more in mind than Tylor, and that I can find no reference at all to Vico in his oeuvre. Forget likewise that talking about thinkers 'anticipating' one another across centuries seems to verge on spirit communication, and that Preus does not emphasize (and in some cases identify) the thinkers Durkheim really took 'for granted', e.g. Robertson Smith, Renouvier, Hamelin, Harnack, and so. Forgetting all that, one major problem in Preus' story is that it plays as the standard version of Durkheimian thought routinely rejected by non-naturalistic critics of naturalism. For example, Durkheim has really nothing to say about the Big Issues which students crave to explore; he does not really project a vision of human life that would stir the human heart. Like Carl Sagan, Durkheim wants to 'explain away' ideas like a personal God, while students really want someone closer to

Jean Dixon to help them build a sense of meaning into their lives. Where is the drama of Durkheim's historical engagement in the affairs of his day—whether seen externally, in terms of his political struggles over Dreyfus, or even internally, in terms of his battles over curricula against the entrenched theological forces at the Sorbonne? In short, Preus gives us precisely the version of a naturalist explanation of religion easily dismissed by nonnaturalists, now feeling ever more justified in returning to their old ways.

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Yet Preus does have a sense of how the story might otherwise have been told to throw new light on Durkheimian naturalism. When Preus tries to make Durkheim's approach plausible, he rightly tries to give us a sense of why Durkheim might have wanted to advance the sociogenetic thesis so cavalierly rejected by critics. Preus says he 'is reminded of the classic formula of biblical hermeneutics, that the letter kills. . . . ' (p. 163, my emphasis) We are led to imagine that Durkheim must have had something like this stirring in mind and that his naturalism should perhaps recommend itself even to religious folk for this reason. But this attempt to make sense of Durkheim is speculative and then only made in passing. It is no wonder that naturalism still cohabits with non-naturalism: we have not really given powerful plausible interpretations of the classics of naturalism, like Durkheim's.

'Externalist' and 'historicist' history can, however, do just that. How would an 'externalist' and 'historicist' begin to explain Durkheim's 'going beyond the letter'? For starters, we might do without the mythology of the great man in communion with other great men through the ages. If we want to investigate 'influences', then let us seek those who in fact did exert influence on Durkheim. If Kant, then what kind of Kant (neo-?) and from whom did he learn his lessons? We might do better than talk of how Durkheim's ideas remind us of or formally resemble a 'Humean fashion' of thought or 'Tylorian framework' (p. 168), and so. We might just see what Durkheim was up to, who in fact he read and with whom he conversed and debated. This is also to say that we would need to know Durkheim's intentions and the texts he read in context. If we knew what these were, we could explain his naturalism in terms of its fulfilling certain wishes, achieving certain goals, purposes and the like—as best we could know them. We would also need to construct a context that would constrain Durkheim to believe that the logic of his explanations made compelling sense.

'GOING BEYOND THE LETTER'

Now this is the briefest outline of what would be a major intellectual project. But let me show what we can already understand about Durkheim's attempts to 'go beyond the letter'.

A first question must be whether Durkheim was alone in having such aspirations? Or can we understand Durkheim in terms of his being part of a larger enterprise, and thus partly explain what he did in thos terms? Sociol. ogist Edward Tiryakian has suggested that we must look at Durkheim's characterization of his approach to religion as a species of 'symbolic' interpretation practised in the arts. Indeed, Durkheim himself speaks of symbolist and his attempts to 'go beyond the letter' are commonly labelled symbolist. Preus, in fact, refers to Durkheim's 'allegoric' method (p. 161), but stops there. On Tiryakian's reading of Durkheim's work, one would expect that getting beyond the letter was like a love for secret signs or revulsion for the commonplace typical of literary or graphic symbolists. The more we know of their inner motivation, the more we would know of Durkheim's, and the more we would understand and be able to explain his naturalism.

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Now, although this has surface plausibility, catching hold of the contexts enabling Durkheim's ideas to make sense is not just a matter of a clever hooking onto something that 'reminds' us of Durkheim's symbolic approach to the letter of religious doctrines. We need to show that we have got the right parallel. Tiryakian has just got it wrong; Durkheim's thought is not located in an aesthetic context. We know this because Durkheim was repelled by the avant garde and profoundly patronizing towards the arts. To him and his followers the arts were the stuff of leisure, a pastime one indulged on lazy Sunday afternoons in the park—nothing much over which to fuss.

I propose we go right after our quarry. It is the letter of *religious* ideas that is at issue. Why not then look to see how and why *religious* symbolists sought to 'go beyond the letter'? It so happens that just when Durkheim was developing his symbolic interpretation of *religious* ideas and practices, an entire contemporary movement of French theologians were engaged in self-conscious symbolic readings of their own religious traditions. Known widely as religious 'modernists', they included such figures as the Catholics, Marcel Hebert and Alfred Loisy, the Jews, Salomon Reinach and Sylvain Lévi, as well as the Protestants, Albert Reville, Jean Reville, and Auguste and Paul Sabatier, Moreover they were as well known to the Durkheimians as Durkheim's group was known to them. Each reviewed the major works of the others, often arguing over issues of common concern in intellectual discussion groups or as colleagues in the councils of academic life.

For students of religion, linking Durkheim with the religious modernists exploits what we know about his projects and aspirations to found a French civil religion in connection with his espousal of the religion of humanity and the sacredness of the individual. In fact, we can better explain Durkheim's role with respect to the religion of humanity as a 'modernizer' like those modernist theologians who sought to renew their own faiths. Making further sense of this view is the close link between liberalism and modernism, both in political and religious spheres. Durkheim's political liberalism—his 'social' individualism—was, among other things, internally connected to his programme of

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modernizing the hithertofore often egoistic religion of humanity. Liberalism needed to be rethought so that the community was given a central place in understanding it.

I could go on, but cannot within the confines of this review. What I hope I have shown is how an historicist and externalist history of our intellectual ancestors would refresh our understanding of what we are and whom we might be. Preus' book might well be the catalyst necessary to start such a major scholarly enterprise. In this light, naturalism has at least begun to take itself seriously as an historic movement with a noble past. Doing a more trenchant history of naturalism in the study of religion will help propel it into the future.

NOTES

Ivan Strenski, 'Our Very Own "Contras": A Reply to the St. Louis Project Report', Journal of the American Academy of Religion 65 (Summer 1986), pp. 323-335.

Edward Tirvakian, 'L'Ecole durkheimienne à la recherche de la sociétié perdue',

Cahiers internationaux de sociologie 66 (1979), pp. 97-114.

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EXPLAINING RELIGION: AUTHOR'S RESPONSE

J. Samuel Preus

Publishing a book with such audacious range guarantees that the author, having promoted himself in accordance with the Peter Principle, will suffer recurrent nightmares while awaiting the reviews. Most scholarly reviewers will know a great deal more about some matters than the author does. Those with different methodological approaches will wish that a different book had been written, showing how it might have been done better and extending the discussion beyond where the author can follow. Still others may find the book so compatible that they will have trouble arguing with it. The present reviewers are cases in point.

Wiebe's able summary indicates two things: that he has nothing to argue with, which might mean that the position represented by my book is so obvious that it requires no critical comment. It would be uncouth to complain; the bulk of what follows will respond to the other two essays, by Strenski and Segal.

One minor comment about Wiebe is in order, however. His statement that Bodin places 'reason above revelation' makes Bodin sound too much like Herbert of Cherbury and other so-called deists who found that distinction unproblematic—which Bodin definitely did not. The transitional nature of his thought is indicated in the fact that he recognizes no sharp distinction; I argue in fact that he would have had trouble understanding it, since revelation and 'right reason' are virtually equated (p12f.). Herbert then cuts the knot and separates the two.

With regard to Strenski and Segal, mine is clearly a book that neither would have written. Both of them fix their attention on some issues that are not central to the book, but in doing so identify critical issues for more study and debate. Strenski makes a convincing plea for the sort of historical study required to deepen our account of the explanatory tradition, while Segal exposes the need for finer distinctions in order to engage the contemporary discussion, particularly of explanation and interpretation.

Strenski pointedly shows that I have not paid sufficient attention to some of my own authors (especially Durkheim's sociological understanding of knowledge): by almost exclusive attention to texts, I have failed to explain

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my explainers, and that failure in turn undercuts my case against those who persist in advocating theological explanations of religion in the academy (the 'persistence of astrology' in his title). Because their approach continues to enjoy a 'social basis of support . . . and thus a social sort of rationality', my too-Humean (i.e. intellectualistic) account of the rise of naturalism is not sufficient to ensure its dominance. My procedure should not foster the illusion that the entire explanatory tradition has been, or can be, explained in this way. I agree that such a project will require fuller knowledge of context, biography, etc., for, as Strenski asserts, ideas 'are made possible by their social location'.

Strenski's remarks remind us that we are engaged in a competition for social rationality which is being affected not merely by arguments, but more critically by the way religion departments are being built and how the next generation of scholars is being trained. Only by making substantial gains in that arena will naturalism become 'mainstream', and not

a mere 'alternative'.

Accepting the limitations of my own approach, however, I still believe that there is a critical difference between reasons and causes, and legitimate work in exploring the former as well as the latter. The distinction is notoriously hard to make with regard to human thought and action, but it seems clear that someone's reasons for thinking or doing something do not exhaust the nexus of discoverable causes for the same thought or action. In my work, I have concentrated on reasons by following selected texts and—as I admit at the beginning (p. xiii)—arranging them in a certain order, guided by a logical structure that I imposed on the texts, namely, putting the question of the rise of naturalism to all of them, and arranging a chronological series that shows how it came about. There is nothing necessary about my sequence (i.e. that B had to think as he did because A thought in a certain way before him)—nothing explanatory, therefore, about the whole, in the causal sense Strenski calls for.

On the other hand, the fact that ideas can travel beyond their original contexts to different ones makes 'history of ideas' possible—which is what I try to do. At least a nod to the determinative power of context appears at the beginning of the book, where I sketch the critical factors influencing Bodin, and observe that the questions he raises had to be confronted by someone. But I also think that once a set of issues gets the attention of intellectuals, as these questions did, they gather a certain momentum of their own. With subsequent writers, the weight of reasons may then increase in proportion to the weight of external causes. (Medieval scholasticism is an extreme example of this: everybody wrote commentaries on Lombard's Sentences. Even there, however, the social structure of the medical university legitimated such procedures, and the outside world also

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intruded.)³ While it is to be hoped that others with the expertise that Strenski has on Durkheim will follow his lead with other figures, such accounts must not forget that Durkheim read books by older authors and built on their ideas.

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Strenski's reference to the Catholic Modernists points in a second fruitful direction for research in depth: the need to develop a better understanding of the *religious* writers contemporary with the emerging naturalists. Filling in this idea-context will help protect us from Vico's 'conceit of scholars', ensuring that each author is placed in the context of his own discussion before being 'whiggishly' called upon to contribute to ours.

On Durkheim's going 'beyond the letter', the interpretation offered by Tiryakian is not at all what I had in mind by comparing Durkheim's analysis with the earlier practice of allegory. The common ground for my comparison is the notion that the birth of the text ('text' here being a literary artefact, testimony, or a set of practices, e.g. rituals) is determined in part by hidden causes of which the author is unaware, a situation that requires an interpreter to go beneath the surface meanings of a text in order to explain and understand it. A fair analogy is possible, I believe, because allegory claimed to explain the text of the Bible by appealing to a cause behind the conscious motives of its authors—to wit, a Divine Author who was 'writing' history in a certain way.

Translated from a theological to a naturalistic framework, Durkheim's and Freud's explanation of their texts also exposes a causal nexus of which participants are not aware. Thus, Durkheim's and Freud's reference to natural causes stands in place of the allegorical/religious reference to a divine causality (grounded in the premise that God is the author of nature, history and Scripture). In both cases, it is absolutely necessary to explain the text in order to interpret it properly. While Strenski is right that my comparison does not constitute an historical explanation of Durkheim, it does show the persistence of certain problems confronted by scholars struggling to make sense of texts whose surface meanings elude comprehension because the analyst's assumptions are at variance with those of the original authors.

It was not my intention, by the way, to recommend Durkheim's naturalism to religious folk by making this comparison! On the contrary, my comparison serves to highlight the decisive difference between interpretations that are grounded in naturalistic as opposed to religious explanations (cf. p.161).

Strenski offers one criticism that provides an entrée to Segal, when he writes (re my Durkheim), 'Preus gives us precisely the version of a naturalist explanation of religion easily dismissed by non-naturalists, now feeling even more justified in returning to their old ways'. Whether Strenski's approach

will alleviate this situation or not remains in doubt, since true believers are wont to regard the impact of context on thought as irrelevant anyway.

The focus of Segal's essay is quite different from Strenski's. He organizes his essay around four defensive strategies of religionists rather than around the argument or method of the book. In that context, Segal finds my case disappointingly weak, as well it must be when ranged against his cloud of contemporary witnesses. Admittedly, my distinctions are too broad to engage the complexities of the contemporary discussion among his authors. My intent was to show that the alternative to the religious (or 'religionist') tradition is the outcome of an extended discussion, going back not merely to Bodin but to the classical period.4

Segal is disappointed in part because I have failed (like so many before me) in the tedious campaign to drive a stake through Eliade's heart, once and for all. Segal gives us a momentarily Humean Eliade (religion grounded in 'human need') to expose the weakness of my references. But if (as Segal claims) Eliade 'never says' what causes the human need for religion, what does Segal make of his silence? Since Eliade repeatedly eschewed the work of social-scientific analysts, and showed no interest in pursuing anthropological inquiry such as Hume's, how does Segal think Eliade would have explained the human need for religion, other than with reference to 'Transcencence'?5 And how does Segal, who does not quote Eliade to support his argument, account for the recurrent statement of Eliade that I quoted (p. xviii), viz. that 'the sacred' (not merely the 'need' for it), is an element of human consciousness? Indeed, how would Eliade (or anyone, for that matter) even identify a need as 'religious' without reference to some religious object? With reference to Eliade, then, Segal's attempt to separate a human religious need from 'the sacred' seems completely artificial.

Segal's most serious criticism is his challenge to the basic thesis that also provides the organizing principle of the whole book: he doubts that 'the debate between religionists and social scientists is over origin and cause'. Although it took me a long time to come to that rather pedestrian conclusion, it now seems both obvious and useful. Segal has not given me any reason to back away from it, so long as his 'social scientists' is broadened to cover all naturalistic (vs. non-naturalistic)⁶ approaches. If I have misidentified the fundamental issue of the debate, Segal should delay no further in telling us what it is.

Meanwhile, I cannot make anything out of the thesis that religion has 'no cause at all', and have no quarrel with religionists who propose a 'naturalistic religious explanation of religion', assuming that they can explain themselves and have something to contribute to the task of explaining religion. The allegation that they escape from my net therefore

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The distinction between explanation and interpetation is much more complex than I present it in the book, and Segal ably shows that I 'overlook or efface' a number of ways to distinguish the two. His efforts to elaborate that discussion deserve further attention to contemporary authors such as those he cites.⁷

Among several misrepresentations or misunderstandings of what I say, the most important is perhaps Segal's discussion of Tylor, where he only confuses what is clear in my book regarding how I use 'origin' and 'cause'. Clarity on this matter is crucial, because writers like Evans-Pritchard sought to banish inquiry about causes by bashing a straw man—the vain search for origins (cf. p. xvii).

In my presentation, Tylor's mistake was to reduce the question of cause to that of origin, i.e. to think that an account of the original cause of religion (the rational need to explain experience) was exhaustive. (I put less stress than I perhaps should have on the critique of the 'intellectualism' of Tylor's theory). Durkheim and Freud understood the weakness of that theory, recognizing that the data (especially the continued vitality of religion) demanded a better explanation. My move from Tylor to the later two writers is therefore not a shift of focus 'from . . . the cause of religion to the survival of religion', as Segal states, but from an explanation that can (at best) explain only how religion began to one that seeks to explain as well why it persists.

Durkheim regarded the pursuit of origin as unscientific and fruitless, and Freud (even though he stuck stubbornly to his notion that the primal crime really occurred) was under no illusion that any direct literary or archaeological evidence from the past would prove his story of origins. His best evidence came from his clinical work with individuals; this he projected backwards on the bridge of ontogeny recapitulating phylogeny.

Segal is also mistaken about the significance of the fact that for Tylor, religion 'becomes ethics'. First, he simply bypasses my point (p.148) that Tylor's theory of religion sees no intrinsic connection between religion and morality. For Tylor, ethics is not religion at all, and Tylor does not therefore see ethics as a 'function' of religion that replaces the explanatory one. Rather, when religion 'becomes' ethics it evolves into something else. When he talks about ethics, then, Tylor is not explaining the 'persistence of religion'.

To conclude, I thank the contributors to this exercise, and I hope that Strenski is right, that my book might serve as a 'catalyst' for progress in the work we do.

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Explaining Religion, p.3: for Bodin, 'the context generated, even required', the

questions he raised.

For example, on the exquisitely theoretical question of how the sacraments cause grace, late-medieval Sentences-commentators clearly reflect the new economic realities of the late-medieval context when they explain the efficacy of the sacrament in terms of a contract between God and the church.

4 Cf. Michel Despland, La Religion en Occident: Évolution des Idées et du Vécu. Montreal,

Editions Fides, 1979.

I do not, by the way, 'lump' Eliade with Schleiermacher and Otto on pp. xviiixix, or with anybody else, and on p. 200, note 56 I simply cite the fact that Eliade

pays tribute to Otto. 6 I do not use the archaic term 'supernatural' (as Segal does) as a general term to cover non-naturalist approaches-among other reasons, because the naturalsupernatural dichotomy is western and has long since been superceded in theological discussion. Spiro's 'superhuman' is better; for the present discussion, Strenski's 'non-naturalistic' is most appropriate.

7 I doubt that Spiro 'reduces' questions of interpretation to explanation (in the sense of claiming that all questions of interpretation can be so reduced); rather, his interpretations are in service of explanations that he is attempting to make,

without precluding further interpretations by others.

8 Some examples: my lament (p. 210) about the 'isolation' of scholars in their several departmental fiefdoms is a lament for us all, having nothing to do with an opinion Segal wrongly attributes to me, that religionist scholars are isolated. A citation (p. 198) of Ricoeur does not 'praise' him, and Segal again simply misses (or ignores) my point, that two scholars with opposite opinions on most things can agree that interpretation does not make explanatory questions disappear. Finally, I never even suggest that I think Freud expected religion to survive far into the future. Its survival in his own time was simply a fact that he tried to account for, at the same time recommending its demise.

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THE ORIGINS OF THE MONTANIST MOVEMENT: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

D. H. Williams

What was the Montanist movement? It is a question which historians still struggle to answer. Once the traditionally held notion that Montanism shared certain features of Phrygian paganism is dismissed, we are left to account for its reported aberrant characteristics by another means. It is the contention of this article that the adaption of a 'millenarian' model may grant us new insight into the dynamics of the movement's origin, especially in addressing those questions that ask why the movement began when it did, and what was its purpose in calling Christians to accept the new authority of the Paraclete as revealed through Montanus and his prophetesses.

One of the earliest major internal challenges that faced the nascent church in the 2nd century, apart from Gnosticism and Marcionism, was a charismatic movement called, by its own adherents, the 'New Prophecy'. In the second half of Marcus Aurelius' reign (A.D. 161-180), 1 a sudden outburst of prophesying occurred, proclaiming the portent of a new and climactic age. According to the 'Anonymous' account preserved by Eusebius, an obscure village in Phrygian Mysia called Ardabau2 was witness to a series of convulsed and frenzied utterances by a certain Montanus.3 Being 'possessed' by the Spirit, he was thrown into a trance and uttered messages purporting to be the words of the Paraclete Himself, who used the prophet as His mouthpiece: 'I am neither angel nor envoy, but I the Lord God have come'. 4 Two women, who were said to have forsaken their husbands,⁵ joined Montanus and likewise were so 'filled with the Spirit' that they prophesied in the same manner.6 Eusebius also mentions a later refutation written by Apollonius which cites that Montanus named Pepuza and Tymion (two small towns in Phrygia) Jerusalem, which had for the movement, if not eschatological, some kind of present prophetic significance. By means of visions and new revelations, the faithful were exhorted to the necessity of assuming the obligations of a new community and rigorous mores—such as the annulling of traditional relationships, stringent fasts, preferred continence—all in recognition and preparation for the new age of the Paraclete now begun in their lifetime.

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What exactly was the 'New Prophecy'? Was it simply a renewal of the early prophetic spirit? Or was it something alien to the concerns of the Church? This is the chief question that still lurks behind the much-debated issue of the reason of the Montanists' condemnation. In order to explain the more aberrant characteristics of the movement, such as the ecstatic prophetic utterances and frenzied babblings reported by Eusebius, scholarly opinion has traditionally pointed to the Phrygian origins of the movement and the possible parallels that exist between the Montanist phenomena and the more extravagant activities of the cult of Cybele and Attis.8 The predominance of such a view has had its dissenters. For instance, P. de Labriolle, in his seminal work on the subject, finds nothing in Montanism that suggests remnants of pagan cults.9 It is true that the 'New Prophecy' bears the marks of a product of native Phrygia, but it was also a uniquely 'pneumatic' movement, a new thing, and its indebtedness to its Phrygian background ought not to be overexaggerated. Based upon this conclusion, it has been suggested more recently that we should distinguish between the 'Phrygian character' of the movement's origins and any specific connection with paganism. 10 And it is along these same lines that H. von Campenhausen, inter alia, has argued that the distinctive features of Montanism derive not from Phrygian paganism, but from the world of the Revelation of John. 11 Indeed one finds evidence for a new emerging consensus among the more recent publications regarding this question. D. E. Aune, for example, has astutely observed that the deliberate attempt on the part of Christian heresiolgists to paganize Montanus has led many modern scholars to conclude that Montanist prophecy was an intrusion of pagan revelatory ecstasy into Christianity. 12 Dennis Groh has also shown how closely some of the extant oracles preserved in Epiphanius, which are attributed to the founding leaders of the movement, parallel or contain specific scriptural allusions. 13

Commensurate with the problem of Montanist origins, scholars continue to debate over the early church's opposition to the 'New Prophecy' and in what ways the movement was considered heretical. There was obviously some confusion among the early anti-Montanists themselves judging from their multiple and sometimes contradictory polemics, 14 which has only exacerbated subsequent attempts to isolate the 'heretical' element(s) in the movement. Modern treatments, in varying degrees, tend to identify the major antagonism as a polarization between the gradual institutionalization of the Church and the opposition this necessitated towards charismatic movements. 15 Against this backdrop of increasing episcopal authority, the Montanists themselves are normally viewed as a 'revivalist' or 'pneumatic' movement, either in continuous and increasing episcopal authority, and increasing episcopal authority episcopal authority episcopal authority, and increasing episcopal authority episcopal movement, either in continuation with the Church's prophetic tradition or as an amalgamate of China in the Church's prophetic tradition or as an amalgamate of Christian apocalypticism and native Phrygian

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In attempting to evaluate the Montanists as a movement, present historians face similar problems of ambiguity which confronted the 2nd-century bishops. How shall we characterize the Montanist phenomena? In what way are we to understand the Montanist phenomena as a 'revivalist' or 'purist' movement, especially in light of its Phrygian birthplace? It would seem that a re-evaluation of the origins of the movement is in order. 18 This article cannot pretend to offer a comprehensive re-assessment, but surely the beginnings of such a movement must rest on certain assumptions about the social context of its origins and what social role the movement played. Specifically, I would like to suggest that a plausible means of interpretation lies in defining the 'New Prophecy' as a millenarian movement. By using this type of sociological model, I believe we are able to diagnose and explain better the prophetic exaggerations and antinomian behaviour that has so troubled historians about the movement. Of course all such theoretical models have their limitations and not every aspect of Montanist teaching or practice may follow a millenarian 'pattern'. Like all movements classed as 'millenarian' there are certain factors that are sui generis to that particular movement. Montanism is no different and due to gaps in the historical records or even elements of early Christianity in rural Asia Minor that we do not yet fully understand, we will find that not all the data can be accounted for. Despite these widely recognized limitations, there is enough reliable ancient evidence to use this cross-disciplinary approach and it can allow us to answer more adequately two important questions about the movement that evades a strictly historical method: (1) What factors prompted the 'New Prophecy' to arise?, and (2) what was the new movement trying to accomplish?

The idea of considering Montanism as a millennial movement is not a new one. Norman Cohn's well-known book, *The Pursuit of the Millennium* (1957) discusses Montanism, even if in a cursory fashion, as one of the millennial prototypes which prefigured the millenarian movements of the Middle Ages. E. R. Dodds footnotes Cohn's book in his published lectures on Christian (and Pagan) prophecy at the end of the 2nd century, but he only insinuates the connection. ¹⁹ It is T. D. Barnes, who, also citing Cohn, views the 'New Prophecy' definitively as a millenarian movement. ²⁰ However, given the purpose of their respective tasks, none of these scholars attempts to illuminate the specific features of Montanism that permit its characterization as such a movement. In the following I will therefore seek to introduce some of the better-known research from the burgeoning field of the sociological study of millennial movements and apply its findings to the available historical data concerning the early advocates of the 'New Prophecy'. ²¹

DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF MILLENARIAN MOVEMENTS
Before we engage in a study of the outstanding characteristics of millenarian

movements, it is first necessary that some preliminary definition be made. In its original and limited use, the term 'millenarian' referred to a literal 1000-year reign of Christ over an established messianic kingdom on earth. According to Revelation 20: 4ff this event follows the second coming and precedes the Last Judgement. During the time of the millennium, the devil is helplessly bound, unable to deceive the nations, while the faithful who suffered martyrdom at the instigation of the devil, come to life and reign with Christ. Following the Last Judgment, the millennial kingdom comes to an end only in the sense that it becomes broadened in the culmination of a new creation:

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And I saw a new heaven and a new earth; for the first heaven and the first earth passed away, and there is no longer any sea. And I saw the Holy City, new Jerusalem, coming down out of heaven from God, made ready as a bride adorned for her husband. And I heard a loud voice from the throne, saying, 'Behold, the tabernacle of God is among men, and He shall dwell among them, and they shall be His people, and God Himself shall be among them; and He shall wipe away every tear from their eyes; and there shall no longer be any death; there shall no longer be any mourning, or crying or pain; the first things have passed away. (Rev. 21: 1–4)

It is interesting to note that Christianity, at least in its infancy, has been defined as a type of millennial movement. Both J. Gager and G. Theissen have developed this idea²² and show how the 'Jesus movement' was born out of a politically and socially oppressive environment, centred on a messianic figure (and later charismatic leaders), contained prophetic promises of an imminent salvation and reversal of the present social order, and accompanied by displays of charismatic power. Of course the raw material for the Christian framework was the prophetic tradition of Judaism. The importance of this indebtedness ought not to be underestimated since Christian eschatological ideals were largely built upon the Jewish apocalypses, some of which had a wider circulation amongst Christians than among Jews.²³

Beyond a strictly Christian pattern of the millenarian ideal, the term 'millenarianism' can be understood in a much wider sense, incorporating accounts of such movements from various societies, some of them having had no influence from Christianity whatsoever. As S. Thrupp remarks in her report on the current status of millennial research, the term may be applied figuratively to any conception of a perfect age to come, or of a perfect land to be made accessible. Here the idea of a millennial reign has no necessary connection to a literal 1000-year period, but simply that a radical change at the culmination of history occurs. Usually this means that a fundamental change in the present order is being sought, not merely an improvement of it. Such a belief is a potent agent for change, and can produce behavioural consequences that range from withdrawal from society to revolutionary

violence. Yet millennial 'dreams' must be carefully distinguished from revolutionary ideals which also seek a radical transformation of the present order. 26

More precisely, we can define a millennial movement on a comparative level as a religious-social movement which expects immediate, total, collective, this-wordly salvation, and which believes this will be accomplished by divine agencies.²⁷ These elements form the core of general millennial expectations. To expand on this definition a little further, we may say that millennial movements live in the conscious awareness that they are in the 'last days' and that history is swiftly moving to a decisive stage of consummation. This implies that the millennial expectation is imminent in that the promised consummation will come soon and at any moment. Coupled with such an emphasis on an apocalyptic view of the future, there is an explicit rejection of the present order as depraved, hopelessly lost without redemption. In light of this radical discontinuity, the transition from the present to the final future is not seen as a gradual process but as a sudden, revolutionary leap onto a totally different level of existence.28 We can expect that another effect of this discontinuity is a strong anti-traditionalism, which may entail a flamboyant overthrow of behavioural norms. Society quickly identifies such an action as antinomian, but to the members of the millennial movement it represents not a rejection of traditional norms so much as a necessary redefinition of appropriate behaviour in preparation for the millennial event.

Moving beyond expectation to realization, we see that the millennium itself has a distinct terrestrial nature. The culmination of history will not be realized in some other-worldly heaven, but on the earth. As Talmon notes, 'The millenarian view of salvation is transcendent and immanent at the same time. The heavenly city is to appear on earth'. ²⁹ Hence, the social order with its injustices and oppression will be completely altered and rectified. This is significant in that new meaning is given to this present life and members of the movement can interpret their circumstances in a purposeful manner. Also related to this is the 'collective orientation' of the millennium. The aim of the movement is not only salvation of the individual soul, but the establishment of a kingdom for the elect. Members of the movement now become divinely appointed emissaries and call upon people to prepare for the advent which looms in the near future.

Having established certain definitional parameters of millenarism, it is important to point out that millennial movements are favoured by specific socio-economic circumstances and may arise in a particular socio-religious context when several of these circumstances are present together.

One condition that sociologists are universally agreed upon is that of deprivation in some form or even catastrophe. Indeed, M. Barkun argues that disaster(s) is the chief factor for producing millenarian commitment.

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'Disaster is prominent in the genesis of millenarian movements. One need only point to the eruption of European chiliasm in the wake of the Black death, or the rise of the Taiping rebellion after a protracted period of flood, famine, banditry and invasion'. Cohn too, points out that at the time of the first Crusade of 1095, the areas swept by mass enthusiasm had been afflicted by famine and drought for ten years and by plague for five years. But unexpected natural disaster is by no means the only cause for such social disruption. Political oppression, demographic shifts, economic depression, etc., all might constitute a catastrophic situation. Such prolonged conditions can cause or portend a form of social disintegration. As a consequence, anxiety and meaningless may create a need for a radical solution. Millennial expectations flare up as a reaction to the hardships and suffering almost as a type of explanation. They tell us why we are in the dreadful circumstances of the present and also assure us that problems which appear insoluble will be dealt with totally, favourably and summarily. See the present and also assure us that problems which appear insoluble will be dealt with totally, favourably and summarily.

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While millennial movements have been widely distributed geographically, they do not occur everywhere. More often they cluster in the so-called 'backwoods' areas or rural regions, as opposed to urban centres. Talmon describes this attraction to millennial movements as essentially a 'prepolitical' phenomenon. That is, millennial hopes most appeal to that part of the social strata which is politically passive, having no or little experience of political organization, and hence no political power. ³³ To this can be added the simple observation that rural societies are more compact, homogeneous, and so more vulnerable to radical change than the polyglot nature of urban societies. ³⁴

Once we examine those contexts that are more favourable to the rise of millennial movements, the characteristics that are most often associated with such movements are hardly unexpected. One of these is the appearance of the charismatic leader or prophetic figure. Acute social disruption caused by disaster or other oppression tends to render traditional forms of leadership impotent. In such a situation, new charismatic leadership is more easily given a hearing, especially where a prophetic tradition already exists. In his discussion of such leaders, Max Weber states that 'leaders in distress have been holders of specific gifts of the body and spirit; and these gifts are believed to be supernatural, not accessible to everybody'. 35 Weber lays stress on the fact that about on the fact that charismatic authority is a quality possessed by an individual and so incites a following from which he is able to demand total obedience. Later sociologists have questioned such an emphasis and although they agree that the perceived leader must authenticate himself/herself by displays of charismata, it is necessary to be a such as the perceived leader must authenticate himself/herself by displays of charismata, it is necessary to be a such as the perceived leader must authenticate himself/herself by displays of charismata, it is necessary to be a such as the perceived leader must authenticate himself/herself by displays of charismata, it is necessary to be a such as the perceived leader must authenticate himself/herself by displays of charismata. of charismata, it is nevertheless, a perceived leader, one who derives his/her authority not so much be in the leader. authority not so much by individual gifts but by what others believe helshe possesses. 36 In any case, the all individual gifts but by what others believe helshe possesses. 36 In any case, the charismatic 'connection' that exists between the

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leader and the followers allows the leader to presume upon the behaviour of the group in that he/she is proclaiming the message of the new age or kingdom on behalf of God. Hence, the movement is apt to make claims of esoteric knowledge upon which the faithful begin to model their new society and reject the old.

A further characteristic of the millenarian movement is the extreme dedication and fervour it evokes. In a majority of cases this fervour is accompanied by an abandonment of self-control, expressed in enthusiastic ritual, violent motion or antinomian acts. ³⁷ By way of example, one is able to point to the convulsive, ecstatic experiences that characterized the early stages of the Taiping rebellion ³⁸ or the frenzied and prolonged dancing (the 'Ghost dance') that accompanied millenarian expectations in North American Indians. ³⁹ Such activities may be understood as emotional group dynamics in preparation for the imminent advent. At the same time there is a withdrawal from conventional society and its relationships; property is sold, fields are left untilled, family ties abrogated or suspended, religious relationships are superseded. In the place of society left behind, the fellowship of the group becomes all-embracing, a unique communion, often demanding a new lifestyle and demonstrations of allegiance.

Depending on the severity of the circumstances, the attraction of millennial promises can have a rapid diffusion. Members are readily recruited by the proclamation of an immediate and total salvation. Consequently, many millennial movements in their early stages spread quickly. After a time however, a severe problem may confront the movement when the promised kingdom does not appear and the hopes of a new social order do not crystallize. The realization of such a crisis may result in the disillusioning and disbanding of the movement. And yet, this is often not the case. The lack of prophetic confirmation may produce an increased emphasis on proselytizing, which attempts in some way to compensate for doctrinal inconsistency by directing attention to religious zeal. Invoking the dissonance theory of Festinger, Riecken and Schacter, J. Gager has argued that the recognition of non-actualization has been a major factor in early Christianity for increased evangelistic fervour. 40 Talmon has also noted that an alternative reaction to non-actualization is a switch from a short-range, radical millenarism to a long-range and more or less attenuated version of it.41 In this sense, the promised millennium may become spiritualized or simply postponed to a future date. In either case, this involves a turning point in the movement, and the millennial dynamism becomes, as Weber puts it, 'routinized' into a new institution that can come to have a long life span.

Having concluded this brief survey about the context and characteristics of millenarism, I will now propose that the earliest known Montanist practices and beliefs can most accurately be interpreted by considering the outbreak

of the 'New Prophecy' in accordance with the millenarian model. In order to prove my assertion, we will look at the social and political context in which the 'New Prophecy' originated, and then turn to examine some of its attending characteristics.

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THE RISE OF THE 'NEW PROPHECY'

When Marcus Aurelius ascended the throne (A.D. 161), the world news was not good. Severianus, the Roman governor of Cappadocia, had invaded Armenia in order to stay an aggressive Parthian advance into the area. He and his army were utterly defeated and the Parthians eagerly pressed into Syria. Pot till five years later did Lucius Verus manage to achieve a Roman victory—thanks mostly to his able general, Avidius Cassius, who would betray Marcus in less than a decade—who then returned to Rome to celebrate the triumph. Yet the celebration was short-lived, for the returning legions had brought a plague back from Syria which rapidly spread throughout the empire and would linger until the end of Marcus' reign. The severity of the plague was such that half the population of the Mediterranean world is reckoned to have died. Captives had to be imported in order to help with repopulation.

In this same year, there was a sudden collapse of the Roman northern frontier as thousands of Germans and Slavs pushing southward easily overran the thinly manned outer defences of the empire. Panic is said to have spread all over Italy especially, which caused many Romans to speak of 'the end of the empire'. The imperial treasury was, however, empty. Marcus Aurelius tried to raise revenue by disposing of this own valuables, a public auction which lasted for over two months. And yet, he could not avoid the imposition of new taxes. Under the strain of the barbarian invasions, he was forced to collect a special tax in Asia Minor, which caused particular discontent and resulted in several revolts.

The Roman Pagan attitude toward Christianity during this period was uncertain and unstable, sometimes even volatile. Christians were well aware of the fact that disaster could portend persecution. 49 And a series of earthquakes in Asia earlier in the decade 50 had only made their position more precarious. Given the events of the 160s it comes as no surprise that a flood of Christian apologies filled the later years of the emperor. 51

It is out of this environment that the 'New Prophecy' came forth. The combination of natural disasters and political/religious oppression—a perceived breakdown in the present order—made conditions ripe for millennial expectations. Undoubtedly, the ravages of the plague, the threat of war, and the powerless and vulnerable position of Christianity required some new solution in the eyes of certain Christians in a rural village of Phrygia. According to later reports, a self-proclaimed prophet named

Montanus announced that God was once again revealing his truths for this final age and calling on men to respond. Now the Paraclete was said to be actively working through the person of Montanus (and his prophetesses), who is reputed to have stated: 'Behold, man is a lyre, and I hover over him like a plectrum: man sleeps but I watch; behold, the Lord is removing the hearts of men and giving them (new) hearts'. But this did not involve, as some later opponents supposed, the claim that Montanus was the Holy Spirit in person, arther, that a new and final age had begun: a second Pentecost had descended, conversion to which bestowed nothing less than a 'new heart'. Even more controversial was Montanus' claim that the Spirit was speaking directly through him and his followers. The divine will had a new herald and was being mediated through him—an essential qualification for the millennial prophet.

From the very beginning of the movement, Montanus was joined by two women followers named Priscilla and Maximilla.⁵⁴ These also, in the present time of distress, acted as prophetic vehicles for the Paraclete, just as Maximilla is quoted as saying: 'The Lord has sent me as adherent, preacher and interpreter of this affliction and this covenant and this promise . . .'⁵⁵ Interestingly, N. Cohn and G. Shepperson have pointed out the predominance of women as leaders or followers of millenarian movements. ⁵⁶ The reasons for such attraction (e.g. the personality of the prophet, reaction to male dominated society, etc.), however, are by no means conclusive and stand in need of further clarification by future studies.

It is clear that Montanus and the two women constituted the new leadership for the new age of the Spirit being announced. Traditional political leadership and ecclesiastical authority—different though they be in the latter 2nd century—are both perceived as helpless or ineffective by the series of disasters and present insecurities. Conversely, the authority of Montanus and his prophetesses is sealed by the divine nature of their message and the charismatic manner in which the message is delivered.

It was this 'charismatic manner' in particular that so alarmed the catholic correspondents in Eusebius' account. Based on a second-hand report, the 'Anonymous' writes of Montanus:

He began to be ecstatic and to speak and talk strangely, prophesying contrary to the custom which belongs to the tradition and succession of the church from the beginning. Of those who at the time heard these bastard utterances some were vexed, thinking that he was possessed by a devil and by a spirit of error, and was disturbing the populace.⁵⁷

The writer goes on to say that others, however, were not mindful of the distinctions made by the Lord and became carried away with the spirit and encouraged Montanus to prophesy further. In the midst of the enthusiasm,

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the two women were said to be filled with a spirit in like manner so that they 'spoke madly and improperly and strangely like Montanus'. The seriousness with which the 'orthodox' took the supernatural character of these prophesy. ings and charismata is indicated by the fact that Eusebius mentions in at least two instances how some bishops attempted to exorcise Maximilla or Priscilla, but for one reason or another were not successful. 58 To attribute Pagan influences to these ecstatic utterances and frenzied behaviour, as many modern scholars were once wont to do, seems completely unnecessary and unwarranted. First, it is significant that the earliest anti-Montanists themselves never indicate a relationship between Montanist behaviour and the rites of Cybele (or any other pagan cult). Being from Asia Minor, certainly these bishops would have known and availed themselves of such a criticism if it were possible. Second, we have seen that a majority of millennial movements are characterized by a loss of self-control, possession, trances, fantasies and other ecstatic phenomena. Some of these characteristics are clearly revealed in the anti-Montanist literature. In addition to the behavioural descriptions already noted earlier, we find that a certain Theodotus was said to have become carried away by the spirit, so that he fell into a trance and became completely at the mercy of the abiding spirit.⁵⁹ Moroever, the Montanist mode of prophetic speech is roundly criticized for its unscriptural use of ecstasy and 'involuntary madness of the soul'. 60 In such a state, any member of the sect could be expected to see visions and hear voices.⁶¹

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These displays of perceived charismatic power and urgent preaching had their effect. The success of Montanus and the prophetesses in attracting a following is evident by the exaggerated personal prominence given to the trio in virtually all the anti-Montanist sources. ⁶² Hippolytus' chief complaint, in his refutation of diverse heresies, is the Montanists' excessive reliance upon these three leaders. 'They allege that they have learned something more through these, than from the Law, and prophets and the Gospels. But they magnify these wretched women above the Apostles and every gift of grace...

The geographical origination of the Montanist movement may also reveal something of its millennial character. As we have already noted above, the place of Montanus' first activities was located in an obscure village in the Phrygian countryside. Likewise, the towns of Tymion and Pepuza, which were to be the site of the new Jerusalem, are referred to by Apollinaris (bishop of Hierapolis), as 'little places' in Phrygia. Given the nusticanus origin of the 'New Prophecy' and its unconventional character, one is tempted to wonder whether the basis of Apollinaris' (an urban bishop) distrust (and dislike) of the 'New Prophecy' was that it came from such a rural setting. We will consider this possibility further below.

But the movement did not remain strictly rural for long. 66 Not unlike many millennial movements, the great promises of its message and the

emotion which it evoked caused the 'New Prophecy' movement to spread very rapidly throughout Asia Minor. The 'Anonymous' account in Eusebius tells us that the church of Pontus in Galatia was very much agitated by the orophecies. 67 It is evident that the movement had a strong missionary impulse⁶⁸ and was attracting many catholics away from 'the fold'. Two disciples of Montanus, Alcibiades and Theodotus, are specifically mentioned as having won a wide reputation for the movement by their charismata. 69 Indeed, the 'Anonymous' cites the fact that the faithful (i.e. the catholics) in Asia were compelled to meet often and in many places on the subject of Montanus and his followers. 70 Unfortunately, the writer gives no other details nor mentions in what towns such synods were held. 71 As a result of these 'assemblies', or local synods, the utterances of the 'New Prophecy' were pronounced as profane and rejected from the Church.

On what basis was the movement condemned? The accounts giving explicit descriptions are mixed. We have already seen the suspicion aroused by the manner of prophesying and other charismata used by the advocates of the 'New Prophecy'. We have also seen how the position of Montanus and the prophetesses were viewed as threats to the traditional modes of religious authority. But another feature that appears in the early accounts of orthodox writers are complaints about the abrogation of certain social norms: something not at all unexpected if one is dealing with a millenarian movement. It is unfortunate that such a marked degree of vindictiveness permeates the extant accounts of Montanist activity so that it is difficult to know exactly what to attribute to the movement. Perhaps one of the more straightforward descriptions is given by Apollonius, another anti-Montanist of the Eusebian catalogue, who states:

But the deeds and teaching of this recent teacher show his character. It is he who taught the annulment of marriage, who enacted fasts, who gave the name Jerusalem to Pepuza and Tymion, which are little towns in Phrygia, and wished to hold assemblies there from everywhere (or 'in his desire to gather to them People from all quarters'), who appointed collectors of money, who organized the receiving of gifts under the name of offerings, who provided salaries for those who preached his doctrine in order that its teaching might prevail through gluttony.72

What are we to make of these seemingly disparate elements attributed to Montanus? I would suggest that we have here a description—however muted of a millennial community which has formed around the leadership of Montanus. Not untypically, such communities live by another set of social norms, not merely in rejection of traditional society, but in reformulation preparation of the age to come. To an outsider, this will appear to be radically antinomian and Apollonius' reaction is hardly surprising.

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Examining the passage quoted above, we see first that the traditional bonds of marriage are being abrogated, presumably (if it is true) as part of a requirement for those wishing to join the new community. This anticipates an accusation which the same writer makes in a later passage that Maximilla and Priscilla left their husbands the moment 'they were filled with the spirit' (V. 18.3). It is not clear whether every member of the movement had to separate from his/her spouse, or whether, like later in Manichaeism, there would be a distinction in the lifestyle between the perfecti and credenles. Second, we find that new regulations regarding fasting were instituted for the followers of Montanus. The accounts in Eusebius never specify what this entailed, but if the practices of the movement in Tertullian's time are a reflection of the earlier stages, 73 than we can speculate that the requirements for fasting were probably much more rigorous. According to Tertullian the occasions for fasting are said to be much more frequent,74 and more arduous by using only dry or parched foods (xerophagia).75

In both cases, regarding the breach of traditional rules of relationships and intensifying religious norms for devotional fasting, the advocates of the 'New Prophecy' have established a different order of existence, commensurate with their standards of purification and preparation for the new age announced by Montanus and the prophetesses. That such behaviour is 'typical' of millennial movements in one way or another can be seen by looking at movements as diverse as the example of the Vailala Madness, a cargo cult from New Guinea, 76 to the more sophisticated programme of the Taborites

in 15th-century Bohemia.77

In addition to the establishment of personal legislation, the 'New Prophecy' had a system of support which was designed to finance its missionaries. From Apollonius' remarks we can infer that there existed a relationship between local sympathizers of the movement and its leaders and its prophets. As Weber points out, such a connection results in a process by which the 'prophet' secures the permanence of his preaching as well as ensures the economic existence of the prophetic enterprise and those who lead it. 78 This is the first stage of the institutionalizing of the movement. Withdrawal from traditional society mandates a millennial collectivity to provide for is members. However, the orthodox writers probably saw this collective arrangement as nothing ment as nothing more than a violation of well-known prohibitions against wandering prophets asking or receiving money. 79 The characterization of the 'false prophet' in the early 2nd-century work, The Shepherd of Hermas, must have seemed particularly suited to the reported behaviour of Montanus.

In the first place, that man who seems to have a spirit exalts himself and wishes to have first place, and he is instant. to have first place, and he is instantly impudent and shameless and talkative, and lives in great luxury and in and lives in great luxury and in many other deceits, and accepts rewards for his prophecy... Is it then possible for a divine spirit to accept rewards and prophecy? It is not possible for a prophet of God to do this, but the spirit of such prophets is of the earth. 80

The last feature in the Apollonius passage is the mention of renaming Tymion and Pepuza 'Jerusalem'. It is difficult to know exactly what this action was to signify. Nor can we count on an oft-cited and much-disputed oracle preserved by Epiphanius to lend us further illumination. Over ten years ago D. Powell emphasized the uncertainties of Epiphanius' reporting the oracle (i.e. whether it should be attributed to Priscilla or a later prophetess Quintilla) and that the content of the oracle was incongruent with the evidence of Apollonius. More recently, D. Groh has insisted that scholars take the textual conclusions of H. G. Voight more seriously, who demonstrated that the source for the oracle in question is to be distinguished from the preceding body of oracles found in Epiphanius and of doubtful authenticity.

We are forced, therefore, to look elsewhere for assistance in the interpretation of Apollonius' statement. Such assistance might be found in Augustine's *De Haeresibus* 27. Based largely on Epiphanius' catalogue of heresies, Augustine tells us that the Pepuzians or the Quintillians get their name from a certain place which Epiphanius said in his day was already a deserted city. 'They, considering this something to be divine (divinum aliquid esse arbitrantes), call it Jerusalem.' It would appear that the significance of calling Pepuza (and Tymion) Jerusalem carries implications more for the present than for the future. This would be in accord with Apollonius' explanation that Montanus performed the renaming 'in his desire to gather to them [the cities] people from all quarters'. A tempting interpretation suggested by Powell may be to understand that these two towns were named not in the content of the heavenly Jerusalem, 'but rather in that of the Jerusalem of Acts—the re-creation of the highly organized but Spirit directed primitive Church'. 85

Whether the message of the 'New Prophecy' announced an imminent consummation of the age is not as clear as we might like. The only other oracle that is considered reliable and has a distinctive apocalyptic flavouring is one attributed to Maximilla, who declares she is not going to be followed by another prophet(ess) but that the end (consummation) will come. Ref Even this, as Wright has observed, presumably did not exclude some interval before it ensued. To not the one hand, we have some evidence to indicate that some kinds of eschatalogical hopes are being nourished by the practices of the members. If there is agreement that the movement was more closely aligned to the world view of the Johannine community, we must expect that apocalyptic dreams would be very much alive. In what way such expectations differed from many 2nd-century Christians, is difficult to tell. Tertullian

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certainly anticipated a speedy consummation, but this need not have been solely due to Montanist influence.

On the other hand, in the gathering of a new prophetic community at Pepuza—a place now invested by the 'New Prophecy' with unique social significance in this inaugural age of the Paraclete—we can find elements of a present, unheavenly kingdom which also echoes the customary millennial emphasis on the terrestrial nature of the promised kingdom. We must keep in mind that millenarian goals are fostered, in part, by present social circumstances and are intricately tied to a vision of a new order of social relationships. The promises of the 'New age' of the Paraclete will be experienced on earth, and the millennial community becomes the exemplary embodiment of this new social order. It represents, at the same time, the last in-gathering before redemption is finally complete.

CONCLUSION

Once the 'New Prophecy' is reckoned as a millennial movement, a number of its seemingly strange phenomena became more intelligible. We can understand why such a movement would have more likely arisen during the reign of Marcus Aurelius (and why, therefore, the earlier date given by Epiphanius is, phenomenologically speaking, less likely). We are better able to decipher the sources for the ecstatic utterances and frenzied behaviour on a social level without the necessity of pointing to Pagan sources of influence, and so strengthen the growing evidence that the 'New Prophecy' was in fact a genuinely 'Christian' movement. The reaction of the catholic bishops trying to exorcise the evil spirit in the Montanist prophets tells us how different the prophetic characteristics of the movement appeared in the eyes of its catholic contemporaries. And yet these phenomena make perfect sense in light of the uncontrolled or trance-like states frequently found in other millennial prophetic traditions. Likewise, the abrogation and redefinition of social and religious norms must be considered as part of the millennial impulse toward total dedication in expectation of a total, collective and this-worldly salvation. This is what Burridge refers to as the 'new rules' of the millennial community, for a new social order is being brought into being. 88 We also saw that the accusations against the Montanists' reception of money and gifts may have more to do with support of itinerant preachers and their relationship to local communities of sympathizers, than merely to the vindictiveness of their opponents.89

Are we therefore better able to tell why the advocates of the 'New Prophecy' were condemned? Perhaps the question to ask in this regard is why are millenarian movements condemned by established societies? Unfortunately, very little has been done in this area on a comparative basis, since the study of millenarian movements is itself still in the beginning stages. Ocertainly

the practices and rapid spread of the Montanist movement were bound to come into conflict with established society, both Roman and the 'third world' society of Christianity. Already, by the end of the 2nd century, a number of Montanists had been martyred. The 'Anonymous' speaks of those who, along with the orthodox Christians Caius and Alexander of Eumenia, were executed at Apamea. Whether Montanists placed a higher value on martyrdom than Catholics, or actively courted it, is a question still debated today. The antinomian behaviour and complete rejection of temporal authority typical of 'New Prophecy' communities would have undoubtedly confirmed the Montanists as 'anti-social in Roman eyes. However, given the passage just mentioned by the 'Anonymous', it appears that the Romans did not distinguish between Catholics and Montanists.

It is not difficult to see that on a sociological basis an immediate and probable cause for conflict was the rural origins of the 'New Prophecy' and the distrust among urban bishops this was sure to raise. As R. MacMullen points out, the differences between Roman cities and rural villages cannot be taken too lightly as a means for our interpreting ancient society as a whole. Even economic ties between the two, which were the closest, were not friendly. 'The two worlds regard each other as, on the one side, clumsy, brutish, ignorant, uncivilized; on the other side, as baffling, extortionate, arrogant.'93 That this view continued to be shared by Christians as well can be seen by Gregory of Nazianzus' remark, 'how great a distance between city-dwellers and the rural'.94 The irrelevance of traditional ecclesiastical authority in Montanist circles would have only exacerbated the tensions between them.

The catholic Church, which by the 4th century had attained a position of political supremecy, would have had little sympathies for a millenarian movement. Montanist proclamation of a new age and social order must have flown directly in the face of a Christianity that had begun to redefine the present age as the millennium. The temporal context of the late 2nd century, with its social and economic uncertainties that had given birth to the movement, was no longer relevant. Apart from those institutionalized aspects of ethical rigorism that had come to characterize the later forms of the movement, such as the 'Cataphrygians', the millenarian impulse faded from view until the Middle Ages.

NOTES

It is not completely certain when the movement began. Pierre de Labriolle, La Crise Montaniste, Paris, 1913, 569ff, argued for acceptance of the Eusebian evidence in the Ecclesiastical History which yields a date of c. 172, over that of Epiphanius, who assigns the origins of Montanism to the nineteenth year of Antoninus Pius (who became emperor in A.D. 138). T. D. Barnes' more recent consideration of the arguments has favoured a date of 171/172, see 'The Chronology of Montanism', The Journal of Theological Studies N. S. 21 (1970),

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tudy ainly pp. 403-408. See G. S. P. Freeman-Grenville, 'The Date of the Outbreak of Montanism', The Journal of Ecclesiastical History 5 (1954), pp. 7-15 for an argument in support of the earlier date. Barnes' use of the evidence seems the most convincing to me and is the position now most commonly accepted by scholars. Furthermore, if the thesis of this paper is solvent, it may be possible to affirm phenomenologically the later dating to Marcus Aurelius' reign.

Cf. 'Ardabau' by P. de Labriolle, Dictionnaire d'Histoire et de Géographie Ecclésia. stiques, Vol 3. The remoteness and unimportance of this village makes precise location almost impossible. W. R. Ramsay, Cities and Bishoprics of Phrygia, Oxford, 1895, p. 573, supposes that Ardabau might be found 15 miles to the

south or south-west of Philadelphia, but this is only a conjecture.

3 Historia Ecclesiastica, V. 16.7. I will be using the text from the Loeb Classical Library, trans. by Kirsopp Lake, London, 1926.

4 Epiphanius, Panarion XLVIII. 11. From R. M. Grant (trans.), Second-Century Christianity: A Collection of Fragments, London, 1946, p. 95.

Historica Ecclesiastica, V. 18.3.

Historica Ecclesiastica, V. 16.9: '... he raised up two women as well, and so filled them with the spurious spirit that they too chattered in a frenzied, inopportune and unnatural fashion'.

Historica Ecclesiastica, V. 18.2; Pan. XLIX. 1.

As D. Powell ('The Tertullianists and Cataphrygians', Vigiliae Christianae 29 (1975), pp. 46-47) points out, Neander in 1827 began the well-received custom of finding the root of Montanist extravagances in the Phrygian cult of Cybele. Many modern scholars have followed a similar assessment such as, W. Schepelern, Der Montanismus und die phrygischen Kulte, Tubingen, 1929, pp. 113f; S. L. Greenslade, Schism in the Early Church, London, 1953, p. 109; R. A. Knox, Enthusiasm: A Chapter in the History of Religion, Westminster, MD, 1983 (orig. pub. Oxford, 1950), pp. 26ff.; E. Evans, Tertullian's Treatise Against Praxeas, London, 1948, p. 75; R. J. Deferrari (ed.), Tertullian: Disciplinary, Moral and Ascetical Works, Vol 40: 'Fathers of the Church' New York, 1959, p. 312. An article by A. Dauton-Fear, 'The Ecstasies of Montanus', in Elizabeth A. Livingstone (ed.) in Studia Patristica, Vol XVII.2, Oxford, 1982, pp. 648-651, has asserted that the trance-like state of Montanist prophesying is more closely associated with the cult of Apollo which was widespread in Asia Minor.

La Crise Montaniste, p. 3ff.

S. E. Johnson, 'Asia Minor and Early Christianity' in J. Neusner (ed.), Christianity, Judaism and Other Graeco-Roman Cults, Vol II, Leiden, 1975, p. 138.

Ecclesiastical Authority and Spiritual Power, trans. by J. A. Baker, Stanford, 1969, 11

pp. 47-48.

D. E. Aune, Prophecy in Early Christianity and the Ancient Mediterranean World, Grand Rapids, 1983, 2012, 1983 12 Grand Rapids, 1983, p. 313. Aune thinks that Eusebius' source has intentionally modelled his depiction of Montanus' inaugural prophetic experience, as well that of the two women, Maximilla and Priscilla, after Lucian's satire on the prophet Alexander of Abonuteichos. Like von Campenhausen, Aune sees the prophetic character of Montanism as closely associated with the Gospel of John and the Apocalpyse of John.

Dennis E. Groh & Robert Jewell (eds), The Living Text: Essays in Honor of Ernest W. Saunders, Lanham MD 1005 W. Saunders, Lanham, MD, 1985, pp. 73-95.

The compiled accounts by Eusebius note the following charges: prophesying in an ecstatic manner (V 171) 14 an ecstatic manner (V. 17.1), lack of demonstrating prophetic succession (V. 17.4); inappropriate asceticism (V. 18.1), yet also shameless ornamentation and usury (V. 18.4, 7); no martyrs (V. 16.12), or that their martyrs receive

pecuniary gain (V. 18.5).

D. F. Wright in his article, 'Why were the Montanists condemned?', Themelios 2 (1976), p. 22. The Montanists' 'renewal of prophecy' was simply caught in the middle of 'a church pre-occupied with closing the ranks, drawing clear lines of demarcation and safeguarding its heritage'. J. Ash suggests that the use or charism of prophecy was assumed by the episcopacy, and in doing so disallowed legitimacy to any movement claiming such charismata outside of the institutional Church. 'The Decline of Ecstatic Prophecy in the Early Church', Theological Studies 37 (1976), pp. 235, 250.

E.g. E. Hennecke & W. Schneemelcher (eds), New Testament Apocrypha, Vol II,

London, 1965, p. 688 ('a restoration of early Christian prophecy').

W. H. C. Frend, Martyrdom and Persecution in the Early Church, Oxford, 1965, 17

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For one of the latest attempts, see Frederick Charles Klawiter, 'The New 18 Prophecy in Early Christianity: The Origin, Nature, and Development of Montanism, A.D. 165-200 Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1975.

Pagan and Christian an Age of Anxiety, New York, 1970, p. 68, n. 1.

Tertullian: A Historical and Literary Study, Oxford, 1971, pp. 130-131, see 131, n. 8. Cf. Aune, p. 313, who, in his brief analysis of the movement, comes to the same conclusion. Of course R. L. Fox, Pagans and Christians, New York, 1987, pp. 405-409 has denied that millenarianism was at the heart of the Montanist movement. His intent is to depict Montanism as just one more example of the intense interest in oracles and prophetic inspiration in the 2nd century. To do so, however, Fox is compelled to minimize or 'naturalize' the series of phenomena associated with the rise of the 'New Prophecy'.

The most comprehensive collection of patristic citations about Montanism can be found in P. de Labriolle, Les Sources de l'Histoire du Montanisme, Fribourg, 1913. Selections from Epiphanius, Tertullian and Eusebius are found in Grant,

Fragments, pp. 95-98 and The New Testament Apocrypha, Vol II, pp. 686-687. Gager, Kingdom and Community, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1975, pp. 20ff; Theissen, The Sociology of Early Palestinian Christianity, trans. by John Bowden, Phila-

delphia, 1977.

Cohn, Pursuit of the Millenium, New York, 19612, pp. 7ff. See Aune, pp. 121ff. for a discussion of the apocalyptic eschatological tradition in Judaism. The illfated Bar Kochba rebellion is cited as an example of a Jewish millennial move-

24 However, Bryan Wilson, Magic and the Millennium: A Sociological Study of Religious Movements of Protest Among Tribal and Third-World Peoples, London, 1973, states that the documented incidence of millennial movements appearing completely ignorant of Judeo-Christian-Muslim eschatalogical conceptions is very rare. See his chapter entitled, 'The Social Sources of Millennialism: three

ambiguous cases', pp. 196-220. 'Millennial Dreams in Action: A Report of the Conference Discussion', in Silvia Thrupp (ed.), Millennial Dreams in Action: Essays in Comparative Study, The

Hague, 1962, p. 12.

The ideological parallels between the two types of movements are rather striking. See Yonina Talmon, 'Pursuit of the Millennium: The Relation between Religious and Social Change', Archives Européennes de Sociologie 3 (1962), p. 144ff for a

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comparison and contrast.

N. Cohn, 'Medieval Millenarism: Its Bearing on the Comparative Study of 27 Millenarian Movements', Millennial Dreams, p. 31; Talmon, Pursuit of the Millennium', pp. 130-133.

Talmon, p. 130. 28

29 Ibid., p. 131.

Disaster and the Millennium, Syracuse, 1986, p. 62. 30

'Medieval Millenarism', p. 34. 31

32 Barkun, p. 56.

- 'Pursuit of the Millennium', p. 138. She also discusses the conditions of a 'post-33 political' phenomenon where millennial expectations appear after the downfall (or threatened downfall) of a developed political system.
- This is not to say that millennial movements are not known to occur in cities. See Barkun, pp. 71ff. In fact, Cohn, Pursuit, p. 30 has insisted that the town. with its lack of intersocial ties and greater mobility, is the more suitable medium for millennial movements (at least in western European medieval society).

35 H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, New York, 1958, p. 245. Cf. The Sociology of Religion, trans. by Ephraim Fischoff, Boston, 1964, 4th edn, pp. 46ff.

See Gager, pp. 28ff; Barkun, pp. 88ff. 36

- Y. Talmon, 'Millenarism', The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 9-10, p. 353. In a minority of cases, such fervour may also manifest itself in excessive self discipline, stringent observation of rules and extreme asceticism.
- Eugene P. Boardman, 'Millenary Aspects of the Taiping Rebellion (1851-64)', 38 Millennial Dreams, p. 77.

39 Barkun, p. 15.

Kingdom and Community, pp. 38ff. D. Bartlett has rightly criticized Gager's overemphasis on this theory to explain the force of the missionary impulse in early Christianity. 'John G. Gager's "Kingdom and Community": A Summary and Response', Zygon 13 (1978), pp. 119-120. For the theory of cognitive dissonance see L. Festinger, H. Riecken & L. Schachter, When Prophecy Fails, New York, 1956.

41 'Millenarism', p. 352.

F. H. Hayward, Marcus Aurelius: A Saviour of Men, London, 1935, p. 121. 42

43 Ibid., p. 123.

H. D. Sedgwick, Marcus Aurelius, New Haven, 1921, p. 166. 44 L. P. Wilkinson, The Roman Experience, London, 1975, p. 182. 45

46 Hayward, p. 148.

47 Sedgwick, pp. 167-8.

M. Rostovtzeff, The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire, Vol I, Oxford, 1926, p. 373. Cf. pp. 348ff for the more serious of the revolts.

49 Barnes, Tertullian, p. 130; W. H. C. Frend, The Early Church, Philadelphia, 1965, p. 69 Cf. Tertullian, A. H. C. Frend, The Early Church, Philadelphia, 1965, p. 69 Cf. Tertullian, A. H. C. Frend, The Early Church, Philadelphia, 1965, p. 69 Cf. Tertullian, A. H. C. Frend, The Early Church, Philadelphia, 1965, p. 69 Cf. Tertullian, A. H. C. Frend, The Early Church, Philadelphia, 1965, p. 69 Cf. Tertullian, A. H. C. Frend, The Early Church, Philadelphia, 1965, p. 69 Cf. Tertullian, A. H. C. Frend, The Early Church, Philadelphia, 1965, p. 69 Cf. Tertullian, A. H. C. Frend, The Early Church, Philadelphia, 1965, p. 69 Cf. Tertullian, A. H. C. Frend, The Early Church, Philadelphia, 1965, p. 69 Cf. Tertullian, A. H. C. Frend, The Early Church, Philadelphia, 1965, p. 69 Cf. Tertullian, A. H. C. Frend, The Early Church, Philadelphia, 1965, p. 69 Cf. Tertullian, A. H. C. Frend, The Early Church, Philadelphia, 1965, p. 69 Cf. Tertullian, A. H. C. Frend, The Early Church, Philadelphia, 1965, p. 69 Cf. Tertullian, A. H. C. Frend, The Early Church, Philadelphia, 1965, p. 69 Cf. Tertullian, A. H. C. Frend, The Early Church, Philadelphia, 1965, p. 69 Cf. Tertullian, A. H. C. Frend, The Early Church, Philadelphia, 1965, p. 69 Cf. Tertullian, A. H. C. Frend, The Early Church, Philadelphia, 1965, p. 69 Cf. Tertullian, A. H. C. Frend, Philadelphia, 1965, p. 69 Cf. Tertullian, A. H. C. Frend, Philadelphia, 1965, p. 69 Cf. Tertullian, A. H. C. Frend, Philadelphia, 1965, p. 69 Cf. Tertullian, 1965, p. 69 Cf. T 1965, p. 69. Cf. Tertullian, Apologeticum 40: 'If the Tiber rises as high as the city walls if the Nile door and the leavens city walls, if the Nile does not send its waters up over the fields, if the heavens give no rains if there is an accordance of the heavens are not send its waters up over the fields, if the heavens give no rains if there is an accordance of the heavens are not send its waters up over the fields, if the heavens are not send its waters up over the fields, if the heavens are not send its waters up over the fields, if the heavens are not send its waters up over the fields, if the heavens are not send its waters up over the fields, if the heavens are not send its waters up over the fields, if the heavens are not send its waters up over the fields, if the heavens are not send its waters up over the fields, if the heavens are not send its waters up over the fields, if the heavens are not send its waters up over the fields are not send its waters up over the fields. give no rains, if there is an earthquake, if there is famine or pestilence, straight-away the cry is "Away with the Classes of there is famine or pestilence, straightaway the cry is "Away with the Christians to the lion!"'

Barnes, 155. The earthquakes occurred during the proconsulate of Antoninus Albinus 16/1. Cf. Fusebing, W. C. 50

F. L. Cross & E. A. Livingstone (eds), The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, 2nd edn, p. 871: 'A number of Church, 2nd edn, 2nd edn Church, 2nd edn, p. 871: 'A number of Christian writers addressed "Apologies"

to him [Marcus], including Athenagoras, and (probably) Theophilus of Antioch, whose works survive, and Miltiades, Claudius Apollinaris and Melito. Bp. of Sardis'.

Pan. XLVIII. 4 (Grant, p. 95). 52

Historica Ecclesiastica, V. 14.1. 'I am the Father, and the Son and the Paraclete', is one of the oracles ascribed to Montanus. Aune, p. 315 describes this oracle (and three others like it) as oracles of 'self-commendation', i.e. oracles whose function it is to legitimate the prophetic spokesman as a reliable source of divine revelation.

Historica Ecclesiastica, V. 14.1. 54

Pan. XLVIII. 13 (Grant, p. 96). 55

Cohn, 'Medieval Millenarism', p. 41; Shepperson, 'The Comparative Study of 56 Millenarian Movements', Millennial Dreams, pp. 47-48.

Historica Ecclesiastica, V. 16.7-8. 57

V. 16.17; 19.3. 58

V. 16.14. 59

V. 17.3-4. 60

Tertullian (quoting Priscilla), De Exhort. Cast. 10. 61

Wright, 'Why Were the Montanists Condemned?', p. 19. 62

Refutatio VIII. 12. For an argument that poses the issue as a conflict between ecclesiastical authority and the threat of charismatic women, see Elaine C. Huber, Women and the Authority of Inspiration, Lanham, MD, 1985, pp. 20-46.

64 See n. 2.

Historica Ecclesiastica, V. 18.2.

W. H. C. Frend's statement that Montanism remained a rural movement can hardly be true. 'Town and Countryside in Early Christianity', Studies in Church History 16 (1979), p. 36. Moreover, Frend bases his conclusions upon W. M. Calder's article, 'Philadelphia and Montanism' (1922) that the 'Christians for Christians' inscriptions from the upper Tembris valley are clearly Montanist. Such confidence may not be warranted, see Elsa Gibson, The 'Christians for Christians' Inscriptions of Phrygia, Missoula, 1978.

67 Historica Ecclesiastica, V. 16.4.

68 Historica Ecclesiastica, V. 14.1. One is forced to read between the lines: 'Of these some like poisonous reptiles crawled over Asia and Phrygia, and boasted that Montanus was the Paraclete and that the women of his sect, Priscilla and Maximilla, were the prophetesses of Montanus'.

69 Historica Ecclesiastica, V. 3.4.

70 Historica Ecclesiastica, V. 16.10. But when the arrogant spirit taught to

blaspheme the whole Catholic church throughout the world ...

Cf. C. J. Hefele, Histoire des Conciles I, Paris, 1907, pp. 127ff. Hefele cites the Libellus synodicus of Pappus as possible evidence for these synods. Two in particular are mentioned in this document: (1) 'A holy provincial synod was held at Hierapolis in Asia by Apollinaris, the most holy bishop from this town and 26 other bishops, judged and condemned there Montanus and Maximilla false prophets and at the same time Theodotus the Corruptor'; (2) 'A particular holy synod met under the most holy bishop Sotas of Anchialus (in Thrace by the Black Sea) and a dozen other bishops; it was convinced of the error or Theodotus the Corruptor, Montanus and Maximilla, and condemned them'.

Historica Ecclesiastica, V. 18.2. There is no need to assume that Apollonius' report is pure slander, even if he has purposely couched his description to raise

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- 73 Caution must be used when looking to Tertullian for corroborating evidence about the beliefs or practices of the early stages of the movement in Phrygia, Powell assumes too quickly that Tertullian's montanist writings are an accurate reflection of early Montanists. For example, he is ready to discount the allegations of Apollonius in Eusebius in part because Tertullian appears to be unaware of them ('Tertullianists and Cataphrygians', pp. 42-43). It hardly needs mentioning anymore among students of Montanism that the movement by Tertullian's time was a more institutionalized and culturally compromised sect (which Powell is very aware of) than it was during its first few decades in the heartland of Asia Minor.
 - 74 De Jejunio 1.
 - 75 De Jejunio 10. Peter Worsley, The Trumpet Shall Sound, London, 1957, pp. 75ff.

Cohn, Pursuit of the Millennium, pp. 217ff. 77

Sociology of Religion, p. 60. Weber sees this process as an inevitable result of the process of routinization.

79 Didache XI. 12; Shepherd of Hermas, Mand. XI. 12. Cf. Historica Ecclesiastica, V. 18.4, 5. Both Priscilla and a confessor named Themiso are specifically condemned for receiving financial gifts.

Mand. XI. 12. 80

'Appearing as a woman clothed in a shining robe, Christ came to me; he put wisdom into me that this place is sacred and that there Jerusalem will come down out of heaven.' Pan. XLIX. 1 (Grant, p. 96).

Powell, p. 44. It is also observed that Tertullian, who 'shared with most of his Catholic contemporaries a belief in the eschatalogical descent of the New Jerusalem', knows nothing of Pepuza.

83 'Utterance and Exegesis', pp. 80-81.

84 Historica Ecclesiastica, V. 18.2.

85 Powell, p. 44.

Pan. Haer. XLVIII. 11 (Grant, p. 96).

87 Wright, p. 20.

88 K. Burridge, New Heaven, New Earth, Oxford, 1969, pp. 165ff.

For instance, W. Bauer notes the tendency of the anti-Montanist polemicists to marshal everything he can in order to make his opponents appear as contemptible as possible. Orthodoxy and Heresy in Earliest Christianity, trans. by a team from the Philadelphia Seminar on Christian Origins, and ed. by G. Strecker & R. Kraft, Philadelphia, 1971, pp. 137-138.

Talmon, 'Millenarism', p. 352. But now see A. Shupe and D. G. Bromley, 'Social Responses to Cyles' in P. F. Responses to Cults', in P. E. Hammond (ed.), The Sacred in a Secular Age, Berkeley 1985, pp. 59-79. C. V. T. Berkeley, 1985, pp. 58-72; G. V. Zito, 'Toward Sociology of Heresy', Sociological

Analysis 44 (1983), pp. 123-130. 91 Historica Ecclesiastica, V. 16.22.

In support of the traditional view, as well as an argument that the importance of martyrdom among Montaging of martyrdom among Montanists explains why women could attain leadership roles within their rapks, can be seen and the second attain leadership and roles within their ranks, see Frederick Klawiter, 'The Role of Martyrdom and Persecution in Developing the Persecution in Deve Persecution in Developing the Priestly Authority of Women in Early Christianity.

A Case Study of Montaniem, Ch. J. Authority of Women in Early Christianity. A Case Study of Montanism' Church History 49 (1980), pp. 251-261. In opposition to the traditional assumption tion to the traditional assumptions, William Tabbernee has made a good case that Montanists differed little Company of the Arguer of the Argue that Montanists differed little from catholic attitudes on the subject. He argues that there is a lack of evidence that Montanists either voluntarily sought or taught that one should provoke the authorities to martyrdom. 'Early Montanism and Voluntary Martyrdom' *Colloquium* 17 (1985), pp. 33–44.

93 Roman Social Relations: 50 B.C. to A.D. 284, New Haven, 1974, p. 15.

94 Ibid., p. 31 quoting Gregory's Oratio 2.29.

95 See Cohn, 'Pursuit of the Millennium', p. 14.

96 Notice in Augustine's (Epiphanius') description of the 'Cataphrygians' or 'Pepuzians' (De Haer. 26; 27) the complete absence of the more offensive traits mentioned in Eusebius' account, especially traits such as ecstatic prophesying.

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SACRED MARRIAGE IN THE STUDY OF RELIGION:

A PERSPECTIVE FROM INDIA ON A CONCEPT THAT GREW OUT OF THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST

William Harman

Current scholarly understandings of 'sacred marriage' are seriously impaired by work that focuses on ancient cultures, primarily in the Near East, but also in Greece. Even when 'diffusionism', 'patternism', and an apparent preoccupation with rituals presumed sexual are all factored out, modern scholars offer little new because they appeal to rituals never witnessed and to fragmentary texts which we can only hope had some connection to ritual. Focusing on an extant ritual tradition in India with a 200-year-old festival and an explicitly associated text from the 13th century CE, Harman suggests that here, at least, sacred marriage is an elaborate, ritual statement of kinship responsibilities and obligations reestablished each year among deities and between deities and selected human beings.

One of the earliest uses in western scholarship of the Greek term 'hieros gamos' ('sacred marriage'; often anglicized as 'hierogamy') was to describe the union of Zeus and Hera in Greek mythology. This mythic union was, we are told, ritually celebrated annually at Gortyna in Crete. As a generic term, sacred marriage was used in early scholarly treatments of religion in reference to marital pairings of divine beings in mythology—and particularly in cosmogonies—2 as well as in reference to ritual re-enactments of marriages between male and female deities.

Sir James Frazer's early use of the term 'sacred marriage' included references both to mythic accounts and ritual re-enactments. But the sacred marriages to which he referred did not always involve deities. Rather, 'sacred marriage' for him included those rituals in which human individuals embodied 'spirits of vegetation' in the earth, and so engaged in sexual intercourse to effect, by virtue of sympathetic magic, the fructification of field and womb. Frazer occasionally used the term 'theogamy' but he also used 'sacred marriage' in the same context. In general, while 'theogamy' referred to ritual, 'sacred marriage' referred to both myth and ritual. His use of the two terms did not indicate an intention to draw significant distinctions between them.⁵

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The term 'sacred marriage' gained greater currency in the history of religions as a result of its use in the context of the religions of the Ancient Near East. In particular, it was isolated by S. H. Hooke as one of the five basic elements in a pervasive 'ritual pattern' which scholars claimed to have found in Egyptian, Sumerian, Mesopotamian, Canaanite, and Israelite! religions. The postulation of this widespread pattern by the 'myth-ritual' school inspired extraordinary scholarly efforts in the decades that followed on the part of such scholars as C. J. Bleeker, Adam Falkenstein, Henri Frankfort, Theodore Gaster, Thorkild Jacobsen, E. O. James, Samuel Kramer, H. Ringgren, and many others. 12

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This scholarly interest in the Ancient Near East was also encouraged by new archaeological finds and corresponding advances in the ability to decipher newly discovered texts. 13 Discussions about the nature of sacral kingship, 14 the relationships between myth and ritual, 15 the role of annual festivals and sacred time, 16 urbanization, 17 and sacred marriage all profited from this early 20th-century concentration of scholarly efforts on the Near East.

In the earlier works of these scholars certain axioms developed whichthough occasionally challenged—remained part and parcel of the discussions of the 'ritual pattern' as it related to sacred marriage. These axioms were, by and large, unproven working assumptions, and yet they inform to a considerable degree what scholars understand when they speak or write today about the concept of sacred marriage.

In the pages that follow, I intend to outline two of the more prominent of these axioms and to demonstrate how they still influence basic notions about sacred marriage. 18 Though, by and large, the scholarly strategies involving what I call below 'functionalism' and 'patternism' are no longer taken seriously, the residue of these strategies remains. 19 After my brief rehearsal of these two approaches, I shall show how my own study of sacred marriage in another context, that of Hinduism, has convinced me that the meanings of sacred marriage in the Hindu context may well shed new light on what we know of the category. What will become clear, I hope, is that notions regarding a particular conceptual category (in this case sacred marriage) depend, often implicitly, upon the unique circumstances and character of the contexts (in this case the Ancient Near East) in which the category has been studied. In one sense, this should not be surprising: generalizations depend upon the particulars from which the ulars from which they are adduced. I shall show in my conclusions how a study of the marriage. study of the marriages of deities in India invites us to modify our implicit and explicit understandings regarding what sacred marriage is as well as what sacred marriage does.

THE AXIOMS CONSIDERED

Most early discussions of sacred marriage associate it with some sort of fertility

ritual.20 A corollary to this axiom is that the female is the source of the fertility.21

In support of the notion that sacred marriage is always associated with fertility, scholars have cited only two specific textual examples from the Near East. 22 But these two early Sumerian examples are remarkably few to justify the generalization that all instances of sacred marriage are intended to effect fertility. Ira Wheatley expresses doubt in his careful consideration of the issue, but also reflects hesitation to question such a basic assumption when he says. One may properly suppose that it [sacred marriage] continued to be associated with the assurance of fertility, but he does so in the absence of direct documentation'.23

That the female is always the source of fertility is an assumption that contradicts the evidence. In the Sumerian texts it is Dumuzi who is the source offecundative powers rather than his bride Inanna. 24 The metaphor by which the female requests her partner to 'plow my vulva'25 is perhaps the most compelling argument for the female as the embodiment of earth-like fertility. But it is a metaphor that needs to be sustained by the imaginative scholar in order to conclude that she is the source of fruitfulness. Could she not be the repository of what is given, the 'storehouse' as Jacobsen says and as Kramer translates, 26 or the one who 'reproduced' rather than 'created'?27

The insistence that sacred marriage will always imply fertility is in part attributable to (a) a view of ritual which emphasizes its function and (b) the excesses risked by a hermeneutic based on 'patternism'. While both methodological approaches probably can be traced to Frazer's account of sacred marriage, their elaboration by Hooke and other scholars of the myth-ritual school lent them credence in later discussions of sacred marriage. Both approaches have, in turn, become associated with how scholars have studied sacred marriage. To a brief discussion of this I now turn.

The functional requisite

For Hooke and his colleagues in the myth-ritual school, ritual was '. . . a set of customary actions directed towards a definite end'. 28 It was purposive. And there is little doubt as to precisely what that purpose was: ritual was an attempt to control the unpredictable. 29 Further on, Hooke claims that ritual is intended '... to secure the prosperity of the community' (p. 8). Given the Point of view that ritual has to do something for the community, and given the Persuasive pioneering work on sacred marriage by Frazer, it is not surprising that these postulated rituals involving sexual intercourse were said to be celebrated for the purpose of fertility. Hooke admits his dependence on Frazer and often cites Frazer's work.30

What alternative do we have to the appeal of this almost relentless but circular functionalism?³¹ We can go to the other extreme and claim—as Frits

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Staal has done—that ritual has no purpose and therefore no meaning.³² It is, and that, he says, suffices. Yet, this alternative is bent on disregarding people—participants, worshippers. It claims that the 'essence' of ritual is meaningless apart from people who, whether the historian of religions likes it or not, invest it with some meaning. The conclusion that things have no meaning unless people give them meaning, that it is people who attribute meaning to acts and/or objects, is almost trivial. But Staal is on the right track despite a failure to distinguish between 'purpose' and 'meaning'. ³³ Can we not take his argument a few steps further to say that rituals have no intrinsic meaning? Rather, they are invested with meanings—old meanings, new meanings, similar meanings, disparate meanings—by those who witness and participate in them. ³⁴

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Perhaps the crux of the issue lies in our valuation of 'the original intent' of a ritual. If we can suppose that there always is a primordial or original purpose on the part of those who first performed a ritual—and this supposition would be extremely difficult to prove—is it feasible to claim that variant interpretations of the meaning of this ritual are 'wrong', that they are 'corruptions'? Theologians within a tradition may wish to argue so, but because historians of religions are not the guardians of the traditions they study, I do not believe such a judgement is feasible. Variant interpretations may well become enrichments rather than corruptions, and new meanings for old rituals may well be the process by which tradition is revitalized from within.

To put it more simply, there is rarely, if ever, one single meaning or understanding of a ritual. There can be priestly as opposed to lay understandings, popular as opposed to elite, mine as opposed to yours. We exaggerate if we say that there are as many meanings for a ritual as there are people who participate in it, just as the frustrated student of political science exaggerates when he claims that there are as many political parties in France as there are Frenchmen

Somewhere between the extremes there is a middle way. Ritual does not always have a single meaning: it is not always directed toward one particular end. On the other hand, in searching out a ritual's meanings, we need not despair that the meanings it accumulates will reveal some sort of rampant heterodox anarchy.

In questioning the claims of scholars that sacred marriage is always celebrated for the purpose of ensuring fertility, I do not claim that fertility should not be associated with sacred marriage. What I want to say is that fertility is overworked and over-rated as an explanation. Indeed, it has encouraged scholars to 'see' things which are not there. For example, it has led certain scholars to claim, without supporting evidence, that the Israelites must also have had a sacred marriage rite. One scholar admits that if there once was a sacred marriage among ancient Israelites, '... its traces have been carefully

eliminated'. Undaunted, he still claims that it did exist because, 'It would be strange if it were not so, for some such ceremonial is almost universal among agricultural peoples, though in many instances it has lost one or more of its characteristic features'. Several respected scholars have concurred with these conclusions. Some have argued with Robinson from the principle of fertility. Still others have argued from the premise of diffusion and patternism.

Patternism everywhere

The second strategy of earlier scholars who discussed sacred marriage in the Ancient Near East was to view it in the context of ritual patterns and their consequent diffusion. Hooke, again apparently depending on some of Frazer's earlier though less explicit formulations, ³⁷ claims that there was a ritual pattern consisting of five elements widely distributed throughout the Near East. ³⁸ Scholars have not been able to produce an Ancient Near Eastern text in which every one of these ritual elements is explicitly mentioned. ³⁹ Yet, the conviction persisted that the pattern not only existed somewhere textually, but was acted out ritually. The logic for the argument seems to run like this: if we find elements 1, 3, and 4 in one text; elements 1, 2, and 5 in another; elements 4, 2, and 5 in another; and elements 1, 2, 3, and 4 in another, then we can assume that (a) there is a 'whole' pattern and a 'whole' text containing all five elements somewhere and that (b) each of the found texts had all five elements at one time. The fragmentary state of the retrieved texts presumably accounts for the loss of these missing parts.

The logic might be more applicable had the texts appeared contiguously either geographically or temporally. ⁴⁰ But the texts bridge gaps of two to three thousand years and come from cultures as different as the Sumerian, Egyptian,

and Israelite.

Many of the scholars cited in these early studies of sacred marriage were great linguists, each tending to specialize in one or two languages. I suspect that the methods used to decipher and translate texts in a single language or script became the methods used to arrive at more comprehensive conclusions about the Near East as a whole. Specifically, in the attempt to understand what a word or concept means, we must consider the word or concept in a variety of contexts. These contexts provide the scholar with the range of its possible meanings, it general meaning. Hardly any text will use a word in all its meanings, but this does not indicate that the word does not have those meanings.

If this logic is transferred to discussions about cultural patterns, and if we substitute 'ritual pattern' in the place of a particular term, we can perhaps begin to understand the logic of patternism and diffusion. The logic seems to be this: a ritual pattern (term, word, concept) need not have all its elements (meanings) each time it appears. But these elements (meanings) are still a part

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of the ritual pattern (term, word, concept) whether the particular text considered makes the meanings explicit or not. Thus, when we see one or two of the elements in the ritual pattern mentioned, we can assume they are all implied.

One of the problems with this logic is that it assumes that similar ritual forms which are widely distant in space and time have similar meanings. This assumption can be problematic enough if we are dealing with texts in the same language and from generally the same time period. But when the languages are as varied as Assyrian, ancient Egyptian, and ancient Hebrew, and when the cultures these languages transmit are just as disparate, the contention that there are basic similarities needs to be demonstrated rather than assumed.

Earlier scholars of the Ancient Near East who were concerned about sacred marriage saw it in the context of a hypothetical ritual pattern, and tended to see that pattern diffused everywhere. Failure to find evidence for it everywhere was considered a simple failure to find evidence which must have been destroyed or overlooked in archaeological digs. Critics such as Mowinkel ('... the ritual pattern is found everywhere, though it existed nowhere')41 and de Fraine (patternists are likely '... à lire ce qu'il y a derrière les textes de préférence à ce qu'il y a dédans')42 are certainly justified in their hesitations.43

Despite these criticisms, the myth-ritual school must be given credit. It has focused the attentions of historians of religions on sacred marriage, kingship, and myth-ritual relations in a constructive way. The value of these scholars' works should not be measured entirely by the conclusions they draw. What has proved more enduring is their choice of a central core of problems on which to concentrate. Such choices can be one of the real values of a theory, and as we look at sacred marriage in Hinduism, we note that the issues of kingship, sacred marriage, and myth-ritual relations tend to re-emerge in stark relief.

SACRED MARRIAGE IN HINDUISM

Scholars studying sacred marriage in Hinduism operate at a real advantage when we compare the richness and availability of the Hindu material with that of the Ancient Near East. Not only do we have abundant, intact textual materials, but we also have temples in which are celebrated annual occasions of marriages between gods and goddesses. 44 Indeed, a problem at the outset is to narrow the field of inquiry and, arbitrarily, I shall do so by concentrating on accounts of sacred marriage in the major Sanskrit *Purāṇas*. Having done so, I shall then move to a discussion of an annual festival celebration of sacred marriage as it is enacted in one particular temple in the southern Tamilspeaking portion of India. This particular ritual event is also described in a Tamil talapurāṇa ('place history'), 45 a document which, in its entirety, constitutes the sacred history of the famous southern temple city of Madurai and its enormous temple. and its enormous temple. The most important yearly festival celebration in this temple is the marriage of the god and goddess. 46 Though I shall refer to marriages that involve Viṣṇu and other Vaiṣṇava deities, my choice is to concentrate on marriages that involve Siva and Saiva deities. 47

Descriptions or brief mentions of the marriages of deities in Sanskrit Purānas are frequent. 48 I shall divide these marriages into two basic kinds, and in so doing, call attention to one of the first differences between the Hindu material and that studied from the Ancient Near East. First, we have the 'standard' forms of sacred marriage in which deities marry deities. 49 One of the difficulties in isolating this group of formal marriages, however, is that of deciding with some certainty whether those participating in marriages are, in every case, deities. 50 In some texts, for example, Radha is considered a mortal when she marries Krsna. In others, she is a consort and goddess. What we encounter in the Hindu tradition is a situation in which distinctions between humans and deities are not always clearly drawn. Deities and humans live in a cosmos of unusual upward and downward 'mobility'. Deities whose powers are threatened by increasingly powerful mortals often find it necessary in the purānic stories to thwart those mortals about to obtain immortal status, either by virtue of intense penance (tapas) or by virtue of the proper number of horse sacrifices. Conversely, certain deities become mortal: either as a penalty for an indiscretion or as a voluntary act of grace, a self-imposed exile of sorts among the less fortunate. The line between human and divine is so fine, in fact, that the traditions have developed certain criteria for determining whether the appearance standing before you is a person or a deity. Unlike humans, deities do not blink, perspire, or leave footprints, and the flower garlands they wear do not fade. One of the more graphic illustrations of this state of affairs is the Indian childrens' game Mokṣa Patamu or Snakes and Ladders. Predicated on a cosmos in which reincarnation is a fact of life, of many lives, the game begins with each player born as a human. Each player progresses up or down in rebirths as a result of acts performed, determined in the game by throws of the dice. She/he is reborn either as an animal, another human, or a deity. Deities may lose their status and be reborn as humans, as well.

Lines between the human and the divine are quite fluid, then, and, as a result, we find many descriptions of sacred marriage in the purāṇas that involve marriages between deities and human beings. This, then, would be our second category for sacred marriage in the Hindu tradition. Were we to take the lead of Near Eastern studies, we would want to exclude mythic accounts of anything but god–goddess marriages from our consideration of sacred marriage. But to do so would be to exclude a large number of marriages in which at least one deity participates. To do so would also require excluding one of the many mechanisms by which mortals, especially female mortals, attain divine status. Once earthly females marry deities, they tend to take on the status and powers of deities. In the context of Hinduism, then,

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considerations of sacred marriage require a shift of emphasis: we will need to define it, at the level of mythology, as a marriage which involves at least one—but not necessarily more than one—deity as a partner.

These marriages between deities and mortals often involve mortals of royal blood. The mortals most often are the daughters of kings.⁵³ Royalty are often depicted as the representatives par excellence of the human realm in its dealings with deities. For this reason, marriages arranged or accomplished between the daughters of kings and divine males frequently become the vehicle for establishing a formal relationship between a particular deity and humans who are ruled by the king whose daughter marries the deity. In their formal exchanges with deities, kings tend to receive children from the deities and, in turn, to give them their daughters as wives. Repeatedly, the mythology describes how sonless kings are the recipients of miraculously born baby girls whom their fathers eventually give away as brides to deities.54 Throughout India, where arranged marriages are still very much the norm, a man seeks to give his daughter to a groom whose status and power are superior to that of the bride and her family. Given this structure, a son-in-law is regarded with respect and honour: he condescends to marry, and in so doing becomes a powerful ally on whom the king, his family, and his kingdom may count in times of need or stress. When a deity marries a king's daughter, he becomes that king's son-inlaw. Therefore, when mythical accounts of sacred marriage involve (as they so frequently do in India) a deity and a member of a royal family, what the events of sacred marriage establish are contractual arrangements between a deity and a 'family' of devotees. Kinship terms and roles are thus used to describe and to understand deities as members of extended human families. Or, seen from the other direction, kinship relations with deities-established by mythical accounts of marriages with those deities-legitimate a king and his kingdom: the family of the king's daughter is infused with divine blood, so to speak, and frequently the children of such a marriage continue in the hereditary line of rulers. It may be an admission of inferiority vis-à-vis a deity to present him with a wife, but it is a clear statement of superiority and of one's divine right to rule vis-à-vis the world of mortals. 55

In the rather extensive Sanskrit and Tamil purāṇa materials, we find that sacred marriage has relatively little, then, to do with fertility. Rather, marriages of deities tend to be formal statements about the relationships that are being established between participants in the marriage event. Marriages in the human community are delicate moments when new relationships between family units are being forged, when strangers are becoming relatives. Similarly, in accounts of marriages involving deities, marriages are the vehicles for establishing new relations between a deity and a group of humans, or, in some cases, between specific deities.

To demonstrate these dynamics, I have chosen to summarize two especially

important purāṇic accounts of sacred marriage. Both depict the marriage of the deity Siva. The first, from the Siva Purāna,⁵⁷ emphasizes the precarious nature of the marriage arrangements, and it expresses the fears the bride's family have about allying themselves with Siva who, particularly in the northern Sanskritic traditions, is depicted more as an unpredictable rogue. In this first account, we note the dangers involved at nearly every point in the progress of the marriage negotiations. The second is quite different, and comes from the Tiruviļaiyāṭarpurāṇam, 'The Story of the Sacred Games', and constitutes the sacred history of the city of Madurai, in southern India.⁵⁸ Here, the tensions occur only before the marriage when the bride sets out to conquer the world, including all deities and, eventually, Siva himself. In large part, because this second account is found in that part of India where cross-cousin marriage is common, there is far less tension on the occasion of the marriage: the event is, in every sense, an auspicious alliance between a deity and a kingdom. First, then, a summary of the Siva Purāna account:

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Pārvatī's ascetic practices (tapas) and her worship of Siva finally become effective when Visnu intercedes for her, convincing Siva to marry her (III.23.31). After testing Pārvatī's steadfastness (III.75.13-18 and III.26.2-31) Siva agrees to go through with what he calls this silly 'earthly convention' of marriage (III.29.27-40). But it will not be that easy, unfortunately. Siva's unpredictable nature cannot be suppressed: he appears at Pārvatī's genteel home and grossly insults her mother, Menā, who promptly vows that her daughter will never marry such a rascal. 59 The gods also become a bit worried about the marriage, but for different reasons. They recognize that Pārvatī's father, Himavat (the personification of the Himalaya mountains) is a valuable asset on earth with all his (its) jewels. But giving away such a marvelous bride as Pārvatī willingly to a deity will accrue so much merit that Himavat will be transported directly to heaven, thereby robbing the earth of Himalaya's jewels (III.31.1-8). They decide to plant doubts in Himavat's mind by casting a shadow of doubt on the character of the intended son-in-law. But in the Siva Purāna nobody can disparage Siva except Siva himself. And so the gods convince Siva to take the form of a Vaisnava Brahmin who then appears before Himavat to insult and disparage the intended son-in-law in no uncertain terms. The plan works, and Himavat is convinced that there will be no marriage to this disgusting carrier of skulls and snakes. Siva then sends emissaries to talk to his intended in-laws and to dissuade them from cancelling the wedding. Eventually the emissaries succeed in rearranging the de-arranged marriage and Himavat sends out a letter of betrothal. But Siva then appears for the wedding in his fierce form, and when Menā sees him she vows to commit suicide and to kill her own daughter before this rogue becomes her daughter's husband. Siva decides to stop playing games, appears in his beautiful form, Menā relents, and the marriage is, once again, rearranged.

However as the ceremony is underway, at one of the crucial points in the proceedings, each party to the alliance is required to recite the lineage from which she/he comes. Pārvatī has no problems, but Śiva cannot proceed: he is eternal and has no progenitors. Himavat, shocked, refuses to continue. But eventually he is talked out of his proud position and he agrees reluctantly to proceed. Another

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problem develops: Brahma, the officiating priest, becomes very interested in the beautiful bride-to-be. She so excites him that he ejaculates involuntarily in the middle of the ceremony. Furious at this breach of gentlemanly conduct, Siva prepares to kill Brahma then and there. Viṣṇu intercedes once more, takes Siva aside and explains that it would not look good to kill the officiant at one's own wedding. Cooler heads prevail and what, by now, seems like a routine crisis, is averted. Eventually, the wedding does occur.

The account of Siva's marriage in the 'place-history' (talapurāṇa) of the great Madurai Temple in southern India is quite different. The document does refer in various places to Siva's capacity to be wild, unpredictable, and even insulting. He sometimes frightens faithless kings (II.21.1-29), inspires devotees to steal money from the royal treasury (III.58.1-86), or even appears in the form of a lazy, mud-slinging workman who accepts money for work he refuses to perform (III.61.1-114). Still, in the longest and arguably the most important chapter of this document, Siva is a model bridegroom in the account of his marriage to the king's daughter Mīnāksī. Instead of being referred to as a 'carrier of skulls who frequents cremation grounds', here he is 'Sundareśvara', or 'the beautiful lord'. The story leading up to the marriage is revealing, for in it the tension and the fear that surround marriages in many Sanskrit texts precede the actual marriage. Once the marriage is arranged, the tension is over; assurances abound that an alliance with Siva as son-in-law can only be beneficial. From the crucial fourth and fifth chapters of the Tiruvilaiyāļarpurānam, here is a summary:

King Malayattuvacca Pāṇḍya and his wife, rulers of the recently established city of Madurai, are desperately childless. After they have celebrated in vain 99 horse sacrifices for the express purpose of getting a son, the deity Indra appears to them, threatened and fearful: if the king celebrates one more sacrifice he will replace Indra as the king of celestials. Indra tells the king to perform another kind of sacrifice, a 'son-producing sacrifice', and so the king does. From the sacrifice, however, emerges not a son but a 3-year-old daughter with three breasts. The king is, of course, upset, but an ethereal divine voice tells him not to despair, to rear the child as a son and to train her as though she were a prince. When she sees the man who eventually will become her husband, that third breast will disappear, says the voice. The girl eventually grows into a woman and succeeds her father as ruler of the kingdom. She conquers not only all the earthly kings, but begins to declare war on the kingdoms of the deities as well. Having defeated several, she and her armies in an explicitly vicious battle challenge the forces of the deity who reigns over the Northeast, Siva himself. Having defeated all Siva's forces, she then must face Siva himself, who is called to the land of the sees. himself, who is called to the battlefield from his meditations. As soon as she sees Siva, Mīnāksī's third breast disappears. She becomes shy, passive, and she realizes that her future lord and bushes at 100 cm. that her future lord and husband stands before her. She is instructed by Siva to return to Madurai where he will marry her on the coming Monday. The elaborate descriptions of the marriage results and th descriptions of the marriage require well over a hundred quatrains, and emphasize the joyous fortunate avanishment of the marriage require well over a hundred quatrains, and emphasize the joyous, fortunate, auspicious nature of the event. No hint of danger or anxiety appears in the wedding. Siva marries her, becomes the king of Madurai, and the two reign happily until they abdicate to their son, Ugra Pāndya. They retire into their temple where they are eternally available for devotees in the kingdom when there is need of their assistance to keep the kingdom prosperous and protected.

What we see in both these mythical accounts are carefully arranged events in which a deity enters into a deliberate contractual relationship with a family and a kingdom. Pārvatī is the daughter of the king of the Himalaya Mountains, and in this sense she represents an 'earthly' alliance with the divine Siva. But by virtue of her alliance with Śiva, she also becomes divine. Similarly, Mī<u>n</u>āṭci is the daughter of an earthly king. But she is born by divine means and she becomes a deity in her own right.

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There is another approach we can take to this second story of divine marriage, and since we are discussing sacred marriage as a ritual enactment as well as a mythical account, it seems appropriate to consider the ritual now. A temple marriage between Mīnāksī and Sundareśvara is celebrated annually in Madurai, and has been celebrated without fail for at least the last 200 years.60 The printed temple programme listing the date, time, location and particulars of each segment of the marriage festival in the Mīnākṣī-Sundareśvara Temple of Madurai frequently cites excerpts from the Tiruvilaiyāṭarpurāṇam account of the marriage to explain what is happening during the 10-day ritual affair. During my discussions with priests of the temple, it became clear that the account of the marriage in the Tiruvilaiyatarpuranam was the one to which they referred when they were asked about what happens during the annual ritual marriage. However, as indicated above, rituals often evoke different interpretations, and in this particular case, we have in addition to the accounts of the event offered by priests in the Mīnākṣī-Sundareśvara temple, another very different version of the events. Hudson has shown that sometime in the 17th century the wedding festival was moved from an earlier month to that of Citrā (April-May), a time when devotees of another deity march with that deity (a form of Vișnu) to the city of Madurai. Annually, the image of the deity Visnu is carried from a temple twelve miles north of Madurai to the borders of the old city of Madurai where the deity 're-enacts' the removal of a curse from one of his devotees. Borrowing from folk and written traditions found elsewhere in India the vast majority of devotees insist that there is a relationship between the event of the marriage and Viṣṇu's coming to Madurai: Viṣṇu, they say, is the brother of the bride. 61 Priests in each temple insist that there is no relationship between the wedding festival on the one hand and the journey festival on the other, and they even cite historical evidence that there was none until the date of the wedding festival was changed. Nevertheless, 95% of devotees know nothing about the history of the festival events. They insist that Visnu is the brother of the bride and that Visnu comes to Madurai to attend the wedding. The fact that Viṣṇu arrives the day after the temple wedding ceremony is explained by the fact that he has been misinformed. Still, what the wedding does, as perceived by the vast majority of devotees, is to establish a relationship between Siva and Viṣṇu: they become brothers-in-law. If the marriage makes Siva a superior ally as a son-in-law in relation to the kingdom of Madurai, it makes him a brother-in-law in relation to Viṣṇu. The brother-in-law who receives the sister is superior in the marriage patterns of southern India and there is traditional tension, mixed with respect and dependence, between such kin. 62

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In other words, what sacred marriage in India seems to do, both in its mythical accounts (varied though they may be) and in its ritual re-enactment, is, first, to establish structured relationships between a deity and a group of people, often the people of a kingdom. The kingdom is usually represented by the king's daughter (eg. Pārvatī in the Śiva Purāṇa, Mīnākṣī in the Tiruvilaiyālarpurāṇam) who then becomes the wife of Śiva. The kingdom may also be represented by the king and/or queen who become Siva's in-laws. The ceremony of sacred marriage becomes a highly structured formal alliance which entails mutual rights and responsibilities. In Śiva's marriage to Pārvatī in the Vāmana Purāņa (26.52.53), for example, Pārvatī's father Himavat consults his kinsmen, the other mountains, about the propriety of the proposed alliance. It will constitute an ongoing commitment which must be honoured. Possible tragedy lurks beyond each new turn in the alliance, as we discover in the accounts of Śiva's earlier marriage with a previous wife, Satī's father, Daksa, fails to give his son-in-law proper honour and respect after the marriage. He neglects to invite Siva to a sacrifice. The results are cosmic havoc: in a tantrum Śiva destroys the sacrifice and both Daksa and Satī are killed.63

Second, sacred marriages in India tend to establish or reaffirm relationships among deities as those relationships are perceived by devotees. Because they are marriages, we come to understand the structure of relationships between selected male and female deities. Siva, depending upon the character of his bride, even assumes different personalities. In two of the largest Saiva temples in India, in the cities of Madurai and Citamparam, Siva's relationship to his spouse is characterized in two very different ways. In Madurai, the goddess is considered dominating and controlling. In Citamparam, Siva is the dominant one of the pair. 64 Similarly, in many of the sacred marriages, the two major male deities in the Hindu pantheon, Siva and Vișnu, assume basic roles with regard to each other. In the accounts of Siva's marriages, Visnu is almost always present in some capacity. In the Śiva Purāṇa (III.43.37-39) he is the officer in charge of 6: officer in charge of Siva's marriage party. In the Linga Purāņa (I.103.48.) he is the brother of Pārvatī and actually gives her away in the ceremony. In the Brahmavaivarta Purāṇa (IV.44.11-23) he is simply a very honoured guest at the ceremony.

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CONCLUSIONS

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As we consider the term sacred marriage in contexts other than the Ancient Near East, and especially, as I have done, in India, we discover that agricultural and human fertility are associated less explicitly with sacred marriage than our earlier theoretical framework, derived from studies of the Ancient Near East, would have led us to anticipate. 65 The Hindu context is more likely to reflect a concern for marriage-whether of humans or of deities-as a symbolic statement of mutual alliances being formed between two groups. The groups are represented by the individuals, human or divine, being married, and the parameters of the alliance are often implied by the use of traditional kinship designations: husband, wife, son-in-law, father-in-law, mother-in-law, brother-in-law, and daughter. Kinship terms are one of the most important means of expressing mutual responsibilities, obligations, and rights among humans. In India, this convention is extended to include the realm of deities. Sacred marriage in India is a symbolic way of making mythical and ritual 'statements' about responsibilities and obligations between humans and deities as well as between deities.

Finally, because the Hindu tradition is less likely and less inclined to draw fine distinctions between the human and the divine, we would severely limit our understanding of sacred marriage in India if we decided to discuss the concept in terms of an event that devotees understand to involve only deities as marriage partners. As long as one deity is involved in the mythical celebrations or the ritual enactments of marriage, we must regard that event as an example of sacred marriage.

NOTES

- F. Lenormant, The Beginnings of History According to the Bible and Traditions of Oriental Peoples. Trans. by Mary Lockwood from the 2nd French edn. New York, Scribners 1882, p. 474. Though the Greek term hieros gamos was used by Western scholars, I am aware of no instance in which the term is used by Greeks themselves to describe the phenomenon.
 - E.g., S. G. F. Brandon (gen. ed.), A Dictionary of Comparative Religion. London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1970, p. 430.
- Jonathan Z. Smith, s.v. Hieros Gamos. Encyclopedia Britannica, Micropedia, Vol 5, 15th edn., 1978, p. 33. See also Mircea Eliade, 'La Terre Mère et les Hierogamies Cosmiques'. Eranos Jahrbuch 22 (1953): 57-95.
- Sir James George Frazer. The Golden Bough. 12 vols, New York, Macmillan 4 1922, Abridged edition, 1 vol., 1963. See ch. 10, entitled 'The Sacred Marriage'.
- 5 S. H. Hooke, 'The Myth and Ritual Pattern of the Ancient Near East', in S. H.
- Hooke (ed.) Myth and Ritual, London, Oxford University Press 1933, p. 1-19. A. M. Blackman, 'Myth and Ritual in Ancient Egypt', in S. H. Hooke (ed.), Myth 7
- and Ritual, London, Oxford University Press 1933, pp. 15-39. C. J. Gadd, 'Babylonian Myth and Ritual', In S. H. Hooke (ed.), Myth and 8 Ritual, London, Oxford University Press 1933, pp. 40-62.
- 9 Ibid.

- S. H. Hooke, 'Traces of the Myth and Ritual Pattern in Canaan'. In S. H. Hooke (ed.), Myth and Ritual, London, Oxford University Press 1933, pp. 68-86.
 Tbid., p. 85 and T. Robinson, 'Hebrew Myths', in Hooke (ed.), ibid, p. 185.
- 11 See C. J. Bleeker, Die Geburt Eines Gottes: Eine Studie Über Den Agyptischen Gott 12 Min und Sein Fest, Leiden, E. J. Brill 1956; Adam Falkenstein, Sumerische und Akkadische Hymnen und Gebete, Zurich, Artemis-Verlag 1953; Henri Frankfort, Kingship and the Gods: A Study of Ancient Near Eastern Religion as the Integration of Society and Nature, Chicago, University of Chicago Press 1948; Theodore Gaster, Thespis: Myth, Ritual, and Drama in the Ancient Near East, New York, Doubleday 1961; Thorkild Jacobsen, 'Toward the Image of Tammuz', History of Religions 1:2 (Winter, 1962) pp. 189-213 and The Treasures of Darkness, New Haven, Yale University Press 1976; E. O. James, The Ancient Gods: The History and Diffusion of Religion in the Ancient Near East and the Eastern Mediterranean, New York, Capricorn Books 1964; Samuel Noah Kramer, The Sacred Marriage Rite. Bloomington, Indiana University Press 1969 and 'The Sumerian Sacred Marriage Texts', Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 107: 6 (1963), pp. 485-527; Ringgren, H. "Hohes Lied und Hieros Gamos." Zeitschrift Für Die Altestamentliche Wissenschaft 65: 3-4 (1953), pp. 300-302. See also Svend Pallis,
 - The Babylonian Akitu Festival, Kobenhaun, Bianco Lunos Bogtrykkeri 1926.

 For an account of this, see Samuel Noah Kramer, Sumerian Mythology: A Study of Spiritual and Literary Achievement, Philadelphia, The American Philosophical Society 1944.
 - Society 1944.

 14 E.g. S. H. Hooke (ed.), Myth, Ritual, and Kingship: Essays on the Theory and Practice of Kingship in the Ancient Near East and in Israel, Oxford, Clarendon Press 1958; C. J. Gadd, Ideas of Divine Rule in the Ancient Near East, London, Oxford University Press 1948. Henri Frankfort, Kingship and the Gods: A Study of Ancient Near Eastern Religion as the Integration of Society and Nature, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1948.
 - See especially S. G. F. Brandon, 'The Myth and Ritual Position Critically Considered' In S. H. Hooke (ed.), Myth, Ritual, and Kingship, Oxford, Clarendon Press 1958, pp. 261–279 and Clyde Kluckholn, 'Myths and Rituals: A General Theory'. Harvard Theological Review 35: 1 (1942), pp. 45–79.
 - See Bleeker, op. cit., 1956 and H. A. Groenwegen-Frankfort, Space and Time in the Representational Art of the Ancient Near East, London, Faber & Faber 1951.
 - 17 Eg. Carl H. Kraeling, and Robert M. Adams, (eds), City Invincible: A Symposium on Urbanization and Cultural Development in the Ancient Near East, Chicago, University of Chicago Press 1960, and Adam Falkenstein, The Sumerian Temple City, Malibu, California, Undena Publications 1974.
 - One of the most pervasive, that sacred marriage implies fertility ritual, is suggested by Marvin Pope who notes.
 - The view that the Song of Songs derives from pagan fertility worship was developed in the present century and, in spite of resistance, has continued to gain ground with the accelerating recovery and progress in interpretation of documents of religious literature of the civilizations of the ancient Near East, especially of Mesopotamia, and more recently the Ugaritic mythological and religious texts.
 - See Marvin Pope, The Song of Songs: A New Translation, with Introduction and Commentary, Anchor Bible Series, New York, Doubleday 1977, p. 145.
 - 19 See, for example, the statement in Walter Harrelson From Fertility Cull Worship, New York, Doubleday 1969, p. 67, in which the author rejects many of

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the earlier conclusions of the 'myth-ritual' school regarding a hieros gamos in Israelite religion but in which he still insists that the primary purpose of the sacred marriage had to be fertility: 'Since Yahweh ruled alone as God, there was no place for a goddess as his consort. . . . In no other respect is the Israelite cultus more sharply to be distinguished from the cultus of her neighbours than in the way in which fertility is dealt with'. For criticisms of this position see Joseph Fontenrose, The Ritual Theory of Myth, University of California Folklore Series, No. 18, Berkeley, University of California Press 1966. For a more recent example of the biases I address here, see Kees Bolle's article, 'Hieros Gamos' in M. Eliade (ed.), Encyclopedia of Religion, Vol 6, pp. 317-321. Bolle presents an impressive array of cross-cultural information and he knows the history of the scholarship well. His article is an excellent statement of the classic understanding of hieros gamos. However, he chooses not to move beyond functionalism. Bolle fails to deal with sacred marriage in light of current studies of it in cultures (most notably India) where it is still alive and well. In citing C. J. Fuller's article ['The Divine Couple's Relationship in a South Indian Temple: Mīnāksī and Sundaresvara at Madurai'. History of Religions 19: 4 (May, 1980), pp. 321-348, he deals with one contemporary example, but that article does not address sacred marriage directly, and entirely omits analysis of relevant texts which are, in fact, preoccupied with the notion of sacred marriage. [See, for example, ch. 2 in my The Sacred Marriage of a Hindu Goddess, Bloomington, Indiana University Press 1989]. Scholarly reconstructions of sacred marriage in classic Greece, imperial Rome, ancient Mesopotamia, prehistoric societies, Babylon, ancient Israel and Egypt: these are the sources from which Bolle draws his information, and so his article remains an unquestioning history of the scholarship rather than an attempt to move beyond functionalism and patternism. It, too, like the earlier scholarship on Mesopotamia, is divorced from any systematic study of observed ritual. Plausible, but unproved (and unprovable) suppositions about ancient ritual and about the intentions of supposed participants mark Bolle's article, just as they mark the scholarship on which he depends.

S. G. F. Brandon, (gen. ed.) A Dictionary of Comparative Religion. London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1970, p. 430; Jonathan Z. Smith s.v., 'Hieros Gamos'. Encyclopedia Britannica, Micropedia, Vol. 5, 15th edn., 1978, p. 33; Jestin Raymond, 'Un Rite Sumèrien de Fécondité: Le Mariage du Dieu Nin-Gir-Su et de la Déesse Ba-Ba', Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 41 (1946), pp. 333-339; M. Gane, & R. Mortier, (eds) Histoire Générale des Réligions, 5 vols, Larousse, Paris 1947-1952, Vol 1, p. 348; M. Eliade, 'La Terre-Mère et les Hierogamies

Cosmiques', Eranos Jahrbuch 22 (1953), pp. 57-95.

Eg. Hartmut Schmökel, Das Land Sumer: Die Wiederentdeckung der Ersten Hochkultur Der Menscheit, Stuttgart, W. Kohlhammer Verlag 1955, p. 125ff; E. O. James,
The Ancient Gods: The History and Diffusion of Religion in the Ancient Near East and
the Eastern Mediterranean, New York, Capricorn Books 1964, see esp. ch. 3;
Elizabeth Douglas Van Buren, 'The Sacred Marriage in Early Times in Mesopotamia', Orientalia, n. s. 13 (1944), pp. 1-72, esp. p. 1; Svend Pallis, The Antiquity of
Iraq: A Handbook for Assyriology, Copenhagen, Enjar Munksgaard 1956, p. 689;
Bolle in his 'Hieros Gamos', M. Eliade (ed.), Encyclopedia of Religion 6 (1987), p. 318.
Samuel Noah Kramer, 'The Sumerian Sacred Marriage Texts', Proceedings of

the American Philosophical Society 107: 6 (1963), pp. 485-527, p. 502 and p. 507. Ira Mitchell Wheatley, 'The Hieros Gamos in the Ancient Near East and in Israel', Ph.D. thesis, University of Iowa, 1966, p. 90.

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See Samuel Noah Kramer, 'The Sumerian Sacred Marriage Texts', Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 107: 6 (1963), pp. 485-527, p. 500; Thorkild 24 Jacobsen, 'Toward the Image of Tammuz', History of Religions 1: 2 (Winter, 1962), pp. 189-213, esp. pp. 190-192 and Thorkild Jacobsen, The Treasures of Darkness, New Haven, Yale University Press 1976, p. 14.

Samuel Noah Kramer, The Sacred Marriage Rite, Bloomington, Indiana Univer-25 sity Press 1969, p. 59.

Jacobsen (1976:14) and Kramer (1969:62). 26

E. O. James, Myth and Ritual in the Ancient Near East, New York, Praeger 1958, p. 120. This, says James, was the case in the hieros gamos in Egypt: 'The function 27 of the mother goddess was not to create life but to reproduce it', In S. N. Kramer (1969: 52-53) it is abundantly clear that Enki, a male god, is the source and cause of fertility. Similarly, the god Ninurta offers 'life-giving semen' to make all things grow-animal and plant (p. 54).

S. H. Hooke, 'The Myth and Ritual Pattern of the Ancient Near East', In S. H. 28 Hooke (ed.), Myth and Ritual, London, Oxford University Press 1933, pp. 1-19, esp. p. 3. See also W. O. E. Oesterley, 'Early Hebrew Festival Rituals', in S. H. Hooke (ed.), Myth and Ritual, London, Oxford University Press 1933, pp. 110-

156, p. 121.

Hooke, 'The Myth and Ritual Pattern of the Ancient Near East' (1933: 8). 29

For the citations, see Hooke (1933: 1). In his chapter entitled 'Sacred Marriage', 30 Frazer is unambiguous as to what this ritualized union of the sexes constitutes: It depends, he says, '. . . on the principle of homeopathic or imitative magic'. Plant life . . . is supposed to be stimulated by the real or mock marriage of men and women'. See Frazer (1963: 161).

See Hans Penner, 'The Poverty of Functionalism', History of Religions 11:1 31 (August, 1971), pp. 91-97 and its expose of the argument claiming that the

unintended effect of a ritual becomes its cause.

Frits Staal, 'The Meaninglessness of Ritual', Numen 26: 1 (1979), pp. 2-22. A 32 similar argument is that of Johan Huizinga, Homo Ludens, Boston, Beacon Press (paperback) 1955, pp. 17-27. See especially p. 26: '. . . ritual is thus sacred play, indispensable for the well-being of the community, fecund of cosmic insight and social development but always play in the sense Plato gave to it—an action accomplishing itself outside and above the necessities and seriousness of everyday life'.

In terms of ritual, 'purpose' I shall take to refer to the effects expected from a 33 ritual by those who participate in its performance. 'Meaning' I shall take to be

'the understanding of the ritual on the part of those involved in it'.

Evidence of this having happened frequently in the history of religions is 34 abundant. See, for example, W. O. E. Oesterley, 'Early Hebrew Festival Rituals, in S. H. Hooka (ed.) 1033. in S. H. Hooke (ed.), Myth and Ritual, London, Oxford University Press 1933, pp. 110–156, esp. p. 113 in which the use of the unleavened bread in the Passover is analyzed. See also W. C. is analysed. See also W. G. Lambert, 'Myth and Ritual as Conceived by the Babylonians', Journal of Control of Babylonians', Journal of Semitic Studies 13: 1 (1968), p. 111 ff.

T. Robinson, 'Hebrew Myths', In S. H. Hooke (ed.), Myth and Ritual, London, Oxford University Press 1988. Oxford University Press 1933, pp. 181–191, esp. pp. 185–188. Notwithstanding the admission that 'Descile and 'Descile and 'Descile and 'Descile and 'Descile a 35 the admission that 'Details are entirely lacking . . . ,' Robinson reconstructs an elaborate marriage ritual for X .

Eg. W. O. E. Oesterley, 'Early Hebrew Festival Rituals', in S. H. Hooke (ed.), Myth and Ritual London, Out and H. Myth and Ritual, London, Oxford University Press 1933, pp. 110-156, pp. 145ff; 36

Theophile James Meek, 'Canticles and the Tammuz Cult', The American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures 39: 1 (1922) pp. 1–14. See also Theophile J. Meek, 'Introduction To The Song of Songs', in The Interpreter's Bible, Vol 5, George A. Buttrick (gen. ed.), 12 Vols, Nashville, Abingdon Press 1956, pp. 91–96; Herbert May, 'The Fertility Cult in Hosea, The American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures 47: 2 (1932), pp. 73–98; and Samuel Noah Kramer, 'The Biblical 'Song of Songs' and the Sumerian Love Songs', Expedition: The Bulletin of the University Museum of the University of Pennsylvania 5: 1 (1962), pp. 25–31.

37 See Frazer's Adonis, Attis, Osiris, 3rd edn, London, Macmillan 1, (1919), pp. 140–142. Hooke cites this work (p. 8 of Hooke's Myth and Ritual) to establish that the sacred marriage was, '... one of the earliest elements in the ritual pattern'.

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He claims that the annual New Year festival had these five parts: (a) representation of the death and resurrection of the god, (b) a recitation of the creation myth, (c) a ritual combat in which the god triumphed, (d) a sacred marriage, and (e) a triumphal procession where the king played the part of the god. See his article 'The Myth and Ritual Pattern of the Ancient Near East', In S. H. Hooke (ed.), Myth and Ritual, London, Oxford University Press 1933, pp. 1–19.

39 See Wheatley's (1966:1) incisive discussion in which he says that the elements of even one of the five rituals, that of the sacred marriage, '... can only be assembled, at present, by bringing together a variety of statements, hints, and opaque allusions from texts and monuments widely separated in time and space'.

40 Indeed, Claude Lévi-Strauss, in his *The Raw and the Cooked: Introduction to A Science of Mythology*, trans. by John and Noreen Weightman, New York, n.p., 1969, p. 5 and Wendey O'Flaherty in her *Asceticism and Eroticism in the Mythology of Siva*, London, Oxford University Press 1973, p. 17ff, have demonstrated that a 'meta-mythology' can be reconstructed from materials drawn from different mythic strands in a culture. This 'meta-mythology', though nowhere found in its entirety in a single text or narration, can represent accurately the ambivalent nature of issues with which the mythology attempts to deal. But these reconstructions are far more convincing when they use materials from one particular culture or culture area.

41 S. Mowinckel, *He That Cometh*, trans. by G. W. Anderson, Oxford, Basil Blackwell 1956, p. 27.

42 J. deFraine, 'Les Implications du "Patternism", Biblica 37: 1 (1956) pp. 59–73, p. 70.

Other scholars who objected especially to the directions in which the 'myth-ritual patternists' were drifting included (a) S. G. F. Brandon, 'The Myth and Ritual Position Critically Considered' In S. H. Hooke (ed.), Myth, Ritual, and Kingship, Oxford, Clarendon Press 1958, pp. 261–279, (b) Clyde Kluckholn, 'Myths and Rituals: A General Theory', Harvard Theological Review 35: 1 (1942), pp. 45–79, (c) and Joseph Fontenrose, The Ritual Theory of Myth, University of California Folklore Series, No. 18, Berkeley, University of California Press 1966.

Because the material is so abundant, I concentrate, in the ritual setting, on material found in the relatively religiously conservative state of Tamilnāţu. Among temples in that region, marriages between gods and goddesses are quite common, and in some temples, these rituals represent the most important ceremonial occasion in an elaborately ceremonial year. See P. K. Nambiar and K. C. Narayana Kurup (eds.), Census of India 1961, Vol 9, Part 7b, 'Fairs and Festivals' Madras, Madras Government Press 1968, pp. 29 ff. Among Saiva temples in which the marriage is a part of the annual major temple festival are

listed Tiruvorriyur, Tiruvaiyarru, Kañcippuram, Kapalicuvarar, and Madurai, I have shown elsewhere that there is a close relationship of mutual literary dependence between themes developed in Tamil talapurāna accounts of divine 45 activities and those developed in the Sanskrit Purānas. See my article, The Precedence of Sanskrit in Tamil Literature: A Case Study in Tracing a Text to its Sources', (Spring, 1987). Mankind Quarterly 27: 3, pp. 296-316.

Witnessing the Wedding Festival is the greatest event a pilgrim may experience at this shrine'. See Nārāyana Nīlakanta Cāstirikal's Shrī Mīnāksi Kōyil Stala 46 Varalāņu, Maturai, Shrī Mīnāķṣi Jotisa Kalā Mantiram 1973, p. 7, translation mine. See also p. 12 of the same work as well as C. Cāmpacivan's Mānakar Maturai, 2nd edn, Maturai, Mīnāṭci Puttakaļ Nilayam 1963, p. 93; Centil Turavi's Aimperu Vilākkal, Cennai; Cāṣtā Patippakam 1970, pp. 197 and 215; and Pañcanatam Pillai's Srī Mīnātci Cuntarēcuvarar Kōyil Varalāru, 2nd edn, Maturai, Maturai Srī Mīnātci Cuntarēcuvarar Ālaya Veliyītu 1970, p. 75. Note that Narayana Kurup and Nambiar say the same of marriage festivals at Kapālīcuvarar, Tiruvaiyārru, and Kāñcippuram in Census of India 1961, p. 30.

In part, the choice is made out of practical necessity, since I know this material 47 better. But it is also the case that Siva is more universally regarded as a 'family man' when we compare him with Visnu who, though he marries in several texts, is rarely portrayed in the domestic, family context. Moreover, Visnu does not have children, but Siva does. See Paul Younger, 'The Family of Siva in a South Indian Grove', Sciences Religieuses/Studies in Religion 11: 3 (Summer, 1982), pp.

245-263.

Whether the descriptions have any relation to rituals that either are or were once 48 enacted is an issue with which I shall not deal here. Dimmitt and van Buitenen hypothesize that most of the major Sanskrit purānas developed out of histories of local temples and of their local rituals, but this cannot be proven. See Cornelia Dimmitt and J. A. B. van Buitenen, (eds. and trans.), Classical Hindu Mythology: A Reader in the Sanskrit Purāṇas, Philadelphia, Temple University Press 1978, p. 8. They also indicate (p. 7) that the puranas present 'the rituals and the social values of the brahmin class of priests'. Kees Bolle, in his 'Reflections on a Puranic Passage', History of Religions 2 (Winter, 1963), pp. 286–291, argues that it can be helpful to read into certain purāṇa texts the influence of an unmentioned ritual which is taken for granted by the author. It may be helpful, but supposed rituals

should not be used to prove a point.

Eg. (1) Visnu Purāna, trans. by Horace Hayman Wilson, F. Hall (ed.), London, Kegan, Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. 1877, the following instances: Visnu and 49 Laksmī, I.8.17-35; Siva and Pārvatī, I.103.1-64. (2) Vāmana Purāṇa, Anand Swarup Gupta (ed. and trans.), Varanasi; All India Kashiraj Trust 1968, the following instances: Siva-Pārvatī 27.1–62; Himalya-Menā 24.8–10. (3) Brahmavaivarta Purāna, trans. by Rajendra Nath Sen, Sacred Books of the Hindus, Vol 24, parts 1 & 2. Allahabad: 1919 and New York: 1973, the following instances: Kropa Padha, W. Hariinstances: Kṛṣṇa-Rādhā IV.16.116.25-40; Varuna-Varunī, II.2.30-49; Hari-Ganga, II.12 18-33; Sita Paras IV.16.49; Varuna-Varunī, II.2.30, 203; Agni-Ganga, II.12.18–33; Sita-Rama, II.14.21–29; Hari-Tulsi, II.16.198–203; Agni-Swaha, II.40.31–40; Dayagan, V. 10.110.25–40; Varuna-Varuni, II.2.30–13, Agni-Swaha, II.40.31–40; Dayagan, V. 10.110.25–40; Hari-Tulsi, II.16.198–203; Agni-Swaha, II.40.31–40; Hari-Tulsi, II Swaha, II.40.31–40; Devasena-Kartika II.45.18–55; Ganeśa-Pusi III.17.1–28; Krsna-Rādhā IV 15 195 190. 6 Kṛṣṇa-Rādhā IV.15.125–130; Śiva-Pārvatī IV.44.54–59. (4) Bhāgavata Purāṇa, trans. by I. M. Sanyal, Colouries trans. by J. M. Sanyal, Calcutta: n.p., 1930–1934, Siva-Mohini 10.88.14-36. (5) Siva Purāna. In J. J. Sharri (11) Siva Purāna. In J. L. Shastri (ed.), Ancient Indian Traditions and Mythology, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidaes 1070 Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass 1970, the following instances: Kāma-Rati II.48.1-49; Siva-Satī II.18.133: Himayot Market Marke Siva-Satī II.18.133; Himavat-Mīna III.1.1–30; Siva-Pārvatī III.48.1–49; Ganeśa-Siddha and Buddhi IV.20.1-6.

The same problem also occurs in temple art. Heinz Mode (The Woman In Indian 50 Art, Bombay, Allied Publishers 1972, p. 19) makes the point that '... it is often difficult to distinguish between heavenly and earthly pairs of lovers'. I exclude from my discussion mention of marriages between humans and demons or between ascetics and such marginal figures as 'celestial nymphs'.

E.g. (1) Visnu Purāna: Visnu-King's Daughter Revati IV.1; Krsna-King's 51 Daughter Rukmini V.26; Kṛṣṇa-King's Granddaughter Rukmin V.28; Kṛṣṇa-16,000 mortal women V.31.(2) Brahmavaivarta Purāņa: Baladeva-King's daughter Revati IV. 106. 1-10; Kṛṣṇa-King's daughter Rukmini IV.108.1-14;

Krsna-16 mortal women IV.112.34-46.

It is true that the ritual enactments of hieros gamos in the Near East were said to 52 include the king, who married the goddess. But in the ritual, the king was said to 'become' or 'represent' the god at the moment of marriage, just as his ritual partner, a queen or priestess 'became the goddess'. Thus, in the mythic accounts, the god-goddess pairing is maintained.

Eg. Visnu-Rukmini in Visnu Purāņa 5.26.1-12, 5.28.1-5 and Brahmavaivarta 53 Purāna IV.108-114; Vasudeva-Daivaki in Brahmavaivarta IV.7.1-16; Baludeva-Reyati in Brahmavaivarta IV.106.1-10; Narada-King Srimanjaya's daughter in

Brahmavaivarta LV.130.1-24; Visnu-Srimati in Linga Purāna II.5.1-59.

Eg. Sita in Agni Purāna, trans. by M. N. Dutt, Calcutta, n.p., 1903, verses V.9-54 12; Draupadi in Mahābhārata, 3 vols, trans. with introduction by J. A. B. van Buitenen, Chicago, University of Chicago Press 1972-1978, verses I.13.189.45ff; King Srimanjaya's daughter in Brahmavaivarta Purāna IV.130.1-24; King Vaisvatamanu's daughter in Bhāgavata Purāṇa, trans. by J. M. Sanyal, Calcutta, n.p., 1930-1934, verses 9.1.13-32 and 36-39; Srimati in Linga Purāņa II.5.1-59; Kalavati in Brahmavaivarta Purāņa IV.17.107-131; Tatātakai in Tiruvilaiyātarpurāṇam of Parañcōtimunivar. With commentary of Na. Mu. Vēnkatacāmi Nāṭṭār, 3 vols, Cennai, Tennintiya Caiva Cittāṇta Nūrpatippu Kalakam 1927 (reissued 1965), verses I.4.14ff.

For a more elaborate description of this dynamic and its implications, see my 55 'Kinship Metaphors in the Hindu Pantheon: Siva as Brother-in-Law and Son-in-Law', Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 53: 3 (September, 1985), pp.

411-430.

57

A significant exception to this rule involves those areas of India, particularly 56 Tamilnātu, where cross- and parallel-cousin marriages are found. In these cases, relatives marry relatives and the sorts of animosity and tension frequently existing between in-laws in northern India are rare.

See Siva Purāṇa III.8.1.-III 51.14 for the entire account of the arrangements and performance of Siva's marriage to Pārvatī. In less detail, the marriage is also

recounted in the Brahmavaivarta Purāņa IV.38.1-IV.56.16.

There are several versions of this document. I have traced at least five in 58 Sanskrit, five in Tamil, and one in Telegu. The earliest, I believe, appeared in the 13th century in Tamil. It is the Tiruvālavāyutaiyar Tiruvilaiyātatpurāņam of Cellinakar Perumparrap Puliyur Nampi. U. Vē. Cāminātaiyar (ed. and commentary). Cennai: Rippan Accivantiraccalai, 1906. The version I have consulted most carefully and to which I refer when I mention the document here is the more recent, and far more popular 17th-century work Tiruvilaiyatarpuranam of Parañcōtimunivar. With commentary of Na. Mu. Vēnkatacāmi Nāttār, 3 vols, Ce<u>nn</u>ai, Te<u>nn</u>intiya Caiva Cittāṇta Nūrpatippu Kalakam 1927 (reissued 1965).

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For further details see my 'The Authority of Sanskrit in Tamil Literature: A Case Study in Tracing a Text to its Sources', Mankind Quarterly 27: 3 (Spring, 1987), pp. 296-316.

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- 59 Siva Purāna III.30.39 and Brahmavaivarta Purāna IV.40.81-92.
- I suspect that it has gone on much longer, but have no documentation that traces it any further. Accounts of the wedding festival include Dennis Hudson's three works: (1) "Siva, Mīnākṣi, Viṣṇu—Reflections On a Popular Myth in Maturai", The Indian Economic and Social History Review 14: 1 (January-March, 1977), pp. 107-119; (2) 'Two Citra Festivals in Madurai', in Bardwell Smith (ed.), Asian Religions: 1971, Chambersburg, The American Academy of Religion 1971, pp. 191-222; (3) 'Two Citrā Festivals in Madurai', in Guy R. Welbon & Glenn E. Yocum, (eds), Religious Festivals in South India and Sri Lanka, New Delhi, Manohar Publications 1982, pp. 101-156, as well as Louis Dumont's 'La double fête du Madura', Marco Polo 22 (1956), pp. 35-48, and my own description in 'The Sacred Marriage of Maturai: Myth, Ritual, and Devotion in a South Indian Temple', Ph.D. thesis, University of Chicago, 1981, pp. 112-136. A documentary film in two parts, 'The Wedding of the Goddess', presents the events. It was filmed by Michael Camerini and Myra Binford and first distributed in 1976. Part I (36 min) provides historical background and Part II (40 min) presents the events of the festivities. The films are available for rent or sale from the Distribution Office of the South Asian Area Center, 1242 Van Hise Hall, University of Wisconsin, Madison Wisconsin 53706, U.S.A.
 - See, For example, Brenda E. F. Beck, 'The Kin Nucleus in Tamil Folklore', in Thomas R. Trautmann (ed.), Kinship and History in South Asia, Michigan Papers on South and Southeast Asia, No. 7, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan 1974, pp. 1-28; Michael Moffat, 'Harijan Religion: Consensus at the Bottom of Caste', American Ethnologist 6: 2 (1978), pp. 244-260, p. 249; and Madeleine Biardeau, (ed.) Autour de la Déesse Hindoue. Purusārtha: Sciences Sociales en Asie du Sud, Paris. Éditions de l'École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales 1981. 'Introduction', p. 11, note 1.
 - Refer again to my article on these dynamics: 'Kinship Metaphors in the Hindu Pantheon: Siva as Brother-in-Law and Son-in-Law', Journal of the American Academy of Religion 53: 3 (September, 1985), pp. 411-430.
 - An English translation of these events, as they are found in the Kurma Purāṇa 1.14.4-97 and in the Śiva Vayaviya 1.18.4-59, is available in Cornelia Dimmitt and J. A. B. van Buitenen, (eds and trans.), Classical Hindu Mythology: A Reader in the Sanskrit Purāṇas, Philadelphia, Temple University Press 1978, pp. 171-179.
 - The relationships are reflected in the common, but indirect way Tamils have of characterizing marriages. A 'Citamparam marriage' is one in which the man is the authoritative head of the family. A 'Madurai marriage', also called a 'Mīnākṣ̄i marriage', is one in which the wife is the dominant spouse of the pair. See, for example, Sheryl B. Daniel, 'Marriage in Tamil Culture: The Problem of Conflicting "Models"', In Susan S. Wadley (ed.), The Powers of Tamil Women, Foreign and Comparative Studies, South Asian Series No. 6, Mazwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse, Syracuse University 1980, pp. 61-92.
 - Nevertheless, in descriptions of marriage ritual as well as in the annual ritual celebrations of hieros gamos in temples, fertility symbolism is evident. See, for example, the description of the marriage between Siva and Taṭātakai (Mīṇāṭci) in the Tiruviļaiyāṭarpurāṇam, especially verses I.5.122–199, in which voluptuous

females lust madly for the bridegroom, and fertility images such as golden water pots are filled with sprouting plants and the decoration of various bulging female breasts with expensive unguents, ointments, and perfumes all figure prominently in the poetry. See also the many references to fertility and to invocation of deities, especially goddesses who marry, in William G. Archer, Songs for the Bride: Wedding Rites of Northern India (Ed. by Barbara Stoler Miller and Mildred Archer), New York, Columbia University Press 1985, especially pp. 7-10.

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CHARISMA AND THE PRODUCTION OF MESSAGES ON TANNA (VANUATU)

Lamont Lindstrom

This paper draws upon Foucault's analysis of 'orders of discourse' to explore why 'charisma'—or legitimate authority based upon the production of valuable messages—is rarely institutionalized in Melanesia. A discursive emphasis on inspiration, devaluation of authorial creativity, and other conditions ensure that individual prophets lose control of their messages and their authoritative sources. As such, Melanesian charisma is depersonalized and difficult to routinize or transform into other kinds of authority. Example messages are drawn from Tanna's John Frum movement.

Recent analysis of the political importance of talk and talking in Pacific societies recalls to mind the familiar, if wayworn, sociological category 'charisma'. This is particularly so when such talk belongs to one of those Melanesian politico-religious movements commonly described by a second, equally fatigued analytical term, the 'cargo cult'. Talk especially 'makes a political difference'l within social movements of this sort that are animated by rumour, prophesy, and strange tidings.

The history of the word charisma, like that of other global analytical categories, has witnessed significant terminological exercitation. Frequently, either the particulars of some charismatic-like event require special arrangement to fit the limitations of the term, or the descriptive range of the term needs to be stretched to cover the peculiarities of a case. After reviewing several attempts to arrive at a definition of charisma, I go on to use one version of the word. 'Charisma', in this paper, describes power relations that hinge upon the production and deployment of 'messages'. The messages I focus on are those of a long-lived movement of Vanuatu—the John Frum organization found on the island of Tanna. John Frum messages began circulating on this island as long ago as the late 1930s.

I resuscitate charisma as an analytical category to facilitate comparison between Melanesian powerful talk and powerful talk in those other sorts of political systems described in Weber's now classic typology. I do not reassert any global descriptive claims for the term—even if now reanimated, poked, and prodded to fit the particularities of Vanuatu. My purpose is not to salvage charisma's utility by a redefinition that manages to wrench the term forward a century into the post-modern era. Rather, I open with charisma as a familiar, well-trodden portal that leads through to newer perspectives on the

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nature of power within Melanesian religious movements.

Phrased in Weberian terms, my problem concerns the reasons why charismatic authority is rarely institutionalized in Melanesia—and why it is occasionally institutionalizable elsewhere. Identifying how powerful talk, in some parts of the world, can be sometimes transformed into one of Weber's two other ideal types of legitimate authority—bureaucratic or traditional—helps make clear why charisma usually fails to become routinized in Melanesia. The significant factor, I conclude, is the degree to which a charismatic message can be individually possessed or controlled. Transformation of extraordinary, powerful talk into routine, everyday authority depends on the ability of the powerful to monopolize the production and circulation of their talk.

In some societies, messages sound most authentic and gain value by being associated with individual prophets or authors. Even talk that is inspired—and thus professes to be supernatural wisdom rather than a humanly authored message—gains value by association with the particular prophet or medium who reveals it. Here, charisma is typically personalized. Where messages are somehow tied to or associated with individuals—with leaders, prophets, or authors—charismatic authority is more readily institutionalized and transformed into traditional or rational authority. A prophet can transmit his personal right to reveal messages to a nominated successor within some newly formed organization. In Melanesia, conversely, messages can be detached from prophets and authors, yet maintain their authority and popular appeal. Messages gain less value by association with individuals. Prophets and authors have looser ties to their messages, and weaker control over their sources of inspiration. Depersonalized Melanesian charismatic authority is much more difficult to routinize.

To discuss this variation in people's rights and opportunities to monopolize charismatic messages, I turn to Foucault's analysis of 'orders' or 'formations' of discourse.³ The degree to which people can control the production of authentic messages varies among discursive formations. These formations consist of rules, procedures, and 'principles of ordering, exclusion and rarity in discourse'.⁴ Or, in more familiar terms, orders of discourse comprise cultural practices and beliefs that govern how people produce talk that sounds to them authentic and, sometimes, true.

In the concluding section of the paper, I compare Tanna's discursive order with the discursive orders of the sorts of societies that Weber describes. Whereas the latter possess principles that permit the control and often even the monopolization of powerful message production, the island's discursive rules and conditions are unable to silence new prophets or to suppress the production of novel, exciting, and truthful-sounding messages. As a consequence, charisma on Tanna cannot be tamed; instead, as in many other

Melanesian societies, it is the ordinary and regular basis of political authority.

CHARISMA: PERSONALITY/DESIRE/MESSAGE

Despite the lethal skills of numerous theoretical hitmen, the concept 'charisma' has proven difficult to erase from sociological discourse. Discussing Melanesian cult movements, Worsley observed twenty years ago that 'there is little hope that we will get far in our efforts to develop and enrich sociological theory with such a blunt instrument as the concept of charisma'. A problem is the term's historical particularity. Fabian notes that charisma is a residual category; it is defined mostly in terms of what it is not. Weber devised charisma for his analysis of political systems in which two other sorts of legitimate authority also occupy the field. Charisma describes legitimate authority not based upon traditional or rational/legalistic grounds. It functions, in part, to describe revolutionary periods in which traditional authority temporarily breaks down, sometimes to transform into rational/bureaucratic.

Can the term be extended to label power relations in societies, say those of Melanesia, where neither much traditional nor rational or bureaucratic authority customarily exists—where 'what we call "cult" or "movement" is nothing less than the ordinary form of ritual and interpretive innovation?' And why is charisma of the classic sort in Melanesia so rarely routinized or transformed into other sorts of authority?

Finding charisma in Melanesia, of course, depends on what one defines charisma to be. The best known of Weber's various approaches to charisma is perhaps the following:⁹

The term 'charisma' will be applied to a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities. These are such as are not accessible to the ordinary person, but are regarded as of divine origin or as exemplary, and on the basis of them the individual concerned is treated as a leader. ¹⁰

Geertz, while lauding Weber's 'attempt to write a sociology of culture and a social psychology in a single set of sentences', concludes 'the concept of charisma suffers from an uncertainty of referent'. The embarrassment with charisma is that it is ambiguous, elusive, blurred; charisma conflates qualities of leaders, desires of followers, and the efficacy of messages. ¹¹ Those who have used the term as an analytical category often concentrate their analyses on one of these three elements—on the exceptional leader, on the needful follower, or on the resonances of a prophetic message. ¹²

The most popular uses of charisma commonly situate this within the Person. Wilson, for example, focuses his attention in large part on leaders: The message may need to be congenial... but the message is by no means

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everything. "The man" may also be demanded. ¹⁴ Thus, he suggests that certain Melanesian movements are *not* charismatic insofar as they are not led by 'one actual leader'. ¹⁵ As I suggest below, however, if Melanesian prophets are sometimes less than exceptional, their messages are always supernaturally (or extraordinarily) inspired.

Secondly, one might tease out desire as the heart of charisma. As Worsley notes, 'the nature of the values held by the mass of followers is thus of prime significance in understanding how it is that charismatic leaders are able to mobilize support readily, or, in some cases, even to have support thrust upon them'. Followers with often 'diffuse and unrealized aspirations cleave to an appropriate leader because he articulates and consolidates their aspirations'. In this approach, an assumption that certain human desires, or needs, are natural and primary explains why certain prophetic messages become popular and why particular individuals realize the power to lead. For example, if people desire political and economic equality and deliverance from oppression, certain messages and prophets attract a following. Charismatic leaders are those who, by whatever happenstance, manage to gratify the needs of others. 18

Finally, instead of focusing upon the leader's personality or the followers' desires as primary, one might begin with the message—or with that body of information deployed within charismatic interactions. ¹⁹ If one starts with the message as primary, charisma may be defined as a kind of legitimate domination based in unequal relations of knowledge exchange: a particular sort of communicative relationship linking a message giver and a message receiver. Along these lines, Worsley has suggested that 'the message, then, is the most important element: it is this that the followers or potential followers "wish to know". ²⁰ Ultimately, however, 'the message' is secondary to desire in Worsley's approach. People only recognize a message as 'the message' insofar as this speaks to their pre-existing needs, values, interests, or desires. ²¹

The message becomes secondary in any functional account of charisma wherein authority is legitimized insofar as it speaks to peoples' desires. This sort of functional accounting of Melanesian cargo cults, millenarian, and other sorts of movements is common. The success of seemingly bizarre messages of cargo, of world reversal, or of the immanent return of the dead is typically understood along the lines of need fulfillment. Such messages, for example, are explained as serving the need for explanation;²² for moral regeneration;²³ for modernization;²⁴ for political equality;²⁵ for revitalized traditional exchange systems;²⁶ and so on.

It remains possible to take the message as primary if human interests, desires and needs are not presumed to be natural or in any way fixed outside of discourse. A radical cultural determinist approach of this sort might argue that a message sometimes inscribes new needs and new interests in those who receive it. Desire, here, is constituted in a dialectical process wherein ruling

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discourses (messages) develop certain interests within the people who take part in conversation or other communicative exchange. In Foucauldian terms, existing discursive orders 'subjectify' people with desires and interests.²⁷ At the same time, however, resistances and counter-desires may develop within the subjected.²⁸ People may then seize upon a second message that better articulates their current interests and, in so doing, supports emergent, charismatic power relations.²⁹

Whether a message inscribes new subjective needs or (more weakly) merely articulates people's needs (wherever these might originate), I suggest that messages can be taken as primary in another sense. The content and shape of successful charismatic messages are not simple, naked reflections of existing needs. The popularity of a particular message, in addition to how well its content addresses subjective desires or counter-desires, also depends on what might be called its 'consumability'. Not every message—no matter how aptly this addresses or articulates people's needs—sounds authentic. A prophet's message also has to 'be consonant with assumptions shared by both himself and his audience'. 30

More specifically, messages are produced, circulated and consumed within local orders of discourse in which discursive rules and conditions regulate the formulation, deployment and consumption of serious talk. As Foucault suggests,

in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed according to a certain number of procedures, whose role is to avert its powers and its dangers, to cope with chance events, to evade its ponderous, awesome materiality.³¹

Some of these discursive procedures govern the production of a message, regulating its shape, so that it appears to have a consumable content. Others control the exchange of a message, including its narration or performance. And others regulate a message's conversational consumption—how people are able to listen so to hear it.³²

In sum, a message's popularity—its charismatic value—depends both on the relationship between its content and subjective desire, and on the degree to which it satisfies the requirements of the local discursive order that establishes the conditions of its authenticity or consumability.³³ Any talk that brings into being relations of charismatic power, reflecting or organizing people's desires, must also make sense in terms of existing discourse control procedures if it is to be deployed and consumed within public conversations.³⁴

To ground these assertions, I next describe discourse control procedures and conditions that regulate the production of messages on Tanna. I discuss, in particular, the formulation of popular messages within one of the island's more successful organizations, the John Frum movement.

MESSAGE PRODUCTION ON TANNA

Close to 20 000 people, speaking five related Austronesian languages, live on Tanna—an island twenty-five miles long and approximately fifteen miles wide. People reside in scattered villages circled around central kava-drinking grounds. Every evening, men meet here to prepare and drink kava (an infusion of the root of *Piper methysticum*). A number of regional politicoreligious organizations conjoin these local groups of co-residents and fellow-kava drinkers from across the island. These include the John Frum movement; several Christian churches; local supporters of national political parties; and other politically syncretic groups such as the Four Corners movement, those people who claim strict adherence to traditional custom, and the ideological supporters of Prince Philip of Great Britain.

Power, at the supralocal level, depends on relations of exchange and, to this extent, island leaders resemble the generic Melanesian big-man. ⁴² The critical exchange sphere here, however, is the informational rather than that of the circulation of material goods or marriageable women. ⁴³ The powerful deploy messages more than they do pigs or women. Important island power relations are thus charismatic (according to the definition above): they are based in a successful deployment of messages within what might be called the local 'information market'.

The island's discursive order is basically conversational. Although some people read and write, the materiality of most messages circulating within Tanna's information market is phonetic, not literate. This has several important consequences. First, message exchange must occur face-to-face. A speaker deploys his text interactionally. Second, memory is the principal storage bank of messages. Message content, which is anchored only to interested, subjective memory, may therefore more easily drift about and mutate.

These initial discursive conditions follow from the fundamental oral materiality of island messages. Beyond this, Tanna's discursive order establishes further, internal conditions that govern the production of messages. These determine a message's degree of authenticity and consumability. Message production everywhere is a cultural practice. To add a message 'to a pre-existing set of statements is to perform a complicated and costly gesture, which involves conditions (and not only a situation, a context and motives) and rules (not [only] the logical and linguistic rules of construction)'. 44

On Tanna, the main discursive rule is a requirement that serious messages must have an obvious authoritative source. To produce a message, a speaker must be able to cite some implicit or explicit authority. Orders of discourse elsewhere may permit or require messages to be 'authored' rather than 'authorized', as are Tannese messages by ancestors or phantoms such as John Frum. Foucault counts 'the author' to be a device of certain discursive formations that limits irruptions into discourse of novel, perhaps wayward and

unsettling talk. 'The author principle limits this same chance element through the action of an *identity* whose form is that of *individuality* and the Γ . 45

In orders of discourse that recognize authors, message production is in part controlled by organizing old and new talk according to the individuals who created the message. Weber, in this regard, describes one type of charismatic discourse that expects message formation to occur according to a leader's 'will'. Here, a leader himself may author the message—be this non-verbal sign or prophetic text—that feeds his charisma.

On Tanna, however, a message must appear formally to be revealed wisdom from some recognized and acknowledged source. Discursive principles demand that messages be inspired rather than personally authored. The style of island messages is thus not one that deliberately attempts to manifest a creative, individual voice. A non-authoritative message is more difficult to add to a series of pre-existing statements. A prophet, therefore, does not account for his message in terms of some flash of mental creativity, his fertile imagination, genius, talent, brilliance, ability, gift, brains, mind, reason, intuition, insight, or any of the other tropic figures used to talk about knowledge production within other orders of discourse. Productive self-citation of one's own will, nature, or intellect on Tanna is discursively made improbable.

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Instead, supernatural prolocutors and other conversationally external sources authenticate a message as serious and consumable. If these authorities are somewhat removed from the immediacy of everyday life (such as deceased forefathers or off-island knowledge brokers) so much the better. This distance generally enhances their authority. An island speaker produces a statement, or message, by serving as its messenger, advocate, mouthpiece, or prophet rather than as its maker. This obliges message formulators to acquire and manage knowledge sources they publicize by citation. Only those people who can claim and demonstrate a communicative relationship with an authoritative source are competent, discursively, to produce authentic messages. To this extent, this discursive condition is more restrictive than an author-principle that permits people, in other orders of discourse, to authorize their own messages by citing personal will or creativity.

There is one local discursive condition that, to a degree, does regulate message production on Tanna. In the main, this condition organizes the repetition of already formulated messages. A procedural 'copyright' disqualifies some people from publicly repeating certain messages. Topyright protects a person's exclusive claims to repeat existing messages, or to formulate new ones that might extend the knowledge in question. On Tanna, copyright governs the public repetition of various sorts of messages including myths and stories about local ancestors and culture heroes; magical and medical recipes; and geographical knowledge of the names associated with a land plot, the location of its boundaries, and the history of its tenure.

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Copyright works best with messages somehow tied to a locality. It restricts public revelation of the magical or medical knowledge owned by the men who live, or once lived, at a particular kava-drinking ground. It regulates public performance of songs produced or commissioned by people living at different kava-drinking grounds. Others must ask permission to sing a song, for example, that belongs to a neighbouring kava-drinking group. Copyright also restricts public narration of myths or local histories which relate events of the past. Rock formations and other localized geological features mark the sites of these events. Those people not associated with a particular local group lack the right of public repetition of its copyrighted histories and myths. Instead, people from the locality concerned have vested rights of knowledge repetition, narration and performance.

This copyright procedure, in effect, brings into existence a number of 'geographical oeuvres' on Tanna—the organization of messages and knowledge according to place rather than according to the identity of an author, or a 'school' of authors. Copyright, however, does not serve well to restrict the production and repetition of other sorts of valuable messages. As discussed below, this absence of controls on serious message production is the primary discursive condition that makes charisma the dominant form of authority in

Melanesia.

Given the discursive rule that messages with highest exchange value must be inspired, it follows that control of the means of inspiration (rather than control of the means of creativity) is politically charged. 48 Islanders recognize at least five major means of inspiration. First, they dream. A person may contact authoritative voices (ancestors, principally) in dreams and thereby receive an authorized message he can deploy within the island's conversational field.49 Secondly, men get drunk on kava. While under the usually mild narcotic influence of this drug, drinkers state that they occasionally receive ancestral inspiration. Important men are buried around the circumferences of kava-drinking clearings so drinkers are surrounded, literally, by their ancestors. Third, those wishing to be inspired may follow a variety of ritual procedures that instigate communicative relations with ancestors or other spiritual beings. To receive a new song (song-writing is an inspirational rather than a creative process), for example, men retire to particular places in the forest they know ancestors or local spirits to infest, sacrifice a white cock, drink a particular variety of kava, and settle back to await a choral message.

Two additional means of inspiration govern the acquisition of messages from external, non-ancestral authorities. These means are travel and reading. Both give access to sources outside the insular information market. In a conversational order of discourse, where message exchange must occur face to-face, travel permits access to new sources of information. Returning travellers

can deploy messages they import from external information marketplaces. The word -sua, which means 'travel', also connotes 'be wise'. In the 19th century, foreign knowledge brokers began to import a number of Christian messages and also set about teaching people to read in order that they might be able to access these texts. From this beginning, reading has become, for some message producers, a further device to acquire valuable knowledge from citable authoritative sources.

Travel and reading, like all other means of inspiration, are 'dangerous', in Foucault's sense of the word. They are dangerous in that they authenticate access to new sources of potentially powerful talk that might challenge those currently endowed with charismatic authority. The deployment of new messages within island conversations may threaten existing relations of knowledge exchange and ruling charismatic powers. The powerfully wise, therefore, attempt to monopolize the various inspirational means. People also attempt to keep secret their ritual inspiration procedures, only putting these to work in private. Reading and travel, similarly, have long been politically strategic activities on the island.

In addition, personal identities of sex and age differentially qualify people to produce messages. Children and women are disqualified from operating most of the means of inspiration. Only adult, married men legitimately may drink kava and thus be subject to drunken inspiration. Men also have better rights and opportunities to read and to travel, and have better access to the locally recognized ritual procedures for contacting the supernatural. Anyone, however, may dream and women occasionally receive important messages from ancestors or other spirits in their sleep.⁵¹

Although women may produce serious and valuable talk, message deployment remains for them a problem. In oral modes of discourse, message circulation frequently requires some degree of personal mobility. Men who enjoy greater rights to travel, therefore, typically appropriate and deploy female-produced messages for their own ends. In this case, female dreamers or mediums provide the talk that empowers their more mobile husbands or brothers. Worsley, along these lines, notes this 'division of leadership between an inspired prophet [sometimes female] and the political leader'. ⁵²

The wise, on Tanna, whatever the source of their messages, have always failed in the end to control the production and circulation of new inspirational messages. They fail to prevent rival prophets from usurping popular authorities. New messages invade the island's information market to challenge, and sometimes overturn existing relations of charismatic domination. New charisma silences old. A brief sketch of one charismatic organization on the island illustrates the discursive procedures, and ultimate embarrassments, of inspirational vis-à-vis creative knowledge production.

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THE CHARISMATIC JOHN FRUM

A considerable literature exists on the John Frum 'cargo cult' cum political movement that first came to the attention of colonial powers in the early 1940s. ⁵³ In this paper, I am concerned only with the production of John Frum talk in the context of Tanna's discursive order—the rules and procedures that underlie the production of serious island messages.

John Frum is a spiritual newsman who links Tanna with the outside world, particularly America. As such, he is one of the conundrums that causes Wilson some discomfort in applying the term charisma to Melanesia: a prophet who does not now exist and probably never did. ⁵⁴ His island spokesmen, however, continue to circulate John Frum messages. John Frum's essential role, given the dictates of the island's discursive order, is to authorize messages, not to author them. The absent prophet is perfectly plausible in such discursive orders, insofar as he remains a known, citable authority for the messages that people produce and deploy.

John Frum spoke first to villagers near Green Point on Tanna's west coast. A shadowy figure (a masquerade?) appeared in the night and delivered a number of interpretive and prescriptive messages about island traditions and about appropriate relations with European missionaries and colonial administrators. Whether or not adroit intellectual entrepreneurs conjured up this drama and personated John Frum to serve their particular ends, John Frum has since come to take his place among an assemblage of didactic ancestors, culture heroes and other message authorities in island political discourse.

Fairly soon after his successful performance in the West, several men from Sulphur Bay on the island's east central coast began, gradually, to appropriate the figure of John Frum and to control the production of his messages. They did this initially by contriving for him several sons who they cited as their own spiritual authorities. They eventually claimed John Frum himself and soon surpassed the original Green Point prophets in the production of popular messages.

The joint British and French colonial government at the time was much concerned to repress the dilating circulation of this talk. To silence John Frum's spokesmen, it removed them from the island's field of conversation, exiling them to prisons and locales elsewhere in the archipelago. The talk went underground until leading spokesmen returned home from a final sentence of exile in 1957. Today, John Frum maintains his authority on the island, although only his various messengers ordinarily claim to see him and hear him. During the 1970s, the movement of eastern Tanna consolidated its political power and its leaders were elected both to the island's Local Government Council and to the Vanuatu National Parliament.

Throughout the past four decades, the content of John Frum's message, as taken up by various spokesmen, has drifted and been transformed. It began as

exhortations to good, cooperative behaviour with the government and mission; it then stressed cultural revitalization and a return to customary truths; then predicted eschatological change and an exodus of the European colonials; then the arrival of American military forces and material goods; and has latterly absorbed Western discourses of modernization and economic development. John Frum's spokesmen over the years have produced numerous, often contradictory messages with variable popularity in the local information market.

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Three examples of recent John Frum messages follow. Some John Frum talk occasionally penetrates information circuits far beyond the island's shores, as Tanna is a popular port of call for tourism writers and freelance journalists. Bits and pieces of island messages in this manner find their way into the world press. An account printed in the Boston Globe reports that John Frum spokesman Isaac Won of Sulphur Bay now

dreams of the good old days, when the men of his island could paint 'U.S.A.' on their bare chests and backs and march, with bamboo poles for rifles, until they could almost see John Frum. Those were great times, he says. The men would drink the intoxicating juice of the kava root and raise the American flag in the field between the village huts and sing out strong for paradise. The government does not allow the marching anymore, says the chief ruefully, or the flag-raising either. But never mind. 'The promised land is still coming', says Chief Won. 'America will bring it. John Frum said so' . . . 'When the Americans come again to this place, John Frum will come too', says the Chief. 'John said our brothers are in America. They will come and help us. They are our friends'. ⁵⁷

A second account, in the *New York Times*, presents the message of Naiva, a leader of people of southwest Tanna for whom both John Frum and Prince Philip count as authorities:

'We must live by our customs', Naiva, a local chief, said . . . Unless they obey their customs, he said, John Frum and Prince Philip may not return to Tanna. And that would mean the disintegration of a religion, the collapse of the local cargo cult . . . John Frum, who appears in dreams or visions to comment periodically on contentious issues, is now cited as authority against a thatched grass disco erected in a clearing in the jungle. ⁵⁸

A third message, widespread and fairly popular on Tanna during July 1987, also refers to the American flags mentioned by Isaac above. Once raised daily in Sulphur Bay, these flags were confiscated by the national police in 1981. The message, summarized, states:

Four Americans arrived at night by submarine, lying off Sulphur Bay [sometime in June, 1987]. They asked after the missing American flags and warned people not to lose these. Leaders confessed that the police had taken the two flags but hinted that they are holding others secretly in reserve. The Americans professed pleasure and spoke darkly of important things to happen soon.

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Many similar deployed island messages are quickly forgotten and are not added to the existing corpus of John Frum knowledge. Some, however, have realized spectacular popularity. Messages, such as the above, about the coming of the Americans, about the importance of custom, and about submarines and flags have circulated for decades about Tanna's information market. Their exchange has formed the basis for relations of charismatic authority within organized groups of message consumers active both in the local and national political arenas.

Subjective desires, interests and needs, in part, determine which messages manage to circulate within this market—stored in memory so that they can be repeated, albeit in sometimes different form—and which messages drop out of the conversation. The broader political context of the middle of 1987, for example, was one in which island factions and parties were manoeuvring for position before national elections scheduled to take place in November of that year. Similar messages that I recorded in 1982, 1983 and 1985 were less popular, at least measured by the numbers of people who then attended the weekly John Frum dances at Sulphur Bay. In 1987, however, messages of submarining Americans acquired increased exchange value in this election year. Many people who had not danced for John Frum since 1981 tuned-up their guitars, practised cult hymns, and began once more to make the Friday night trip to Sulphur Bay.

The *content* of these three messages is: (1) America is yet coming to help the faithful; (2) protect custom by rejecting disco; and (3) things will happen soon, the flags have returned. Whatever the details of this content, and the current constitution of needs and desires on the island, a message's consumability is also informed by the local, discursive conditions of inspiration and copyright. Note that the formulators of all three messages above present their statements as authorized by John Frum, Prince Philip, or submarining Americans, and

not as authored, personally created productions.

Prophets may attempt to invoke copyright restrictions to assert a claim to what they say and to their sources. This is more difficult to accomplish, however, with message authorities such as John Frum, Prince Philip, or submariners who are less localized than traditional neighbourhood kava-clearing ancestors, or regional culture heroes. Those Green Point spokesmen who in the late 1930s first reported John Frum's initial messages failed to protect the exclusivity of their source. Competing spokesmen from the east coast seized their authority and now cite John Frum too for the messages they produce—although their Green Point rivals continue to deny the authority of these messages. John Frum, in this regard, is the object of an auspicious competition. Spokesmen in different corners of the island's information market produce sometimes contradictory messages they assign to his authority.

Message producers, furthermore, to ensure the exchange value of what they

say, need to demonstrate their access to one of the known means of inspiration. Thus, they let it be known that they control specific means of access to John Frum, Prince Philip, or other acknowledged authorities. In addition to submarines, means of inspiration include datura flower telephones by which leaders speak with John Frum, and special houses, built in movement headquarters, where John Frum comes to sleep. In the past, prophets have also cleared airfields and operated home-made telegraph systems, stringing metaphoric wires from America to Tanna along which knowledge purportedly flows. Parallel devices for the transmission of messages from external authoritative sources to island spokesmen are commonplace in the histories of Melanesian movements.59

The charismatic are concerned to monopolize as far as possible these means of inspiration. This concern, for example, was apparent in a small dispute between an Australian overseas volunteer and John Frum spokesmen on Tanna. The volunteer let it be known that he had applied for funds with which he proposed to transport a young movement supporter to America. This young man's encounter with the reality of the United States, magnificent and sordid, would perhaps help drain John Frum messages of their characteristic Americophilia. Older John Frum leaders, however, angered at this threat to their own control of the American voice, refused to sanction this tour and, in fact, had organization guards rough up the volunteer to warn him not to meddle in local affairs.

Control of the known means for the formulation of charismatic messages was at stake here. Unsanctioned travel to the authoritative source would have short-circuited ruling leaders' asserted management of the Tanna-America connection. Although the powerful may for a time prevent their younger rivals from travelling, in the end they are unable to monopolize the other means of message production (dreaming, drunkenness, ritual procedures, reading) that are much less amenable to control.

The popularity of island messages, and thus charismatic authority itself, depend both on the match of message content with subjective desire, and on the extent to which a message sounds authentic given the conditions and control procedures of a particular discursive order. Not just any message—no matter how much people might desire to hear-realizes conversational exchange value. On Tanna, message authenticity requires that speakers cite an inspiring authority and publicly demonstrate their access to one of the acknowledged means of inspiration.

CHARISMATIC REVOLUTION?

The conditions of discourse in some societies allow individuals to maintain their control of powerful messages. People look for the author or the prophet behind the message. Here, charisma is personalized in the classic Weberian sense. On Tanna and throughout much of Melanesia, on the other hand, existing discursive conditions limit the degree to which individuals can monopolize a message. With no discursive desire to attach powerful messages to specific individuals, island charisma is depersonalized.

Tanna's means of message production are difficult to monopolize. Truthful sounding messages on the island require authorities, not authors—and access to those authorities is open. Prophets cannot prevent charismatic competitors from tapping into their inspiring sources. Control of the message eventually slips away. Although copyright restrictions may regulate to some degree the public repetition of some messages, and although the powerful may attempt to monopolize particular means of inspiration, the appearance of new prophets who cite new authorities is hardly constrained. The charismatically powerful may impugn the authority of some particular message source, but find it more difficult to question inspiration itself as a mode of knowing the truth, and of authenticating messages, insofar as inspiration is the foundation of their own charismatic powers.

In the West, a prophet's associations with his message can be transferred and, as Weber noted, his charisma routinized. Detached from a founding leader, it can be transformed into 'hereditary', 'priestly', or 'official' charisma. A succeeding leader acquires the right, now vested in his lineage or office, to monopolize the further production of authentic messages. The principle that the production of further messages might be restricted to a prophet's heirs or otherwise monopolized—that charisma can, in fact, be transferred from person to person—undergirds those systems of domination that emerge from a successful institutionalization of charismatic authority.

The discursive condition that certain people may possess greater personal rights to formulate powerful messages also supports systems of domination based on traditional or bureaucratic authority. A traditional chief's 'commands', for example, are legitimized in part by his 'free personal decision, in that tradition leaves a certain sphere open for this'. 61 Messages (knowledge) are similarly monopolized in bureaucratic organizations: 'bureaucratic administration means fundamentally the exercise of control on the basis of knowledge'. 62

It is not surprising to find 'authors' where charisma is routinizable or where authority is traditional or bureaucratic in character. If messages are tied, discursively, as creative products to an author, then individuals can acquire important personal interests in politically valuable bodies of talk. These individuals may be prophet authors, chiefly authors, or even bureaucratic authors—anyone, in fact, who has recognized best rights to his own talk. Whenever a message is deployed, local discursive conditions automatically call to mind an originating author. The powerful may thereby more easily monopolize the right to produce additional messages of a particular genre, as

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tr el cı C well as the right to interpret those messages already produced. Moreover, an author's copyright to his message can be transferred to his heirs, whether these are his sons, official replacements, or priestly disciples.

On Tanna as in much of Melanesia, however, authentic messages are not discursively linked with originating authors. Charismatic relations based on message exchange, therefore, are more fragile and labile. Unlike authorial creativity, the means of inspiration are not privatizable. Charismatic rivals readily cite another prophet's authorities, stealing his thunder. They also easily revise existing messages in that personal claims to talk are enfeebled. Conversely, our own order of discourse, evoking the author to organize messages, works to prevent these threats to ruling charisma by decreeing for us the sins of plagiarism and heresy.

In Melanesia, discursive rules and conditions that might permit individuals to monopolize the means of message production either do not exist, or exist in attenuated form. The difficulties on Tanna of extending the local copyright procedure to regulate the production and repetition of inspirational messages have been noted above. Melanesian messages are depersonalized in a double sense: discursively, they emanate from external authorities; and it is difficult for individuals to establish exclusive, personal rights to the means of message production. Messages cannot be copyrighted; authorities cannot be monopolized (everyone can dream). As such, charisma in Melanesia is routine, but

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The degree to which messages and inspiring sources are controllable, and charisma tied to the person, determines charisma's revolutionary force. Weber suggested that charisma brings about social transformation: 'The genuine prophet, like the genuine military leader and every true leader in this sense, preaches, creates, or demands new obligations'; and 'within the sphere of its claims, charismatic authority repudiates the past, and is in this sense a specifically revolutionary force'. 63 Charismatic movements undermine existing systems of domination based on traditional authority. As a movement works itself out, if traditionally based authority is re-established it is in different hands—perhaps in those of a prophet's successors if a movement has successfully institutionalized itself. Along these lines, charisma has been defined to be the revolutionary energy that serves to transform backwards, traditional societies towards the modern, bureaucratic norm.64

In Melanesian societies, however, charisma typically fails to become routinized or, more singularly, to clear the way for the development of traditional or bureaucratic forms of authority, as it has been argued to do elsewhere. Neither much traditional nor rational-bureaucratic authority customarily existed. 65 On these islands, power remains typically charismatic. Charisma is not an extraordinary event—a lightening flash that disturbs the normal structures of traditional or bureaucratic domination. Nor does charisma commonly weaken or settle down over time, routinized into more institutionalized inequalities. ⁶⁶ Rather, existing charismatic truths are more often silenced, and political relations of message exchange snapped, by the circulation of some new charismatic message.

If charisma is not a temporary, aberrant form of power, and if it does not regularly evolve into more rational forms of authority, how revolutionary is it in the end? It is true that the exchange of a novel message may bring into being new relations of domination between message producers and message consumers. But, in another sense, as long as the island's order of discourse—including its conditions and rules of message production—remains unchanged, one charismatically organized regime on Tanna merely replaces another.

It is possible to interpret the (temporary) triumph of Christian discourses on Tanna as this sort of charismatic reformation rather than charismatic revolution. In the early years of this century, a set of personal duties based on the newly realized popularity of Christian messages supplanted existing relations of domination founded on the exchange of more customary truths. John Frum messages, in turn, subsequently replaced Christian truths and overturned Christian obligations and power structures in the 1940s. Even though subjective desire may shift and be reconstituted, and message content be radically altered, the underlying inspirational conditions of message production on the island have remained the same.

Serious change, of the revolutionary sort, in the character of Melanesian legitimate authority would require the consolidation of traditional or bureaucratic bases of domination from which the powerful could stifle the production, deployment and consumption of dangerous messages—putting an end to charisma once and for all.⁶⁷ This would follow some transformation in the island's order of discourse such that, for example, a message's consumability or authenticity comes to require people to cite personal creativity instead of inspiring authorities. It would, discursively, then be possible to author messages personally and thus more easily control, by copyright or otherwise, the means of message production.

This would entail what Foucault calls a historical discontinuity—the emergence of some novel discursive order—in which 'statements are governed by new rules of formation'. Here at last, the creative author, the chief, the bureaucrat, or the priest would supplant and silence the inspired prophet.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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NOTES

- F. Myers & D. Brenneis, 'Introduction: Language and Politics in the Pacific', in D. Brenneis & F. Myers (eds), Dangerous Words: Language and Politics in the Pacific, New York, New York University Press 1984, p. 20.
- It is perhaps especially perverse to import into Melanesia a Greek term, via Sohm 2 and Weber, when there is a potential alternative, mana, that is native to the region. Mana, like charisma, has become part of sociology's metalanguage. See R. M. Keesing, 'Rethinking Mana', Journal of Anthropological Research 40 (1984), pp. 137-156. The term mana, however, does not extend throughout Melanesia-although the underlying concept probably does (see J. MacClancy, 'Mana: An Anthropological Metaphor for Island Melanesia', Oceania 57 (1986), pp. 142-153). This concept is something like 'be potent, efficacious, successful or true' (Keesing, p. 140). All of this might be considered part of a message. Mana, however, often serves to legitimate systems of hierarchy, such as Polynesian chiefdoms or Melanesian secret societies. Here, mana, is successfully monopolized, routinized and institutionalized. Chiefs or secret society potentates possess most of it. As a regional universal category, mana faces the same problem as does the more general 'charisma'. The term must be reanalyzed, according to the case, into non-routinizable mana and routinizable mana.
- M. Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language, New 3 York, Harper & Row 1972.
- Ibid., p. 234. 4
- P. Worsley, The Trumpet Shall Sound: A Study of 'Cargo' Cults in Melanesia, 2nd edn, New York, Schocken Books 1968, p. liii. K. Ratnam, similarly bloodyminded, announced that charisma 'has not in any substantial way improved our understanding of the problems it touches on' ('Charisma and Political Leadership', Political Studies 12 (1964), pp. 341-354). And Fabian, a Robespierre, proclaims the demise of charisma and extols the development of 'post-Weberian' theory. (J. Fabian, 'The Anthropology of Religious Movements: From Explanation to Interpretation', Social Research 46 (1979), pp. 4-35).
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- Accordingly, an assortment of influential characters are thereby all deemed to possess charisma: prophets, berserkers, leaders of the hunt, war heroes, shaman 7 and even popular intellectuals, viz. Margaret Mead (Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, New York, Oxford University Press 1947, p.
- R. Wagner, 'The Talk of Koriki: A Daribi Contact Cult', Social Research 46 8
- See C. Camic, 'Charisma: Its Varieties, Preconditions, and Consequences', 9
- Weber, pp. 358-359. At first glance, this definition appears suspiciously psychological—the founding of authority upon a leader's extraordinary personality. 10 Fixating upon leaders, Worsley warns, is 'a non-sociological view of organized behaviour, since it implicitly assumes that the leader-follower relationship is not reflexive' (Worsley, p. xviii). Worsley argues that charismatic power, 'if it is to become the basis of collective social action, needs to be perceived, invested with

meaning, and acted upon by significant others' (ibid., p. xi). Charisma is rooted in the particulars of communicative exchange relations, and not in supposed supernaturally bestowed personal qualities. If God is derivative of social structures, then so too must be His gifts. Fabian, pace Worsley, is more willing to remark Weber's explicit sociological grounding of charisma, as well as the psychological (Fabian, p. 18). He notes that Weber did argue that 'it is recognition on the part of those subject to authority which is decisive for the validity of charisma' (Weber, p. 359).

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C. Geertz, 'Centers, Kings, and Charisma: Reflections on the Symbolics of Power', in J. Ben-David & T. Clark (eds), Culture and Its Creators: Essays in 11 Honor of Edward Shils, Chicago, University of Chicago Press 1977, pp. 151-171.

Some, of course, may assume a radical actor's viewpoint and accept charisma as 12 a real force or power. See, for example, I. Lewis, Religion in Context: Cults and Charisma, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1986. Lewis defines 'positive charisma' as legitimate mystical power, and 'negative charisma' as malign force.

This psychologizing is often decried—e.g. 'Pop sociology scavenges on ideas that 13 are dead or dying' (Fabian, p. 3).

B. Wilson, The Noble Savages: The Primitive Origins of Charisma, Berkeley, 14 University of California Press 1975, p. 20.

Ibid., p. 85. Wilson correlates absent leaders in Melanesian movements with 15 what he deems to be underdeveloped individuality in a region with a simple division of labour. Moreover, in societies where leaders are frequently big-men rather than chiefs, 'extraordinary social power was not claimed by reference to the divine, perhaps because power differentials between individuals were not sufficiently great to warrant appeal to exceptional sources' (ibid., p. 16).

Worsley, p. xiii. 16 17 Ibid., p. xiii.

Whereas Worsley presumes a more-or-less Marxian list of needs, others have 18 drawn upon Freud. Camic defines four sorts of charisma based upon how these address four types of presumably universal psychological needs. When the Ego is passive with respect to certain dependency, or ego-ideal, or superego, or id needs, those who gratify the ungratified needs in question are considered to be special' (Camic, p. 13). Extraordinary dependency needs induce individuals to transfer omnipotence to external objects, gods, or other individuals (e.g. magicians, prophets, war-lords, certain political figures); extraordinary ego-ideal needs lead people to find excellence and superior abilities in others; extraordinary superego needs evoke a desire for the sacred; and extraordinary id needs attract people to the uncanny (ibid., pp. 14-17).

'Message' must be interpreted broadly, given the diversity among charismatic 19 figures that Weber allows. Charismatic messages may range from miscellaneous

'signs and proof' to full-blown prophetic revelations (Weber, p. 359).

20 Worsley, p. xiv. 'And it cannot be any message: it must, firstly, speak to unsatisfied wants of the 21 hearers, and, secondly, offer them some promise of eventual fulfillment' (ibid., p. xiv).

See C. Belshaw, 'The Significance of the Modern Cults in Melanesian Develop-22 ment', The Australian Outlook 4 (1950), pp. 116-125.

See K. Burridge, Mambu, New York, Harper & Row 1960. 23

See E. Ogan, Business and Cargo: Socio-Economic Change Among the Nasioi of 24 Bougainville, New Guinea Research Bulletin no. 44, Canberra, Australian

National University 1972.

See J. Guiart, 'Forerunners of Melanesian Nationalism', Oceania 22 (1951), pp. 25 81-90; R. Keesing, 'Politico-Religious Movements and Anti-colonialism on Malaita: Maasina Rule in Historical Perspective', Oceania 48 (1978), pp. 241-261; 49 (1979), pp. 46-73.

R. Brunton, 'Cargo Cults and Systems of Exchange in Melanesia', Mankind 8 26

(1971), pp. 115-128.

I am equating, here, desire, need, and interests. For a post-structuralist account-27 ing of desire, see G. Deleuze & F. Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press 1983.

M. Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, New York, Vintage Books 28

1980, p. 96.

See Worsley, pp. xiii-xiv. 29

Ibid., p. xvii. 30

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Foucault 1972, p. 216. 31

I draw upon economic terminology for convenience only to describe meta-32 phorically linguistic 'production', 'exchange', and 'consumption'. No underlying homology between economics and linguistics is implied. Alternatively, I use message formulation (but not creation) for production; circulation or deployment for exchange; popularity or authenticity for exchange value; and hearing or reception for consumption. Readers may substitute these or other metaphors throughout if they so prefer.

Bakhtin's analysis of authoritative and persuasive discourses in the novel parallels this approach to charisma (M. Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, 33

Austin, University of Texas Press 1981).

Geertz (1977) echoes a concern with charismatic message as primary in his analysis of the symbolic forms by which the dominant justify their power. 34

L. Lindstrom, 'Personal Names and Social Reproduction on Tanna', Journal of 35 the Polynesian Society 94 (1985), pp. 27-44.

See L. Lindstrom, 'Spitting on Tanna', Oceania 50 (1980), pp. 228-234.

See J. Guiart, Un siècle et demi de contacts culturels à Tanna, Paris, Musée de 36 l'Homme 1956; L. Lindstrom, 'Cult and Culture: American Dreams in Vanuatu', 37 Pacific Studies 4 (1981), pp. 101-123.

See L. Lindstrom, 'Cultural Politics: National Concerns in Bush Arenas on Tanna (Vanuatu)', in G. Cronin (ed.), The Politics of Evolving Cultures in the 38 Pacific Islands, Laie, HI, Institute for Polynesian Studies 1982, pp. 232-233.

See J. Guiart, 'Le mouvement "four corner" à Tanna (1974)', Journal de la

Société des Oceanistes 46 (1975), pp. 107-111.

See L. Lindstrom, 'Leftamap Kastom: The Political History of Tradition on Tanna (Vanuatu)', Mankind 13 (1982), pp. 316-329. 40 See A. Frater, 'Pandemonium Beneath the Palms in the Isles of Bali Hai', London 41

See M. Sahlins, 'Poor Man, Rich Man, Big-Man, Chief: Political Types in Polynesia and Melanesia', Comparative Studies in Society and History 5 (1963), pp. 42 See L. Lindstrom, 'Doctor, Lawyer, Wise Man, Priest: Big-Men and Knowledge

in Melanesia', Man 13 (1984), pp. 291-309. 43

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Ibid., p. 222; see also M. Foucault, 'What is an Author?', in J. Harari (ed.), Textual Strategies: Perspectives in Post-Structuralist Criticism, Ithaca, Cornell 45

University Press 1979, pp. 141-160.

46 Weber, p. 361; see Worsley, p. xv.

47 See M. Young, Magicians of Manumanua: Living Myth in Kalauna, Berkeley: University of California Press 1983, p. 265.

48 See P. Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1977, pp. 187-188.

For analysis of Melanesian dreaming, see M. Stephen, 'Dreams of Change: The Innovative Role of Altered States of Consciousness in Traditional Melanesian Religion', Oceania 50 (1979), pp. 3–22; and '"Dreaming is Another Power!": The Social Significance of Dreams Among the Mekeo of Papua New Guinea', Oceania 53 (1982), pp. 106–122.

50 Foucault 1972, p. 216.

51 For an early account of a female medium, see A. Watt, Twenty-Five Years Mission Life on Tanna, J. Paisley & R. Parlane 1896, pp. 214-215.

52 Worsley, p. 271.

- 53 For example, see Guiart (1956); also, E. Rice, John Frum He Come: A Polemical Work About a Black Tragedy, New York, Doubleday 1974.
- 54 Wilson, pp. 86–89.55 Guiart 1956, p. 152.

56 Ibid., p. 159.

- 57 T. Ashbrook, 'Islanders Await American Dream', The Boston Globe (October 3, 1986), p. 2.
- N. Kristof, 'Space Age Succeeds Stone Age on Pacific Isle', New York Times (July 19, 1987), pp. 1, 6.

59 See Worsley, pp. 55, 200.

60 Weber, pp. 363-373. Shils extrapolates from this to claim that any stable system of domination has charismatic properties (E. Shils, 'Charisma, Order, and Status', American Sociological Review 30 (1965), pp. 199-213). In this view, charisma becomes mere 'legitimacy, as that concept is usually defined' (J. Bensman & M. Givant, 'Charisma and Modernity: The Use and Abuse of a Concept', in R. Glassman & W. Swatos, Jr (eds), Charisma, History and Social Structure, New York, Greenwood Press 1986, pp. 27-56).

61 Weber, p. 341. 62 Ibid., p. 339.

Ibid., p. 339.
 Ibid., pp. 361-362. See also S. Tambiah, The Buddhist Saints of the Forest and the Cult of Amulets: A Study in Charisma, Hagiography, Sectarianism, and Millennial Buddhism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1984, pp. 329-332.

64 See H. Gerth & C. Mills, 'Bureaucracy and Charisma: A Philosophy of History', in J. Ben-David & T. Clark (eds), Culture and Its Creators: Essays in Honor of

Edward Shils, Chicago, University of Chicago Press 1986, pp. 11-16.

At the community level, that is. Men commonly enjoyed some amount of traditional authority over women as did adults over children. Traditional authority existed also in those societies which were more 'chiefly' and less 'bigmanly' in character (see B. Douglas, 'Rank, Power, Authority: A Reassessment of Traditional Leadership in South Pacific Societies', Journal of Pacific History 14 (1979), pp. 2-27.

66 Wagner, p. 163.

Weber once implied that even in radically disenchanted bureaucratic/legalistic orders, charismatic prophets might appear to at least rattle the bars of the iron cage of materialistic rationality (M. Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of

Capitalism, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons 1958, p. 182); see also M. Kimmel & R. Tavakol, 'Against Satan: Charisma and Tradition in Iran', in R. Glassman & W. Swatos, Jr (eds), *Charisma, History, and Social Structure*, New York, Greenwood Press 1986, pp. 101–112. Foucault 1972, p. 173.

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BOOK REVIEW

Martin E. Marty. Modern American Religion Vol. 1: The Irony of It All, 1893–1919. Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1986, xi + 386 pp.

With this book Professor Marty announces a multi-volume of history 20th-century American religion, the last of which presumably will be published round about the second millenium after a date (to be announced) which will seem important at that time. To promise three further volumes on a period not yet over may be to tempt fate, but Marty has such excellent reasons for telling us why 1893 began the century that it will be worth hearing from him as to the whys and wherefores of the closing date. This fine study adds to many many other reasons why we should all wish

Martin Marty long life and good health.

To advance an ironic theme requires a clear sense of outcomes, and this suggests that while Marty's century is not yet over he has decided much about its ultimate direction, even its consummation. No doubt that is true, but much of the irony of this volume is self-contained. The period began with leaders of the dominant (native-born, Anglo-Saxon, protestant) groups seemingly at one in their desire to fit American religion to the coming century (and thus to change it in a 'modern' direction). It ended not so much in failure as in unintended results—personal, denominational, and political—which mocked the modernist promises of 1893. Billy Sunday ('I don't know any more about theology than a jack-rabbit knows about ping-pong, but I'm on my way to glory') was one such result of efforts to make religion—theology, worship, spirituality—conformable to an important part of a new world of science and progress and dynamic change. The fundamentalists (a term nearly coined during this period) substituted inerrancy for change and captured the loyalty of many Americans during the era we have been taught to call 'progressive'.

For some—the modernists—the irony was already there, for instance in a willingness to accept evolution as a conscious progress which scientifically required and established white supremacy in the American south and Teutonic or Anglo-Saxon tutelage for the rest of the world; and could be stopped there. Only a few-the moderns-actually sensed or saw the ironies and (as historians or philosophers or social critics) developed an intellectual and affective vision of religion which might have evaded ironic outcomes had they possessed greater faith or greater numbers. Most of both the moderns and the modernists belonged to social and political elites; they observed events as if from the eye of a storm. Most Americans (ethnics and native born) felt the wind directly and had less reason to think they might shape or control events. They suffered from or reacted to modernity in ways that usually signalled an intent to deny its existence or its power. The wind-swept cocooned themselves in protective casings of ethnic church-hood, adopted self-protection under traditional denominational canopies, or like Billy Sunday constructed new and frighteningly hard carapaces as perfect foils to progress. Progressivism or modernism survived, if sometimes taking new leads from rather odd exemplars like Mary Baker

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400 Book Review

Eddy and Ellen Gould White to minister to the health of modern men and women, or seizing upon the seeming victory of 1918 to relaunch ecumenicism in partnership with John D. Rockefeller and with a proposed annual budget of \$336 million 'of uncollected money'. Rockefeller thought these 'plans . . . wisely and conservatively drawn'.

This sarcasm is not unique and raises the question of other than ironic themes. Some would think tragedy more appropriate for a period that saw much in the way of blasted dreams and early death, particularly for blacks, immigrants, and the native-born rural poor. Marty accepts that irony is not an appropriate tool for judging the aspirations of the powerless, and here and there tragedy intrudes in his analysis, as for instance of the Native Americans' fate at the hands of those who would bring them into the modern world. He is aware, however, that stress on the ironic puts him in a certain school of American historiography which has not always dealt satisfactorily with fundamental conflict, and promises us a changed tone in the next volume. Throughout this one, words like irony and tragedy, modernism and modern, cocoon, canopy, and carapace are used repeatedly and weightily. This reminds one inevitably of the 'Beyond the Fringe' satire on the bad modern sermon ('Life is like a sardine tin') but not ultimately, for Marty gives these words a precision, which moves his argument along with great force and clarity. Once introduced, the reader encounters these words as old friends, and they become terms replete with meaning. This is a book to be read and used, then savoured, by anyone seriously interested in the history or present state of American religion.



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